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Service Law : A Judicial Career Reclaimed – Due Process Trumps Minor Omissions

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The case concerns Pinky Meena, who holds a Bachelor of Arts, Bachelor of Education, Bachelor of Laws, and Masters in Law degrees. She served as a Teacher Grade-II in the Education Department of Rajasthan from 2014. In 2017, she applied for the post of Civil Judge and Judicial Magistrate, was selected, and commenced training as a trainee RJS on 6th March 2019, completing it successfully by 7th March 2020.

However, her service was discontinued following a show cause notice issued on 17th February 2020, and a discharge order dated 29th May 2020…. The allegations against her included:

  • Fraudulently obtaining simultaneous LLB and B.Ed degrees in the same year, and an LL.M. degree while working as a teacher, without proper attendance.
  • Concealing her employment as a Teacher in the checklist submitted for the RJS interview, despite submitting her resignation on 25th October 2018 (prior to the interview on 2nd November 2018)….
  • Failing to obtain a ‘No Objection Certificate’ (NOC) from her employer for appearing in the RJS examination.
  • Concealing information about her resignation on medical grounds.

The High Court of Rajasthan had dismissed her writ petition and review petition, upholding the discharge.

Law Involved The judgment primarily involved:

  • Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958: Specifically, Rule 16, under which the initial show cause notice was issued.
  • Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules, 2010: Particularly Rules 44 (Probation), 45 (Confirmation), and 46 (Unsatisfactory progress during probation and extension), which govern the appointment and termination of Civil Judges…. Also, Rule 14 (“Employment by irregular or improper means”), which deals with suppression of material information.
  • Principles of Natural Justice and Fair Play: The appellant argued that the inquiry conducted lacked due process, including the absence of a Presenting Officer or Inquiry Officer and no effective hearing, violating Article 311 of the Constitution.
  • Article 311 of the Constitution of India: Pertains to dismissal, removal, or reduction in rank of persons employed in civil capacities under the Union or a State.
  • Case Law: Shamsher Singh Vs. State of Punjab 1974, Raj Kumar Vs. Union of India (1968), Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Ltd. Vs. Anil Kanwariya (2021), and Jaswantsingh Pratapsingh Jadeja vs. Rajkot Municipal Corporation, (2007), were cited to establish principles of arbitrary discharge and the requirement of substantive inquiry for punitive termination.

Reasoning: The Supreme Court scrutinised the nature of the allegations and the process followed.

  • The Court found that the appellant’s late submission of resignation (25.10.2018 vs. interview 02.11.2018) and failure to disclose past government service in the checklist was not a “material irregularity or a serious misconduct” that warranted discharge…. The Court viewed this as a “minor irregularity (omission)”.
  • The Court observed that the appellant had successfully completed her training without any blemish.
  • It was noted that the appellant had been suffering from lymphadenopathy tuberculosis since March 2018 and had been admitted to hospital, and the suppression of this medical information was not a “criminal antecedent”.
  • Crucially, the Court distinguished between a simpliciter termination (termination during probation without stigma) and a punitive termination. The discharge order dated 29th May 2020 contained allegations and was based on an assessment of her work and conduct, rendering it “stigmatic and punitive”.
  • For a punitive termination, it is mandatory to provide an opportunity of being heard and conduct a proper inquiry, which was not afforded to the appellant. The inquiry against her was held “without participation” of the appellant and without appointing a Presenting Officer or Inquiry Officer. This was a clear violation of principles of natural justice and fair play.
  • The Court emphasised that termination of a probationer cannot be arbitrary or discriminatory.
  • The judgment also highlighted the importance of advancing women’s greater participation in the judiciary and acknowledged the appellant’s perseverance in fighting societal stigmas and achieving higher education.

Holding: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, thereby setting aside the order of the High Court. The Court held that:

  • The show cause notice dated 17th February 2020 and the discharge order dated 29th May 2020 are quashed.
  • The appellant shall be entitled to reinstatement in service forthwith with all consequential benefits, including fixation of seniority as per the merit list in the examination in question and notional fixation of pay.
  • However, the appellant shall not be entitled to back wages.
  • The respondent is directed to treat the appellant as having successfully completed her probation period and as a confirmed employee.

