Indian Judgements

Indian Judgements

Highway Encroachment Removals and High Court Remedies

The Supreme Court of India clarified that its earlier road-safety and encroachment-removal directions dated 13.04.2026 in Suo Moto Writ Petition (Civil) No. 9 of 2025 do not dispense with statutory procedures under the Control of National Highways (Land and Traffic) Act, 2002, or adjudicate individual ownership and demarcation disputes. Relegating the interlocutory applicants to their respective jurisdictional High Courts, the Court extended interim protection against demolition or coercive action on the disputed structures until those proceedings are disposed of.

Background and Procedural History

  • Arising out of highway road-safety concerns following accidents at Phalodi, Rajasthan and elsewhere, the Supreme Court issued interim directions on 13.04.2026 (including directions 4(b), 4(c), and 4(e)) covering surveys, grievance redressal, prohibition/removal of unauthorized structures within the Right of Way (ROW) of National Highways, land-use restrictions, and District Highway Safety Task Forces.
  • Pursuant to those directions, NHAI and other authorities initiated removal/demolition actions and notices, leading multiple applicants (including landowners in Gujarat such as in Valsad and Navsari districts claiming private ownership, disputed demarcation, lack of acquisition/compensation, or non-service of formal notices) to seek clarification and interim protection.
  • During pendency, the Court passed status quo / interim orders on 08.09.2026, 22.09.2026, and 06.10.2026, and NHAI filed responses in several applications.

Key Issue

  • Whether the 13.04.2026 directions authorized NHAI and authorities to remove or demolish disputed structures without statutory compliance or adjudication of individual ownership/demarcation claims, and what forum should adjudicate those individual grievances.

Legal Analysis and Ruling

  • Scope of 13.04.2026 Directions vs. Individual Rights: The 13.04.2026 order addressed systemic road safety and encroachment removal generally; it did not adjudicate whether any specific structure is an encroachment or dispense with statutory requirements. Direction 4(c) expressly requires following the procedure under the Control of National Highways (Land and Traffic) Act, 2002 (CNH Act) and the SOP dated 07.08.2025.
  • Statutory Procedure Under Section 26: Section 26 of the CNH Act (including subsections (2) to (6), and the principles emphasized in Gyan Prakash v. Union of India) provides notice, opportunity for representation, and consideration of cause shown, aligning with natural justice; any powers under subsections (7) and (8) depend on their statutory conditions.
  • Relegation to Jurisdictional High Courts: Factual disputes over ownership, ROW extent, demarcation, revenue records, and land acquisition are best examined by the respective jurisdictional High Courts while keeping the 13.04.2026 directions operative. Existing interim protection continues—and where none was previously granted, demolition, removal, or coercive action under the impugned notices is stayed—until disposal by the High Courts, confined strictly to the subject structures without creating equity or authorizing fresh encroachment.

Disposition

  • The Supreme Court disposed of the specified interlocutory applications granting liberty to approach or pursue remedies before the jurisdictional High Courts, kept remaining interlocutory applications pending, and directed listing of the main matter with connected matters in due course.

2026 INSC 1243

In Re: Phalodi Accident v. National Highways Authority of India & Ors. (with connected Writ Petitions and Interlocutory Applications) (D.O.J. 18.11.2026)

2026 INSC 1243 click here to view full text of judgment

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Highway Encroachment Removals and High Court Remedies

The Supreme Court of India clarified that its earlier road-safety and encroachment-removal directions dated 13.04.2026 in Suo Moto Writ Petition (Civil) No. 9 of 2025 do not dispense with statutory procedures under the Control of National Highways (Land and Traffic) Act, 2002, or adjudicate individual ownership and demarcation disputes. Relegating the interlocutory applicants to their respective jurisdictional High Courts, the Court extended interim protection against demolition or coercive action on the disputed structures until those proceedings are disposed of.

Background and Procedural History

  • Arising out of highway road-safety concerns following accidents at Phalodi, Rajasthan and elsewhere, the Supreme Court issued interim directions on 13.04.2026 (including directions 4(b), 4(c), and 4(e)) covering surveys, grievance redressal, prohibition/removal of unauthorized structures within the Right of Way (ROW) of National Highways, land-use restrictions, and District Highway Safety Task Forces.
  • Pursuant to those directions, NHAI and other authorities initiated removal/demolition actions and notices, leading multiple applicants (including landowners in Gujarat such as in Valsad and Navsari districts claiming private ownership, disputed demarcation, lack of acquisition/compensation, or non-service of formal notices) to seek clarification and interim protection.
  • During pendency, the Court passed status quo / interim orders on 08.09.2026, 22.09.2026, and 06.10.2026, and NHAI filed responses in several applications.

