This judgment by the Supreme Court of India addresses critical questions regarding the enforcement of orders under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (the 1986 Act), particularly in light of subsequent amendments in 2002 and the replacement by the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 (the 2019 Act).
The case is between Palm Groves Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. (Appellant) and M/s Magar Girme and Gaikwad Associates etc. (Respondent builder/developer). The appellant society comprises flat purchasers, formed by the respondent builder in 2003 under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960.
The respondent builder acquired development rights in 1995 for a housing project named “Palm Groves.” Flat-buyers entered into agreements, and the appellant society filed a consumer complaint against the builder and original landowners for defects in construction, deficiency of service, and failure to execute the Deed of Conveyance.
District Forum’s Order: On March 16, 2007, the District Forum partly allowed the complaint, directing the respondent builder to pay ₹5,00,000/- compensation to the appellant society and the respondent bungalow owners to pay ₹2,00,000/-. Crucially, it directed the respondent builder to execute a Conveyance Deed in favour of the appellant society. It also declared that unit holders had equal right to common facilities and amenities.
Execution Proceedings: An execution petition was filed seeking enforcement of the Conveyance Deed, which was passed by the District Forum. The District Forum, on November 20, 2007, directed the respondent builder to execute a deed of conveyance.
Appeals and Revisions:
The State Commission partially allowed three appeals, modifying the District Forum’s order dated March 16, 2007, but upheld the compensation for the appellant society.
The appellant society preferred a revision before the National Commission, which set aside the State Commission’s order dated May 5, 2016, and remanded the matter back to the State Commission.
The respondent builder challenged the order of the District Forum dated November 20, 2007, by filing revision petitions before the State Commission under Section 17(1)(b) of the 1986 Act.
The State Commission allowed these revision petitions and set aside the District Forum’s execution order of November 20, 2007.
The National Commission dismissed subsequent Execution Revision Petitions filed by the appellant society, holding them “not maintainable”.
Law Involved
The core of the judgment revolves around the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, particularly concerning:
Enforcement of Orders: Section 25 of the 1986 Act deals with the enforcement of orders passed by the District Forum, State Commission, or National Commission.
Prior to the 2002 Amendment Act, Section 25 merely stated that every order could be enforced as if it were a decree of a civil court. After the 2002 Amendment Act (w.e.f. 15.03.2003), it included provisions for attaching property and recovering amounts as arrears of land revenue for non-compliance with “interim orders”.
The 2019 Act replaced Section 25 with Section 71, providing comprehensive provisions for enforcement of “every order” in the same manner as a decree or order made by a Civil Court.
Appeals against Execution Orders: Section 27-A of the 1986 Act provided for appeals against orders passed under Section 27, which relates to penalties for non-compliance. Appeals from District Forum orders would go to the State Commission, from the State Commission to the National Commission, and from the National Commission to the Supreme Court.
Jurisdiction of Forums:
District Forum (Section 11): Jurisdictional limits for entertaining complaints.
State Commission (Section 17): Jurisdiction to entertain complaints exceeding ₹5 lakhs but not ₹20 lakhs (under the 1986 Act) and to call for records and pass appropriate orders. Section 17(1)(b) allowed the State Commission to entertain appeals against District Forum orders.
National Commission (Section 21): Jurisdiction to entertain appeals against State Commission orders.
Definition of “Complaint”: Section 2(c) defines a complaint, which includes allegations of unfair trade practice, restrictive trade practice, defects in goods, or deficiency in service.
The main issue was the interpretation of “interim order” in Section 25 (post-2002 amendment) versus the broader “every order” in the original 1986 Act and the 2019 Act, and whether a revision petition against an order passed in execution proceedings was maintainable.
Reasoning
The Supreme Court meticulously analyzed the evolution of Section 25 of the 1986 Act and its replacement by Section 71 of the 2019 Act.
Legislative Intent and Anomaly: The Court noted that the 1986 Act, being beneficial legislation, adopted a constructive liberal approach. The 2002 Amendment Act substituted Section 25, which primarily focused on the enforcement of ‘interim orders’ via attachment or sale of property, or recovery as arrears of land revenue. This created an anomaly or lacuna because there was no specific provision in the amended Section 25 for executing a ‘final order’. The Court observed that “every order” (as per the pre-2002 and 2019 Act) was enforceable as a decree, but the post-2002 Section 25 created a distinction without clarity for final orders.
Interpretation of Statutes: The Court emphasized the normal principle of statutory interpretation, stating that words should be given their normal meaning to avoid confusion or absurdity. When words are vague or ambiguous, or if their normal meaning leads to absurdity or repugnancy, courts can use interpretative tools to set the situation right. The intent of the legislature to provide remedies for consumers should not be defeated by an inadvertent error in drafting. The Court cited various precedents stressing the need to avoid absurdity and give meaning to the statute’s object.
Section 25 (Post-2002) vs. “Every Order”: The Court found that the omission of ‘every order’ in Section 25 after the 2002 Amendment, limiting it to ‘interim orders’ for enforcement, was an “injudicious blunder” and a “lacuna”. It inferred that the legislature intended for all orders (interim or final) to be enforceable, despite the drafting error. The 2019 Act rectified this anomaly by clearly stating that “every order” shall be enforced in the same manner as a decree of a Civil Court.
Maintainability of Revision Petitions against Execution Orders: The Court determined that revision petitions filed against orders passed in execution proceedings under Section 27-A of the 1986 Act are not maintainable. Appeals are the prescribed remedy. The National Commission erred in dismissing the appellant society’s revision petitions as “not maintainable” based on this reasoning. The proper remedy was an appeal under Section 27A.
Holding
The Supreme Court’s judgment held the following:
Section 25 of the 1986 Act (post-2002 Amendment), despite using the term ‘interim order’, was always understood to mean that ‘every order’ passed by different Fora under the 1986 Act was enforceable. This interpretation is necessary to align with the spirit and object of the 1986 Act.
The omission of “every order” in sub-section (1) of Section 25 of the 1986 Act (post-2002 amendment) was an apparent error in drafting.
Execution petitions were being filed, entertained, and disposed of even during the interregnum (period between 2002 Amendment and 2019 Act).
Revision petitions against orders passed in execution proceedings are not maintainable. The remedy to challenge such orders lies in filing an appeal before the appropriate Commission as per Section 27-A of the 1986 Act.
The National Commission’s decision to dismiss the revision petitions filed by the appellant society on the ground of maintainability was therefore correct, as the appropriate remedy was an appeal.
The Court appreciated the assistance of the learned Attorney General for India and learned Senior Counsel, Shri R. Venkataramani and Shri Jai Deep Gupta, in resolving the anomalous situation in Section 25(1) of the 1986 Act.
Palm Groves Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. v. M/s Magar Girme and Gaikwad Associates Etc.
Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 1023 (DoJ 22-08-2025)
