Indian Judgements

Indian Judgements

SEBI: Distinguishion between structural breach from a finding of “fraud” or “manipulation

In Reliance Industries Limited & Ors. v. The Securities and Exchange Board of India (Civil Appeal No. 4015 of 2020 with Civil Appeal No. [To Be Allocated] of 2026, decided on May 29, 2026), the Supreme Court of India adjudicated a landmark statutory appeal concerning the legal thresholds of market manipulation, the boundaries of derivative hedging, and the interpretation of “fraud” under the SEBI (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 2003 (PFUTP Regulations). The dispute arose from a 2:1 majority decision of the Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT) which had affirmed an order of the Whole Time Member (WTM) of SEBI holding Reliance Industries Limited (RIL) liable for manipulating the stock prices of Reliance Petroleum Ltd. (RPL) in November 2007 to amass illegal profits in the futures segment, resulting in a directive for disgorgement of Rs. 447.27 crore plus interest.

The Supreme Court examined the structural design of single-stock futures and the mechanics of hedging. Resolving key legal issues, the Court determined that the calculation of position limits must happen on an aggregate basis across all derivative instruments of an underlying scrip, rather than being confined to a single-month series. Applying this structural baseline, the Court observed that RIL’s use of 12 independent entities to corner a dominant market share without necessary disclosures constituted a regulatory infraction under the 2001 SEBI framework. However, the Court distinguished this structural breach from a finding of “fraud” or “manipulation” under the PFUTP Regulations, emphasizing that under Regulation 2(1)(c), the essential element of inducement to deal in securities must be established through objective market impact rather than inferred through structural position concentration or trading motives alone.

Detailed Summary of Judgment

1. Factual Matrix & Regulatory Intervention

  • The Divestment Mandate: In March 2007, the Board of RIL passed a broad resolution authorizing officials to raise Rs. 87,000 crore for corporate projects through various means, including the divestment of its holdings. RIL decided to divest a 5% stake in its subsidiary, RPL, equivalent to 22.50 crore shares, against the backdrop of an exceptionally bullish price surge where RPL shares quadrupled within 17 months.
  • The Trading Strategy: Observing reports from international institutional analysts identifying RPL as overvalued and ripe for price correction, RIL sought to mitigate the downside risk of offloading a massive chunk of shares in the cash market. RIL noted that liquidity in the November 2007 futures segment was four times higher than the cash segment. Between November 1 and November 6, 2007, RIL executed agency agreements with 12 independent entities to build up a collective short position of 9.92 crore shares in November futures at an average locked-in price of Rs. 265.67 per share. Under the agreements, all trading profits/losses were to the account of RIL, while the agents received a fixed commission.
  • Market Settlement and Realization: RIL sold 20.29 crore RPL shares in a phased manner in the cash segment throughout November 2007, realizing Rs. 4,500 crore. On the futures settlement date (November 29, 2007), 1.95 crore futures positions had been squared off early, leaving 7.97 crore outstanding short positions to be automatically cash-settled by the NSE at the weighted average price derived from the final 30 minutes of cash trading. During the last 8 minutes and 20 seconds of that day, RIL sold 1.95 crore shares in the cash segment. RIL made a gain of Rs. 513 crore from the futures segment.
  • The Show Cause Notice: SEBI issued a fresh Show Cause Notice (SCN) on December 16, 2010, alleging that RIL had engaged in a fraudulent, manipulative trading scheme by using 12 front entities to corner the futures market in breach of prescribed position limits, and had dumped shares in the final minutes of trading to depress the cash settlement price to inflate its futures profits. The WTM upheld these charges, directing a disgorgement of Rs. 447.27 crore, which was subsequently sustained by a 2:1 majority at the SAT on November 5, 2020.

2. Legal Issues for Determination

The Supreme Court framed four principal issues for adjudication:

  1. Whether the agreements between RIL and the 12 entities constituted a fraudulent and manipulative device under the PFUTP Regulations.
  2. Whether the 9.92 crore open positions held in the November 2007 futures segment qualified as valid commercial hedges.
  3. Whether the agreements were utilized to illegitimately corner positions to manipulate the futures market.
  4. Whether the sale of 1.95 crore shares during the final 10 minutes on November 29, 2007, was a manipulative attempt to depress settlement prices.