Key Issue

  • Whether the 13.04.2026 directions authorized NHAI and authorities to remove or demolish disputed structures without statutory compliance or adjudication of individual ownership/demarcation claims, and what forum should adjudicate those individual grievances.

Legal Analysis and Ruling

  • Scope of 13.04.2026 Directions vs. Individual Rights: The 13.04.2026 order addressed systemic road safety and encroachment removal generally; it did not adjudicate whether any specific structure is an encroachment or dispense with statutory requirements. Direction 4(c) expressly requires following the procedure under the Control of National Highways (Land and Traffic) Act, 2002 (CNH Act) and the SOP dated 07.08.2025.
  • Statutory Procedure Under Section 26: Section 26 of the CNH Act (including subsections (2) to (6), and the principles emphasized in Gyan Prakash v. Union of India) provides notice, opportunity for representation, and consideration of cause shown, aligning with natural justice; any powers under subsections (7) and (8) depend on their statutory conditions.
  • Relegation to Jurisdictional High Courts: Factual disputes over ownership, ROW extent, demarcation, revenue records, and land acquisition are best examined by the respective jurisdictional High Courts while keeping the 13.04.2026 directions operative. Existing interim protection continues—and where none was previously granted, demolition, removal, or coercive action under the impugned notices is stayed—until disposal by the High Courts, confined strictly to the subject structures without creating equity or authorizing fresh encroachment.

Disposition

  • The Supreme Court disposed of the specified interlocutory applications granting liberty to approach or pursue remedies before the jurisdictional High Courts, kept remaining interlocutory applications pending, and directed listing of the main matter with connected matters in due course.

2026 INSC 1243

In Re: Phalodi Accident v. National Highways Authority of India & Ors. (with connected Writ Petitions and Interlocutory Applications) (D.O.J. 18.11.2026)

2026 INSC 1243 click here to view full text of judgment

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Additional Relief for Delayed Dues After Decades of Litigation

The Supreme Court of India held that while a miscellaneous application in a finally disposed writ petition is not the proper vehicle to seek substantive interest on delayed service dues, the appellant’s claim for interest arose from a distinct subsequent cause of action following prolonged proceedings and was not barred by constructive res judicata or Order II Rule 2 CPC. Taking a compassionate view of the septuagenarian appellant’s decades-long litigation, the Court invoked Article 142 of the Constitution to direct payment of an additional Rs. 5,00,000/- as full and final settlement.

Background and Procedural History

  • The appellant joined the Central Bank of India on 01.03.1969, was suspended on 22.11.1978 over alleged defalcation, and was acquitted in criminal trial on 15.07.1983, with appeals/revisions dismissed by the High Court on 27.05.1991.
  • After the Bank initiated departmental proceedings on 16.05.1990, the appellant filed an earlier writ petition (CWP-8983-1991) on 11.06.1991, which the High Court allowed on 12.10.2007 by quashing inquiry proceedings and granting reinstatement (if not superannuated) and consequential benefits; an intra-court appeal failed on 20.12.2007, and the Bank’s SLP was dismissed on 26.07.2011 (the appellant having retired on 31.03.2009 while a dismissal order passed on 30.03.2009 could not take effect under an interim order).
  • Following contempt proceedings (COCP 2688/2011), the Bank disbursed over Rs. 42,00,000/- (including salary arrears and Provident Fund dues), and the contempt action was closed on 28.10.2013.
  • The appellant then filed a subsequent writ petition (CWP-11438-2015) on 26.05.2015 claiming compound interest on delayed salary arrears, which was dismissed on 11.12.2023 on the ground that interest had not been claimed earlier.
  • On 26.02.2024, he filed a miscellaneous application under Section 151 CPC in the 1991 writ petition seeking 18% compound interest up to 01.12.2011; a Single Judge dismissed it on 21.03.2024 and a Division Bench dismissed LPA 1164 of 2024 on 09.05.2024 on grounds of finality, constructive res judicata, and estoppel. He appealed to the Supreme Court.

Key Issue

  • Whether the appellant could sustain his claim for interest on delayed service dues and whether the High Court properly rejected his subsequent claim and miscellaneous application.

