Indian Judgements

Indian Judgements

Substitution of legal representatives

Civil Appeals both stemming from disputes over specific performance of agreements to sell property that originated in the 1970s. The core issue in both appeals revolves around the abatement of second appeals due to the death of original parties (Om Prakash Gupta, Satish Chandra, and Rooprani) and the timeliness and necessity of substituting their legal heirs. The Court analyzes whether previous High Court decisions to dismiss the appeals as abated, or to recall orders restoring them, were justified, particularly concerning the interpretation of legal procedures for substitution and condonation of delay when a party dies. Ultimately, the Supreme Court overturns the High Court’s orders, emphasizing a justice-oriented approach and concluding that the appeals should be restored and heard on their merits with the legal heirs properly substituted.

(A) Civil Procedure Code, 1908, Order 22 Rule 1, 3 and 4 – Limitation Act, 1963, Section 5; Article 120 and 121 – Substitution of legal representatives  – Abatement – Condonation of delay – Limitation – Rule 1 of Order 22, CPC provides that when a party to a suit passes away, the suit will not abate if the right to sue survives – In instances where the right to sue does survive, the procedure for bringing on record the legal representative(s) of the plaintiff/appellant and the defendant/respondent are provided in Rules 3 and 4, respectively, of Order 22 – The suit/appeal automatically abates when an application to substitute the legal representative(s) of the deceased party is not filed within the prescribed limitation period of 90 days from the date of death, as stipulated by Article 120 of the  Act, 1963 – It could well be so that death of a defendant/respondent is not made known to the plaintiff/appellant within 90 days, being the period of limitation – In the event the plaintiff/appellant derives knowledge of death immediately after the suit/appeal has abated, the remedy available is to file an application seeking setting aside of the abatement, the limitation wherefor is stipulated in Article 121 and which allows a period of 60 days – Therefore, between the 91st and the 150th  day after the death, one has to file an application for setting aside the abatement – On the 151st day, this remedy becomes time-barred; consequently, any application seeking to set aside the abatement must then be accompanied by a request contained in an application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in filing the application for setting aside the abatement – Thus, the total time-frame for filing an application for substitution and for setting aside abatement, as outlined in Articles 120 and 121 of the Limitation Act, is 150 (90 + 60) days – The question of condonation of delay, through an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, arises only after this period and not on the 91st day when the suit/appeal abates.

(Para 11)

(B) Civil Procedure Code, 1908, Order 22 Rule 1, 3 and 4 – Limitation Act, 1963, Section 5; Article 120 and 121 – Substitution of legal representatives  – Abatement – Condonation of delay – Sufficient cause – Found it somewhat of a frequent occurrence that after abatement of the suit and after the 150th day of death, an application is filed for condonation of delay in filing the application for substitution but not an application seeking condonation of delay in filing the application for setting aside the abatement – The proper sequence to be followed, therefore, is an application for substitution within 90 days of death and if not filed, to file an application for setting aside the abatement within 60 days and if that too is not filed, to file the requisite applications for substitution and setting aside the abatement with an accompanying application for condonation of delay in filing the latter application, i.e., the application for setting aside the abatement – Once the court is satisfied that sufficient cause prevented the plaintiff/appellant from applying for setting aside the abatement within the period of limitation and orders accordingly, comes the question of setting the abatement – That happens as a matter of course and following the order for substitution of the deceased defendant/respondent, the suit/appeal regains its earlier position and would proceed for a trial/hearing on merits.

(Para 11)

(C) Civil Procedure Code, 1908, Order 22 Rule 4 – Civil Procedure – Substitution of legal representatives – Whether the heirs of ‘O’ were required to file a separate application for substitution when, admittedly, an application for substitution had previously been filed by the heirs of ‘S’? – Held that Rule 4 of Order 22 lays down the procedure in case of death of one of several defendants or of sole defendant – It does not expressly provide who between the parties to a civil suit is to present an application for substitution – There seems to be no legal requirement that on the death of a defendant, an application for substitution in all cases has to be made by the plaintiff only and that, any application, made by the heir(s)/legal representative(s) of the deceased defendant seeking an order to allow him/them step into the shoes of the deceased defendant and to contest the suit, cannot be considered – Once an application has been made by either party and the court has been informed about the death of a party and who the heir(s)/legal representative(s) he has left behind, the only thing that remains for the court is to pass an order substituting the heir(s)/legal representative(s) – Held that the application moved by the heirs of ‘S’ whereby the court was informed by them of his death and the heirs that he had left behind, amounted to an application for substitution which was legally permissible and valid and deserved consideration.

