Whether the President of India, acting as the Visitor of the University, possesses the statutory jurisdiction to initiate disciplinary proceedings and terminate the “First Registrar” appointed under transitional provisions, or whether such authority rests exclusively with the University’s Executive Council.
Appeals Disposed of Without Interfering with Operative Directions. The Supreme Court reversed the Allahabad High Court’s jurisdictional finding, holding that since the Visitor was the statutory appointing authority for the First Registrar under transitional provisions, the Visitor legally retained the power of dismissal under Section 16 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. However, given that the First Registrar’s three-year tenure had already expired and multiple rounds of litigation had transpired, the Court declined to disturb the operative directions of the High Court.
1. Factual Matrix and Institutional Framework
The Rajiv Gandhi National Aviation University (“the University”) was established under the Rajiv Gandhi National Aviation University Act, 2013 (“the Act”) to promote advanced aviation studies and management. In 2016, the Central Government framed the University’s First Statutes.
The friction began when the President of India, serving as the Visitor of the University, approved the appointment of Respondent No. 1 (“the First Registrar”) under the special transitional provisions of the Act. On March 1, 2019, the Vice Chancellor issued an official appointment letter placing the First Registrar on probation for one year, and he assumed charge on April 8, 2019.
2. First Round of Litigation and Remand
During his probation period, the University abruptly terminated the First Registrar’s services on January 8/9, 2020, offering one month’s salary in lieu of notice. The First Registrar challenged this before a Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court, who ordered his reinstatement with full consequential benefits.
The University filed an intra-court appeal. On December 17, 2021, a Division Bench ruled that the probation termination order was ex facie stigmatic. However, instead of simple reinstatement, the Bench remitted the matter back to the University to conduct fresh proceedings in accordance with law within two months, making his back wages conditional upon that outcome. The First Registrar’s Special Leave Petition against this remand was dismissed by the Supreme Court on February 4, 2022.
3. Disciplinary Action and Second Round of Litigation
Pursuant to the High Court’s remand, the University reinstated the First Registrar on December 31, 2021, but immediately placed him under suspension to face an internal inquiry. A Memorandum of Charges alleging indiscipline, gross insubordination, unprofessional conduct, and obstructing public servants was served on February 22, 2022.
A three-member Enquiry Committee found all charges proved. The inquiry report was channelled through the Secretary of the Ministry of Civil Aviation (MOCA) to the President of India (the Visitor), who formally approved the termination on April 20, 2022. The Deputy Secretary of MOCA communicated the final termination order on April 27, 2022.
The First Registrar filed a fresh writ petition. The Single Judge disposed of it on April 25, 2023, declaring that because his services were never explicitly extended beyond the initial one-year probation, he was merely a probationer entitled to one month’s salary. The First Registrar appealed to the Division Bench.
4. The High Court’s Dynamic Reversal
On May 22, 2024, the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court allowed the First Registrar’s appeal and quashed the termination. The High Court observed that the entire disciplinary setup had been orchestrated by officers of MOCA and the Visitor. It ruled that under the primary Statutes of the University, the Visitor has no legal role in disciplinary or removal proceedings concerning University employees. Finding the entire action fundamentally lacking in jurisdiction, the High Court awarded the First Registrar back wages up to April 7, 2022. This prompted the University and the Union of India to appeal to the Supreme Court.
5. Legal Arguments Before the Supreme Court
- For the Appellants (University & Union of India): Argued that the High Court completely overlooked the transitional architecture of the institution. The First Registrar was not a regular appointee governed by regular provisions; his appointment was governed by Section 46(b) of the Act, which explicitly mandates that the Visitor makes the appointment. Under settled principles of interpretation, the authority vested with the power to appoint naturally holds the power to dismiss. Moreover, until the regular Executive Council was fully operational, MOCA’s Steering Committee acted as the interim executive body.
- For the Respondent (First Registrar): Contended that MOCA and the Visitor are separate legal entities from the University. Statute No. 28 explicitly designates the University’s “Executive Council” as the competent appointing and removing authority for the post of Registrar. They argued that the Visitor cannot assume arbitrary disciplinary powers on the recommendations of a government ministry (MOCA) which has no statutory domain over University employees.
6. Supreme Court’s Jurisprudential Analysis
A. The Legal Mechanics of Transitional Provisions
The Supreme Court illuminated the distinct legislative purpose behind transitional clauses. Referencing standard legislative drafting principles, the Court observed that transitional provisions are temporary, specialized mechanisms designed to manage circumstances existing at the literal birth of a piece of legislation. While primary legislation is meant to govern new circumstances indefinitely, transitional powers exhaust themselves once exercised.
The Court pointed out that Section 46 of the Act explicitly overrides the rest of the Act and Statutes. Section 46(b) mandates that the First Registrar shall be appointed directly by the Visitor on the recommendation of the Vice Chancellor for a fixed tenure of three years.
B. The Power to Appoint Implies the Power to Dismiss
To resolve the jurisdictional clash between the regular Statutes and the transitional sections, the Supreme Court invoked Section 16 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Section 16 dictates that where a central statute confers a power to make an appointment, the appointing authority automatically possesses the corresponding power to suspend or dismiss the appointee, unless a contrary intention appears on the face of the statute.
The Court noted that for a regular, sequentially recruited Registrar, the Executive Council is the explicit appointing and removing authority under Statute No. 28(1). However, because the respondent was the First Registrar, his root source of employment was the Visitor. Therefore, by operation of Section 16 of the General Clauses Act, the Visitor legally retained the ultimate disciplinary authority to approve and finalize his removal on the grounds of misconduct. The Court further noted that during the entire first round of litigation, the First Registrar had never once contested the Visitor’s threshold authority to terminate him.
7. Conclusion and Final Order
The Supreme Court formally disagreed with the Allahabad High Court’s finding, holding that the Visitor did indeed possess proper statutory jurisdiction to handle the disciplinary actions against the First Registrar.
Nevertheless, the Court took note of the practical realities of the timeline: the First Registrar’s statutory three-year transitional tenure (from March 1, 2019, to February 28, 2022) had already fully run its course, and the parties had endured exhausting, repetitive rounds of litigation. Exercising its equitable discretion under these peculiar facts, the Supreme Court declined to disturb the final operative directions of reinstatement or monetary relief formulated by the High Court.
The civil appeals were thus formally disposed of with no order as to costs.
2026 INSC 520
Vice Chancellor, Rajiv Gandhi National Aviation University V. Jitendra Singh & Ors. (D.O.J. 21.05.2026)
