2025 INSC 225
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(HON’BLE
VIKRAM NATH, J. HON’BLE SANJAY KAROL, J. AND HON’BLE SANDEEP MEHTA, JJ.)
SOVARAN SINGH
PRAJAPATI
Appellant
VERSUS
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
Respondent
Crl.A.259-260
of 2019-Decided on 04-02-2025
Criminal,
Constitution Law
(A) Penal
Code, 1860, Section 302/ 201 – Murder – Remand back - Death sentence – Appreciation of evidence – Right of
accuse of fair and speedy trial – Held that prosecutor in the present case
seemed to have missed his duty as an officer of the Court - Change of counsel;
belated appointment of Amicus Curiae/defence counsel; closure of opportunity to
cross-examine; recording of evidence in the absence of defence counsel are all
factors that the prosecutor, in their solemn duty ought to have objected to and
brought to the notice of the Court, as contravening the principle of a fair
trial - Statements of PW-1 and PW-2, i.e., the complainant and star witness respectively
of the prosecution, were recorded in the absence of counsel for the accused -
Opportunity for cross-examination also stood closed qua PW-1 which cannot be
countenanced - If a trial is conducted in such a manner, the argument of
prejudice will be available to the accused - Presence of the accused’s counsel
at the time of recording of the statement is necessary - Frequent change in
counsel as also the matter being reserved for judgment on the very day that a
new counsel for the accused is brought on record, leads us to question the
assistance given to the appellant by such lawyers - Held that the imposition of
the death penalty here appears fraught with danger and should not be sustained
- Sufficient time should be given to counsel to prepare the case and conduct
the same on behalf of his client the manner in which the application to recall
under Section 311 was filed and the statement of the accused in Section 313
Cr.P.C. was refused and recorded respectively, is rendered questionable in the
sum total of circumstance - Both rights under these Sections are important for
a trial to reach a just conclusion -Given that the counsel for the accused had
been changed, an additional charge has been added against the accused and that
it had taken over two years to record the evidence of the witnesses, taking the
sum total of circumstances, such an application under Section 311 Cr.P.C. for
recall of witnesses should have been allowed - All the incriminating
circumstances were not put to the accused - General, sweeping questions were
employed, which were only denied by him - Here, the role of the prosecutor also
requires to be highlighted - It is incumbent upon them to aid the Court in
preparing questions to be put to the accused - Over a trial period of 2.3 years,
the matter was posted on 74 occasions and surprisingly, for a variety of
reasons including the majority thereof being non-production of witnesses, was
adjourned on 52 occasions approximately - In a matter of this nature, it cannot
be stressed enough that the examination of witnesses and smooth conduct of
trial is essential which obviously, was given a go-by - Judgments of the Trial Court convicting the
appellant of the charged offence and awarding capital punishment and
confirmation thereof by the High Court, with particulars as mentioned in Para 1
cannot be sustained and, as such, is liable to be set aside - The Appeals accordingly allowed - The matters remanded to
the Trial Court and restored on the respective docket. The Trial Court shall
proceed afresh from the stage of framing of charge.
(Para 21, 25, 28, 29,
31, 32, 34 and 35)
(B)
Constitution of India, Article 21 – Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Chapter
XXIII, Chapter XXIV and Chapter XXVIII – Constitution Law - Fair trial – Held that fair and impartial
administration of justice is a treasured right protected by various enactments
of law including, first and foremost, the Constitution, which under Article 21
guarantees the Right to Fair Trial - Principles as to the meaning and import of
fair trial, can be illustratively deduced as follow:
(1) Fair and Just
investigation is the starting point of the fair trial process.
(2) This process is a
triangulation of the rights of the accused, the victim and the community that
acts through the state and prosecuting agencies.
(3). Process of
investigation and trial must be completed with promptitude.
(4) The trial Judge
has to play an active role in the search for truth, which a trial, undoubtedly
has to be.
(5) Bias of all
nature, against the accused, the victim, the witnesses; or the cause of/at
trial, has to be eliminated.
(6) The process of
fair trial is to be done to maintain public confidence & uphold the majesty
of law.
(7) The atmosphere in
which a trial is to be conducted in a fair manner has to be in an atmosphere of
‘judicial calm’.
(8) Unfair
prolongation of trial is an affront to the ideal of fair trial.
(9) The ideal of fair
trial has protection in the Constitution and in the international legal
framework, as a basic human right.
(10) The centripodal
purpose of fair trial is to ensure that injustice is avoided as far as
possible, but equally ‘fair trial’ is not leveraged to a point which would
hinder the established procedure of Cr.P.C. In other words, the command of the
Code cannot be ignored at the behest of the prosecution or defence, in the name
of fair trial.
(Para
8 and 10.6)
(C) Criminal Procedure
Code, 1973, Chapter XXIII, Chapter XXIV and Chapter XXVIII – Criminal Procedure
- Purpose of Trial -
A trial is a fact-finding exercise wherein both parties, i.e., the prosecution
and defence, after investigation by the competent authorities, present their
versions of events and the role and duty of the Court to determine the truth -
While undertaking such determination, the Court is not only to look at the
evidence at hand but also ensure that all consideration balances the demand for
justice and the rights of the accused - Statutory mechanism regarding a trial
before a Court of Session is provided in the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973, under Chapter XVIII - The process and mode of taking and
recording evidence have been provided for in Chapter
XXIII - Chapter XXIV details the general provisions qua inquiries and
trials - Herein, also provided is, the duty of the Court, in certain cases, to
provide the person standing trial before it, with legal aid at the expense of
the State - Also relevant here is Chapter XXVIII,
which lays down the procedure for submission of a death sentence awarded by a
Court of Session to the High Court for confirmation.
(Par
7 and 8)
(D) Criminal Procedure
Code, 1973, Section 311 – Criminal Procedure - Recall of witness – On the basis case law
following principles as governing the application of Section 311 Cr.P.C.
enumerated:
(a) The Section is
divided into two parts, the first being directory with the use of the word
‘may’ and the latter being mandatory with the use of the word ‘shall’.
(b) The power of the
Court is couched in the widest terms possible with no express limitation
thereon.
(c) The exercise of
such power is not only the prerogative but also the duty of the Court, in
connection with a witness who may be considered absolutely necessary, in the
interest of justice.
(d) This power is to
be used both for the benefit of the prosecution and the defence. To summon a
witness because it serves the case of one of the parties and not the other,
would be improper.
(e) This power can be
exercised at any stage of proceedings, i.e. enquiry, trial or any other.
(f) Power is to be
exercised judiciously since wider the power, greater the requirement of the
application of a judicial mind.
(g) If a witness
so-called under this power, gives evidence against the complainant, the latter
should be given an opportunity to cross-examination. This power arises not
under Section 311 but under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
(h) A witness cannot
be recalled by the use of this power to simply fill up a lacuna in the case of
the prosecution.
(Para
30)
(E) Criminal
jurisprudence - In a criminal trial, unless the law otherwise requires, the
onus of proof never shifts - It is always on the prosecution - The job of the
prosecution is to drive home the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt,
but at the same time, the prosecutor cannot forget that his first and foremost
duty is, that of an officer of the Court - The prosecuting agency carries the
role, primarily, till the time the matter enters the Court - They have a
responsibility to examine all possible angles, collect all relevant evidence
and then produce the same before the Court for determination of guilt or lack
thereof.
(Para
20)
ORDER
Sanjay Karol, J:- These appeals arise
out of judgment and order dated 1st October 2018 passed by the High Court of
Judicature at Allahabad in Capital Case No.2611 of 2017 and Reference No.05 of
2017. The impugned judgment of the High Court confirmed the judgment of
conviction dated 28th February 2017, and the sentence of capital punishment
imposed vide judgment dated 1st March 2017 upon the appellant by the Additional
Sessions Judge, Mainpuri in Sessions Trial No.377/2014, titled State v. Sovaran
Singh, under Sections 302 and 201 of Indian Penal Code 1860[for short ‘IPC 1860’"].
FACTS
AND PREVIOUS PROCEEDINGS
2.
Brief Facts, as allegedly set out by the prosecution, are that in the
intervening night of 29th- 30th of June 2014, the appellant returned home in an
inebriated state,also carrying two bottles of liquor which he then consumed
along with his father. Sometime later, a quarrel ensued between them which led
to the appellant slapping his father, who was, as a result, injured in his ear.
Thereafter, he demanded money from his wife Mamta to procure more liquor which
she denied. As such he trashed, abused and eventually killed her. He also killed
his daughter Sapna who was twelve years old. Resultantly, FIR No.128 of 2014
was registered under Section 302 IPCat P.S. Karhal, District Mainpuri. With the
completion of the investigation, challan was presented in the Trial Court and
the appellant herein was put to trial.
3.
Post-Mortem conducted by Dr. Rajesh Kumar Mishra (PW-3), found the following
injuries on both the deceased persons, as recorded by the High Court in the
impugned judgment:
“4. P.W. 3 Dr. Rajesh
Kumar Mishra conducted post-mortem on dead body of Mamta on 30.6.2014 at 4.25
PM. On external examination, Doctor found her slim and weak with 146 cm height
and 39.700 Kg in weight. Rigor mortis found present in lower segment of body;
eyes were half closed, mouth open, nail in-tact and bleeding from nose and ear
was noticed. P.W. 3 found following ante mortem injuries on her person:
1. Abrasion 3 cm x 2
cm on right side forehead, 1 cm above eye brow, blackening present
2. Abrasion 3 cm x 4
cm just below right eye, blackening present.
3. Abrasion 5 cm x 4
cm on left side of left eye, blackening present.
4. Blood through nose
and both ears.
5. Abrasion 6 cm x 3
cm on right side of neck, 1 cm below right mandible.
6. Abrasion 3 cm x 2
cm over anterior aspect of right shoulder, blackening present.
7. Abrasion 5 cm x 3
cm on right side of chest, 5 cm below left nipple.
8. Lacerated wound 5
cm x 3 cm on left side of vagina, exposing uterus and bladder."
