Indian Judgements

Indian Judgements

Murder: Right of accuse of fair and speedy trial – Remand back

Criminal appeals bySovaran Singh Prajapati concerning his conviction and death sentence for the double murder of his wife and daughter. The Court examines numerous procedural irregularities in the initial trial, including the absence of defense counsel during crucial stages, improper recording of the accused’s statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C., and unexplained delays. The ruling emphasizes the fundamental right to a fair trial under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution and various international human rights instruments, highlighting the duties of the trial court, appellate court, and prosecutor in ensuring a just process. Ultimately, due to these significant flaws, the Supreme Court sets aside the conviction and remands the case for a fresh trial.

(A) Penal Code, 1860, Section 302/ 201 – Murder – Remand back – Death sentence Appreciation of evidence – Right of accuse of fair and speedy trial – Held that prosecutor in the present case seemed to have missed his duty as an officer of the Court – Change of counsel; belated appointment of Amicus Curiae/defence counsel; closure of opportunity to cross-examine; recording of evidence in the absence of defence counsel are all factors that the prosecutor, in their solemn duty ought to have objected to and brought to the notice of the Court, as contravening the principle of a fair trial – Statements of PW-1 and PW-2, i.e., the complainant and star witness respectively of the prosecution, were recorded in the absence of counsel for the accused – Opportunity for cross-examination also stood closed qua PW-1 which cannot be countenanced – If a trial is conducted in such a manner, the argument of prejudice will be available to the accused – Presence of the accused’s counsel at the time of recording of the statement is necessary – Frequent change in counsel as also the matter being reserved for judgment on the very day that a new counsel for the accused is brought on record, leads us to question the assistance given to the appellant by such lawyers – Held that the imposition of the death penalty here appears fraught with danger and should not be sustained – Sufficient time should be given to counsel to prepare the case and conduct the same on behalf of his client the manner in which the application to recall under Section 311 was filed and the statement of the accused in Section 313 Cr.P.C. was refused and recorded respectively, is rendered questionable in the sum total of circumstance – Both rights under these Sections are important for a trial to reach a just conclusion -Given that the counsel for the accused had been changed, an additional charge has been added against the accused and that it had taken over two years to record the evidence of the witnesses, taking the sum total of circumstances, such an application under Section 311 Cr.P.C. for recall of witnesses should have been allowed – All the incriminating circumstances were not put to the accused – General, sweeping questions were employed, which were only denied by him – Here, the role of the prosecutor also requires to be highlighted – It is incumbent upon them to aid the Court in preparing questions to be put to the accused – Over a trial period of 2.3 years, the matter was posted on 74 occasions and surprisingly, for a variety of reasons including the majority thereof being non-production of witnesses, was adjourned on 52 occasions approximately – In a matter of this nature, it cannot be stressed enough that the examination of witnesses and smooth conduct of trial is essential which obviously, was given a go-by –  Judgments of the Trial Court convicting the appellant of the charged offence and awarding capital punishment and confirmation thereof by the High Court, with particulars as mentioned in Para 1 cannot be sustained and, as such, is liable to be set aside – The Appeals  accordingly allowed – The matters remanded to the Trial Court and restored on the respective docket. The Trial Court shall proceed afresh from the stage of framing of charge.

(Para 21, 25, 28, 29, 31, 32, 34 and 35)

(B) Constitution of India, Article 21 – Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Chapter XXIII, Chapter XXIV and Chapter XXVIII – Constitution Law – Fair trial – Held that fair and impartial administration of justice is a treasured right protected by various enactments of law including, first and foremost, the Constitution, which under Article 21 guarantees the Right to Fair Trial – Principles as to the meaning and import of fair trial, can be illustratively deduced as follow:

(1) Fair and Just investigation is the starting point of the fair trial process.

(2) This process is a triangulation of the rights of the accused, the victim and the community that acts through the state and prosecuting agencies.

(3). Process of investigation and trial must be completed with promptitude.

(4) The trial Judge has to play an active role in the search for truth, which a trial, undoubtedly has to be.

(5) Bias of all nature, against the accused, the victim, the witnesses; or the cause of/at trial, has to be eliminated.