Pinky Meena V. High Court Of Judicature For Rajasthan At Jodhpur And Another

Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 756: (DoJ 22-05-2025)

2025 INSC 756 Download Supreme Court File

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Justice Prevails: Apex Court Quashes Tax Evasion Prosecution After Settlement Commission’s Immunity Grant

August 29, 2025 No Comments

The appellant invoked the High Court’s jurisdiction to quash criminal proceedings initiated by the Revenue under Section 276C(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (IT Act), for the assessment year 2017-2018, alleging a willful attempt to evade tax. The High Court dismissed the appellant’s quashing petition and a subsequent writ appeal.

A search was conducted on 24.04.2016 under Section 132 of the IT Act, leading to the seizure of unaccounted cash. A show-cause notice followed on 31.10.2017.

The Revenue filed a complaint against the appellant on 11.08.2018.

The appellant filed an application with the Settlement Commission under Section 245C of the IT Act on 07.12.2018, disclosing additional income and seeking immunity from penalty and prosecution.The Settlement Commission, on 26.11.2019, allowed the application, granting immunity from levy of penalty and prosecution.

The total undisclosed income for the assessment year 2017-2018 was Rs. 61,50,000/-, resulting in a tax liability of less than Rs. 25 lakhs.

Law Involved

Section 276C(1) of the IT Act, 1961: Deals with willful attempts to evade tax, penalties, or interest chargeable.

Section 245C of the IT Act: Pertains to applications for settlement before the Settlement Commission.

Section 245D(4) & 245I of the IT Act: Relate to the Settlement Commission’s order and its conclusiveness.

Section 245H(1) of the IT Act: Grants the Settlement Commission power to provide immunity from prosecution and penalty.

Proviso to Section 245H(1): States that immunity cannot be granted if prosecution was initiated prior to the settlement application.

Section 279(1) of the IT Act: Requires sanction for prosecution by specified authorities (e.g., Principal Chief Commissioner or Commissioner).

Government of India Guidelines/Circulars:

2008 Circular (dated 24.04.2008): Streamlines procedure for prosecution, including thresholds for penalty exceeding Rs. 50,000/-.

2019 Circular (dated 09.09.2019): For tax liability below Rs. 25 lakhs, prosecution requires previous administrative approval of the Collegium of CCIT/DGIT rank officers.

Recommendations of the Wanchhoo Committee (1971): Advocated for a “Settlement Machinery” to compromise with errant taxpayers and reduce litigation.

Reasoning

The Supreme Court’s reasoning highlighted several critical points:

Conclusiveness of Settlement Commission’s Order: The Court emphasized that an order passed by the Settlement Commission under Section 245D(4) is conclusive regarding the matters stated therein. The Settlement Commission had granted immunity to the appellant from both penalty and prosecution.

Settlement Commission’s Finding on “Wilful Evasion”: Crucially, the Settlement Commission did not find any wilful evasion of tax by the appellant. This finding undermined the very basis of the prosecution under Section 276C(1), which requires a “wilful attempt to evade tax”.

Misinterpretation of Proviso to Section 245H(1): The Court noted that the High Court and the Revenue’s view, that immunity could not be granted because the complaint was filed before the settlement application, was incorrect. The power to grant immunity under Section 245H is an integral part of the settlement scheme.

Violation of Binding Circulars:

The tax liability in this case was less than Rs. 25 lakhs. According to the ‘2019 circular’, prosecution for tax liability below this threshold requires previous administrative approval from the Collegium of CCIT/DGIT rank officers. This approval was not obtained.

The Court reiterated that circulars issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) are binding on the authorities administering the provisions of the IT Act.

Abuse of Process of Law: The Court strongly stated that the continued prosecution by the Revenue, despite the Settlement Commission’s findings and the non-compliance with binding circulars, amounted to an abuse of the process of law. The High Court’s approach was deemed “entirely misdirected”.

Competence of DDIT to Initiate Prosecution: The appellant had also challenged the competence of the Deputy Director of Income Tax (Investigation) to initiate prosecution under Section 279(1) of the IT Act.

Holding

The Supreme Court granted leave. The appeal was allowed.The order of the High Court was set aside.The criminal prosecution proceedings initiated by the Revenue against the appellant for the offence under Section 276C(1) of the IT Act for assessment year 2017-2018 were quashed.

Vijay Krishnaswami @ Krishnaswami Vijayakumar vs Deputy Director of Income Tax (Investigation) 

Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 1048 (DoJ 28-08-2025)

2025 INSC 1048Download Supreme Court File

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Upholding Integrity: Supreme Court on ‘Misbehaviour’ and Collective Responsibility in Public Service Commissions

August 29, 2025 No Comments

The case concerns Ms. Mepung Tadar Bage (referred to as “Respondent”), a Member of the Arunachal Pradesh Public Service Commission (APPSC), appointed on August 13, 2021.