5. On internal
examination, right eye was black; lips were swollen and black in colour; tongue
inside mouth; ecchymosis present in neck muscles; hyoid left corner fractured;
weight of right lung 340 gm (Pale) and left 320 gm; both chambers of heart
empty; blood present in peritonial cavity; stomach contained about 150 gm semi
digested food matter; small intestine contained semi digested food particles
and large intestine contained faecal matter and gases; liver was lacerated 5 cm
and pale; spleen weighed 150 gm and pale; kidneys-pale, right kidney weighed
150 gm and left 130 gm, urinary bladder and urethra were ruptured. In the
opinion of Doctor, about one day has passed since the death. Cause of death was
due to acute haemorrhagic shock as a result of ante mortem injuries, causing
internal bleeding. Postmortem report prepared by P.W. 3 is Ex. Ka. 2.
6. The same Doctor,
P.W. 3 examined dead body of deceased Sapnaat about 04:40 PM on 30.06.2014.
According to him, deceased was aged about 12 years, 22.400 kg in weight. Rigor
mortis was present; eyes and mouth closed and lips swollen. He found following
ante mortem injuries on her person.
“1. Face and fore head
swollen, right black eye.
2. Abrasion 6 cm x 4
cm on right side of face, 2 cm anterior to right ear.
3. Lips swollen and
teeth mark laceration in inner side of lips.
4. Abrasion 5 cm x 3
cm on left side of face anterior to left eye.
5. Abrasion 1 cm x 1
cm on anterior aspect of left fore arm, 3 cm above wrist joint, bluish.
6. Abrasion 1 cm x 1
cm on posterior aspect of base of index finger (II Metacarpo-phallangeal
joint), bluish.
7. Lateral fold of
vagina wide open, mens (menstrual) and labia swollen, vagina congested and
lacerated, particularly some sticky wheatish substance present, slide prepared.
8.
Abrasion 2 cm x 1 cm on anterior lateral aspect of right knee, bluish
coloured."
7. On internal
examination, brain was found congested with 1.100 kg in weight and haematoma
was present; bleeding found from nose and left ear; right lung weighed 300 gm
and was congested and left lung weighed 250 gm; left side heart was empty and
right side was full; stomach contained 200 gm semi solid food content, mucous
normal, no foul smell; small intestine contained semi digested food material
and large intestine had faecal matter and gases and liver was congested. In the
opinion of doctor, death had occurred due to head injury/ante_mortem injuries.
P.W. 3 had prepared post-mortem report Ex. Ka-3.”
4.
The Trial Court considered the arguments of both the parties and eventually
held that the prosecution had proved its case beyond reasonable doubt and as
such, convicted the appellant of having committed a double murder. On the point
of sentence, the matter was put up the following day, i.e., on 1st March 2017
and, having considered a host of judicial pronouncements, evaluating the aggravating
and mitigating circumstances, the sentence of death by hanging was imposed
quaSection 302 IPC and seven-year imprisonment for the offence punishable under
Section 201 IPC.
5.
On appeal, the High Court confirmed the sentence of death imposed by the Trial
Court, accounting for all the attending aggravating and mitigating
circumstances.
6.
We have heard learned counsel for the parties, Mr. Rajiv Shakdher, learned
Senior Counsel for the appellant and Mr. Divyesh Pratap Singh for the State. At
the outset, it was clarified by the learned Senior counsel that under assail
was the finding of conviction as also the sentence. In taking us through the
record, numerous lapses have been pointed out, which go to the root of the
matter, calling into question credibly, the justiciability of the conviction as
well as the sentence imposed on the appellant.
Purpose
of Trial
7.
It is important to restate the purpose of trial. A trial, of course, is a
fact-findingexercise wherein both parties, i.e., the prosecution and defence,
after investigation by the competent authorities, present their versions of
events and the role and duty of the Court to determine the truth. While
undertaking such determination, the Court is not only to look at the evidence
at hand but also ensure that all consideration balances the demand for justice
and the rights of the accused. The American Jurisprudence 2nd Ed. 2007, in the
following terms, captures the purpose of a trial:
“The purpose of trial
is to determine the validity of the allegations. The objective is to secure a
fair and impartial administration of justice between the parties to the
litigation and not the achievement of a hearing wholly free from errors. Once a
civil action has been instituted and issue is joined upon the pleadings, there
must be a trial on the issue before a judgment may be rendered. Trial is not a
contest between lawyers but a presentation of facts to which the law may be
applied to resolve the issues between the parties and to determine their
rights. It is also not a sport; it is an inquiry into the truth, in which the
general public has an interest.”
8.
The statutory mechanism regarding a trial before a Court of Session is provided
in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973[Abbreviated
as Cr. P.C.], under Chapter XVIII. The process and mode of taking and
recording evidence have been provided for in Chapter XXIII. Chapter XXIV
details the general provisions qua inquiries and trials. Herein, also provided
is, the duty of the Court, in certain cases, to provide the person standing
trial before it, with legal aid at the expense of the State. Also relevant here
is Chapter XXVIII, which lays down the procedure for submission of a death
sentence awarded by a Court of Session to the High Court for confirmation.
9.
This case raises questions of compliance with various basic requirements of a
fairly conducted trial, in accordance with well-established prepositions of
law. Fair Trial - A Guarantee under Article 21 of the Constitution of India
10.
Fair and impartial administration of justice is a treasured right protected by
various enactments of law including, first and foremost, the Constitution,
which under Article 21 guarantees the Right to Fair Trial. In numerous
pronouncements, this Court has underscored the same.
10.1
A Three-Judge Bench of this Court in Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya v. State of
Gujarat[(2019) 17 SCC 1], held as
under:
“17. Article 21 of the
Constitution of India makes it clear that the procedure in criminal trials
must, after the seminal decision in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [Maneka
Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248] , be “right, just and fair and not
arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive” (see para 7 therein). Equally, in Commr. of
Police v. Delhi High Court [Commr. of Police v. Delhi High Court, (1996) 6 SCC
323 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 1325] , it was stated that Article 21 enshrines and
guarantees the precious right of life and personal liberty to a person which
can only be deprived on following the procedure established by law in a fair
trial which assures the safety of the accused. The assurance of a fair trial is
stated to be the first imperative of the dispensation of justice (see para 16
therein).
18. It is clear that a
fair trial must kick off only after an investigation is itself fair and just.
The ultimate aim of all investigation and inquiry, whether by the police or by
the Magistrate, is to ensure that those who have actually committed a crime are
correctly booked, and those who have not are not arraigned to stand trial. That
this is the minimal procedural requirement that is the fundamental requirement
of Article 21 of the Constitution of India cannot be doubted. It is the
hovering omnipresence of Article 21 over CrPC that must needs inform the
interpretation of all the provisions of CrPC, so as to ensure that Article 21
is followed both in letter and in spirit.”
(Emphasis
supplied)
10.2
In the well-known ‘Best Bakery Case’ titled Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State
of Gujarat[(2004) 4 SCC 158], the
Court, detailing various aspects of fair trial, observed as under:
“35. This Court has
often emphasised that in a criminal case the fate of the proceedings cannot
always be left entirely in the hands of the parties, crimes being public wrongs
in breach and violation of public rights and duties, which affect the whole
community as a community and are harmful to the society in general. The concept
of fair trial entails familiar triangulation of interests of the accused, the
victim and the society and it is the community that acts through the State and
prosecuting agencies. Interests of society are not to be treated completely
with disdain and as persona non grata. Courts have always been considered to
have an overriding duty to maintain public confidence in the administration of
justice — often referred to as the duty to vindicate and uphold the “majesty of
the law”. Due administration of justice has always been viewed as a continuous
process, not confined to determination of the particular case, protecting its
ability to function as a court of law in the future as in the case before it.
If a criminal court is to be an effective instrument in dispensing justice, the
Presiding Judge must cease to be a spectator and a mere recording machine by
becoming a participant in the trial evincing intelligence, active interest and
elicit all relevant materials necessary for reaching the correct conclusion, to
find out the truth, and administer justice with fairness and impartiality both
to the parties and to the community it serves. Courts administering criminal
justice cannot turn a blind eye to vexatious or oppressive conduct that has
occurred in relation to proceedings, even if a fair trial is still possible,
except at the risk of undermining the fair name and standing of the judges as
impartial and independent adjudicators.
36. The principles of
rule of law and due process are closely linked with human rights protection.
Such rights can be protected effectively when a citizen has recourse to the
courts of law. It has to be unmistakably understood that a trial which is
primarily aimed at ascertaining the truth has to be fair to all concerned.
There can be no analytical, all-comprehensive or exhaustive definition of the
concept of a fair trial, and it may have to be determined in seemingly infinite
variety of actual situations with the ultimate object in mind viz. whether
something that was done or said either before or at the trial deprived the
quality of fairness to a degree where a miscarriage of justice has resulted. It
will not be correct to say that it is only the accused who must be fairly dealt
with. That would be turning a Nelson's eye to the needs of the society at large
and the victims or their family members and relatives. Each one has an inbuilt
right to be dealt with fairly in a criminal trial. Denial of a fair trial is as
much injustice to the accused as is to the victim and the society. Fair trial
obviously would mean a trial before an impartial judge, a fair prosecutor and
atmosphere of judicial calm. Fair trial means a trial in which bias or
prejudice for or against the accused, the witnesses, or the cause which is
being tried is eliminated. If the witnesses get threatened or are forced to
give false evidence that also would not result in a fair trial. The failure to
hear material witnesses is certainly denial of fair trial.
xxx
38. A criminal trial
is a judicial examination of the issues in the case and its purpose is to
arrive at a judgment on an issue as to a fact or relevant facts which may lead
to the discovery of the fact issue and obtain proof of such facts at which the
prosecution and the accused have arrived by their pleadings; the controlling
question being the guilt or innocence of the accused. Since the object is to
mete out justice and to convict the guilty and protect the innocent, the trial
should be a search for the truth and not a bout over technicalities, and must
be conducted under such rules as will protect the innocent, and punish the
guilty. The proof of charge which has to be beyond reasonable doubt must depend
upon judicial evaluation of the totality of the evidence, oral and
circumstantial, and not by an isolated scrutiny.”