3. Comprehensive Legal Analysis by the Court

A. Position Limits and the Logic of Aggregate Calculation

The Court closely evaluated the methodology used by SEBI and the SAT majority to compute market concentration.

  • The Single-Series Error: SEBI had calculated RIL’s market cornering percentage (ranging from 61.15% to 93.60%) based exclusively on the open interest within the November 2007 futures series
  • The Combined Derivatives Rule: Reviewing the explicit text of the 2001 SEBI Circular, the Court noted that customer-level position limits (the higher of 1% of free-float market capitalization or 5% of open interest) are applicable on the combined positions across all derivative contracts on an underlying stock at an exchange. Position limits cannot be isolated to a single-month series. If limits were computed per individual series, it would create a regulatory loophole allowing a trader to capture a dominant market footprint by spreading risk across consecutive months while remaining within the 5% cap on each.
  • Factual Recalculation: When properly aggregated across all RPL futures (November, December, January) and options contracts, RIL’s actual open interest concentration on the settlement date stood at 10%, rather than the 93.60% stated by SEBI.

B. Principal-Agent Disclosures vs. “Acting in Concert”

  • The Circumvention Baseline: RIL contended that because the 2001 Single Stock Futures Circular contained no express restrictions on “persons acting in concert” (unlike the index futures framework of the 1999 Circular), it was legally entitled to deploy 12 distinct entities as separate clients. The Court rejected this hyper-literal approach, ruling that position limits exist to minimize systemic risk, preserve market equilibrium, and ensure fair price discovery.
  • Indirect Violations: Invoking the established legal maxim that what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly, the Court observed that since RIL could not cross the client-level threshold in its individual capacity, it could not utilize 12 contractual agents to achieve the same result for its exclusive profit.
  • Disclosure Deficit: The 2001 framework did not impose an absolute ban on taking larger positions; instead, it established a framework where clients were required to disclose positions exceeding the cap to the exchange. RIL violated the 2001 Circular by failing to fulfill this implicit disclosure obligation while using proxy accounts. However, the Court clarified that a breach of a position limit does not automatically render bilateral derivative contracts void or illegal under Section 18A of the SCRA, as the circulars prescribe self-contained internal penalties (such as fines or membership suspensions) rather than contract nullification.

[ 2001 SEBI CIRCULAR FRAMEW

C. Dissecting “Fraud” and the Requirement of Inducement under PFUTP

The Court engaged in a detailed textual reconstruction of Regulation 2(1)(c) of the PFUTP Regulations and its interplay with Regulations 3 and 4:

  • The Core Definition: The definition of “fraud” under the PFUTP Regulations encompasses any act, expression, omission, or concealment—whether committed in a deceitful manner or not—while dealing in securities, in order to induce another person to deal in securities.
  • Inducement as a Sine Qua Non: Relying on its previous ruling in SEBI v. Kanhaiyalal Baldevbhai Patel (2017), the Court reaffirmed that the first part of Regulation 2(1)(c) serves as an inclusive catch-all provision, but it remains structurally anchored to the act of inducement. To sustain a charge of market fraud, the regulator must establish that the impugned conduct directly induced other market participants to alter their trading behavior to their detriment.
  • Distinguishing Mere Position Concentration: The Court observed that while RIL held a dominant market share of 40.10%, concentration by itself does not automatically equate to fraud or market manipulation. The 12 entities built their short positions early in the month at market-determined prices, and the subsequent increase in their percentage of open interest was a passive result of other independent traders squaring off their positions, rather than an active, deceptive device deployed by RIL. The transactions were executed through standard, anonymous, screen-based exchange mechanisms with unrelated counterparties.