(Para 16)

(D) Civil Procedure Code, 1908, Order 22 Rule 4, 10A – Civil Procedure – Substitution of legal representatives – Contention that the application filed by the heirs of ‘S’ was an application intimating the death of ‘S’ under Order 22 Rule 10-A, CPC and it was not an application under Rule 4 thereof; thus, there being no valid and proper application for substitution, the appeal was rightly held to have abated repelled – Held that the application filed by the heirs of ‘S’  was registered as a substitution application and the prayer was also for deletion of the name of ‘S’  and substitution of his three sons in his place – Held that an application having been filed by the heirs of ‘S’ , the heirs of ‘O’ were not legally obliged to apply separately for substitution – Law not having expressly mandated that an application for substitution has to be filed by the plaintiff/appellant upon receiving intimation of death, requiring a formal application from the plaintiff only will serve no tangible purpose – A justice-oriented approach has to be followed in interpreting the provisions of the CPC is the well settled law – High Court having been duly informed of the death of ‘S’, and substitution having been prayed by the heirs of the deceased, it ought to have proceeded to consider such application and pass an order bringing the heirs of the deceased respondent on record – Order dated 2nd January 2007 vide which the second appeal was dismissed as having abated cannot sustain and will have to be set aside.

(Para 17 to 21)

(E) Civil Procedure Code, 1908, Order 22 Rule 4, 10A – Substitution of legal representatives – Abatement of second appeal – Second appeal was restored by the High Court vide order dated 25th May, 2018 – This order, restoring the second appeal, was recalled vide order dated 11th January 2019 – The reason given was that, in the absence of an application praying for setting aside the abatement, the second appeal could not have been ordered to be restored – Held that find it difficult to agree with such reasoning – When an application praying for substitution had been made, then, even assuming that it does not have an explicit prayer for setting aside the abatement, such prayer could be read as inherent in the prayer for substitution in the interest of justice – Impugned orders as well as the order dismissing the second appeal as abated, under challenge held to be bad in law and the same deserves to be set aside.

(Para 22 to 24)

(F) Civil Procedure Code, 1908, Order 22 10A – Substitution of legal representatives – Abatement of second appeal – Rule 10-A casts a duty upon a pleader appearing for a party to the suit to intimate the court about the death of such party – It further provides that once the court is informed by the pleader of a party that he is no more, the court “shall” notify the opposing party of the death – A straightforward interpretation of this rule would suggest that the court’s obligation to issue notice to the other party is indeed mandatory – Nonetheless, this obligation may not arise in all circumstances – One notable exception could be when the information regarding the party’s death is conveyed to the court in the presence of the opposing party’s pleader or is documented by the court in the order sheet – In such cases, if the pleader of the concerned party (and consequently the party itself) has already been notified, issuing a further notice from the court would not serve any substantial purpose other than being an exercise by way of abundant caution – Therefore, in the aforementioned scenario, the absence of a notice from the court would not imply a failure to comply with Rule 10A, suggesting that it is not “always mandatory”.

(Para 29)

(G) Civil Procedure Code, 1908, Order 22 10A – Substitution of legal representatives – Abatement of second appeal – In the affidavit submitted alongside an application by ‘A’ which primarily was not intended to inform the court of ‘R’’s death, it was stated that he is “one of the sons of deceased ‘R’ – The inclusion of such pertinent information within an inconspicuous section of an application meant for a different purpose without the date of death does not constitute sufficient compliance with Rule 10-A either by the pleader of the deceased or amount to due notice to ‘O’ by the court (without such death being recorded in any order passed subsequently in the presence of counsel for Om Prakash) – To rule otherwise would undermine the intention of Rule 10-A, which mandates the clear communication of information relating to death of a party which, obviously, would mean not only the factum of death being conveyed but also the date of death since limitation to apply under Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for substitution begins to run from the date of death – The manner of conveying information of the death of ‘R’ was not wholly in accordance with Rule 10-A, information through the application of ‘A’ cannot operate adversely against ‘O’ – Had ‘O’ been noticed by the High Court in due compliance with Rule 10-A, yet, did not file an application for substitution, he would be estopped from pleading ignorance and we would have been inclined to hold otherwise – This not being the case, the abatement of the second appeal ought to be set aside – Although no application praying for setting aside of abatement was ever made by the appellants before the High Court, but prayer for setting aside of abatement can be read in a prayer for substitution – Accordingly, the abatement of the second appeal can and ought to be set aside for ends of justice.