(Emphasis
supplied)
10.3
In Sidhartha Vashisht v. State (NCT of Delhi) [(2010) 6 SCC 1] this Court observed :
“197. In the Indian
criminal jurisprudence, the accused is placed in a somewhat advantageous
position than under different jurisprudence of some of the countries in the
world. The criminal justice administration system in India places human rights
and dignity for human life at a much higher pedestal. In our jurisprudence an
accused is presumed to be innocent till proved guilty, the alleged accused is
entitled to fairness and true investigation and fair trial and the prosecution
is expected to play balanced role in the trial of a crime. The investigation
should be judicious, fair, transparent and expeditious to ensure compliance
with the basic rule of law. These are the fundamental canons of our criminal
jurisprudence and they are quite in conformity with the constitutional mandate
contained in Articles 20 and 21 of the Constitution of India.”
(Emphasis
supplied)
10.4
Observations in J. Jayalalithaa v. State of Karnataka[(2014) 2 SCC 401], are important for our purposes. The relevant
extracts are :
“28. Fair trial is the
main object of criminal procedure and such fairness should not be hampered or
threatened in any manner. Fair trial entails the interests of the accused, the
victim and of the society. Thus, fair trial must be accorded to every accused
in the spirit of the right to life and personal liberty and the accused must
get a free and fair, just and reasonable trial on the charge imputed in a
criminal case. Any breach or violation of public rights and duties adversely
affects the community as a whole and it becomes harmful to the society in
general. In all circumstances, the courts have a duty to maintain public
confidence in the administration of justice and such duty is to vindicate and uphold
the “majesty of the law” and the courts cannot turn a blind eye to vexatious or
oppressive conduct that occurs in relation to criminal proceedings.
29. Denial of a fair
trial is as much injustice to the accused as is to the victim and the society.
It necessarily requires a trial before an impartial Judge, a fair prosecutor
and an atmosphere of judicial calm. Since the object of the trial is to mete
out justice and to convict the guilty and protect the innocent, the trial
should be a search for the truth and not a bout over technicalities and must be
conducted under such rules as will protect the innocent and punish the guilty.
Justice should not only be done but should be seem to have been done.
Therefore, free and fair trial is a sine qua non of Article 21 of the
Constitution. Right to get a fair trial is not only a basic fundamental right
but a human right also. Therefore, any hindrance in a fair trial could be
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. “No trial can be allowed to
prolong indefinitely due to the lethargy of the prosecuting agency or the State
machinery and that is the raison d'être in prescribing the time frame” for
conclusion of the trial.
30. Article 12 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides for the right to a fair trial
what is enshrined in Article 21 of our Constitution. Therefore, fair trial is
the heart of criminal jurisprudence and, in a way, an important facet of a
democratic polity and is governed by the rule of law. Denial of fair trial is
crucifixion of human rights…”
(Emphasis
supplied)
10.5
This Court in Asha Ranjan v. State of Bihar[(2017)
4 SCC 3978(2016)] , written by Dipak Misra J., (as his Lordship then was)
referring to State of Haryana v. Ram Meher[SCC
762 (3)] , summarized the conclusions drawn in the latter, as under :
“51. … Simultaneously,
the concept of fair trial cannot be allowed to such an extent so that the
systemic order of conducting a trial in accordance with Criminal Procedure Code
or other enactments get mortgaged to the whims and fancies of the defence or
the prosecution. The command of the Code cannot be thrown to the winds. In such
situation, as has been laid down in many an authority, the courts have
significantly an eminent role. A plea of fair trial cannot be acquiesced to
create an organic disorder in the system. It cannot be acceded to manure a
fertile mind to usher in the nemesis of the concept of trial as such. The Court
further observed that there should not be any inference that the fair trial
should not be kept on its own pedestal as it ought to remain but as far as its
applicability is concerned, the party invoking it has to establish with the
support of established principles. The process of the court cannot be abused in
the name of fair trial at the drop of a hat, as that would lead to miscarriage
of justice.”
(Emphasis
supplied)
10.6 From a studied
analysis of the above decisions, the following principles as to the meaning and
import of fair trial, can be illustratively deduced :
(1) Fair and Just
investigation is the starting point of the fair trial process.
(2) This process is a
triangulation of the rights of the accused, the victim and the community that
acts through the state and prosecuting agencies.
(3). Process of
investigation and trial must be completed with promptitude.
(4) The trial Judge
has to play an active role in the search for truth, which a trial, undoubtedly
has to be.
(5) Bias of all
nature, against the accused, the victim, the witnesses; or the cause of/at
trial, has to be eliminated.
(6) The process of
fair trial is to be done to maintain public confidence & uphold the majesty
of law.
(7) The atmosphere in
which a trial is to be conducted in a fair manner has to be in an atmosphere of
‘judicial calm’.
(8) Unfair
prolongation of trial is an affront to the ideal of fair trial.
(9) The ideal of fair
trial has protection in the Constitution andin the international legal
framework, as a basic human right.
(10) The centripodal
purpose of fair trial is to ensure that injustice is avoided as far as
possible, but equally ‘fair trial’ is not leveraged to a point which would
hinder the established procedure of Cr.P.C. In other words, the command of the
Code cannot be ignored at the behest of the prosecution or defence, in the name
of fair trial.
11.
As is evident from the principles enunciated above, to secure a fair trial, is
not a solitary responsibility. The Judge; the investigator; the investigating
agency; and the counsel for either side, each have their own responsibility.
12.
An inspection of the records of this case, reveals that on many points each of
the constituents responsible for a fair trial have in some way or another
abdicated their responsibility. Some of the points that we noticed:
(a) At the time of
examination of the star witness of the prosecution (PW_2), counsel of the
defence was absent.
(b) The statement of
the accused under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. was improperly recorded without all scenarios
and circumstances being put to him.
(c) The initial charge
under Section 302 IPC against the appellant was framed on 22nd December 2014
and then, an additional charge was framed under Section 201 IPC on 27th August
2016. The delay of a year and a half in adding a charge against the appellant
is entirely unexplained.
(d) The Legal Aid
Counsel provided to the appellant was not only appointed at a belated stage but
also changed more than once during the course of trial.
(e) The application
under Section 311 Cr.P.C., while true, is a power which has to be exercised
judiciously, was rejected summarily and without assigning any reason.
(f) On 21st February
2017, the defence counsel was changed and, yet, on the same day, the defence
evidence was closed on account of non_production of witness.
(g) The accused being
a person of considerably less means, did not have access to an independent
counsel/counsel of his own choice. As such, he was entirely dependent on the
counsel appointed for him by the Court. The assistance given by such counsel on
account of being not present and changes/substitutions is rendered doubtful.
13.
At this juncture, we deem it appropriate to refer to certain orders, recorded
by the Trial Court in its daily status report, are as under:
Order dated 1st
September 2015 reads as under:“01.09.2015- Case called out. Accused Sobran
Singh present from jail in judiciary custody. Statement of PW-1 Rajnesh Kumar
recorded. But Accused Counsil not appeared for cross examination. The
opportunity of cross examinations is closed at 3.35 P.M. fix 17.09.2015 for
remaining evidence. Summon witnesses.
(A.S.J./F.T.C.)”
(Emphasis
supplied)
Order dated 8th June
2016 is extracted below :
“08.06.2016- Case
called out. Accused Sobran Singh present from jail in judicial custody.
Evidence of Pw-2 Km. Poonam recorded. But Accused counsil not appeared for
cross examination. Accused filed 18-B application for providing Government
Counsel and Sri Veer Pal Singh Rathor appointed as Amicus Curie in this case as
per list in the office. He be informed accordingly. Fixed 24.06.2016 for cross
examination on PW-2. Advocate be informed accordingly.
(A.S.J./F.T.C.)”
(Emphasis
supplied)
Order dated 10th June
2016 is extracted below :
“10.06.2016- Put up
today. Accused counsel filled application 19-B for strucking off the name from
the list of Amicus Curie and to appoint any other Advocate. According to the
order passed on the application ‘File taken up today on application of Ld.
Amicus Curie appointed on 08.06.2016. As he has shown his in avaiablety to
conduct the case, Sri Naresh Chand Dixit is appointed as Amicus Curie as per
list. He be informed accordingly.
(A.S.J./F.T.C.)”
Order dated 25th July
2016 is extracted below :
“25.7.2016- Case
called out. Accused Sobran Singh present from jail in judicial custody. A.D.G.C.
(Criminal) moved application No. 25 A for framing charge under Section 201
I.P.C agaisnt the accused. Fixed 29.07.2016 for hearing of 25-A.
(A.S.J./F.T.C.)”
Order dated 27th
August 2016 is extracted below :
“27.8.2016- Case
called out. Accused Sobran Singh present from jail in judicial custody. charge
framed against the accused Under Section 201 I.P.C. Charge Read over and
explationed before the accused. Accused denied the charge and claimed for
trial. Fixed 03.09.2016 for remaining evidence. summon witnesses.
(ASJ
1st)
”Order dated 1st
February 2017 is extracted below :
“01.02.2017- Case
called out. Accused Sobran Singh present from jail in judicial custody.
Statement of witness S.I. Sri Om Veer Singh has been recorded as PW-6. Cross
Examination of witness has been done by Defence counsel. Application No. 32-B
filled by the defence counsel for summoning PW-1 and PW-2 for cross
examination. Objected by A.D.G.C. And endorsed that no prosecution evidences to
be recorded. Strongly opposed by defence counsel. Fixed 04.02.2017 for
statement Under Section 313 Cr.P.C. And hearing of 32-B application.
(A.S.J.
1st)
”Order dated 4th
February 2017 is extracted below :
“04.02.2017- Case
called out. Accused Sobran Singh present from jail in judicial custody.
Statement of accused Sobran Singh has been recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C.
Fixed on 08.02.2017 for defence argument.
(A.S.J.
1st)”
Order dated 18th
February 2017 is extracted below :
“18.02.2017- Case
called out accused present in J.C. But not present. Counsel present heared on
application 32-B brief order is passed on the application. After lunch at 02:30
P.M. an application for time to adduce defence witness 35-B moved by defence counsel.
Order passed on the application as
“Vide order of even
date today, application u/s 311 moved by Ld. counsel has been rejected. He
sought time to adduce arguments which was granted. After which, he has moved
application for providing defence evidence. if the Ld. Counsel produce the
witness on the date fixed he will be examined failing which matter will be
posted for Judgment after hearing the argument of prosecution.”
(A.S.J.