D. Evaluation of the Final-Minutes Cash Segment Sales

  • The Commercial Reality of Price Spikes: SEBI argued that RIL’s offloading of 1.95 crore shares in the final 8 minutes and 20 seconds of the settlement day was a deliberate strategy to depress the cash price and maximize its futures payoff. The Court observed that between November 26 and November 28, the RPL stock had consistently traded below Rs. 208. On November 29, the price suddenly experienced a sharp, volatile surge, climbing to Rs. 224.70 by 3:21 p.m.. RIL, which still held a remaining inventory of shares earmarked for capital generation under its March board resolution, took a business decision to sell into this liquidity spike.
  • The LTP Revision Fallacy: The SAT majority had inferred manipulation from the fact that 12 out of 17 of RIL’s sell orders were placed below the Last Traded Price (LTP). The Supreme Court clarified that in an automated, screen-based trading system governed by price-time priority, a seller looking to offload large volumes when buyers are scarce must necessarily lower their offer price to find matching buy orders. Placing orders below the LTP is a standard execution practice under volatile market conditions, not conclusive proof of a price-depressing device. Furthermore, independent market participants had simultaneously offloaded 1.06 crore shares during those exact final minutes, meaning the downward pressure on the volume-weighted average price could not be isolated or exclusively attributed to RIL.

4. Final Determination and Conclusion

The Supreme Court systematically answered the issues for determination:

  1. The Nature of the Agreements: The principal-agent agreements were structured to bypass individual position limits, constituting a regulatory infraction under the 2001 Single Stock Futures framework due to non-disclosure, but they did not inherently constitute a deceptive or fraudulent device under the PFUTP Regulations.
  2. The Hedging Motivation: RIL’s derivative positions functioned as an integrated commercial tool to de-risk its underlying exposure from the proposed sale of 22.50 crore shares in the cash segment. The futures short positions covered less than half of its actual asset exposure, supporting the commercial explanation of risk mitigation.
  3. Market Cornering & Manipulation: While RIL accumulated a dominant aggregate position of 40.10%, SEBI failed to establish that this concentration distorted general trading conditions or directly induced other market participants to trade blindly, failing to satisfy the legal standard for fraud under the PFUTP Regulations.
  4. The Final-Minutes Trades: The sale of 1.95 crore shares was a genuine commercial transaction executed at prevailing market prices to liquidate remaining inventory during a price spike, and could not be characterized as a fraudulent attempt to depress the final settlement average.

Final Order: The statutory civil appeals are allowed, and the majority judgment of the Securities Appellate Tribunal is set aside. The finding of fraud under the PFUTP Regulations is extinguished, and SEBI is directed to process the financial consequences in accordance with this judgment. All connected pending applications stand formally disposed of.

5. Single Follow-Up Question for Guidance

To assist in applying these principles to your current query, are you looking for a specific analysis of how this judgment impacts ongoing enforcement actions concerning position limit aggregation, or do you require an exploration of the standard of proof required to establish “inducement” in screen-based trading environments under the post-2016 SEBI amendments?

2026 INSC 585

Reliance Industries Limited And Others  V. Securities And Exchange Board of India (D.O.J. 29.05.2026)

2026 INSC 585 click here to view full text of judgment

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Political Rivalry & Limits of Bail: SC Cancels Sentence Suspension for Mastermind in Murder

This criminal appeal arose from a challenge to an order of the High Court suspending the sentences of the accused respondents following their conviction for a murder stemming from political rivalry over a Sarpanch election. The appellant, father of the deceased victim, contested the High Court’s routine suspension of sentences, which was granted primarily due to the heavy backlog and long pendency of criminal appeals. The Supreme Court partly allowed the appeal, ruling that while the suspension of sentence for the co-accused (where key prosecution witnesses turned hostile) did not warrant interference, the suspension granted to “A1” (the mastermind behind the conspiracy) was legally flawed. Emphasizing that courts cannot casually release convicts of heinous crimes simply due to systemic court delays, the Supreme Court cancelled the bail of A1 and directed him to surrender.