Legal Analysis and Ruling

  • No Bar of Res Judicata or Order II Rule 2 CPC on Subsequent Cause of Action: Distinguishing CIT v. T.P. Kumaran, the Court held that on 11.06.1991 the appellant challenged disciplinary proceedings and sought reinstatement—a claim for interest on delayed payment arising from prolonged litigation up to 2011 was a subsequent cause of action and not barred by constructive res judicata or Order II Rule 2 CPC.
  • Narrow Scope of Miscellaneous Applications: Drawing on precedents including State of U.P. v. Brahma Dutt Sharma, Budhia Swain v. Gopinath Deb, Ram Chandra Singh v. Savitri Devi, A. Ansari v. Indian Airlines Ltd., and Govt. of NCT of Delhi v. K.L. Rathi Steels Ltd., the Court reaffirmed that a miscellaneous application after final disposal is ancillary and cannot seek substantive relief or reopen merits—meaning the appellant should have pursued an intra-court appeal against the 11.12.2023 dismissal rather than a miscellaneous application.
  • Nature of Interest and Article 142 Relief: Citing Alok Shanker Pandey v. Union of India and Jeypore Sugar Company Ltd. v. Sales Tax Officer, the Court noted that interest is a normal accretion on capital rather than a penalty, and that the septuagenarian appellant had endured decades of litigation. Exercising Article 142 powers, the Court ordered an additional Rs. 5,00,000/- within two months as full and final settlement.

Disposition

  • The Supreme Court disposed of the appeal by directing payment of an additional Rs. 5,00,000/- within two months as full and final settlement, and disposed of connected applications.

2026 INSC 1242

Ashok Kumar v. Central Bank of India & Ors. (D.O.J. 18.11.2026)

2026 INSC 1242 click here to view full text of judgment

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Lump Sum Relief for Defective Termination After Consent Order

The Supreme Court of India held that although the appellants’ writ petitions before the Bombay High Court were poorly drafted and failed to properly plead the school’s non-compliance with an earlier High Court consent order, the termination of their services without furnishing final inquiry reports or leading evidence before the School Tribunal violated a judicial order and suffered from serious procedural flaws. Exercising powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, the Court awarded Rs. 10,00,000/- lump sum compensation to each appellant (or legal representatives) as full and final settlement.

Background and Procedural History

  • Appellant Prithviraj S. Singh (senior clerk) and appellant Shivadatta R. Singh (head clerk), along with the in-charge headmaster, faced departmental proceedings for alleged misappropriation of public money and allied charges at a private school run by a trust.
  • After their objection to a committee member was rejected and they abstained, the inquiry proceeded ex parte, resulting in inquiry reports in November 2004 (without inquiry minutes or final inquiry reports being furnished to them) and subsequent termination from service.
  • Challenging the terminations before the School Tribunal, Mumbai under Section 9 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977, the appellants obtained interim orders on 10.03.2005 staying termination and directing resumption with 50% salary.
  • On the school’s writ petitions, a Bombay High Court Single Judge passed a consent order on 17.03.2005 substituting the interim order, granting subsistence allowance pending appeal, and giving the school liberty to apply before the Tribunal to lead evidence to substantiate the charges.
  • The school did not apply to lead evidence, yet on 19.07.2006 the School Tribunal dismissed the appellants’ appeals based on record material and non-participation. In Writ Petition Nos. 2506 and 2507 of 2006, the appellants focused primarily on parity with the in-charge headmaster (whose termination had been converted to compulsory retirement), and a Single Judge dismissed the writ petitions on 17.06.2016. The appellants appealed to the Supreme Court.

Key Issue

  • Whether relief could be granted to the appellants despite unpleaded merits in their writ petitions, given that the school did not lead evidence pursuant to the 17.03.2005 consent order and had not supplied the final inquiry reports prior to termination.

Legal Analysis and Ruling

  • Pleadings and Writ Scope: A litigant must plead necessary averments to support claimed relief, and courts are not obliged to entertain unpleaded grounds. However, an action or order wholly contrary to an express judicial order is a nullity and cannot be accepted.
  • Non-Compliance and Procedural Flaws: Despite liberty under the 17.03.2005 consent order, no evidence was led before the Tribunal to establish the charges, and final inquiry reports were not furnished prior to termination.
  • Equitable Relief Under Article 142: Because the appellants’ writ petitions were ineptly drafted, wider relief was foreclosed at this stage. Invoking Article 142, the Court directed payment of Rs. 10,00,000/- lump sum compensation to each appellant (to the heirs/legal representatives of late Prithviraj S. Singh and to surviving appellant Shivadatta R. Singh or his authorized representative) within three months as full and final settlement, carrying 12% annual interest upon default.

