Indian Judgements

Indian Judgements

Quashing of FIR – Criminal proceedings cannot be used as an instrument to leverage a purely civil property dispute.

Challenge against a High Court order refusing to quash a supplementary FIR that arrayed the appellant as an accused in a property dispute, despite a lack of new evidence or criminal elements.

Appeal Allowed. The Supreme Court quashed FIR No. 588 dated June 2, 2018, specifically regarding the appellant, ruling that criminal proceedings cannot be used as an instrument to leverage a purely civil property dispute.

1. Introduction and High Court Ruling

The appellant filed a criminal appeal before the Supreme Court challenging a common order passed by the High Court. The High Court had declined to grant relief or quash FIR No. 588 dated June 2, 2018, which was registered at the Faridabad Central Police Station. The High Court had reasoned that even though a civil suit was already pending and the dispute primarily concerned land boundaries, the criminal allegations could not be ignored because the accused persons were alleged to have knowingly executed forged General Power of Attorneys (GPAs) for land that had already been partially transferred to the State of Uttar Pradesh.

2. The Prosecution and Supplementary FIR

The initial FIR explicitly mentioned the name of the appellant, Sunisha Anand, but did not array her as an accused party. However, through a supplementary FIR (Annexure P10), the police subsequently arrayed the appellant as an accused.

The Additional Attorney General for the State of Haryana argued that the appellant’s criminal role was unmasked during the regular course of investigation, justifying her subsequent inclusion. Conversely, Senior Counsel Sri Siddharth Luthra, representing the appellant, countered that the supplementary report was added without any fresh material or evidence being unearthed by the police. He relied upon the Supreme Court precedent in Mariam Fasihuddin & Anr. v. State by Adugodi Police Station & Anr., which explicitly frowned upon filing supplementary reports in the absolute absence of new, independent evidence.

3. Factual Matrix and Core Allegations

The background of the dispute indicates that the appellant is the daughter of Onkar Singh and Mohinder Kaur, who were the original titleholders of the disputed land. Following her father’s demise, the appellant obtained partial rights over the property through legal succession.

The de-facto complainant (the second respondent), who claims to be in physical possession of a portion of the land, filed the complaint. The core allegations leveled in both the first and the supplementary FIR were that:

  • The appellant’s mother executed and registered “fake” GPAs.
  • On the strength of these GPAs, lands were transferred to co-accused individuals (Pratap Singh and Prem Pal), who then executed further commercial conveyances.
  • The appellant and her mother did not hold a clean title over the entire property because a portion of the land had already been divested and transferred to the Government.
  • The subsequent sale deeds incorrectly referenced a jamabandi (land revenue record) that did not exist in reality.

4. Supreme Court’s Evaluation and Findings

The Supreme Court closely evaluated the evidentiary record and exposed the lack of substance in the criminal case against the appellant:

  • The Authenticity of the GPAs: The Court noted that since the prosecution itself asserted that the GPAs were physically executed by the mother and the daughter (the appellant), it was logically incomprehensible to brand the documents as “fake” or “fraudulent”.
  • Absence of Culpability Towards the Complainant: The Apex Court observed that even if the vendors had mistakenly or intentionally sold more land than they actually held title to, or if a non-existent jamabandi was mentioned in the sale deeds, such grievances belong strictly to the purchasers of the property. A third-party occupier cannot convert these contractual mismatches into a criminal offense.
  • Lack of New Evidence: The Court verified that the supplementary FIR merely repeated the exact same allegations as the first FIR and failed to unearth any new evidence connecting the appellant to a cognizable crime.

5. Conclusion and Order

The Supreme Court reiterated a settled tenet of criminal jurisprudence: criminal law machinery cannot be weaponized or exploited to advance a party’s position in a purely civil dispute. Noting that a civil suit initiated by the de-facto complainant was already active, the Court found absolutely no trace of criminality against the appellant.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and officially quashed FIR No. 588 dated June 2, 2018 (Annexure P10) registered at Faridabad Central Police Station, strictly as it applied to the appellant, Sunisha Anand.