  • Background and Trial Conviction:
    • The crime involved the assassination of a candidate standing for bye-elections as a Sarpanch, orchestrated out of political rivalry.
    • “A1” (a government teacher whose faction lost influence) was convicted under Section 302 read with Section 120B IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment for masterminding the conspiracy, while other co-accused were convicted under Section 120B with 10 years of imprisonment.
    • The High Court suspended the sentences of the accused largely due to the impossibility of disposing of pending appeals in the near future.
  • Supreme Court’s Analysis Regarding the Mastermind (A1):
    • On a prima facie evaluation of evidence, the Supreme Court noted that witnesses testified to open threats made by A1 in the Returning Officer’s office stating the deceased would not stay alive until the election.
    • Furthermore, evidence from an Assistant Commissioner (PW40) established that A1 was present at a police station without provocation on the fateful day, pointing toward a deliberate attempt to create an alibi.
    • Given the compelling evidence of motive, threats, and calculated conspiracy, the High Court erred in granting bail to A1 solely based on appeal pendency.
  • Analysis Regarding the Co-Accused:
    • The prosecution alleged that the other respondents assisted by changing vehicle number plates, booking rooms, and purchasing SIM cards for the perpetrators.
    • However, material witnesses (such as PW8, PW12, PW13, PW27, PW66, PW67, and PW68) turned hostile or failed to establish the allegations, leaving insufficient direct material to disturb the High Court’s suspension of sentence for these co-accused.
  • Caution Against Routine Suspension of Sentences for Heinous Crimes:
    • The Court strongly criticized the knee-jerk practice of releasing convicts of heinous offences merely because appeals cannot be heard immediately, noting that it perils civil society and undermines public trust.
    • The bench underscored that courts must exercise circumspection, balance actual incarceration against appeal pendency, and remain sensitive to the trauma of victims’ families, since convicted persons no longer enjoy the presumption of innocence.
  • Final Orders and Directions:
    • The appeals were partly allowed.
    • The order suspending the sentence of A1 stands cancelled; he was directed to surrender before the Trial Court within two weeks.
    • The High Court’s order suspending the sentences of the other accused/respondents was left undisturbed.

2026 INSC 1180

Hanuman Prasad Hanuta Ram v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (D.O.J. 27.10.2026)

2026 INSC 1180 click here to view full text of judgment

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Weaponisation of Criminal Law in Failed Relationships: SC Sets Aside Prosecution for Rape and Cheating

This criminal appeal arose from a common order passed by the High Court of Kerala, which dismissed the appellant’s revision petition and miscellaneous case, thereby refusing to discharge him from charges under Sections 376, 420, 493, 494, and 495 of the IPC. The complainant had alleged that the appellant deceived her into a temple marriage in 1996 while concealing his prior marriage and children, and that her consent to sexual relations over seven years was vitiated by this misconception. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and discharged the appellant, holding that the essential ingredients of the alleged offences were entirely absent because the complainant admitted to discovering the appellant’s prior marriage within six months of cohabitation yet voluntarily continued the relationship for years. Citing a worrying trend of converting failed consensual relationships into criminal prosecutions, the Court emphasized that criminal law cannot be weaponized to settle personal scores or exact revenge following emotional discord.

  • Factual Background & Lower Court Proceedings:
    • The appellant and respondent No. 2 lived together from 1996 to 2003 following a purported marriage ceremony at a temple in Mysuru.
    • After the relationship ended and domestic violence proceedings filed in 2008 were dismissed, respondent No. 2 filed a second private complaint that led to an FIR in 2011 for offences punishable under Sections 376, 420, 493, 494, and 495 of the IPC.
    • The Trial Court dismissed the appellant’s discharge application, and the Kerala High Court upheld that decision, ruling that a prima facie case of rape under misconception of fact was made out.
  • Legal Principles on Discharge (Section 277 CrPC):
    • Reaffirming principles from Prafulla Kumar Samal and Sajjan Kumar, the Supreme Court reiterated that at the stage of discharge, the court must sift and weigh evidence for the limited purpose of finding a prima facie case or grave suspicion. If the probability of the commission of the offence is non-existent, the accused is entitled to be discharged.
  • Analysis of Alleged Offences:
    • Rape (Section 376/375): The Court noted that the complainant admitted to being informed of the appellant’s prior marriage by his brother within six months of cohabitation, yet she continued to live with him voluntarily. A consensual relationship cannot be retrospectively branded as rape merely because the relationship soured years later.
    • Cheating (Section 420): There was no evidence that any deceit induced the complainant to deliver property or alter/destroy any “valuable security” as defined under Section 30 of the IPC.
    • Deceitful Cohabitation & Bigamy (Sections 493, 494, 495): Because the complainant continued cohabiting with full knowledge of the prior marriage and failed to establish a valid formal marriage beyond vague temple rituals, the core statutory ingredients were not satisfied.
  • Censure of Criminalizing Failed Relationships:
    • The Court expressed deep concern over a growing trend where courts witness consensual relationships that end in emotional discord being retrospectively combed for criminal elements.
    • While emphasizing the gravity of genuine sexual assault and the need to protect bodily autonomy, the Court cautioned that the justice system must not be turned into a tool for vengeance or financial coercion when adult relationships fail.
  • Final Order and Relief:
    • The Supreme Court set aside the impugned orders of the High Court and Trial Court.
    • The appellant’s discharge application was allowed, and he was completely discharged from all charges.