1st)
”Order dated 21st
February 2017 is extracted below:
“21.02.2017- Case
called out. Accused person is present in Judicial Custody. An application 36-B
moved by the Ld. counsel for accused as per order passed on the application
“Application is rejected. As apportunity has already been given”
At 12:00 P.M. present
Sri Dalveer Yadav newly appoint counsel for the accused. He states that no
witness no present. D.E. Closed as on last date it was ordered that if Ld.
producees the witness on the date fixed he will be examined failing which
argument will be recorded.
Argument of prosecution
recorded. Part argument of defence also recorded. Put up after lunch for
remaining argument of Ld. defence counsel.
03:00 P.M. Present Ld.
Counsel for defence. Arguments concluded. Putup for Judgment on 28.02.2017 for
judgment.”
Order dated 28th
February 2017 is extracted below :
“28.02.2018[It should be 2017 but is mentioned as 2018
in the Convenience Compilation] - Case called out. Accused in presented in
Judicial Custody from the evidence on record, I found that the prosecution has
proved the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt both u/s 302 IPC
and 201 IPC.
Accused has guilty and
putup on 01.03.2017 for the point of sentence.
(A.S.J. 1st)”
Order dated 1st March
2017 is extracted below :
“01.03.2017- Case
called out. Accused person present in Judicial custody order passed on separate
sheet 37-A. Order Convict Sobran Singh sentence to death for offence punishable
u/s 302 IPC accordingly the convict be hanged by neck till he is death. Fine of
Rs. 20,000/- to the convict is also imposed in default of payment of fine, the
convict shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two months.
Convict Sobran Singh
is further sentenced to seven years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs.
5,000/- u/s 201 IPC in default of payment of fine rigorous imprisonment for two
month to the convict. Out of the realized Rs. 20,000/- will be paid to the
family of the deceased.
A copy of this order
be sent to the Secretary, Legal Service Authority, Mainpuri for deciding the
quantum of compensation to be awarded under the scheme refereed to in
sub-section 1 of section 357-A Cr.P.C.
(A.S.J.
1st)”
14.
In this context, it is essential to delve into the responsibilities cast on
each unit. (a) Duty of the Trial Court
15.
On numerous occasions, this Court has highlighted the duty of a Trial Court to
be an active participant to seek out the truth in a given set of circumstances
ensuring that a balance is struck between the role and responsibility of
prosecution as also the rights of the accused. It would be helpful to refer to
certain pronouncements:
15.1
This Court in Pooja Pal v. Union of India[(2016)
3 SCC 135], observed :
“54…It was remarked as
well that due administration of justice is always viewed as a continuous
process, not confined to the determination of a particular case so much so that
a court must cease to be a mute spectator and a mere recording machine but
become a participant in the trial evincing intelligence and active interest and
elicit all relevant materials necessary for reaching the correct conclusion, to
find out the truth and administer justice with fairness and impartiality both
to the parties and to the community…”
15.2
Reference may once again be made to the Best Bakery Case (supra), where in
regard to the role of a Court, it was held :
“55. The courts, at the expense of repetition
we may state, exist for doing justice to the persons who are affected. The
trial/first appellate courts cannot get swayed by abstract technicalities and close
their eyes to factors which need to be positively probed and noticed. The court
is not merely to act as a tape recorder recording evidence, overlooking the
object of trial i.e. to get at the truth. It cannot be oblivious to the active
role to be played for which there is not only ample scope, but sufficient
powers conferred under the Code. It has a greater duty and responsibility i.e.
to render justice, in a case where the role of the prosecuting agency itself is
put in issue and is said to be hand in glove with the accused, parading a mock
fight and making a mockery of the criminal justice administration itself.”
(Emphasis
supplied)
15.3
In Bablu Kumar v. State of Bihar[(2015) 8
SCC 787], this Court observed :
“22. Keeping in view
the concept of fair trial, the obligation of the prosecution, the interest of
the community and the duty of the court, it can irrefragably be stated that the
court cannot be a silent spectator or a mute observer when it presides over a trial.
It is the duty of the court to see that neither the prosecution nor the accused
play truancy with the criminal trial or corrode the sanctity of the proceeding.
They cannot expropriate or hijack the community interest by conducting
themselves in such a manner as a consequence of which the trial becomes a
farcical one. The law does not countenance a “mock trial”. It is a serious
concern of society. Every member of the collective has an inherent interest in
such a trial. No one can be allowed to create a dent in the same. The court is
duty-bound to see that neither the prosecution nor the defence takes
unnecessary adjournments and take the trial under their control. The court is
under the legal obligation to see that the witnesses who have been cited by the
prosecution are produced by it or if summons are issued, they are actually
served on the witnesses. If the court is of the opinion that the material
witnesses have not been examined, it should not allow the prosecution to close
the evidence. There can be no doubt that the prosecution may not examine all
the material witnesses but that does not necessarily mean that the prosecution
can choose not to examine any witness and convey to the court that it does not
intend to cite the witnesses.”
(Emphasis
supplied)
16.
In the present facts, the Court ought to have been the first one to observe and
halt proceedings, given that counsel for the defence was absent on crucial
occasions such as the examination-in-chief and cross-examination of
PW-1;statement of PW-2 also was recorded in the absence of counsel for the
accused; no adequate opportunity was given to produce and examine defence
witnesses; and the examination of the accused under Section 313 was improper,
inadequate and incomplete. The course of action adopted by the Court was
mechanical and in complete ignorance of the rights of the accused and the
overarching purpose of a trial. It is true that the Court had provided an
opportunity for the defence to produce a witness but at the same time a
condition was put that if on the said date the witness is not produced, the
opportunity would be closed. This approach is in ignorance of the ground
realities of production of a witness, and to the detriment of the accused. The
Court cannot be said to have done its part.
17.
We must also observe that in this case, the daily status of the Trial Court
extracted supra, reveals that that the Court appointed both an Amicus Curiae
and a legal aid counsel for the accused. There is no quarrel on that point. The
same is permissible. [See: Lalu Prasad v. State of Jharkhand[(2013) 8 SCC 593] and Shaik Mukhtar
& Anr. v. The State of Andhra Pradesh now State of Telangana[Criminal Appeal No. 1753 of 2019] ]
However, we are constrained to record that the appointment of the Amicus Curiae
in a manner of this magnitude is in ignorance thereof for the case papers are
silent as to the standing of the said person appointed to such a position. What
was the role played by him? Was he appointed to assist the Court or was he
appointed to aid the representation of the accused? Such matters should be
clearly indicated to enable the Appellate Court to gain a full view of the
matter including being able to ascertain compliance of essential aspects such
as continuous and qualitative legal assistance to the accused.
(b)
Duty of the Appellate Court
18.
In the context of the duty of the Court, we must also look to the role played
by the Court when sitting in appellate and/or confirmation jurisdiction. It has
long been held that a Court in first appellate jurisdiction, has to appreciate
the evidence on record, after duly summoning the record of the Courts below,
and then arrive at its own finding, irrespective of the order under challenge
before it being of conviction or acquittal. [See: Wilayat Khan v. State of U.P. [1951 SCC 898] ; Atley v. State of U.P[AIR 1955 SC 807]; Harijana Thirupala v.
Public Prosecutor[(2002) 6 SCC 470];
and Ravasaheb v. State of Karnataka[(2023)
5 SCC 391]]
19.
When particularly concerned with cases of Capital Punishment, naturally, since
a person’s life hangs in the balance, the High Court’s responsibility is
accordingly enhanced/heightened. It “must carefully examine all relevant and
material circumstances before upholding the conviction and confirming the
sentence of death.” [See: Masalti v. State of U.P. [AIR 1965 SC 202]; Charan Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab[(1975) 3 SCC 39]; and Arjun Marik &
Ors. v. State of Bihar[1994 Supp (2) SCC
372]](b) Duty of Prosecutor
20.
In a criminal trial, unless the law otherwise requires, the onus of proof never
shifts. It is always on the prosecution. The job of the prosecution is to drive
home the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, but at the same time,
the prosecutor cannot forget that his first and foremost duty is, that of an
officer of the Court. The prosecuting agency carries the role, primarily, till
the time the matter enters the Court. They have a responsibility to examine all
possible angles, collect all relevant evidence and then produce the same before
the Court for determination of guilt or lack thereof. The following extracts of
judgments underscore the indispensable role of the prosecutor.
20.1
In Bablu Kumar (supra), it was held that :
“The Public Prosecutor
who conducts the trial has a statutory duty to perform. He cannot afford to
take things in a light manner. The court also is not expected to accept the
version of the prosecution as if it is sacred. It has to apply its mind on
every occasion. Non_application of mind by the trial court has the potentiality
to lead to the paralysis of the conception of fair trial.”