2026 INSC 494

Sunisha Anand V. State of Haryana & Anr. (D.O.J. 11.05.2026)

2026 INSC 494 click here to view full text of judgment

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Supreme Court Upholds RBI’s Authority to Supersede Boards of Multi-State Co-Operative Banks

These civil appeals address the critical interplay between the constitutional democratic governance of co-operative societies under Part IXB and the statutory powers of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) under the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 (BR Act), to supersede the Board of Directors (BoD) of a multi-State co-operative bank. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and upheld the Bombay High Court’s judgment, ruling that the RBI’s power to supersede a multi-State co-operative bank’s board under Section 36AAA of the BR Act is not restricted by the six-month limit in Article 243ZL(1) of the Constitution and can be extended beyond the original elected term of the board up to an aggregate outer limit of five years.

  • Brief of Judgment: The Abhyudaya Co-operative Bank Limited, a multi-State co-operative bank, faced severe financial deterioration, leading the RBI to issue a supersession order on November 24, 2023, and appoint an Administrator. The elected directors challenged the supersession and its subsequent extensions, arguing that successive orders passed after the expiry of their statutory five-year term violated Articles 243ZL and 243ZT of the Constitution. The Supreme Court rejected these contentions, holding that the third proviso to Article 243ZL(1) incorporates the BR Act independently into the constitutional framework to prioritize depositor protection and robust economic regulation over standard co-operative tenures.
  • Supersession Limits: The RBI’s power of supersession under Section 36AAA(1) of the BR Act is bounded by an aggregate outer limit of five years, and extensions can legally occur beyond the original tenure of the erstwhile board.
  • Constitutional Harmonization: The third proviso to Article 243ZL(1) of the Constitution acts as an independent substantive provision ensuring that co-operative banks remain under the specialized regulatory oversight of the RBI.
  • Inapplicability of State Consultation: The statutory requirement for prior state government consultation under the proviso to Section 36AAA(1) applies exclusively to uni-State co-operative banks registered with a State Registrar, and not to multi-State co-operative banks.

2026 INSC 955

Sandeep S. Ghandat & Ors. v. Reserve Bank of India & Ors. (D.O.J. 03.09.2026)

2026 INSC 955 click here to view full text of judgment

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Electricity Regulation: Supreme Court Declines to Interfere with Interim Order Permitting Third-Party Participation

This special leave petition challenges an interim order passed by the High Court of Jharkhand, which rejected the petitioners’ preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) filed by ‘Energy Watchdog’ and allowed the respondent to participate in departmental proceedings. The Supreme Court declined to interfere with the interim measure under Article 136 of the Constitution, noting that the High Court’s cautious approach aimed to ensure transparency in an inquiry involving alleged unauthorized power supplies and massive cross-subsidy surcharge defaults.

  • Brief of Judgment: Petitioner No. 1 entered into an agreement with Jharkhand Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. (JBVNL) for surplus captive power supply, which later triggered complaints by Energy Watchdog alleging lack of valid ‘captive user’ status and unauthorized power transmission. After JBVNL issued show cause and demand notices for cross-subsidy surcharges exceeding Rs. 280 crores total, a PIL was instituted. The High Court held the PIL maintainable and permitted the complainant to take part in the proceedings to ensure full disclosure of facts. The Supreme Court upheld this interim arrangement while clarifying that JBVNL must act independently and that all legal questions regarding third-party intervention under the Electricity Act, 2003 remain open for final adjudication.
  • Statutory Framework of the Electricity Act: Reaffirming precedents like PTC India Ltd. and Southern Power Distribution Company, the Electricity Act is an exhaustive code leaving no unallocated regulatory residue outside commissions like the State Commission, which is mandated to ensure transparency under Section 86.
  • Justification for Interim Measure: The High Court adopted a pragmatic interim measure because the circumstances suggested that prior administrative inaction warranted third-party inputs to bring full facts before JBVNL.
  • Preservation of Legal Contentions: The Supreme Court explicitly refrained from commenting on the merits, leaving it open for the High Court to comprehensively examine the scope and ambit of third-party intervention during the final hearing of the writ petition.