2026 INSC 1179

Santhosh Kumar N.P. v. State (Station House Officer, Kadirur Police) & Another (D.O.J. 30.10.2026)

2026 INSC 1179 click here to view full text of judgment

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Judicial Discipline Overruled: The Illegality of Reviewing Binding Precedents on Tariff Fixation and Sinking Funds

This appeal arose from a patent breach of judicial discipline by the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity, which allowed a review petition after more than five years and overturned a 2019 tariff fixation order that had strictly followed a binding precedent of the Supreme Court (Bhaskar Shrachi Alloys Limited v. Damodar Valley Corporation). The underlying issue concerned whether the “Sinking Fund” created by the Damodar Valley Corporation (DVC) for redeeming bonds could be factored in as an item of expenditure in tariff determination alongside asset depreciation. The Supreme Court strongly criticized the Tribunal for overstepping the narrow contours of review, violating Article 141 of the Constitution, and attempting to rewrite settled tariff principles under the guise of correcting a “double benefit”. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned review order, restored the original 2019 Tribunal judgment, and imposed exemplary costs on the review petitioner and the intervening public sector undertaking.

  • Background and Statutory Context:
    • The dispute relates to tariff fixation for DVC for the period 2009 to 2014 under the Electricity Act, 2003, the DVC Act, 1948, and the CERC Tariff Regulations, 2009.
    • DVC is a statutory corporation created (on the lines of the US Tennessee Valley Authority) not only to generate power but also to handle flood control, irrigation, and socio-economic development of the Damodar Valley.
    • Under Section 40 of the DVC Act and Regulation 43 of the 2009 Regulations, DVC is permitted to recover both depreciation (stipulated by the C&AG) and funds established under Section 40 (such as Sinking Funds for bond redemption) through tariff recovery.
    • The core issue regarding the validity of the Sinking Fund as a pass-through in tariff had already been conclusively settled by the Supreme Court in Bhaskar Shrachi Alloys Limited v. DVC ((2018) 8 SCC 281), which underscored the overriding protective effect of the fourth proviso to Section 14 of the Electricity Act, 2003.
  • The Tribunal’s Erroneous Review Order:
    • Following the 2018 Supreme Court judgment, the Appellate Tribunal in 2019 upheld the CERC’s tariff order allowing the Sinking Fund.
    • However, upon a review petition filed by consumers (Maithan Alloys), the Tribunal reversed its stand after 5 years, ruling that allowing both depreciation on capital assets and contributions to the Sinking Fund amounted to an impermissible “double allowance” or duplication.
  • Supreme Court’s Legal Analysis & Findings:
    • Scope of Review: Citing established principles (such as State of West Bengal v. Kamal Sengupta), the Supreme Court reiterated that an error which requires a long process of reasoning or debate cannot be termed an “error apparent on the face of the record”. A tribunal cannot sit in appeal over its own judgment or review it based on a supposed misconception that escaped notice.
    • Violation of Judicial Discipline and Article 141: The Tribunal’s action in reviewing an order based on a direct, binding Supreme Court precedent was labeled as “innovating at pleasure” and a clear violation of Article 141 of the Constitution.
    • Substantive Legality of Sinking Funds: The Court reaffirmed that Section 40 of the DVC Act departs from general accounting principles to accommodate DVC’s unique statutory mandate, allowing Sinking Funds to be treated as a first charge/expense deductible before net profits are determined.
  • Relief and Costs Awarded:
    • The impugned review order of the Tribunal was set aside, and the original Tribunal order dated May 17, 2019, was restored.
    • Noting that the review petition was an abuse of process and that the intervenor Public Sector Undertaking (Steel Authority of India Ltd.) ill-advisedly supported a breach of judicial discipline, the Court imposed exemplary costs:
      • 2,00,000 (Rupees Two Lakh) to be paid by the 1st Respondent (Maithan Alloys Limited) to DVC.
      • 1,50,000 (Rupees One Lakh and Fifty Thousand) to be paid by the Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL) to DVC.
    • Failure to pay within one month will attract an 18% per annum interest rate.

