Appeal regarding disciplinary action taken against a Senior Medical Officer just prior to his retirement. The original charges against the officer related to alleged misconduct, including taking unauthorized leave, failing to participate in a pulse polio program, and not complying with superior orders, leading to a pension cut initially imposed by the Disciplinary Authority. This decision was challenged through various court levels, with the High Court eventually modifying the penalty to a limited duration. The Supreme Court ultimately reversed the earlier decisions, finding insufficient evidence to support the misconduct charges and highlighting potential procedural unfairness and concerns about the reasons behind the disciplinary action, including the officer having previously pursued legal action against higher officials. The Court restored the officer’s full pension and awarded costs.
(A) Constitution of India, Article 14, 226 – Punjab Civil Services (Punishment & Appeal) Rules, 1970, Rule 8 – Service Law – Cut in pension – Judicial review – Held that though the rules closely associated with the traditional concept of natural justice may not have been breached in this case, the contention of the appellant that the process of decision-making stands vitiated for lack of procedural fairness – The second and the fourth charges levelled against the appellant that he had proceeded on leave without sanction thereof and in not complying with the orders of his superior officers – Inquiry Officer while exonerating the appellant of the second part of the third charge reasoned that neither the Senior Assistant had been produced in the inquiry as a witness nor were call details produced, and what PW-1 said is mere hearsay; hence, in the absence of proof, that part of the charge is not proved – This was a valid reason assigned by the Inquiry Officer, which the Disciplinary Authority even accepted- Held that on the same analogy and for the same reason, the appellant could not have been held guilty in respect of the second charge – There is no record of the Civil Surgeon’s refusal to sanction leave being communicated to the appellant either – Held that there was no legal evidence based whereon the appellant could have been held guilty of the second and fourth charges – Regarding the charges that the appellant did not comply with the directions of the Election Commission and did not participate in the pulse polio programme constitute the first charge and the first part of the third charge, respectively – The second part of the third charge of the appellant having threatened the Senior Assistant has not been found to be proved – It is the clear finding of the Inquiry Officer, based on the evidence on record, that the appellant was not assigned any duty in connection with election duty and pulse polio programme during the period he wished to avail leave to attend court proceedings before the High Court – Insofar as defiance of Election Commission’s directions by the appellant are concerned, no such written directions were part of the documentary evidence led before the Inquiry Officer – As is evident from the report, the prosecution having failed to establish that the appellant had been assigned election duty as well as duty associated with the pulse polio programme, the Inquiry Officer went on record to hold the charges under consideration proved by referring to what was, in his perception, the duty of a senior medical officer who has been in charge of an organisation – Inquiry Officer found the appellant guilty for a perceived failure to perform a moral duty – Not only was it completely extraneous, but such a finding was clearly at variance with the charge levelled against the appellant – Held that holding the appellant guilty of a perceived failure to perform a duty not being the charge in respect of which any opportunity of explanation was given, such a finding could not have been taken into consideration by the Disciplinary Authority to impose penalty on the appellant – A detailed response to the inquiry report had been submitted by the appellant – Dismissing the claims by a single sentence that the same are not acceptable, is not part of a fair procedure – This is a substantial ground for which appellant’s grievance seems to be justified – Tenor of the impugned order does suggest that the Division Bench found the appellant to have been wronged and regard being had thereto, the Division Bench ought to have set things right by interfering with the findings and granting full relief – Impugned order, insofar as it declines to interfere with the findings on the charges, being clearly indefensible liable to be set aside – The order of penalty passed by the appellant’s Disciplinary Authority also stands set aside and the writ petition is allowed – Directed that the appellant shall be entitled to full pension without any cut – Whatever quantum has been deducted from his pension shall be returned, within three months from date, together with interest @ 6% per annum – Appellant shall be entitled to costs assessed conservatively at Rs.50,000/-, to be released in his favour within the aforesaid period – Liberty granted to the GoP to realize the amount of costs payable in terms hereof from the persons responsible after fixing responsibility in accordance with law.
(Para 38 to 42 and 46)
(B) Constitution of India, Article 226 – Service Law – Punishment – Judicial review – Held that an administrative order punishing a delinquent employee is not ordinarily subject to correction in judicial review because the disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts – If there is some legal evidence on which the findings can be based, then adequacy or even reliability of that evidence is not a matter for canvassing before the high court in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution – However, should on consideration of the materials on record, the court be satisfied that there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice, or that the inquiry proceedings have been conducted contrary to statutory regulations prescribing the mode of such inquiry, or that the ultimate decision of the disciplinary authority is vitiated by considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case, or that the conclusion of the disciplinary authority is ex facie arbitrary or capricious, so much so that no reasonable person could have arrived at such conclusion, or there is any other ground very similar to the above, the high court may in the exercise of its discretion interfere to set things right – After all, public servants to whom Article 311 of the Constitution apply do enjoy certain procedural safeguards, enforcement of which by the high court can legitimately be urged by such servants depending upon the extent of breach that is manifestly demonstrated.
(Para 33)
(C) Constitution of India, Article 226 – Service Law – Punishment – Judicial review – Principles of natural justice – Held that the traditional concept of natural justice comprises of the two rules that prohibit anyone from being condemned unheard and anyone from being a judge of his own cause – In relation to disciplinary proceedings, subject to just exceptions, natural justice would envisage observance of procedural fairness before holding a public servant guilty of misconduct and imposing a punishment on him for such misconduct – While it is true that principles of natural justice supplement, and not supplant, the law, such principles have been declared by this Court to be a constituent feature of Article 14 – Validity of any disciplinary action, whenever questioned, has to be tested on the touchstone of Articles 14, 16 and 21 as well as Article 311(2), wherever applicable – To test whether interference is warranted, this Court has laid down that the scrutiny ought to be confined to finding out whether the disciplinary proceedings have been conducted fairly; if not, an inference can be drawn that this has caused prejudice to the charged employee – Be that as it may, there can be no gainsaying that the consequences of violation of a fair procedure, which principles of natural justice embody, in a given situation has to be considered on a case-by-case basis bearing in mind that judicial review is not intended to be an appeal in disguise.
(Para 35)
(D) Constitution of India, Article 226, 136 – Constitution Law – Issuing of limited notice – Objection on behalf of the respondent-State that limited notice having been issued at the time of admission of the intra-court appeal and the appellant’s grievance being addressed, this Court ought not to enlarge the scope of the appeal repelled – Held that issuing limited notice at the stage of admission does not bar a Constitutional Court having inherent powers to pass such orders as the justice of the case before it demands to enlarge the scope of a petition/appeal at the stage of final hearing – Any observation that the court may choose to make while entertaining the petition/appeal by issuing limited notice ought to be regarded as tentative – Such observation cannot limit the court’s jurisdiction to consider the controversy, as raised, in its entire perspective – Whether or not the court would enlarge the scope is, however, a question which is largely dependent on the facts and circumstances of each case – If the court seized of the petition/appeal considers that the justice of the case before it demands enlargement of the scope, notwithstanding that a limited notice had been issued earlier, the court’s powers are not fettered particularly when enforcement of any Fundamental/Constitutional right is urged by the party approaching it.
(Para 15 to 19)
Bhupinderpal Singh Gill V. State Of Punjab And Others
Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 83: (DoJ 20-01-2025)