The core issue originated from the leakage of question papers for the Assistant Engineer (Civil) Mains Examination, conducted by the APPSC on August 26th and 27th, 2022.

Following a complaint, the APPSC cancelled the examinations and the matter was transferred to the Special Investigation Cell (Vigilance) (SIC) and later to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI).

A three-member High-level Inquiry Committee was constituted by the Government of Arunachal Pradesh to probe irregularities in the Mains Examination.

The Inquiry Committee submitted its report on October 06, 2022, pointing out lapses in the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) and concluding that the SOP and the APPSC Conduct of Examination Guidelines, 2017 (“2017 Guidelines”), had not been followed by the APPSC.

The Chairman of APPSC resigned on moral grounds.

The Hon’ble Governor of Arunachal Pradesh requested the Hon’ble Chief Minister to place the matter before the Hon’ble President of India for making a reference under Article 317(1) for the removal of four APPSC members, including the Respondent.

The President of India made a reference to the Supreme Court for the removal of the Respondent on April 18, 2023.

The Respondent was suspended on June 15, 2023.

The reference focused on whether the Respondent’s conduct constituted “misbehaviour” under Article 317 of the Constitution.

Law Involved:

Article 317(1) of the Constitution of India governs the removal of the Chairman or any other member of a Public Service Commission (PSC) from office on the ground of “misbehaviour.” The process involves a reference by the President of India to the Supreme Court for an inquiry.

The Constitution Framers recognized the prominence of Civil Services and the need to safeguard PSC officers from political pressure and public expectations, leading to the establishment of autonomous and independent bodies.

The term “misbehaviour” in Article 317 has been subject to judicial interpretation, drawing from precedents under Article 124(4) which defines misbehaviour for Judges.

“Misbehaviour” is defined as “ill conduct; improper or unlawful behaviour” or “a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act”. It denotes actions that would “destroy the faith in a public office”.

It requires specific, demonstrable acts or omissions that betray public trust and are “unimpeachable in the eyes of law”.

The Court highlighted that for a PSC member, expected standards of behaviour are natural and are elevated by the very nature of the institution they represent.

The concept of “collective responsibility” was also considered, primarily in the context of the Cabinet, where Ministers are jointly accountable for government policies and actions. The Court explored its applicability to a constitutional body like a PSC.

Reasoning:

The Court carefully examined the six charges leveled against the Respondent, based on the Inquiry Committee’s report and subsequent investigations.

Regarding the question paper leakage (Charge No. I): The Inquiry Committee report did not attribute any specific act or omission by the Respondent as constituting misbehaviour. While the Respondent was involved in paper setting and other examination processes, the evidence did not show her failure in preventing leakage or ensuring confidentiality. The Court found no evidence to prove her individual responsibility for the leakage.

Regarding previous leakages (Charge No. II): The Respondent joined APPSC after the alleged leakages in 2017. No specific allegation against her linked to these previous incidents after her joining was found.

Regarding the “2022 Guidelines” and the 2017 Guidelines (Charges No. III & V): These charges related to the draft “2022 Guidelines” and the keeping of “2017 Guidelines” in abeyance. The Court noted that the “2022 Guidelines” were kept in abeyance by “common consensus of the Chairman and Members of the APPSC”. The Inquiry Committee found no deliberative act by the Respondent. The Court emphasized that institutional failure cannot be attributed to an individual in an institutional setting if there is collective duty.

Regarding allocation of legal work and revision of guidelines (Charge No. IV): The Respondent was allocated legal work, which included the duty to revise the 2017 Guidelines. While she failed to perform this duty, the Court clarified that this was an institutional failure and not solely attributable to her individual capacity to initiate new guidelines. The Inquiry Committee did not find any specific act or omission by her constituting misbehaviour in this regard.

The Court elaborated on “collective responsibility”, noting that while PSCs are constitutional bodies with collective functions, it is distinct from the Cabinet’s collective responsibility. It held that an individual member cannot be held liable in their individual capacity for the entire Commission’s responsibilities, particularly for institutional failures or lack of clear guidelines for individual duties.

The Court found that no cogent material or evidence was presented to substantiate the allegations of misbehaviour against Ms. Mepung Tadar Bage. Her actions did not meet the high threshold of “misbehaviour” required for removal under Article 317(1).

Holding:

The Supreme Court concluded that the charges alleged against Ms. Mepung Tadar Bage were not proven and, therefore, her conduct did not constitute “misbehaviour” within the meaning of Article 317(1) of the Constitution of India.