(6) The process of fair trial is to be done to maintain public confidence & uphold the majesty of law.

(7) The atmosphere in which a trial is to be conducted in a fair manner has to be in an atmosphere of ‘judicial calm’.

(8) Unfair prolongation of trial is an affront to the ideal of fair trial.

(9) The ideal of fair trial has protection in the Constitution and in the international legal framework, as a basic human right.

(10) The centripodal purpose of fair trial is to ensure that injustice is avoided as far as possible, but equally ‘fair trial’ is not leveraged to a point which would hinder the established procedure of Cr.P.C. In other words, the command of the Code cannot be ignored at the behest of the prosecution or defence, in the name of fair trial.

(Para 8 and 10.6)

(C) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Chapter XXIII, Chapter XXIV and Chapter XXVIII – Criminal Procedure – Purpose of Trial – A trial is a fact-finding exercise wherein both parties, i.e., the prosecution and defence, after investigation by the competent authorities, present their versions of events and the role and duty of the Court to determine the truth – While undertaking such determination, the Court is not only to look at the evidence at hand but also ensure that all consideration balances the demand for justice and the rights of the accused – Statutory mechanism regarding a trial before a Court of Session is provided in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, under Chapter XVIII – The process and mode of taking and recording evidence have been provided for in Chapter XXIII – Chapter XXIV details the general provisions qua inquiries and trials – Herein, also provided is, the duty of the Court, in certain cases, to provide the person standing trial before it, with legal aid at the expense of the State – Also relevant here is Chapter XXVIII, which lays down the procedure for submission of a death sentence awarded by a Court of Session to the High Court for confirmation.

(Par 7 and 8)

(D) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 311 – Criminal Procedure – Recall of witness – On the basis case law following principles as governing the application of Section 311 Cr.P.C. enumerated:

(a) The Section is divided into two parts, the first being directory with the use of the word ‘may’ and the latter being mandatory with the use of the word ‘shall’.

(b) The power of the Court is couched in the widest terms possible with no express limitation thereon.

(c) The exercise of such power is not only the prerogative but also the duty of the Court, in connection with a witness who may be considered absolutely necessary, in the interest of justice.

(d) This power is to be used both for the benefit of the prosecution and the defence. To summon a witness because it serves the case of one of the parties and not the other, would be improper.

(e) This power can be exercised at any stage of proceedings, i.e. enquiry, trial or any other.

(f) Power is to be exercised judiciously since wider the power, greater the requirement of the application of a judicial mind.

(g) If a witness so-called under this power, gives evidence against the complainant, the latter should be given an opportunity to cross-examination. This power arises not under Section 311 but under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

(h) A witness cannot be recalled by the use of this power to simply fill up a lacuna in the case of the prosecution.

(Para 30)

(E) Criminal jurisprudence – In a criminal trial, unless the law otherwise requires, the onus of proof never shifts – It is always on the prosecution – The job of the prosecution is to drive home the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, but at the same time, the prosecutor cannot forget that his first and foremost duty is, that of an officer of the Court – The prosecuting agency carries the role, primarily, till the time the matter enters the Court – They have a responsibility to examine all possible angles, collect all relevant evidence and then produce the same before the Court for determination of guilt or lack thereof.

(Para 20)

Sovaran Singh Prajapati V. State Of Uttar Pradesh

Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 225: (DoJ 04-02-2025)

2025 INSC 225 Click here to View Full Text of Judgment

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Delayed Death: When ‘Attempted Murder’ Becomes More

Maniklall Sahu, the appellant, along with three co-accused, trespassed into the house of Rekhchand Verma, assaulted him with sticks and fisticuffs, and flung him from a terrace. The injured person, Rekhchand Verma, initially survived but was in a critical condition. He eventually succumbed to his injuries approximately nine months after the incident, dying on 8th November 2022 due to septicaemia and pneumonia, leading to cardiorespiratory arrest. The trial court had initially convicted the appellant under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) for murder. However, the High Court altered this conviction to Section 307 IPC for attempt to murder, sentencing the appellant to 7 years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000/-. The appellant subsequently filed this appeal challenging the Section 307 IPC conviction.