(Para 30 to 32)

Om Prakash Gupta Alias Lalloowa (Now … V. Satish Chandra (Now Deceased)

Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 183: (DoJ 11-02-2025)

2025 INSC 183 Click here to View Full Text of Judgment

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Delayed Death: When ‘Attempted Murder’ Becomes More

Maniklall Sahu, the appellant, along with three co-accused, trespassed into the house of Rekhchand Verma, assaulted him with sticks and fisticuffs, and flung him from a terrace. The injured person, Rekhchand Verma, initially survived but was in a critical condition. He eventually succumbed to his injuries approximately nine months after the incident, dying on 8th November 2022 due to septicaemia and pneumonia, leading to cardiorespiratory arrest. The trial court had initially convicted the appellant under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) for murder. However, the High Court altered this conviction to Section 307 IPC for attempt to murder, sentencing the appellant to 7 years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000/-. The appellant subsequently filed this appeal challenging the Section 307 IPC conviction.

Law Involved The primary legal provisions under consideration are Sections 299, 300, 302, and 307 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

Section 307 IPC (Attempt to Murder): This section deals with acts done with the intention or knowledge that it might cause death, and if death occurs, the act would be murder.

Section 299 IPC (Culpable Homicide): Defines culpable homicide.

Section 300 IPC (Murder): Specifies when culpable homicide amounts to murder, including acts done with the intention of causing death, or causing bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or knowing the act is so imminently dangerous that it will most probably cause death.

Section 302 IPC (Punishment for Murder): Prescribes the punishment for murder. The core legal question revolves around the “Application of Theory of Causation where death ensues after some delay” and whether the High Court correctly applied Section 307 IPC despite the victim’s eventual death.

Reasoning The Supreme Court critically analysed the High Court’s decision to alter the conviction from Section 302 IPC to Section 307 IPC, especially given the victim’s death.

  1. Medical Evidence and Causation: The Court reviewed extensive medical evidence, which consistently showed that the deceased, Rekhchand Verma, suffered severe injuries, including a head injury, spinal cord injury leading to paraplegia, and multiple complications such as infected bedsores, septic shock, and bilateral pneumonia. Medical experts testified that these complications were a direct result of the initial injuries sustained during the assault and were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The Court highlighted that the injured person received medical treatment for nine months before his demise. The Court concluded that the injuries suffered were grievous and that the death was a consequence of these injuries, with complications like septicaemia and pneumonia not breaking the chain of causation.
  2. High Court’s Error: The Supreme Court determined that the High Court committed a serious error in bringing the case under the ambit of “attempt to commit murder” (Section 307 IPC) on the premise that the victim survived for about nine months, and his death was due to complications during treatment and not directly from the initial injuries. The Supreme Court stressed that if the injury was fatal and intended to cause death, or if death occurred after some delay due to septicaemia or other complications stemming from the injury, the offence would fall under the first limb of Section 300 IPC (murder) [36a]. Furthermore, if the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and death occurred due to septicaemia or other complications, the act would amount to culpable homicide punishable under Section 302 IPC, falling under the third limb of Section 300 IPC [36b, 37c, 37d].
  3. Jurisprudence on Delayed Death: Drawing on various precedents, the Court reiterated that delayed death or intervening medical conditions (like septicaemia or pneumonia) do not automatically absolve an accused of murder charges if the initial injuries were the proximate cause of death. The Court concluded that the cause of death was indeed due to the injuries suffered, and the contention that the death resulted from a lack of proper treatment or was disconnected from the initial assault was unfounded.

Holding The Supreme Court dismissed Maniklall Sahu’s appeal . While the appellant’s conviction under Section 307 IPC (attempt to murder) as altered by the High Court stands affirmed due to the dismissal of his appeal, the Supreme Court clearly stated that the High Court committed a serious error in altering the conviction from Section 302 IPC to Section 307 IPC . The Supreme Court’s detailed reasoning underscored that given the medical evidence and the established chain of causation, the offence should have been considered murder or culpable homicide amounting to murder, punishable under Section 302 IPC, because the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.