2026 INSC 954

M/s. Amalgam Steels and Power Ltd. and Anr. v. Energy Watchdog and Ors. (D.O.J. 03.09.2026)

2026 INSC 954 click here to view full text of judgment

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Empowering Educational Regulators: Upholding NCTE’s Mandate to Mandate Performance Appraisal Reports for Teacher Training Institutions

This civil appeal addresses the statutory authority of the National Council for Teacher Education (NCTE) to mandate the online submission of annual Performance Appraisal Reports (PAR) along with a processing fee from recognized Teacher Education Institutions (TEIs). The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the Delhi High Court’s Division Bench judgment, ruling that the NCTE and its Executive Committee possess full statutory and ancillary powers under the NCTE Act, 1993, to enforce accountability and regulatory oversight over educational institutions.

  • Brief of Judgment: The litigation originated when TEIs challenged a 2019 Public Notice issued by the Member Secretary of the NCTE’s Executive Committee requiring them to submit online PARs and nominal processing fees. While a single judge dismissed the challenge, the Division Bench quashed the notice on the premise that the specific proforma had not been explicitly approved by the general body of the Council and that delegation to the Member Secretary was improper. The Supreme Court strongly disapproved of the High Court’s pedantic approach, holding that statutory regulators must be empowered to enforce institutional transparency, performance audits, and accountability without judicial overreach.
  • Statutory Framework and Duty Bearers: The judgment emphasizes that following the enactment of Article 21A and the Right of Education (RTE) Act, 2009, elementary school teachers, TEIs, and the NCTE act as critical constitutional duty bearers responsible for upholding high standards of educational quality.
  • Scope of Regulatory Powers: Section 12(k) of the NCTE Act expressly empowers the Council to evolve suitable performance appraisal systems and mechanisms to enforce accountability, which includes the incidental power to collect processing fees and utilize digital portals for management information systems.
  • Role of the Executive Committee: The Executive Committee, operating as the executive arm of the Council, is fully competent to implement decisions made by the General Body, such as substituting cumbersome annual renewal regimes with streamlined PAR submissions.
  • Reversal of High Court Judgment: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order, reaffirming that courts must support and enable the effective functioning of statutory regulators rather than restrict them through hyper-technical interpretations.

2026 INSC 953

The National Council for Teacher Education v. Association of NCTE Approved Colleges Trust and Ors. (D.O.J. 03.09.2026)

2026 INSC 953 click here to view full text of judgment

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Relief for Homebuyers: Waiver of Time Extension and Penalty Charges in Corporate Insolvency Resolution

This civil appeal addresses the plight of homebuyers and the Successful Resolution Applicant (SRA) who faced severe liabilities in the form of time extension and penalty charges imposed by NOIDA after a real estate developer (“Granite Gate Properties Private Limited”) was subjected to Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP). The Supreme Court allowed the appeal filed by the homebuyers’ Authorized Representative and dismissed NOIDA’s appeal, ruling that penal time extension charges resulting from the original developer’s defaults cannot be validly mulcted on the innocent homebuyers and the SRA as CIRP costs.

  • Brief of Judgment: The developer took perpetual leases for two high-rise projects (“Lotus Boulevard” and “Lotus Panache”) in Sectors 100 and 110, Noida, but subsequently defaulted and became a Corporate Debtor. Homebuyers pooled their own resources under a “Pool and Build” mechanism to keep the project afloat, and a Resolution Plan was approved under an SRA. The National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) had directed time extension charges for up to three years to be treated as CIRP costs, while NOIDA sought even extended charges up to the tenth year under subsequent office orders. The Supreme Court set aside these directions, holding that penal charges intended to deter a defaulting developer cannot be shifted onto homebuyers and the SRA.
  • Role and Nature of NOIDA: While NOIDA operates as a local development authority engaged in commercial and urban planning ventures, its foundational purpose remains public welfare and infrastructural development rather than mere profit-seeking.
  • Exemption from Past Sins: The delay and default were committed by the erstwhile corporate debtor, not by the homebuyers or the SRA who stepped in to rescue the project; consequently, penalizing them for “past sins” is legally unjustified.
  • Rejection of CIRP Cost Classification: The Supreme Court set aside the NCLAT’s direction to treat the time extension charges as CIRP costs and flatly rejected NOIDA’s demand for extended delay penalties stretching up to the tenth year.

2026 INSC 952

The Authorised Representative for Granite Gate Properties Private Limited, Ms. Rakesh Verma v. M/s New Okhla Industrial Development Authority and Ors. (D.O.J. 03.09.2026)

2026 INSC 952 click here to view full text of judgment

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