Law Involved The primary legal provisions under consideration are Sections 299, 300, 302, and 307 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

Section 307 IPC (Attempt to Murder): This section deals with acts done with the intention or knowledge that it might cause death, and if death occurs, the act would be murder.

Section 299 IPC (Culpable Homicide): Defines culpable homicide.

Section 300 IPC (Murder): Specifies when culpable homicide amounts to murder, including acts done with the intention of causing death, or causing bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or knowing the act is so imminently dangerous that it will most probably cause death.

Section 302 IPC (Punishment for Murder): Prescribes the punishment for murder. The core legal question revolves around the “Application of Theory of Causation where death ensues after some delay” and whether the High Court correctly applied Section 307 IPC despite the victim’s eventual death.

Reasoning The Supreme Court critically analysed the High Court’s decision to alter the conviction from Section 302 IPC to Section 307 IPC, especially given the victim’s death.

  1. Medical Evidence and Causation: The Court reviewed extensive medical evidence, which consistently showed that the deceased, Rekhchand Verma, suffered severe injuries, including a head injury, spinal cord injury leading to paraplegia, and multiple complications such as infected bedsores, septic shock, and bilateral pneumonia. Medical experts testified that these complications were a direct result of the initial injuries sustained during the assault and were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The Court highlighted that the injured person received medical treatment for nine months before his demise. The Court concluded that the injuries suffered were grievous and that the death was a consequence of these injuries, with complications like septicaemia and pneumonia not breaking the chain of causation.
  2. High Court’s Error: The Supreme Court determined that the High Court committed a serious error in bringing the case under the ambit of “attempt to commit murder” (Section 307 IPC) on the premise that the victim survived for about nine months, and his death was due to complications during treatment and not directly from the initial injuries. The Supreme Court stressed that if the injury was fatal and intended to cause death, or if death occurred after some delay due to septicaemia or other complications stemming from the injury, the offence would fall under the first limb of Section 300 IPC (murder) [36a]. Furthermore, if the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and death occurred due to septicaemia or other complications, the act would amount to culpable homicide punishable under Section 302 IPC, falling under the third limb of Section 300 IPC [36b, 37c, 37d].
  3. Jurisprudence on Delayed Death: Drawing on various precedents, the Court reiterated that delayed death or intervening medical conditions (like septicaemia or pneumonia) do not automatically absolve an accused of murder charges if the initial injuries were the proximate cause of death. The Court concluded that the cause of death was indeed due to the injuries suffered, and the contention that the death resulted from a lack of proper treatment or was disconnected from the initial assault was unfounded.

Holding The Supreme Court dismissed Maniklall Sahu’s appeal . While the appellant’s conviction under Section 307 IPC (attempt to murder) as altered by the High Court stands affirmed due to the dismissal of his appeal, the Supreme Court clearly stated that the High Court committed a serious error in altering the conviction from Section 302 IPC to Section 307 IPC . The Supreme Court’s detailed reasoning underscored that given the medical evidence and the established chain of causation, the offence should have been considered murder or culpable homicide amounting to murder, punishable under Section 302 IPC, because the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.

Maniklall Sahu Vs State of Chhattisgarh

Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 1107: (DoJ 12-09-2025)

2025 INSC 1107 Download Supreme Court File

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Tender Troubles: Supreme Court Upholds Bid Sanctity, Overturns Rectification

The case originated from an electronic bid (No. 7 of 2023-24) issued by the Superintending Engineer and Project Director, Project Implementation Unit – I, Public Works (Roads) Directorate, Government of West Bengal, on 17.10.2023. The tender was for collecting Road User Fee (RUF) from commercial vehicles for 1095 days. The earnest money deposit was fixed at Rs. 25,00,000.00. Seven bidders participated. The technical bids were evaluated, and four bidders were technically qualified, including Prakash Asphaltings and Toll Highways (India) Limited (appellant) and Mandeepa Enterprises (respondent No. 1).

Financial bids were opened on 08.12.2023. The appellant, Prakash Asphaltings, was found to be the highest bidder (H1) with a quoted amount of Rs. 91,19,00,000.00 for 1095 days. Respondent No. 1, Mandeepa Enterprises, was the lowest bidder (H4) with an offered amount of Rs. 9,72,999.00 per day.