Maniklall Sahu Vs State of Chhattisgarh

Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 1107: (DoJ 12-09-2025)

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Tender Troubles: Supreme Court Upholds Bid Sanctity, Overturns Rectification

The case originated from an electronic bid (No. 7 of 2023-24) issued by the Superintending Engineer and Project Director, Project Implementation Unit – I, Public Works (Roads) Directorate, Government of West Bengal, on 17.10.2023. The tender was for collecting Road User Fee (RUF) from commercial vehicles for 1095 days. The earnest money deposit was fixed at Rs. 25,00,000.00. Seven bidders participated. The technical bids were evaluated, and four bidders were technically qualified, including Prakash Asphaltings and Toll Highways (India) Limited (appellant) and Mandeepa Enterprises (respondent No. 1).

Financial bids were opened on 08.12.2023. The appellant, Prakash Asphaltings, was found to be the highest bidder (H1) with a quoted amount of Rs. 91,19,00,000.00 for 1095 days. Respondent No. 1, Mandeepa Enterprises, was the lowest bidder (H4) with an offered amount of Rs. 9,72,999.00 per day.

Respondent No. 1 subsequently claimed a typographical error in their financial bid, stating they intended to quote Rs. 106,54,33,905.00 for the entire contract period instead of Rs. 9,72,999.00 per day. They requested the tendering authority to treat the figure of Rs. 9,72,999.00 as a typographical error and read it as Rs. 106,54,33,905.00. The tendering authority rejected this request on 20.12.2023, stating that correction of a financial bid after opening was not possible and would impeach the sanctity of the tender process.

Aggrieved, Respondent No. 1 filed a writ petition (WPA No. 29001 of 2023) before a Single Judge of the High Court, which was dismissed on 03.01.2024, as the Single Judge found no scope for interference. Respondent No. 1 then filed an intra-court appeal (MAT No. 93 of 2024). A Division Bench of the High Court allowed the appeal on 23.02.2024, observing that the error in quoting the figure by respondent No. 1 was inadvertent. The Division Bench directed the tendering authority to evaluate Respondent No. 1’s BOQ at Rs. 106,54,33,905.00 and offer other bidders the opportunity to match this figure. This civil appeal was directed against the Division Bench’s judgment and order.

Law Involved

Clause 4(g) of the Notice Inviting Electronic Bid: This clause specifically states that any change in the template of the Bill of Quantity (BOQ) will not be accepted under any circumstances.

Clause 5B(v) of the Instructions to Bidders: This clause outlines that during bid evaluation, if bidders fail to submit supporting documents or original hard copies within the stipulated timeframe, their proposals will be liable for rejection.

Article 226 of the Constitution of India: Pertains to the High Court’s jurisdiction to issue writs.

Principles of Equity and Natural Justice in Tender Processes: The judgment refers to the importance of these principles in tender and contract awards, but also emphasises that these principles should be kept at a distance when there is a violation of rules.

Judicial Review of Administrative Action: The Court reiterated that judicial review in administrative action, particularly tenders, is limited to preventing arbitrariness, irrationality, bias, and mala fides. Courts should not interfere with a decision unless it is “unlawful” or “unsound”.

Public Interest: Tenders are a cornerstone of governmental procurement processes, aiming for competitiveness, fairness, and transparency in resource allocation. Adherence to rules and conditions and the sanctity of the tender process are paramount.

Reasoning The Supreme Court reasoned that the Division Bench’s interpretation was erroneous for several key reasons:

Sanctity of Tender Process: The Court held that allowing rectification of financial bids after they have been opened would impeach the sanctity and integrity of the entire tender process.

Strict Adherence to Tender Conditions: Clause 4(g) explicitly prohibits any change in the BOQ template under any circumstances. The Division Bench’s broad interpretation of “bona fide mistake” to allow rectification was held to be incorrect and would put “shackles on the functioning of the tendering authority”.

Nature of the Mistake: While Respondent No. 1 claimed an inadvertent mistake, it was effectively a unilateral or systematic computer typographical transmission failure, not one attributable to the tendering authority. Such a mistake, even if unintentional, cannot be a ground to allow post-bid modifications that would undermine the competitive bidding process.

Adverse Consequences to Public Exchequer: The Division Bench’s decision to re-evaluate Respondent No. 1’s bid at a significantly higher amount (Rs. 106,54,33,905.00) meant that the appellant, who was originally the H1 bidder, would be displaced. This would lead to a considerable loss of revenue to the state exchequer (approximately 15 crores) by not accepting the higher bid of the appellant and giving an opportunity to Respondent No. 1 to correct its bid post-opening.

Limited Scope of Judicial Review: The Court reiterated that interference by a writ court in ongoing tender processes is not permissible unless there is a clear violation of principles of natural justice, or the decision is arbitrary or mala fide. The Division Bench’s decision was deemed a clear violation of natural justice principles.