The Court recommended that the Hon’ble President of India revoke her suspension forthwith.

Furthermore, it recommended that she be entitled to all consequential and monetary benefits.

Re: Mepung Tadar Bage, Member, Arunachal Pradesh Public Service Commission

Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 1047 (DoJ 28-08-2025)

2025 INSC 1047 Download Supreme Court File

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Proprietorship Concerns: Clarifying Legal Standing in Court

August 27, 2025 No Comments

This judgment from the Supreme Court of India clarifies the legal standing of a proprietorship concern in a lawsuit, particularly regarding its ability to be sued and represented. The case stemmed from an eviction suit filed by the appellants against a lessee, Aditya Motors, a sole proprietorship concern of Pilla Durga Prasad (P.D. Prasad).

A registered lease deed dated 13th April, 2005, leased premises from the appellants to Aditya Motors. After the lease expired and the premises were not vacated, the appellants filed an eviction suit under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

Party Amendment: Initially, M/s. Associated Auto Services Pvt. Ltd. was impleaded as defendant no.1, with Pilla Durga Prasad as defendant no.2. An application was filed by the appellant to delete the original defendant no.1 (lessee-defendant no.1) and substitute Pilla Durga Prasad as the representative of the lessee, changing the cause title to Dogiparthi Venkata Satish and another Vs. Pilla Durga Prasad and others. This amendment was allowed on 28th March, 2018.

Rejection Application: The defendant (Pilla Durga Prasad) later applied under Order VII Rule 11 CPC to reject the plaint, arguing that Aditya Motors was a proprietorship concern and therefore not a “juristic person,” and thus, the original plaint against it should be rejected.

Trial Court Decision: The Trial Court rejected the application to reject the plaint.

High Court Decision: The High Court, in revision, set aside the Trial Court’s order, ruling that a proprietorship concern ought to have been made a party and could be sued.

Law Involved

The key legal provisions discussed in this judgment are:

Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908: This rule pertains to the rejection of a plaint.

Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC: This rule relates to the amendment of pleadings.

Order XXX Rule 10 of the CPC: This is the central provision, dealing with suits against persons carrying on business in a name other than their own. It allows such a person to be sued in the business name or style as if it were a firm name, and applies other rules under Order XXX accordingly.

Order XXX Rule 1 CPC: Mentioned in context of partnership firms, enabling partners to sue or be sued in the firm’s name.

Reasoning

The Supreme Court’s reasoning centered on the legal nature of a proprietorship concern and the interpretation of Order XXX Rule 10 CPC:

Proprietorship is Not a Juristic Person: The Court unequivocally stated that a proprietorship concern is not a juristic person; it is merely a trade name for an individual carrying on business. Therefore, it cannot, in its own name, sue or be sued.

Representation of Proprietor: The Court emphasized that the proprietor is the real party in interest. If the proprietor is impleaded as a party representing the proprietorship, no prejudice is caused, and the interest of the proprietorship concern is well protected.

Misinterpretation by High Court: The Supreme Court found that the High Court committed a serious error by equating a proprietorship concern with a company or a partnership firm for the purpose of being sued. Order XXX specifically deals with partnership firms, not proprietorships.

Purpose of Order XXX Rule 10 CPC: This rule enables the proprietor of a proprietorship business to be sued in the business name. It clarifies that the real party being sued is the proprietor, and this provision does not convert a proprietorship business into a partnership firm. The phrase “insofar as the nature of such case permits” means that other provisions of Order XXX apply to a suit against a proprietary concern only to the extent possible given its nature.

Precedents: The Court referenced Ashok Transport Agency v. Awadhesh Kumar and another, which explained that a proprietorship concern is a business name and Order XXX Rule 10 enables the real party (the proprietor) to be sued. Similarly, Shankar Finance and Investments v. State of Andhra Pradesh and others affirmed that the proprietor remains the real party in interest, even if the representation is in the trade name or through an agent.

Trial Court’s Correctness: The Court concluded that the Trial Court was correct in rejecting the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, as the plaintiff had been amended and Aditya Motors (the proprietorship name) had been deleted, and Pilla Durga Prasad (the proprietor) was substituted in its place. The cause of action was actually against Pilla Durga Prasad, who was the signatory to the lease deed.

Holding

The appeal is allowed.

The impugned order of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh dated 19th October, 2023, is set aside.