(Emphasis
supplied)
20.2
Recently, a Three-Judge Bench of this Court in Ashok v. State of Uttar Pradesh[2024 SCC OnLine SC 3580] issued
directions regarding the role of public prosecutors and appointments of counsel
through legal aid processes, this Court held :
“23. Our conclusions
and directions regarding the role of the Public Prosecutor and appointment of
legal aid lawyers are as follows:
a. It is the duty of
the Court to ensure that proper legal aid is provided to an accused;
b. When an accused is
not represented by an advocate, it is the duty of every Public Prosecutor to
point out to the Court the requirement of providing him free legal aid. The
reason is that it is the duty of the Public Prosecutor to ensure that the trial
is conducted fairly and lawfully;
c. Even if the Court
is inclined to frame charges or record examination-in-chief of the prosecution
witnesses in a case where the accused has not engaged any advocate, it is
incumbent upon the Public Prosecutor to request the Court not to proceed
without offering legal aid to the accused;
c. It is the duty of
the Public Prosecutor to assist the Trial Court in recording the statement of
the accused under Section 313 of the CrPC. If the Court omits to put any
material circumstance brought on record against the accused, the Public
Prosecutor must bring it to the notice of the Court while the examination of
the accused is being recorded. He must assist the Court in framing the
questions to be put to the accused. As it is the duty of the Public Prosecutor
to ensure that those who are guilty of the commission of offence must be
punished, it is also his duty to ensure that there are no infirmities in the
conduct of the trial which will cause prejudice to the accused;
d. An accused who is
not represented by an advocate is entitled to free legal aid at all material
stages starting from remand. Every accused has the right to get legal aid, even
to file bail petitions;
f. At all material
stages, including the stage of framing the charge, recording the evidence,
etc., it is the duty of the Court to make the accused aware of his right to get
free legal aid. If the accused expresses that he needs legal aid, the Trial
Court must ensure that a legal aid advocate is appointed to represent the
accused;
g. As held in the case
of Anokhilal5, in all the cases where there is a possibility of a life sentence
or death sentence, only those learned advocates who have put in a minimum of
ten years of practice on the criminal side should be considered to be appointed
as amicus curiae or as a legal aid advocate. Even in the cases not covered by
the categories mentioned above, the accused is entitled to a legal aid advocate
who has good knowledge of the law and has an experience of conducting trials on
the criminal side. It would be ideal if the Legal Services Authorities at all
levels give proper training to the newly appointed legal aid advocates not only
by conducting lectures but also by allowing the newly appointed legal aid
advocates to work with senior members of the Bar in a requisite number of
trials;
h. The State Legal
Services Authorities shall issue directions to the Legal Services Authorities
at all levels to monitor the work of the legal aid advocate and shall ensure
that the legal aid advocates attend the court regularly and punctually when the
cases entrusted to them are fixed;
i. It is necessary to
ensure that the same legal aid advocate is continued throughout the trial
unless there are compelling reasons to do so or unless the accused appoints an
advocate of his choice;
j. In the cases where the
offences are of a very serious nature and complicated legal and factual issues
are involved, the Court, instead of appointing an empanelled legal aid
advocate, may appoint a senior member of the Bar who has a vast experience of
conducting trials to espouse the cause of the accused so that the accused gets
best possible legal assistance;
k. The right of the
accused to defend himself in a criminal trial is guaranteed by Article 21 of
the Constitution of India. He is entitled to a fair trial. But if effective
legal aid is not made available to an accused who is unable to engage an
advocate, it will amount to infringement of his fundamental rights guaranteed
by Article 21;
l. If legal aid is
provided only for the sake of providing it, it will serve no purpose. Legal aid
must be effective. Advocates appointed to espouse the cause of the accused must
have good knowledge of criminal laws, law of evidence and procedural laws apart
from other important statutes. As there is a constitutional right to legal aid,
that right will be effective only if the legal aid provided is of a good
quality. If the legal aid advocate provided to an accused is not competent
enough to conduct the trial efficiently, the rights of the accused will be
violated.”
(Emphasis
supplied)
20.3
In Shiv Kumar v. Hukam Chand[(1999) 7 SCC
467], a Three-Judge Bench of this Court, having taken note of various
judgments returned by some High Courts, made the following observations:
“13. … A Public
Prosecutor is not expected to show a thirst to reach the case in the conviction
of the accused somehow or the other irrespective of the true facts involved in
the case. The expected attitude of the Public Prosecutor while conducting
prosecution must be couched in fairness not only to the court and to the investigating
agencies but to the accused as well. If an accused is entitled to any
legitimate benefit during trial the Public Prosecutor should not
scuttle/conceal it. On the contrary, it is the duty of the Public Prosecutor to
winch it to the fore and make it available to the accused. Even if the defence
counsel overlooked it, the Public Prosecutor has the added responsibility to
bring it to the notice of the court if it comes to his knowledge. A private
counsel, if allowed a free hand to conduct prosecution would focus on bringing
the case to conviction even if it is not a fit case to be so convicted. That is
the reason why Parliament applied a bridle on him and subjected his role
strictly to the instructions given by the Public Prosecutor.
Xxx
14. An early decision
of a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Queen-Empress v. Durga [ILR
(1894-96) 16 All 84 : 1894 AWN 7] has pinpointed the role of a Public
Prosecutor as follows:
“It is the duty of a
Public Prosecutor to conduct the case for the Crown fairly. His object should
be, not to obtain an unrighteous conviction, but, as representing the Crown, to
see that justice is vindicated; and, in exercising his discretion as to the
witnesses whom he should or should not call, he should bear that in mind. In
our opinion, a Public Prosecutor should not refuse to call or put into the
witness box for cross-examination a truthful witness returned in the calendar
as a witness for the Crown, merely because the evidence of such witness might
in some respects be favourable to the defence. If a Public Prosecutor is of
opinion that a witness is a false witness or is likely to give false testimony
if put into the witness box, he is not bound, in our opinion, to call that
witness or to tender him for cross-examination.”
16. As we are in
complete agreement with the observation of a Division Bench of the High Court
of Andhra Pradesh in Medichetty 22 (1999) 7 SCC 467Ramakistiah v. State of A.P.
[AIR 1959 AP 659 : 1959 Cri LJ 1404] we deem it fit to extract the said
observation:
“A prosecution, to use
a familiar phrase, ought not to be a persecution. The principle that the Public
Prosecutor should be scrupulously fair to the accused and present his case with
detachment and without evincing any anxiety to secure a conviction, is based
upon high policy and as such courts should be astute to suffer no inroad upon
its integrity. Otherwise there will be no guarantee that the trial will be as
fair to the accused as a criminal trial ought to be. The State and the Public Prosecutor
acting for it are only supposed to be putting all the facts of the case before
the Court to obtain its decision thereon and not to obtain a conviction by any
means fair or foul. Therefore, it is right and proper that courts should be
zealous to see that the prosecution of an offender is not handed over
completely to a professional gentleman instructed by a private party.” ”
20.4
In Harendra Rai v. State of Bihar[(2023)
13 SCC 563] , this Court, speaking through one of us, (Vikram Nath J.) took
notice of the observations made by the Law Commission of India in regard to the
prosecutors, as follows :
“123. Insofar as the
Public Prosecutors are concerned, a lot of comments have been made, not only by
this Court but also by the Law Commission, highlighting the role and importance
of a Public Prosecutor. We may quote with profit the role of the Prosecutors as
stated in the 197th Law Commission of India Report on Public Prosecutors'
Appointments (2006) :
“…‘The Prosecutor has
a duty to the State, to the accused and to the court. The Prosecutor is at all
times a minister of justice, though seldom so described. It is not the duty of
the prosecuting counsel to secure a conviction, nor should any prosecutor even feel
pride or satisfaction in the mere fact of success.”
(Emphasis
in original)
124. In 154th Law Commission of India Report it was
reported as follows :
“15. …‘8. …
Prosecutors are really ministers of Justice whose job is none other than
assisting the State in the administration of justice. They are not
representatives of any party. Their job is to assist the court by placing
before the court all relevant aspects of the case. They are not there to see
the innocent go to the gallows; they are also not there to see the culprits
escape conviction.’ ”
20.5
In Anees v. State (NCT of Delhi) [2024
SCC OnLine SC 757] , a Three-Judge Bench recently observed as follows :
“67. …The relations
between the Public Prosecution Service and the judiciary are the very
cornerstone of the criminal justice system. The public prosecutors who are
responsible for conducting prosecutions and may appeal against the court
decisions, are one of judges' natural counterparts in the trial proceedings and
also in the broader context of management of the system of criminal law.”
21.
The prosecutor in the present case, in our view, seemed to have missed his duty
as an officer of the Court. Change of counsel; belated appointment of Amicus
Curiae/defence counsel; closure of opportunity to cross-examine; recording of
evidence in the absence of defence counsel are all factors that the prosecutor,
in their solemn duty ought to have objected to and brought to the notice of the
Court, as contravening the principle of a fair trial. The relevant orders in
this regard stand extracted as part of Para 13 of this opinion.
22.
In earlier paragraphs of this order, we have pointed out factors which call
into question the sanctity of the sentence imposed upon the appellant. Most of
these shortfalls impact the constitutional and statutory rights guaranteed to
the accused standing trial.
(c)
Rights of the Accused
23.
As noticed supra, the Indian Criminal Justice System places the accused person
at a comparative disadvantage which is more so exacerbated when the person is
economically or socially less fortunate as in the present case. This Court
through various judicial pronouncements has underscored and strengthened the
rights of a person accused of committing a crime in order to ensure that the
constitutional guarantee of Justice sees the light of the day. Some of those
pronouncements in addition to those already discussed supra, are below:
23.1
In State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh[(1999)
6 SCC 172], this Court held :
“45. .... Prosecution
cannot be permitted to take advantage of its own wrong. Conducting a fair trial
for those who are accused of a criminal offence is the cornerstone of our
democratic society. A conviction resulting from an unfair trial is contrary to
our concept of justice. Conducting a fair trial is both for the benefit of the
society as well as for an accused and cannot be abandoned. While considering
the aspect of fair trial, the nature of the evidence obtained and the nature of
the safeguard violated are both relevant factors…”
(Emphasis
supplied)
23.2
In Chaluvegowda & Ors. v. State[(2012)
13 SCC 538], this Court discussed extensively the right of representation
by counsel. The relevant paragraphs are reproduced with profit as under :
“18. The right to a
fair trial is one to be enjoyed by the guilty as well as the innocent, for an
accused is presumed to be innocent until proved to be otherwise in a fairly
conducted trial. This right would include that he be defended by a competent
counsel. The provision of an amicus curiae for an accused, in case the accused
is unable to engage an advocate to conduct his defence, is to ensure the goal
of a fair trial which is a guarantee provided in the Constitution. We may
recall the often quoted passage of Potter Stewart “Fairness is what justice
really is”.
19. The right to be
represented by a lawyer must not be an empty formality. It must not be a sham
or an eyewash. The appointment of an amicus curiae for the defence of an
accused person must be in true letter and spirit, with due regard to the
effective opportunity of hearing that is to be afforded to every accused person
before being condemned. The due process of law incorporated in our
constitutional system demands that a person not only be given an opportunity of
being heard before being condemned, but also that such opportunity be fair,
just and reasonable.
20. It is appropriate
to recall Powell v. Alabama [77 L Ed 158 : 287 US 45 (1932)] , in which nine
Black men were accused of raping two White women, and were charged with the
same. Since the accused were from a different State, they did not have legal
assistance, so the trial Judge, in a very vague manner, appointed all the
members of the Alabama Bar to defend the accused. However, when the actual
trial was underway, none of the lawyers defended the accused, but only offered
to provide assistance to the defence lawyer. Satisfied by this, the trial Judge
allowed the trial to proceed in the absence of an effective legal assistance
for the accused, and the trial resulted in a conviction with the death sentence
accorded on the accused. The US Supreme Court took strong exception to the
procedure adopted by the trial court. The Court held: (L Ed p. 162 : US p. 53)
“It is hardly
necessary to say that the right to counsel being conceded, a defendant should
be afforded a fair opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice. Not only
was that not done here, but such designation of counsel as was attempted was
either so indefinite or so close upon the trial as to amount to a denial of
effective and substantial aid in that regard.”