Non-Joinder of Party: The appellant (Prakash Asphaltings), as the highest bidder and a directly affected party, was not made a party respondent in the intra-court appeal before the Division Bench, which was viewed as prejudicial and a violation of natural justice.

Holding The Supreme Court allowed the civil appeal, thereby setting aside and quashing the judgment and order dated 23.02.2024 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court at Calcutta in MAT No. 93 of 2024. The Court sustained the order of the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition. Consequently, Prakash Asphaltings and Toll Highways (India) Limited (the appellant), being the H1 bidder, is to be awarded the contract in terms of the notice inviting electronic bid dated 17.10.2023. The Court also ruled that there shall be no order as to costs.

Prakash Asphaltings And Toll Highways (India) Limited Vs Mandeep Enterprises And Others

Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 1108: (DoJ 12-09-2025)

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“Speculative Investors” Barred from IBC Relief: Supreme Court Upholds Homebuyer Protections

Four appeals were heard together, arising from orders of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT). The key appellants, Mansi Brar Fernandes and Sunita Agarwal, had entered into agreements with developers (Gayatri Infra Planner Pvt. Ltd. and Antriksh Infratech Pvt. Ltd., respectively) for property units. Both agreements included buy-back clauses and involved advance payments. The developers defaulted, and the appellants initiated proceedings under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC). The NCLAT reversed the admission of these applications, branding the appellants as “speculative investors” rather than genuine homebuyers or financial creditors.

Law Involved: The central legal framework is the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC), specifically Section 7, which governs the initiation of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) by financial creditors. The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Ordinance, 2019, and the subsequent Amendment Act, are also critical. These amendments introduced a threshold requirement for allottees to file a Section 7 application (requiring at least 10% of allottees or 100 allottees). The Court frequently referenced its earlier judgment in Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd v. Union of India, which distinguishes between genuine homebuyers and speculative investors. The judgment also emphasizes the Right to Shelter as a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution and the role of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (RERA).

Reasoning: The Supreme Court deliberated on the distinction between “speculative investors” and “genuine homebuyers” within the context of the IBC. It observed that the IBC is intended as a collective mechanism to revive viable projects and safeguard the fundamental right to shelter of genuine homebuyers, not as a recovery tool or a bargaining chip for individuals. The legislative intent behind recognizing allottees as financial creditors was to protect genuine homebuyers, while simultaneously preventing misuse by speculative investors seeking premature exits or exorbitant returns, which had burdened the real estate sector and the adjudicatory machinery.

The Court provided criteria to identify speculative investors, including: agreements that substitute possession with buy-back or refund options, insistence on refunds with high interest, purchase of multiple units (especially in double digits), demanding special rights or privileges, deviations from the RERA Model Agreement, and unrealistic interest rates or promises of returns. The transaction entered into by Mansi Brar Fernandes, involving a buy-back clause and the pursuit of commercial returns rather than possession, led the Court to conclude that she was indeed a speculative investor. Similarly, Sunita Agarwal’s agreement for an “investment” with a 25% per annum return over 24 months, coupled with a buy-back clause, indicated a speculative intent.

While affirming the NCLAT’s finding that the appellants were “speculative investors,” the Supreme Court clarified that the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Ordinance, 2019, was indeed applicable to the facts of the present case, correcting the NCLAT’s reasoning on this point [19, 20, 35, 36, 48(ii)]. The Court applied the doctrine of Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit (an act of the Court shall prejudice no one) to address the procedural issues related to the Ordinance’s applicability and the delay it caused.

Holding: The Supreme Court affirmed the NCLAT’s findings that Mansi Brar Fernandes and Sunita Agarwal were “speculative investors” and therefore not entitled to initiate proceedings under Section 7 of the IBC [25, 34, 48(i)]. Consequently, the Court upheld the NCLAT’s orders setting aside the admission of their Section 7 applications by the NCLT [48(i)]. However, the Court clarified that the Ordinance/Amendment Act was applicable to the case, although this correction in reasoning did not alter the ultimate outcome given the appellants’ status as speculative investors [48(ii)]. The appellants remain free to pursue their remedies through other appropriate legal forums, without being barred by limitation [48(i)].

Mansi Brar Fernandes Vs Subha Sharma And Anr.

Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 1110: (DoJ 12-09-2025)

2025 INSC 1110 Download Supreme Court File

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