Respondent No. 1 subsequently claimed a typographical error in their financial bid, stating they intended to quote Rs. 106,54,33,905.00 for the entire contract period instead of Rs. 9,72,999.00 per day. They requested the tendering authority to treat the figure of Rs. 9,72,999.00 as a typographical error and read it as Rs. 106,54,33,905.00. The tendering authority rejected this request on 20.12.2023, stating that correction of a financial bid after opening was not possible and would impeach the sanctity of the tender process.

Aggrieved, Respondent No. 1 filed a writ petition (WPA No. 29001 of 2023) before a Single Judge of the High Court, which was dismissed on 03.01.2024, as the Single Judge found no scope for interference. Respondent No. 1 then filed an intra-court appeal (MAT No. 93 of 2024). A Division Bench of the High Court allowed the appeal on 23.02.2024, observing that the error in quoting the figure by respondent No. 1 was inadvertent. The Division Bench directed the tendering authority to evaluate Respondent No. 1’s BOQ at Rs. 106,54,33,905.00 and offer other bidders the opportunity to match this figure. This civil appeal was directed against the Division Bench’s judgment and order.

Law Involved

Clause 4(g) of the Notice Inviting Electronic Bid: This clause specifically states that any change in the template of the Bill of Quantity (BOQ) will not be accepted under any circumstances.

Clause 5B(v) of the Instructions to Bidders: This clause outlines that during bid evaluation, if bidders fail to submit supporting documents or original hard copies within the stipulated timeframe, their proposals will be liable for rejection.

Article 226 of the Constitution of India: Pertains to the High Court’s jurisdiction to issue writs.

Principles of Equity and Natural Justice in Tender Processes: The judgment refers to the importance of these principles in tender and contract awards, but also emphasises that these principles should be kept at a distance when there is a violation of rules.

Judicial Review of Administrative Action: The Court reiterated that judicial review in administrative action, particularly tenders, is limited to preventing arbitrariness, irrationality, bias, and mala fides. Courts should not interfere with a decision unless it is “unlawful” or “unsound”.

Public Interest: Tenders are a cornerstone of governmental procurement processes, aiming for competitiveness, fairness, and transparency in resource allocation. Adherence to rules and conditions and the sanctity of the tender process are paramount.

Reasoning The Supreme Court reasoned that the Division Bench’s interpretation was erroneous for several key reasons:

Sanctity of Tender Process: The Court held that allowing rectification of financial bids after they have been opened would impeach the sanctity and integrity of the entire tender process.

Strict Adherence to Tender Conditions: Clause 4(g) explicitly prohibits any change in the BOQ template under any circumstances. The Division Bench’s broad interpretation of “bona fide mistake” to allow rectification was held to be incorrect and would put “shackles on the functioning of the tendering authority”.

Nature of the Mistake: While Respondent No. 1 claimed an inadvertent mistake, it was effectively a unilateral or systematic computer typographical transmission failure, not one attributable to the tendering authority. Such a mistake, even if unintentional, cannot be a ground to allow post-bid modifications that would undermine the competitive bidding process.

Adverse Consequences to Public Exchequer: The Division Bench’s decision to re-evaluate Respondent No. 1’s bid at a significantly higher amount (Rs. 106,54,33,905.00) meant that the appellant, who was originally the H1 bidder, would be displaced. This would lead to a considerable loss of revenue to the state exchequer (approximately 15 crores) by not accepting the higher bid of the appellant and giving an opportunity to Respondent No. 1 to correct its bid post-opening.

Limited Scope of Judicial Review: The Court reiterated that interference by a writ court in ongoing tender processes is not permissible unless there is a clear violation of principles of natural justice, or the decision is arbitrary or mala fide. The Division Bench’s decision was deemed a clear violation of natural justice principles.

Non-Joinder of Party: The appellant (Prakash Asphaltings), as the highest bidder and a directly affected party, was not made a party respondent in the intra-court appeal before the Division Bench, which was viewed as prejudicial and a violation of natural justice.