2026 INSC 1178

Damodar Valley Corporation v. Maithan Alloys Limited & Ors. (D.O.J. 30.10.2026)

2026 INSC 1178 click here to view full text of judgment

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Strangers to a Consent Decree: Safeguarding Rights and Access to Appeal Against Fraudulent Compromises

This appeal arose from a challenge to interim orders and a final judgment passed by the High Court of Gujarat, which condoned an 11-year delay, granted leave to appeal to non-parties (strangers to the suit), and maintained an ad interim injunction. The dispute centered around a 2012 specific performance suit that culminated in a consent decree in 2013, through which the appellant ultimately secured a sale deed in 2022 via a Court Commissioner. The original respondents (heirs/members of a Hindu Undivided Family), alleging fraud and collusion, sought to challenge the consent decree. The Supreme Court dismissed the appellant’s appeals, holding that the statutory bar under Section 96(3) and Order XXIII Rules 3 and 3A of the CPC applies only to parties to a compromise, and that strangers whose independent rights are prejudiced can maintain an appeal with the leave of the court. The Court also upheld the condonation of delay and the interim protection, emphasizing that non-parties cannot be deemed to have prior knowledge of a collusive decree.

  • Background and Procedural Context:
    • A civil suit for specific performance (Civil Suit No. 322 of 2012) was filed by a housing society against the heirs of an original land owner, which rapidly ended in a compromise consent decree on April 29, 2013.
    • Execution proceedings were initiated in 2020, leading to a registered sale deed executed by a Court Commissioner in June 2022 in favour of the appellant, Girishbhai Natwarlal Patel (who had previously acted as a power-of-attorney holder for the defendants in the suit).
    • Respondent Nos. 1 to 9, claiming through a family HUF that held historical revenue interests, discovered the alienation in 2023, filed an appeal with an application for leave to appeal, and secured an ex parte ad interim injunction from the High Court in 2024, which was later confirmed along with an 11-year delay condonation.
  • Maintainability of Appeal by a Stranger to a Consent Decree:
    • The Supreme Court clarified that while Section 96(3) of the CPC and Order XXIII Rule 3A bar parties to a compromise from challenging a consent decree via separate suits or standard appeals, these provisions do not apply to strangers to the decree.
    • Non-parties who assert an independent legal interest that is prejudicially affected by a fraudulent or collusive decree are entitled to seek leave to appeal under Section 96 of the CPC.
  • Principles Governing Leave to Appeal for Non-Parties:
    • Citing precedents such as N. Krishna Murthy, Jatan Kumar Golcha, and H. Anjanappa, the Court reiterated that a stranger cannot file an appeal unless they qualify as an “aggrieved person” whose legal rights or interests are directly jeopardized.
    • The material on record—including the appellant’s dual role under a power of attorney for the defendants while linked to the plaintiff society—disclosed a sufficient prima facie grievance to warrant appellate scrutiny, without foreclosing the final merits.
  • Validity of Condonation of Delay:
    • The 11-year delay was validly condoned because the contesting respondents were not parties to the original suit and could not be imputed with constructive knowledge of the proceedings from the date of the decree.
    • Their explanation regarding discovering the revenue mutation changes in 2023 and acting promptly thereafter justified the exercise of judicial discretion.
  • Supreme Court’s Final Directions:
    • The appeals filed by the appellant were dismissed in entirety.
    • The Supreme Court requested the High Court of Gujarat to expedite the hearing of the main First Appeal and dispose of it within three months.

2026 INSC 1177

Girishbhai Natwarlal Patel v. Gautam Punjabhai Palkhiwala (Dead) by LRs & Ors. (D.O.J. 30.10.2026)

2026 INSC 1177 click here to view full text of judgment

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