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SRA’s Misconduct & Land Grabbing Attempt Foiled: Supreme Court Upholds Church’s Redevelopment Right

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The dispute revolved around the validity of the acquisition of a portion of land (1,596.40 sq. m.) at CTS No. B-960 in Village Bandra, Mumbai, owned by the Basilica of Our Lady of the Mount (Church Trust). This Subject Land, encroached by hutment dwellers since the 1930s, was declared a Slum Area in parts in 1978 and 2002. The slum dwellers formed the Shri Kadeshwari Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. (Proposed) (Kadeshwari Society).

In 2017, Kadeshwari Society appointed M/s Saldanha Real Estates Pvt. Ltd. (Saldanha) as its developer for redevelopment. Saldanha also attempted to purchase the land from the Church Trust, offering INR 3 crores, but the deal did not proceed. The Church Trust intended a composite redevelopment of the Subject Land with other plots, including ‘Nirmala Colony’. Kadeshwari Society, however, opposed this and sought an NOC for Saldanha to redevelop the Subject Land independently.

Kadeshwari Society then submitted a proposal to the Slum Rehabilitation Authority (SRA) to declare the Subject Slum (including parts of BMC land) as a Slum Rehabilitation Area (SR Area) under Section 3C(1) of the Slums Act. Despite the Church Trust informing the SRA of its own redevelopment plans and submitting a feasibility report, the SRA processed Kadeshwari Society’s proposal. The SRA declared the Subject Slum as an SR Area on December 29, 2020, rejecting the Church Trust’s objections. The Church Trust appealed this order to the Apex Grievance Redressal Committee (AGRC), but the appeal remained unheard.

Subsequently, both Saldanha (with Kadeshwari Society’s support) and the Church Trust submitted redevelopment proposals. The SRA only considered Saldanha’s proposal and initiated acquisition proceedings for the Subject Land under Section 14, based on Kadeshwari Society’s application. The Church Trust’s proposal was rejected by the SRA on technical grounds.

Aggrieved by the acquisition proceedings, the Church Trust approached the High Court. The High Court, in its judgment dated June 11, 2024, declared the acquisition void and directed the SRA to consider the landowner’s proposal for redevelopment, citing the Church Trust’s preferential right to develop the Subject Land. Kadeshwari Society, Saldanha, and the SRA filed appeals against this High Court judgment.

Law Involved:

Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971 (Slums Act): This is the primary legislation governing the dispute.

Chapter I-A of the Slums Act: Specifically addresses Slum Rehabilitation Areas.

Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) (Amendment) Act, 2017 (2018 Amendment): Introduced changes to the Slums Act, which came into force on April 26, 2018.

Section 3B: Amended to allow the SRA to amend General Slum Rehabilitation Schemes, broadened the scope of matters to be provided for, and explicitly included ‘owners’ as stakeholders. A new sub-section (4) stipulated that the General SR Scheme would be deemed Development Control Regulations and prevail over others.

Section 3C(1): Augmented the process for declaring land as an SR Area, requiring a 30-day notice and opportunity to be heard for owners and stakeholders before the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) issues a reasoned order.

 Section 13 (as modified by Section 3D): Modified to qualify ‘reasonable time’ for owners to come forward for redevelopment as “not more than one hundred and twenty days”. It also introduced an appeal mechanism to the Apex Grievance Redressal Committee (AGRC).

 Section 14: Outlines the power of the State Government to acquire land for development under an SR Scheme, requiring a show-cause notice to the owner.

Precedents:

Tarabai Nagar Co-Op. Hog. Society (Proposed) v. The State of Maharashtra and others: A 2-Judge Bench decision (including Surya Kant, J.) that upheld the private owner’s preferential right to develop an SR Area, requiring notice to the owner and extinguishment of this right before acquisition.

Indian Cork Mills (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra: Laid down the principle of a private owner’s preferential right to develop an SR Area, requiring notification and invitation to undertake redevelopment.

Reasoning:

The Supreme Court addressed three key issues:

  1. Rejection of Kadeshwari Society’s Preliminary Objection (Maintainability of Writ Petition):

The Court held that the High Court was justified in intervening at a preliminary stage in exercise of its plenary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Intervention was necessary to prevent executive overreach, arbitrary decision-making, mala fides, or colourable exercise of power, and to avoid “more complications on account of creation of third-party rights by the private builder and consequential multiplicity of litigation”.