Disposition

  • The Supreme Court disposed of the appeals with the Article 142 compensation direction and disposed of pending applications.

2026 INSC 1241

Prithviraj S. Singh (Deceased) Through LRs. Etc. v. The Secretary, School Education Department, State of Maharashtra & Ors. (D.O.J. 18.11.2026)

2026 INSC 1241 click here to view full text of judgment

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Mesne Profits and Interest After Tenancy Termination

The Supreme Court of India upheld the High Court of Delhi’s determination of mesne profits at Rs. 7/- per sq. ft. per month for the ground floor and Rs. 5/- per sq. ft. per month for the mezzanine floor, along with 7.5% simple interest (reducible to 6% on timely payment), for wrongful occupation of premises at Ansari Road, Daryaganj, New Delhi after termination of tenancy. Dismissing the appeals, the Court found no legal infirmity or perversity in the High Court’s balanced evidentiary assessment and brought finality to a three-decade-old dispute.

Background and Procedural History

  • The appellants’ predecessors instituted a suit in 1990 for recovery of possession of premises at 1, Ansari Road, Daryaganj, New Delhi after terminating respondent no. 1’s tenancy from midnight of 31.12.1989, claiming damages for use and occupation at Rs. 1,47,500/- per month from 02.01.1990 with 15% interest.
  • By judgment and decree dated 22.12.1998, the Trial Court decreed possession and ordered a preliminary inquiry under Order XX Rule 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) for mesne profits; the decree for possession attained finality upon dismissal of SLP (C) No. 3879 of 2001 on 19.03.2001.
  • In the Order XX Rule 12 CPC inquiry, the Trial Court on 30.04.2004 fixed mesne profits at Rs. 22/- per sq. ft. per month (ground floor carpet area) and Rs. 11/- per sq. ft. per month (mezzanine floor carpet area) with 15% interest.
  • On 12.07.2010, the First Appellate Court set aside the Trial Court’s figures as speculative—noting differences between the old godown premises and the 1972 banking premises let to Vijaya Bank—and proceeded on the admitted rate of rent.
  • In RSA Nos. 186 and 187 of 2010, by judgment dated 11.08.2011, the High Court of Delhi held that the First Appellate Court overlooked respondent no. 1’s witness (DW-1) admission of prevailing local rent of Rs. 5/- to Rs. 8/- per sq. ft. per month, raising a substantial question of law under Section 100 CPC, and fixed mesne profits at Rs. 7/- (ground floor) and Rs. 5/- (mezzanine floor) with 7.5% simple interest (or 6% if paid within two months). The appellants appealed to the Supreme Court seeking higher mesne profits and 15% interest.

Key Issue

  • Whether the High Court erred in fixing mesne profits at Rs. 7/- and Rs. 5/- per sq. ft. per month and awarding 7.5% simple interest (with a 6% concession) upon finding that the First Appellate Court omitted material evidence regarding prevailing rental value.

Legal Analysis and Ruling

  • Compensatory Nature and Evidentiary Estimation: Citing Martin and Harris Private Limited v. Rajendra Mehta, the Court observed that mesne profits compensate the owner for wrongful occupation through a fair, reasonable estimate based on property nature, location, prevailing rental value, evidence, and attendant circumstances, without a rigid formula or routine appellate interference absent arbitrariness or legal error.
  • Omission of Material Admission Under Section 100 CPC: DW-1’s admission in chief examination that prevailing local rent at tenancy termination ranged between Rs. 5/- and Rs. 8/- per sq. ft. per month had a direct bearing on mesne profits, and overlooking it properly warranted correction under Section 100 CPC.
  • Balanced Rate, Interest, and Finality: The High Court’s rates fell within the evidentiary range shown by DW-1 without mechanically adopting the lowest figure or equating the premises with Vijaya Bank’s premises. Following Mahant Naryana Dasjee Varu v. Board of Trustees, Tirumalai Tirupathi Devasthanam, interest is an integral part of mesne profits, and the High Court’s interest rates and finality after over three decades of litigation were fair and reasonable.

Disposition

  • The Supreme Court found no ground to interfere and dismissed the appeals.

2026 INSC 1240

Bharat Bhushan Jain (Dead) Through LRs. And Others Etc. v. M/s Goodyear India Ltd. And Another (D.O.J. 18.11.2026)

2026 INSC 1240 click here to view full text of judgemnt

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