21. The Court,
speaking through Sutherland, J. further held: (Powell case [77 L Ed 158 : 287
US 45 (1932)] , L Ed p. 165 : US p. 58)“…
The defendants, young,
ignorant, illiterate, surrounded by hostile sentiment, haled back and forth
under guard of soldiers, charged with an atrocious crime regarded with especial
horror in the community where they were to be tried, were thus put in peril of
their lives within a few moments after counsel for the first time charged with
any degree of responsibility began to represent them.
It is not enough to
assume that counsel thus precipitated into the case thought there was no
defence, and exercised their best judgment in proceeding to trial without
preparation.”
22. In Gideon v.
Wainwright [9 L Ed 2d 799 : 372 US 335 (1963)] the US Supreme Court, approving
the above observations, laid down following principles: (L Ed p. 805)“…
In returning to these
old precedents, sounder we believe than the new, we but restore constitutional
principles established to achieve a fair system of justice. Not only these
precedents but also reason and reflection require us to recognise that in our
adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too
poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is
provided for him. This seems to us to be an obvious truth. Governments, both
State and Federal, quite properly spend vast sums of money to establish
machinery to try defendants accused of crime. Lawyers to prosecute are
everywhere deemed essential to protect the public's interest in an orderly
society. Similarly, there are few defendants charged with crime, few indeed,
who fail to hire the best lawyers they can get to prepare and present their
defences. That Government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who have
the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the
widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not
luxuries. The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed
fundamental and essential to fair trial in some countries, but it is in ours.”
”
(Emphasis
supplied)
23.3
In Brijesh Kumar v. State of U.P. [(2021)
19 SCC 177], this Court underlined the importance of legal representation
and particularly for those economically or socially less fortunate. It was
observed :
“3. The right to legal
representation sits at the core of not only the right to life and liberty
conferred by Article 21 of the Constitution, but at the very foundation of the
entirety of our justice system, be it civil or criminal. For this right to be meaningful,
it is imperative that it does not make distinctions between the rich and the
poor, the haves and have-nots. The right to legal representation, as
necessitated by the demands of justice and equity, must be unfazed by the
economic class or financial resources of the accused.
4. To this end was
enacted the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (hereinafter “the 1987 Act”),
setting for itself the following object and purpose:
“… to provide free and
competent legal services to the weaker sections of the society to ensure that
opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of
economic or other disabilities, and to organise Lok Adalats to secure that the
operation of the legal system promotes justice on a basis of equal opportunity.”
5. Having secured for
itself the above hallowed purpose, the Act has created a nationwide network of
Legal Services Authorities (at the National, State, district and taluk level)
for framing policies for legal aid and services, as well as a network of Legal
Services Committees (within the Supreme Court, the High Court and the taluk
level) for the on-ground implementation of the legal services programme at
various levels.
6. In further
recognition of the need to fill a dire gap in access to justice for the poor,
it has also become a well-settled position that, that where an accused comes
before the Court without legal representation, the Court is duty-bound to
either appoint an Amicus Curiae or refer him to the appropriate Legal Services
Committee who shall then appoint an advocate to represent the accused (Rakesh
v. State of M.P. [Rakesh v. State of M.P., (2011) 12 SCC 513 : (2012) 1 SCC
(Cri) 613] and Sk. Mukthar v. State of A.P. [Sk. Mukthar v. State of A.P.,
(2020) 19 SCC 178 : (2021) 3 SCC (Cri) 795] ).”
23.4
Krishna Iyer, J. in M.H. Hoskot v. State of Maharashtra[(1978) 3 SCC 544], said :
“14. The other
ingredient of fair procedure to a prisoner, who has to seek his liberation
through the court process is lawyer's services. Judicial justice, with
procedural intricacies, legal submissions and critical examination of evidence,
leans upon professional expertise; and a failure of equal justice under the law
is on the cards where such supportive skill is absent for one side. Our
judicature, moulded by Anglo-American models and our judicial process,
engineered by kindred legal technology, compel the collaboration of
lawyer-power for steering the wheels of equal justice under the law.
15. Gideon's trumpet
has been heard across the Atlantic. Black, J. there observed: [ Processual
Justice to the People, (May 1973) p. 69 (372 US at 344 : 9 L Ed 2d at 805)]
“Not only those
precedents but also reason and reflection require us to recognise that in our
adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too
poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is
provided for him. This seems to us to be an obvious truth. Governments, both
State and federal, quite properly spend vast sums of money to establish
machinery to try defendants accused of crime. Lawyers to prosecute are
everywhere deemed essential to protect the public's interest in an orderly
society. Similarly, there are few defendants charged with crime who fail to
hire the best lawyers they can get to prepare and present their defences. That
Government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who have the money hires
lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the widespread belief that
lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries. The right of one
charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to
fair trials in some countries, but is in ours. From the very beginning, our
state and national constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on
procedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before
impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before the law. This
noble idea cannot be realised if the poor man charged with crime has to face
his accusers without a lawyer to assist him.”
(Emphasis
supplied)
23.5
In Suk Das v. Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh29, this Court held as under
:
“6. But the question
is whether this fundamental right could lawfully be denied to the appellant if
he did not apply for free legal aid. Is the exercise of this fundamental right
conditioned upon the accused applying for free legal assistance so that if he
does not make an application for free legal assistance the trial may lawfully
proceed without adequate legal representation being afforded to him? Now it is
common knowledge that about 70 per cent of the people living in rural areas are
illiterate and even more than that percentage of the people are not aware of
the rights conferred upon them by law. Even literate people do not know what
are their rights and entitlements under the law. It is this absence of legal
awareness which is responsible for the deception, exploitation and deprivation
of rights and benefits from which the poor suffer in this land. Their legal
needs always stand to become crisis-oriented because their ignorance prevents
them from anticipating legal troubles and approaching a lawyer for consultation
and advice in time and their poverty magnifies the impact of the legal troubles
and difficulties when they come. Moreover, because of their ignorance and
illiteracy, they cannot become self-reliant : they cannot even help themselves.
The law ceases to be their protector because they do not know that 29 (1986) 2
SCC 401they are entitled to the protection of the law and they can avail of the
legal service programme for putting an end to their exploitation and winning
their rights…”
(Emphasis
supplied)
23.6
A recent judgment in Suhas Chakma v. Union of India[2024 SCC OnLine SC 3031], highlighted the legal aid defence
counsel system, observing that the objective of the scheme is to provide
quality legal aid to all those in need. Herein, reference was also made to
Ramanand @ Nandlal Bharti v. State of U.P.
[2022 SCC OnLine SC 1396], while discussing the quality of legal aid and in
para 120, it was held :
“120. It is by far now
well-settled for a legal proposition that it is the duty of the court to see
and ensure that an accused put on a criminal trial is effectively represented
by a defence counsel, and in the event on account of indigence, poverty or
illiteracy or any other disabling factor, he is not able to engage a counsel of
his choice, it becomes the duty of the court to provide him appropriate and
meaningful legal aid at the State expense. What is meant by the duty of the
State to ensure a fair defence to an accused is not the employment of a defence
counsel for namesake. It has to be the provision of a counsel who defends the
accused diligently to the best of his abilities. While the quality of the
defence or the caliber of the counsel would not militate against the guarantee
to a fair trial sanctioned by Articles 21 and 22 resply of the Constitution, a
threshold level of competence and due diligence in the discharge of his duties
as a defence counsel would certainly be the constitutional guaranteed
expectation. The presence of counsel on record means effective, genuine and
faithful presence and not a mere farcical, sham or a virtual presence that is
illusory, if not fraudulent.”
(Emphasis
supplied)
23.7
In Anokhilal v. State of M.P. [(2019) 20
SCC 196], a Three-Judge Bench of this Court summarized certain principles
regarding the grant of free legal aid, and the same being ‘real and
meaningful’, while setting aside a judgment of conviction, noticing the absence
thereof. [See: Paragraphs 31 to 31.4]
24.
Having considered the rights and guarantees in favour of the accused, we now
examine the record. One of the primary issues that revealed itself is
inadequate representation by counsel for the appellant. On various crucial
dates, such as the committal of proceedings to the concerned Trial Court
(compliance of Section 209Cr.P.C.) and the examination-in-chief of the primary
witness of the prosecution, i.e.,PW-2, the appellant was not represented or
adequately so.
25.
What is apparent, therefore, is that the statements of PW-1 and PW-2, i.e., the
complainant and star witness respectively of the prosecution, were recorded in
the absence of counsel for the accused. Opportunity for cross-examination also
stood closed qua PW-1 which, in our view, cannot be countenanced. If a trial is
conducted in such a manner, the argument of prejudice will be available to the
accused. Presence of the accused’s counsel at the time of recording of the
statement is necessary. [See: Ekene Godwin v. State of T.N. [2024 SCC OnLine SC 337]]
26.
This Court has, in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab[(1994) 3 SCC 56927.] also
spoken of the purpose of cross-examination, they are: a) to call into question,
credibly the evidentiary value of the witness; b) to bring out such facts, that
may favour the cross-examining lawyer’s client; and c) to establish the said
witness, is unworthy of belief, and that his credit stands impeached.
27.
In the same vein, the effect of counsel not being present in Court on crucial
dates, and its effect on the sanctity of the entire exercise of prosecution has
to be considered. The matter begins before the Trial Court on 20th October
2014. Save the two occasions, i.e., on 1st September 2015 and 8th June 2016,
nowhere does the record state that counsel for the accused was absent[Whereas on other dates his presence was
recorded.] and on the latter date,
an Amicus Curie was appointed. On 21st February 2017, a different/new lawyer
was appointed as counsel for the accused, and on the same day, the matter was
put up for judgment.
28.