Actions taken under statutory power, such as the notice for acquisition under Section 14, are amenable to judicial review.

  1. Impact of the 2018 Amendment on the Law Laid Down in Indian Cork Mills (supra) and Tarabai (supra):

The Court found that the 2018 Amendment did not remove or dilute the preferential right of the landowner to redevelop an SR Area. Instead, the inclusion of ‘owner’ in Sections 3B(5) and 13 further entrenched this right.

The specific notice-cum-invitation under Section 13 for redevelopment remains a mandatory requirement. A notice under Section 3C (for declaring an SR Area) serves a different purpose (inviting objections to the declaration) and cannot substitute the Section 13 notice.

The newly added 120-day time limit in Section 13 takes effect after the owner is notified and invited to redevelop the SR Area, not automatically from the Section 3C(1) Declaration. The argument that the owner is expected to submit a scheme without such an invitation was rejected as “wholly misconceived”.

  1. Validity of Acquisition Proceedings in the Instant Case:

Absence of Notice-cum-Invitation: The SRA failed to issue any specific notice or invitation under Section 13 to the Church Trust. This omission meant the Church Trust’s preferential right to redevelop remained intact, rendering the acquisition proceedings “vitiated in law”.

No Waiver of Preferential Right: The Church Trust consistently expressed its intent to redevelop since 2013 and submitted a consolidated proposal. The Court found no basis to infer any waiver of its preferential right.

Questionable Conduct of Parties: The Court drew “adverse inferences from the Appellants’ disconcerting conduct”.

Kadeshwari Society and Saldanha: The Society’s persistent resistance to the Church Trust’s proposal (which offered better benefits to slum dwellers) in favor of Saldanha’s less advantageous one, suggested Saldanha was “orchestrating the Society’s actions from behind the scenes”. Saldanha’s actions were seen as a “calculated attempt to wrest the Subject Land” for commercial gain, even including a “veiled threat” in its correspondence to the Church Trust. This was characterized as a “land grab”.

SRA’s Conduct: The SRA demonstrated a “dire lack of application of mind or any objective and coherent reasoning”. It blatantly “shrugged off its duty” to invite the owner under Section 13. The SRA ignored the Church Trust’s proposal, processed Saldanha’s favorably, and rejected the Trust’s on “flimsy grounds” without offering a chance for rectification. Furthermore, the SRA proceeded with acquisition despite the Church Trust’s appeal against the SR Area declaration itself pending before the AGRC, showing “uncharacteristic urgency” and “pervading influence of the powerful private developer”. The SRA was found to have abandoned its public duty, showing “collusion and connivance” with private builders.

Holding: The Supreme Court dismissed all appeals.

The Impugned Judgement of the High Court was upheld. Liberty was granted to the Church Trust to submit an SR Scheme for redevelopment of the Subject Slum within 120 days, strictly in accordance with laws and regulations, and bound by its earlier offers for apartment sizes and benefits to slum dwellers. The SRA was directed to offer full support to the Church Trust for surveys, demarcation, etc., to enable scheme submission.

The SRA and the State were directed to process the Church Trust’s proposal expeditiously within 60 days from the date of submission. The acquisition proceedings were deemed illegal due to the SRA’s failure to adhere to the prerequisites and the “obviously colourable conduct” of the Appellants, thus protecting the statutory rights of the Church Trust.

Saldanha Real Estate Private Limited V. Bishop John Rodrigues and others

Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 1016 (DoJ 22-08-2025)

2025 INSC 1016 Download Supreme Court File 

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Delayed Death: When ‘Attempted Murder’ Becomes More

September 13, 2025 No Comments

Maniklall Sahu, the appellant, along with three co-accused, trespassed into the house of Rekhchand Verma, assaulted him with sticks and fisticuffs, and flung him from a terrace. The injured person, Rekhchand Verma, initially survived but was in a critical condition. He eventually succumbed to his injuries approximately nine months after the incident, dying on 8th November 2022 due to septicaemia and pneumonia, leading to cardiorespiratory arrest. The trial court had initially convicted the appellant under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) for murder. However, the High Court altered this conviction to Section 307 IPC for attempt to murder, sentencing the appellant to 7 years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000/-. The appellant subsequently filed this appeal challenging the Section 307 IPC conviction.