Holding The Supreme Court allowed the civil appeal, thereby setting aside and quashing the judgment and order dated 23.02.2024 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court at Calcutta in MAT No. 93 of 2024. The Court sustained the order of the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition. Consequently, Prakash Asphaltings and Toll Highways (India) Limited (the appellant), being the H1 bidder, is to be awarded the contract in terms of the notice inviting electronic bid dated 17.10.2023. The Court also ruled that there shall be no order as to costs.

Prakash Asphaltings And Toll Highways (India) Limited Vs Mandeep Enterprises And Others

Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 1108: (DoJ 12-09-2025)

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“Speculative Investors” Barred from IBC Relief: Supreme Court Upholds Homebuyer Protections

Four appeals were heard together, arising from orders of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT). The key appellants, Mansi Brar Fernandes and Sunita Agarwal, had entered into agreements with developers (Gayatri Infra Planner Pvt. Ltd. and Antriksh Infratech Pvt. Ltd., respectively) for property units. Both agreements included buy-back clauses and involved advance payments. The developers defaulted, and the appellants initiated proceedings under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC). The NCLAT reversed the admission of these applications, branding the appellants as “speculative investors” rather than genuine homebuyers or financial creditors.

Law Involved: The central legal framework is the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC), specifically Section 7, which governs the initiation of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) by financial creditors. The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Ordinance, 2019, and the subsequent Amendment Act, are also critical. These amendments introduced a threshold requirement for allottees to file a Section 7 application (requiring at least 10% of allottees or 100 allottees). The Court frequently referenced its earlier judgment in Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd v. Union of India, which distinguishes between genuine homebuyers and speculative investors. The judgment also emphasizes the Right to Shelter as a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution and the role of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (RERA).

Reasoning: The Supreme Court deliberated on the distinction between “speculative investors” and “genuine homebuyers” within the context of the IBC. It observed that the IBC is intended as a collective mechanism to revive viable projects and safeguard the fundamental right to shelter of genuine homebuyers, not as a recovery tool or a bargaining chip for individuals. The legislative intent behind recognizing allottees as financial creditors was to protect genuine homebuyers, while simultaneously preventing misuse by speculative investors seeking premature exits or exorbitant returns, which had burdened the real estate sector and the adjudicatory machinery.

The Court provided criteria to identify speculative investors, including: agreements that substitute possession with buy-back or refund options, insistence on refunds with high interest, purchase of multiple units (especially in double digits), demanding special rights or privileges, deviations from the RERA Model Agreement, and unrealistic interest rates or promises of returns. The transaction entered into by Mansi Brar Fernandes, involving a buy-back clause and the pursuit of commercial returns rather than possession, led the Court to conclude that she was indeed a speculative investor. Similarly, Sunita Agarwal’s agreement for an “investment” with a 25% per annum return over 24 months, coupled with a buy-back clause, indicated a speculative intent.

While affirming the NCLAT’s finding that the appellants were “speculative investors,” the Supreme Court clarified that the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Ordinance, 2019, was indeed applicable to the facts of the present case, correcting the NCLAT’s reasoning on this point [19, 20, 35, 36, 48(ii)]. The Court applied the doctrine of Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit (an act of the Court shall prejudice no one) to address the procedural issues related to the Ordinance’s applicability and the delay it caused.

Holding: The Supreme Court affirmed the NCLAT’s findings that Mansi Brar Fernandes and Sunita Agarwal were “speculative investors” and therefore not entitled to initiate proceedings under Section 7 of the IBC [25, 34, 48(i)]. Consequently, the Court upheld the NCLAT’s orders setting aside the admission of their Section 7 applications by the NCLT [48(i)]. However, the Court clarified that the Ordinance/Amendment Act was applicable to the case, although this correction in reasoning did not alter the ultimate outcome given the appellants’ status as speculative investors [48(ii)]. The appellants remain free to pursue their remedies through other appropriate legal forums, without being barred by limitation [48(i)].

Mansi Brar Fernandes Vs Subha Sharma And Anr.

Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 1110: (DoJ 12-09-2025)

2025 INSC 1110 Download Supreme Court File

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