This frequent change in counsel as also the matter being reserved for judgment
on the very day that a new counsel for the accused is brought on record, leads
us to question the assistance given to the appellant by such lawyers. Was his
case effectively argued? Were all the possible gaps in the prosecution case
sufficiently explored and exploited to his advantage? Were the prosecution
witnesses ably cross-examined leading to the creation of a reasonable doubt,
where ver possible? All these questions arise in our mind, considering the
situation of the defence counsel. To us, the imposition of the death penalty
here appears fraught with danger and should not be sustained. We are supported
in holding such an apprehension by the fact that this Court has recognized that
sufficient time should be given to counsel to prepare the case and conduct the
same on behalf of his client. Although, it is true that there can be no
formulae for what may be considered sufficient, the same has to be determined
in the facts and circumstances of the case. [See: Bashira v. State of U.P. [1968 SCC OnLine SC 84]] As has already
been noticed, there was a change of counsel recorded in the daily status of the
Trial Court, arguments were closed on the very same day and the matter was
reserved for judgment. What is the efficiency of the newly appointed counsel’s
assistance to the appellant? This question stares in the face of the conclusion
of capital punishment arrived at by the Court, more so when there was a
frequent change of counsel during trial, losing out the continuity of thought
process.
Rights
under Section 311 and 313 Cr.P.C.
29.
Additionally, we may note the manner in which the application to recall under
Section 311 was filed and the statement of the accused in Section 313 Cr.P.C.
was refused and recorded respectively, is rendered questionable in the sum
total of circumstance. Both rights under these Sections are important for a
trial to reach a just conclusion. This principle has been repeatedly emphasized
by this Court through various judgments.
30.
On Section 311 and the rejection of the application, we may refer to the
observations of this Court in the Zahira Habibullah Sheikh (5) v. State of
Gujarat[(2006) 3 SCC 374]. It was
said :
“26… The section is manifestly
in two parts. Whereas the word used in the first part is “may”, the second part
uses “shall”. In consequence, the first part gives purely discretionary
authority to a criminal court and enables it at any stage of an enquiry, trial
or proceeding under the Code (a) to summon anyone as a witness, or (b) to
examine any person present in the court, or (c) to recall and re_examine any
person whose evidence has already been recorded. On the other hand, the second
part is mandatory and compels the court to take any of the aforementioned steps
if the new evidence appears to it essential to the just decision of the case.
This is a supplementary provision enabling, and in certain circumstances
imposing on the court the duty of examining a material witness who would not be
otherwise brought before it. It is couched in the widest possible terms and
calls for no limitation, either with regard to the stage at which the powers of
the court should be exercised, or with regard to the manner in which it should
be exercised. It is not only the prerogative but also the plain duty of a court
to examine such of those witnesses as it considers absolutely necessary for
doing justice between the State and the subject. There is a duty cast upon the
court to arrive at the truth by all lawful means and one of such means is the
examination of witnesses of its own accord when for certain obvious reasons
either party is not prepared to call witnesses who are known to be in a
position to speak important relevant facts.
27. The object
underlying Section 311 of the Code is that there may not be failure of justice
on account of mistake of either party in bringing the valuable evidence on
record or leaving ambiguity in the statements of the witnesses examined from
either side. The determinative factor is whether it is essential to the just
decision of the case. The section is not limited only for the benefit of the
accused, and it will not be an improper exercise of the powers of the court to
summon a witness under the section merely because the evidence supports the
case of the prosecution and not that of the accused. The section is a general
section which applies to all proceedings, enquiries and trials under the Code
and empowers the Magistrate to issue summons to any witness at any stage of
such proceedings, trial or enquiry. In Section 311 the significant expression
that occurs is “at any stage of any inquiry or trial or other proceeding under
this Code”. It is, however, to be borne in mind that whereas the section
confers a very wide power on the court on summoning witnesses, the discretion
conferred is to be exercised judiciously, as the wider the power the greater is
the necessity for application of judicial mind.
28. As indicated
above, the section is wholly discretionary. The second part of it imposes upon
the Magistrate an obligation : it is, that the court shall summon and examine
all persons whose evidence appears to be essential to the just decision of the
case. It is a cardinal rule in the law of evidence that the best available
evidence should be brought before the court…
29. The object of
Section 311 is to bring on record evidence not only from the point of view of
the accused and the prosecution but also from the point of view of the orderly
society. If a witness called by the court gives evidence against the
complainant, he should be allowed an opportunity to cross-examine. The right to
cross-examine a witness who is called by a court arises not under the
provisions of Section 311, but under the Evidence Act which gives a party the
right to cross-examine a witness who is not his own witness. Since a witness
summoned by the court could not be termed a witness of any particular party,
the court should give the right of cross-examination to the complainant. These
aspects were highlighted in Jamatraj Kewalji Govani v. State of Maharashtra
[(1967) 3 SCR 415 : AIR 1968 SC 178 : 1968 Cri LJ 231] .”
(Emphasis
supplied)
[See also: Jamatraj
Kewalji Govani v. State of Maharashtra[1967
SCC OnLine SC 19]; Rajendra Prasad v. Narcotic Cell[(1999) 6 SCC 110]; Vijay Kumar v. State of U.P. [(2011) 8 SCC 136]; Natasha Singh v.
CBI[(2013) 5 SCC 741];Rajaram Prasad
Yadav v. State of Bihar[(2013) 14 SCC
461]; State v. N. Seenivasagan[(2021)
14 SCC 1]; and Satbir Singh v. State of Haryana[2023 SCC OnLine 1086] ]
30.1
A perusal and consideration of the aforesaid decisions reveal the following
principles as governing the application of Section 311 Cr.P.C. :
(a) The Section is
divided into two parts, the first being directory with the use of the word
‘may’ and the latter being mandatory with the use of the word ‘shall’.
(b) The power of the
Court is couched in the widest terms possible with no express limitation
thereon.
(c) The exercise of
such power is not only the prerogative but also the duty of the Court, in
connection with a witness who may be considered absolutely necessary, in the
interest of justice.
(d) This power is to
be used both for the benefit of the prosecution and the defence. To summon a
witness because it serves the case of one of the parties and not the other,
would be improper.
(e) This power can be
exercised at any stage of proceedings, i.e. enquiry, trial or any other.
(f) Power is to be
exercised judiciously since wider the power, greater the requirement of the
application of a judicial mind.
(g) If a witness
so-called under this power, gives evidence against the complainant, the latter
should be given an opportunity to cross_examination. This power arises not
under Section 311 but under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
(h) A witness cannot
be recalled by the use of this power to simply fill up a lacuna in the case of
the prosecution.
31.
The order rejecting the application to recall witnesses, dated 18th February
2017 reads as below:
“18.02.2017- Case
called out Accused present in J.C. But not present. Counsel heared on
application 32-B brief order is passed on the application. After lunch on 2.30
P.M. an application for time to adduce defence witness 35-B moved by defence
counsel. Order passed on the application “Vide order of even date, application
u/s 311 moved by Ld counsel has been rejected. He sought time to adduce
arguments which was granted. After which, he has moved application for providing
defence evidence. If the Ld. Counsel produce the witness on the date fixed he
will be examined failing which matter will be posted for Judgment after hearing
argument of the prosecution.”
(A.S.J.
1st)”
Such
a summary rejection, in our view, is unjustified. The object and purpose of
this power of wide amplitude resting with the Trial Court has been detailed in
Zahira Habibullah Sheikh (5) (supra). Given that the counsel for the accused
had been changed, an additional charge has been added against the accused and
that it had taken over two years to record the evidence of the witnesses,
taking the sum total of circumstances, such an application should have been
allowed.
32.
Let us now consider, the examination of the accused under Section 313. In a
recent judgment titled Raj Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) [2023 SCC OnLine SC
609], this Court summarised the principles regarding Section 313 Cr.P.C., while
also observing that if prejudice is caused to the appellant in non-observance
of these principles, the trial would vitiate. [See: Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v.
State of Maharashtra[(1973) 2 SCC 793] ]
The principles are reproduced below for ready reference:
“17. The law consistently laid down by this Court
can be summarized as under :
(i) It is the duty of
the Trial Court to put each material circumstance appearing in the evidence
against the accused specifically, distinctively and separately. The material
circumstance means the circumstance or the material on the basis of which the prosecution
is seeking his conviction;
(ii) The object of
examination of the accused under Section 313 is to enable the accused to
explain any circumstance appearing against him in the evidence;
(iii) The Court must
ordinarily eschew material circumstances not put to the accused from
consideration while dealing with the case of the particular accused;
(iv) The failure to
put material circumstances to the accused amounts to a serious irregularity. It
will vitiate the trial if it is shown to have prejudiced the accused;
(v) If any
irregularity in putting the material circumstance to the accused does not
result in failure of justice, it becomes a curable defect. However, while
deciding whether the defect can be cured, one of the considerations will be the
passage of time from the date of the incident;
(vi) In case such
irregularity is curable, even the appellate court can question the accused on
the material circumstance which is not put to him;
(vii) In a given case,
the case can be remanded to the Trial Court from the stage of recording the
supplementary statement of the concerned accused under Section 313 of CrPC; and
(viii) While deciding
the question whether prejudice has been caused to the accused because of the
omission, the delay in raising the contention is only one of the several
factors to be considered.”
(Emphasis
supplied)
32.1
The statement recorded under Section 313 of the accused is as below :
“Name - Sovaran Singh
Father's Name -
Babura,
Age – 35
Occupation – Labourer
R/o – Rooppur
Thana – Karhal
District – Mainpuri
Question 1 - It is
well known that you have married Mamta, the plaintiff in this case.
What do you have to
say about this?
Answer - That is
correct.
Question 2 - The
prosecution says that on the day of the incident, dated 30.06.14, at about
11-12 in the night, you killed your daughter by holding her by the legs,
lifting her, throwing her on the ground and keeping your foot on her neck. What
do they call this?
Answer - That is
incorrect.
Question 3 - The
prosecution says that on 30.06.14 at about 11-12 in the night, you killed your
wife Smt. Mamta by hitting her with bricks, stones and bamboo and you scraped
the blood from the ground and threw it somewhere, what do you have to say about
this?
Answer - That is
incorrect.
Question 4 - It is
noteworthy that the complainant Mr. Rajnesh Kumar gave the report of the
incident as Exhibit-1 to the police station, according to which an FIR was
lodged which is Exhibit-6, which was disclosed in GD which is Exhibit-7, what
do you have to say about this?