Law Involved The primary legal provisions under consideration are Sections 299, 300, 302, and 307 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

Section 307 IPC (Attempt to Murder): This section deals with acts done with the intention or knowledge that it might cause death, and if death occurs, the act would be murder.

Section 299 IPC (Culpable Homicide): Defines culpable homicide.

Section 300 IPC (Murder): Specifies when culpable homicide amounts to murder, including acts done with the intention of causing death, or causing bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or knowing the act is so imminently dangerous that it will most probably cause death.

Section 302 IPC (Punishment for Murder): Prescribes the punishment for murder. The core legal question revolves around the “Application of Theory of Causation where death ensues after some delay” and whether the High Court correctly applied Section 307 IPC despite the victim’s eventual death.

Reasoning The Supreme Court critically analysed the High Court’s decision to alter the conviction from Section 302 IPC to Section 307 IPC, especially given the victim’s death.

  1. Medical Evidence and Causation: The Court reviewed extensive medical evidence, which consistently showed that the deceased, Rekhchand Verma, suffered severe injuries, including a head injury, spinal cord injury leading to paraplegia, and multiple complications such as infected bedsores, septic shock, and bilateral pneumonia. Medical experts testified that these complications were a direct result of the initial injuries sustained during the assault and were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The Court highlighted that the injured person received medical treatment for nine months before his demise. The Court concluded that the injuries suffered were grievous and that the death was a consequence of these injuries, with complications like septicaemia and pneumonia not breaking the chain of causation.
  2. High Court’s Error: The Supreme Court determined that the High Court committed a serious error in bringing the case under the ambit of “attempt to commit murder” (Section 307 IPC) on the premise that the victim survived for about nine months, and his death was due to complications during treatment and not directly from the initial injuries. The Supreme Court stressed that if the injury was fatal and intended to cause death, or if death occurred after some delay due to septicaemia or other complications stemming from the injury, the offence would fall under the first limb of Section 300 IPC (murder) [36a]. Furthermore, if the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and death occurred due to septicaemia or other complications, the act would amount to culpable homicide punishable under Section 302 IPC, falling under the third limb of Section 300 IPC [36b, 37c, 37d].
  3. Jurisprudence on Delayed Death: Drawing on various precedents, the Court reiterated that delayed death or intervening medical conditions (like septicaemia or pneumonia) do not automatically absolve an accused of murder charges if the initial injuries were the proximate cause of death. The Court concluded that the cause of death was indeed due to the injuries suffered, and the contention that the death resulted from a lack of proper treatment or was disconnected from the initial assault was unfounded.

Holding The Supreme Court dismissed Maniklall Sahu’s appeal . While the appellant’s conviction under Section 307 IPC (attempt to murder) as altered by the High Court stands affirmed due to the dismissal of his appeal, the Supreme Court clearly stated that the High Court committed a serious error in altering the conviction from Section 302 IPC to Section 307 IPC . The Supreme Court’s detailed reasoning underscored that given the medical evidence and the established chain of causation, the offence should have been considered murder or culpable homicide amounting to murder, punishable under Section 302 IPC, because the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.

Maniklall Sahu Vs State of Chhattisgarh

Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 1107: (DoJ 12-09-2025)

2025 INSC 1107 Download Supreme Court File

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Tender Troubles: Supreme Court Upholds Bid Sanctity, Overturns Rectification

September 13, 2025 No Comments

The case originated from an electronic bid (No. 7 of 2023-24) issued by the Superintending Engineer and Project Director, Project Implementation Unit – I, Public Works (Roads) Directorate, Government of West Bengal, on 17.10.2023. The tender was for collecting Road User Fee (RUF) from commercial vehicles for 1095 days. The earnest money deposit was fixed at Rs. 25,00,000.00. Seven bidders participated. The technical bids were evaluated, and four bidders were technically qualified, including Prakash Asphaltings and Toll Highways (India) Limited (appellant) and Mandeepa Enterprises (respondent No. 1).