The order passed by the Trial Court dated 2nd July, 2018, is set aside (This seems to be a slight contradiction with the reasoning which said Trial Court was correct, but given the final holding, the specific Trial Court order referenced in which was set aside by High Court, means the Supreme Court is overturning the High Court and restoring the Trial Court’s position).

The Trial Court is directed to proceed in accordance with law to decide the suit on its own merits.

Dogiparthi Venkata Satish v. Pilla Durga Prasad

Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 1046 (DoJ 26-08-2025)

2025 INSC 1046 Download Supreme Court File

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PF Dues Priority Dispute: Supreme Court Mandates Re-evaluation and Party Impleadment

August 27, 2025 No Comments

M/s Acropetal Technologies Pvt. Ltd. (referred to as ‘the Establishment’) defaulted on provident fund (PF) payments since July 2013, leading to an inquiry under Section 7(A) of the PF Act. The Regional PF Commissioner II determined a liability of Rs. 1,28,90,486/- via an order dated June 8, 2015, and initiated recovery proceedings.

The Establishment’s bank accounts were declared Non-Performing Assets (NPA) on June 29, 2015, prompting recovery processes by banks through property auctions. Axis Bank initiated the auction of the ‘Attibele property’ and claimed a first charge under Section 35 of the SARFAESI Act.

The Employees Provident Fund Organisation (EPFO) communicated with Axis Bank, asserting its priority under Section 11(2) of the PF Act for outstanding dues of Rs. 2,96,76,656/-.

Axis Bank subsequently sold the ‘Attibele property’ in March 2016 and informed EPFO that the proceeds were fully appropriated against its dues, leaving no amount for the Establishment’s outstanding PF dues.

Separately, another property (‘Kammanahalli’ or ‘Palya property’) was being auctioned by State Bank of Travancore (now taken over by SBI).

M/S Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Limited (the Appellant-EARC) was involved in recovering dues and communicated with EPFO regarding the ‘Palya property’, eventually filing a writ petition challenging an attachment order and recovery certificate.

The Karnataka High Court dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellant and directed the deposited amount be transmitted to the respondent.

The appellant challenged this High Court judgment, arguing that EPFO dues have a first charge and that Axis Bank, which had sold a property for approximately Rs. 12 crores, was not made a party-respondent before the High Court.

Law Involved

The Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (PF Act):

Section 7(A): For determining the liability for provident fund dues.

Section 11(2): Pertains to the priority of provident fund dues over other debts.

Sections 7(Q), 14(B), 8(B), 8(G): Related to interest, damages, and recovery procedures.

The Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act):

Section 35: Under which Axis Bank claimed a first charge on the property.

Reasoning

The Supreme Court noted that the High Court’s judgment, dated February 1, 2024, which dismissed the appellant’s writ petition, failed to adequately address the critical issue of the priority of first charge among EPFO and the secured creditors.

A significant procedural oversight was identified: Axis Bank, which had initiated recovery proceedings and sold the ‘Attibele property’, was not impleaded as a party-respondent before the High Court during the writ petition hearing.

The Court highlighted the established legal position that EPFO dues typically hold first charge and priority over other government or local authority dues, as also seen in the Maharashtra State Co-operative Bank vs. Assistant PF, Commissioner case.

The Supreme Court found it essential for the High Court to thoroughly examine the inter-se priority of the first charge among the EPFO, Axis Bank, State Bank of India, and State Bank of Travancore (now SBI), considering the provisions of Section 11(2) of the PF Act and Section 35 of the SARFAESI Act.

The appellant’s argument that the balance amount due to EPFO could be recovered from Axis Bank, given the significant amount Axis Bank realized from the sale of the ‘Attibele property’, also warranted detailed consideration by the High Court.

Holding

The Supreme Court granted leave in the appeal.

The judgment and order of the Karnataka High Court dated February 1, 2024, were set aside.

The writ petition filed by the appellant (Writ Petition No. 2543 of 2023 (L-PF)) was restored to its original number before the High Court.

The High Court was directed to proceed and decide the writ petition afresh, specifically to:

Examine the priority of first charge amongst the EPFO and the secured creditors (Axis Bank, State Bank of India, and State Bank of Travancore/SBI) in view of Section 11(2) of the PF Act.

Ensure that Axis Bank is impleaded as a party-respondent to the writ petition for a comprehensive and lawful adjudication.

M/s Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Limited v. Regional Pf Commissioner II And Recovery Officer, RO Bengaluru (Koramangala)

Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 1045 (DoJ 26-08-2025)

2025 INSC 1045 Download Supreme Court File

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