Answer - Has given
false testimony.
Question 5 -
Prosecution says that after registration of the case in the police station, the
investigation was taken over by the investigating officer and on reaching the
spot of incident, on the indication of the plaintiff, he made a map of the
spot, which is Exhibit-10 and Exhibit_11. And under the supervision of the
investigating officer, a Panchnama of the deceased Smt. Mamta was prepared and
all the police records were prepared, which are Exhibit-1 and Exhibit-18. He
also prepared the Panchnama of the deceased Kumari Sapna and prepared police
records, which are Exhibit-19 and Exhibit-23. What do you have to say in this
regard?
Answer - I don't want
to say anything.
Question 6 -
Prosecution says that the investigator prepared the report on the spot by
taking soil, soil and blood stains from the crimescene, which is Exhibit-9.
What do you have to say about this?
Answer - I don't want
to say anything.
Question 7 - You heard
the statements of witnesses PW1 Rajnesh Kumar, plaintiff, PW2 Kumari Poonam.
Why do the witnesses testify against you?
Answer - It is false
testimony only.
Question 8 - You heard
the statements of witnesses PW1 Rajnesh Kumar, plaintiff, PW4 Kumar Ramveer
Singh, PW5 Inspector Balveer Singh, investigating officer, PW6 Omveer Singh.
Why do the witnesses testify?
Answer - Due to
animosity.
Question 9 - The
prosecution is true that you got the murder weapon, a lathi (bamboo), recovered
on your indication by the investigating officer, the report of which was
prepared by the investigating officer on the spot, which is Exhibit-12. What do
you have to say about this?Answer - This is incorrect.
Question 10 -
Prosecution Evidence that I0 submitted a charge sheet against you Ex. 13 based
on the availability of enough evidence. What do you have to say about it?
Answer - The wrong
Charge-sheet has been submitted.
Question 11 - Do you
want to say anymore?Answer - I don't want to say anything.
Question 12 - Why is
the case registered against you?
Answer - Due to
animosity.
Question 13 - Any
clarifications you would like to give?
Answer - Yes.”
32.2
The factors summarised in Raj Kumar (supra) were clearly not followed. All the
incriminating circumstances were not put to the accused. General, sweeping
questions were employed, which were only denied by him. Here, the role of the
prosecutor also requires to be highlighted. It is incumbent upon them to aid
the Court in preparing questions to be put to the accused. It has also been
held in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade (supra) that prejudice can be caused, if the
statements are not properly recorded. We find there to be adequate possibility
that the appellant has been prejudiced.
Obligations
under International Law
33.
The Indian Constitution enjoins a responsibility upon all persons to foster
respect for international law. [See:
Article 51(c) the Constitution of India] The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
1948, which is considered the foremost document in International Human Rights
Law, records guarantees for fairness in criminal procedure on two occasions,
i.e., Articles10 and 11. They read :
“Article 10
Everyone is entitled
in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial
tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any
criminal charge against him.
Article 11
1. Everyone charged
with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty
according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees
necessary for his defence.
2. No one shall be
held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did
not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the
time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one
that was applicable at the time the penal offence was committed.”
33.1
Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966,
which was ratified by India in 1979, guarantees equality to all persons before
the law. It is extracted as below[International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, available at:
https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments_mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights]
:
“1. All persons shall
be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any criminal
charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone
shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and
impartial tribunal established by law. The press and the public may be excluded
from all or part of a trial for reasons of morals, public order (ordre public)
or national security in a democratic society, or when the interest of the
private lives of the parties so requires, or to the extent strictly necessary
in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would
prejudice the interests of justice; but any judgement rendered in a criminal
case or in a suit at law shall be made publicexcept where the interest of
juvenile persons otherwise requires or the proceedings concern matrimonial
disputes or the guardianship of children.
2. Everyone charged
with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until
proved guilty according to law.
3. In the
determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be entitled to
the following minimum guarantees, in full equality:
(a) To be informed
promptly and in detail in a language which he understands of the nature and
cause of the charge against him;
(b) To have adequate
time and facilities for the preparation of his defence and to communicate with
counsel of his own choosing;
(c) To be tried
without undue delay;
(d) To be tried in his
presence, and to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his
own choosing; to be informed, if he does not have legal assistance, of this
right; and to have legal assistance assigned to him, in any case where the
interests of justice so require, and without payment by him in any such case if
he does not have sufficient means to pay for it;
(e) To examine, or
have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and
examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses
against him;
(f) To have the free
assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used
in court;
(g) Not to be compelled
to testify against himself or to confess guilt.
4. In the case of
juvenile persons, the procedure shall be such as will take account of their age
and the desirability of promoting their rehabilitation.
5. Everyone convicted
of a crime shall have the right to his conviction and sentence being reviewed
by a higher tribunal according to law.
6. When a person has
by a final decision been convicted of a criminal offence and when subsequently
his conviction has been reversed or he has been pardoned on the ground that a
new or newly discovered fact shows conclusively that there has been a
miscarriage of justice, the person who has suffered punishment as a result of
such conviction shall be compensated according to law, unless it is proved that
the non-disclosure of the unknown fact in time is wholly or partly attributable
to him.
7. No one shall be
liable to be tried or punished again for an offence for which he has already
been finally convicted or acquitted in accordance with the law and penal
procedure of each country.”
33.2
The International Criminal Court, which has been created by the Rome Statute to
investigate and where warranted, try “individuals charged with the gravest
crimes of concern to the international community: genocide, war crimes, crimes
against humanity and the crime of aggression[Article
67 49 https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/the-court].”thereof guarantees, in
proceedings before it, the rights of an accused in the following terms :“
Article 67
Rights of the accused
In the determination
of any charge, the accused shall be entitled to a public hearing, having regard
to the provisions of this Statute, to a fair hearing conducted impartially, and
to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality:
(a) To be informed
promptly and in detail of the nature, cause and content of the charge, in a
language which the accused fully understands and speaks;
(b) To have adequate
time and facilities for the preparation of the defence and to communicate
freely with counsel of the accused’s choosing in confidence;
(c) To be tried
without undue delay;
(d) Subject to article
63, paragraph 2, to be present at the trial, to conduct the defence in person
or through legal assistance of the accused’s choosing, to be informed, if the
accused does not have legal assistance, of this right and to have legal
assistance assigned by the Court in any case where the interests of justice so
require, and without payment if the accused lacks sufficient means to pay for it;
(e) To examine, or
have examined, the witnesses against him or her and to obtain the attendance
and examination of witnesses on his or her behalf under the same conditions as
witnesses against him or her. The accused shall also be entitled to raise
defences and to present other evidence admissible under this Statute;
(f) To have, free of
any cost, the assistance of a competent interpreter and such translations as
are necessary to meet the requirements of fairness, if any of the proceedings
of or documents presented to the Court are not in a language which the accused
fully understands and speaks;
(g) Not to be
compelled to testify or to confess guilt and to remain silent, without such
silence being a consideration in the determination of guilt or innocence;
(h) To make an unsworn
oral or written statement in his or her defence; and
(i) Not to have
imposed on him or her any reversal of the burden of proof or any onus of
rebuttal.
3. In addition to any
other disclosure provided for in this Statute, the Prosecutor shall, as soon as
practicable, disclose to the defence evidence in the Prosecutor’s possession or
control which he or she believes shows or tends to show the innocence of the
accused, or to mitigate the guilt of the accused, or which may affect the
credibility of prosecution evidence. In case of doubt as to the application of
this paragraph, the Court shall decide.”
What rights of an
accused being codified in the Rome Statute signifies is that even when it comes
to the gravest and most heinous crimes committed against humanity as a whole, a
person accused of having so committed such offences is also entitled to basic
protection under the law. In our facts, ending someone’s life is, in fact, one
of the gravest crimes that a person may commit, and so even here the accused is
entitled to the protection of law ensuring that the process that condemns him
as ‘convicted of an offence’, is free of procedural irregularities and
blemishes which may call into question the credibility of the conclusion
arrived at by such a process.
The sole purpose of
reproduction of the above articles is to restate and emphasize the commitment
to international law. All prosecutions and conclusions of either guilt or
innocence must give due importance and primacy to these obligations along with
constitutional and statutory guarantees as discussed supra.
34.
Before parting with these matters, we may observe the casual manner in which
the prosecution and the trial proceeded. Record reveals set for examination of
witnesses was 13th January, 2015 where after, on 15 occasions till 14th August
2015, the accused was present from judicial custody the matter was adjourned as
witnesses were not present. No explanation can be found for this lackadaisical
approach of the prosecution. In fact, till 1st June 2015, the matter was
adjourned on 33 occasions and only once on 1st September 2015 was one witness
examined. Over a trial period of 2.3 years, the matter was posted on 74
occasions and surprisingly, for a variety of reasons including the majority
thereof being non-production of witnesses, was adjourned on 52 occasions
approximately. In a matter of this nature, it cannot be stressed enough that
the examination of witnesses and smooth conduct of trial is essential which
obviously, was given a go-by.
35.
In view of the above discussion, the judgments of the Trial Court convicting
the appellant of the charged offence and awarding capital punishment and
confirmation thereof by the High Court, with particulars as mentioned in Para 1
cannot be sustained and, as such, is set aside. The Appeals are accordingly
allowed. The matters are remanded to the Trial Court and restored on the
respective docket. The Trial Court shall proceed afresh from the stage of
framing of charge. Trial is expedited. It shall proceed, to the extent possible
on a day-to-day basis. Parties shall appear before the Trial Court on 18th
March 2025 and fully cooperate during trial. It is requested that the matter be
heard and judgment delivered within a period of one year.
36.
In conclusion, we may observe the importance of compliance with the principles
of law and procedural rigours, since now, due to such clear non_compliance all
parties to the dispute shall have to go through the process of trial once more
and relive the horrific offence committed against the two deceased persons,
namely, Smt. Mamta and Kumari Sapna. Courts must give due regard to such
aspects and not be swayed by the emotions that the offence may evoke.
37.
The Registry is directed to communicate this order to the Registrar General,
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad who shall ensure its swift passage to the
concerned court. Pending application(s) if any, are disposed of.
------