Financial bids were opened on 08.12.2023. The appellant, Prakash Asphaltings, was found to be the highest bidder (H1) with a quoted amount of Rs. 91,19,00,000.00 for 1095 days. Respondent No. 1, Mandeepa Enterprises, was the lowest bidder (H4) with an offered amount of Rs. 9,72,999.00 per day.

Respondent No. 1 subsequently claimed a typographical error in their financial bid, stating they intended to quote Rs. 106,54,33,905.00 for the entire contract period instead of Rs. 9,72,999.00 per day. They requested the tendering authority to treat the figure of Rs. 9,72,999.00 as a typographical error and read it as Rs. 106,54,33,905.00. The tendering authority rejected this request on 20.12.2023, stating that correction of a financial bid after opening was not possible and would impeach the sanctity of the tender process.

Aggrieved, Respondent No. 1 filed a writ petition (WPA No. 29001 of 2023) before a Single Judge of the High Court, which was dismissed on 03.01.2024, as the Single Judge found no scope for interference. Respondent No. 1 then filed an intra-court appeal (MAT No. 93 of 2024). A Division Bench of the High Court allowed the appeal on 23.02.2024, observing that the error in quoting the figure by respondent No. 1 was inadvertent. The Division Bench directed the tendering authority to evaluate Respondent No. 1’s BOQ at Rs. 106,54,33,905.00 and offer other bidders the opportunity to match this figure. This civil appeal was directed against the Division Bench’s judgment and order.

Law Involved

Clause 4(g) of the Notice Inviting Electronic Bid: This clause specifically states that any change in the template of the Bill of Quantity (BOQ) will not be accepted under any circumstances.

Clause 5B(v) of the Instructions to Bidders: This clause outlines that during bid evaluation, if bidders fail to submit supporting documents or original hard copies within the stipulated timeframe, their proposals will be liable for rejection.

Article 226 of the Constitution of India: Pertains to the High Court’s jurisdiction to issue writs.

Principles of Equity and Natural Justice in Tender Processes: The judgment refers to the importance of these principles in tender and contract awards, but also emphasises that these principles should be kept at a distance when there is a violation of rules.

Judicial Review of Administrative Action: The Court reiterated that judicial review in administrative action, particularly tenders, is limited to preventing arbitrariness, irrationality, bias, and mala fides. Courts should not interfere with a decision unless it is “unlawful” or “unsound”.

Public Interest: Tenders are a cornerstone of governmental procurement processes, aiming for competitiveness, fairness, and transparency in resource allocation. Adherence to rules and conditions and the sanctity of the tender process are paramount.

Reasoning The Supreme Court reasoned that the Division Bench’s interpretation was erroneous for several key reasons:

Sanctity of Tender Process: The Court held that allowing rectification of financial bids after they have been opened would impeach the sanctity and integrity of the entire tender process.

Strict Adherence to Tender Conditions: Clause 4(g) explicitly prohibits any change in the BOQ template under any circumstances. The Division Bench’s broad interpretation of “bona fide mistake” to allow rectification was held to be incorrect and would put “shackles on the functioning of the tendering authority”.

Nature of the Mistake: While Respondent No. 1 claimed an inadvertent mistake, it was effectively a unilateral or systematic computer typographical transmission failure, not one attributable to the tendering authority. Such a mistake, even if unintentional, cannot be a ground to allow post-bid modifications that would undermine the competitive bidding process.

Adverse Consequences to Public Exchequer: The Division Bench’s decision to re-evaluate Respondent No. 1’s bid at a significantly higher amount (Rs. 106,54,33,905.00) meant that the appellant, who was originally the H1 bidder, would be displaced. This would lead to a considerable loss of revenue to the state exchequer (approximately 15 crores) by not accepting the higher bid of the appellant and giving an opportunity to Respondent No. 1 to correct its bid post-opening.

Limited Scope of Judicial Review: The Court reiterated that interference by a writ court in ongoing tender processes is not permissible unless there is a clear violation of principles of natural justice, or the decision is arbitrary or mala fide. The Division Bench’s decision was deemed a clear violation of natural justice principles.

Non-Joinder of Party: The appellant (Prakash Asphaltings), as the highest bidder and a directly affected party, was not made a party respondent in the intra-court appeal before the Division Bench, which was viewed as prejudicial and a violation of natural justice.

Holding The Supreme Court allowed the civil appeal, thereby setting aside and quashing the judgment and order dated 23.02.2024 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court at Calcutta in MAT No. 93 of 2024. The Court sustained the order of the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition. Consequently, Prakash Asphaltings and Toll Highways (India) Limited (the appellant), being the H1 bidder, is to be awarded the contract in terms of the notice inviting electronic bid dated 17.10.2023. The Court also ruled that there shall be no order as to costs.

Prakash Asphaltings And Toll Highways (India) Limited Vs Mandeep Enterprises And Others

Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 1108: (DoJ 12-09-2025)

2025 INSC 1108 Download Supreme Court File

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“Speculative Investors” Barred from IBC Relief: Supreme Court Upholds Homebuyer Protections

September 13, 2025 No Comments

Four appeals were heard together, arising from orders of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT). The key appellants, Mansi Brar Fernandes and Sunita Agarwal, had entered into agreements with developers (Gayatri Infra Planner Pvt. Ltd. and Antriksh Infratech Pvt. Ltd., respectively) for property units. Both agreements included buy-back clauses and involved advance payments. The developers defaulted, and the appellants initiated proceedings under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC). The NCLAT reversed the admission of these applications, branding the appellants as “speculative investors” rather than genuine homebuyers or financial creditors.

Law Involved: The central legal framework is the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC), specifically Section 7, which governs the initiation of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) by financial creditors. The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Ordinance, 2019, and the subsequent Amendment Act, are also critical. These amendments introduced a threshold requirement for allottees to file a Section 7 application (requiring at least 10% of allottees or 100 allottees). The Court frequently referenced its earlier judgment in Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd v. Union of India, which distinguishes between genuine homebuyers and speculative investors. The judgment also emphasizes the Right to Shelter as a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution and the role of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (RERA).

Reasoning: The Supreme Court deliberated on the distinction between “speculative investors” and “genuine homebuyers” within the context of the IBC. It observed that the IBC is intended as a collective mechanism to revive viable projects and safeguard the fundamental right to shelter of genuine homebuyers, not as a recovery tool or a bargaining chip for individuals. The legislative intent behind recognizing allottees as financial creditors was to protect genuine homebuyers, while simultaneously preventing misuse by speculative investors seeking premature exits or exorbitant returns, which had burdened the real estate sector and the adjudicatory machinery.

The Court provided criteria to identify speculative investors, including: agreements that substitute possession with buy-back or refund options, insistence on refunds with high interest, purchase of multiple units (especially in double digits), demanding special rights or privileges, deviations from the RERA Model Agreement, and unrealistic interest rates or promises of returns. The transaction entered into by Mansi Brar Fernandes, involving a buy-back clause and the pursuit of commercial returns rather than possession, led the Court to conclude that she was indeed a speculative investor. Similarly, Sunita Agarwal’s agreement for an “investment” with a 25% per annum return over 24 months, coupled with a buy-back clause, indicated a speculative intent.

While affirming the NCLAT’s finding that the appellants were “speculative investors,” the Supreme Court clarified that the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Ordinance, 2019, was indeed applicable to the facts of the present case, correcting the NCLAT’s reasoning on this point [19, 20, 35, 36, 48(ii)]. The Court applied the doctrine of Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit (an act of the Court shall prejudice no one) to address the procedural issues related to the Ordinance’s applicability and the delay it caused.

Holding: The Supreme Court affirmed the NCLAT’s findings that Mansi Brar Fernandes and Sunita Agarwal were “speculative investors” and therefore not entitled to initiate proceedings under Section 7 of the IBC [25, 34, 48(i)]. Consequently, the Court upheld the NCLAT’s orders setting aside the admission of their Section 7 applications by the NCLT [48(i)]. However, the Court clarified that the Ordinance/Amendment Act was applicable to the case, although this correction in reasoning did not alter the ultimate outcome given the appellants’ status as speculative investors [48(ii)]. The appellants remain free to pursue their remedies through other appropriate legal forums, without being barred by limitation [48(i)].

Mansi Brar Fernandes Vs Subha Sharma And Anr.

Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 1110: (DoJ 12-09-2025)

2025 INSC 1110 Download Supreme Court File

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