Appellant Suresh’s challenge to a High Court order that upheld his conviction and life sentence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code for the death of his wife. The judgment analyzes conflicting dying declarations made by the deceased and other witness testimonies, ultimately finding insufficient corroborative evidence to support the conviction. As a result, the Supreme Court acquitted Suresh, granting him the benefit of the doubt and ordering his immediate release.
Penal Code, 1860, Section 302 – Evidence Act, 1872, Section 32 Murder – Conviction set aside – Dying declaration – Appreciation of evidence – PW1 and PW2, who are the mother and father of the deceased respectively tried to suggest that the appellant had set the deceased on fire and neither did he make any attempt to douse the fire nor did he accompany them when they took the deceased to the hospital – PW3 and PW4 deposed that they were the first to reach the deceased’s house and they deposed that the appellant was the one who informed PW1 and PW2 about the incident – PW3 also deposed that she and her father (PW4), as well as, the appellant tried to extinguish the fire – However, these two prosecution witnesses i.e. PW3 and PW4 were declared hostile
PW13 (doctor) had deposed that when the deceased was brought to the hospital, the appellant was with the deceased – Appellant suffers from 40% physical disability resulting from a polio attack – Also, the version that the appellant had not made any attempt to take the deceased to the hospital is not only in contradiction with the deposition of PW13 but would also be fatal for the prosecution case itself as the prosecution case mainly relies on the story that the deceased had made a false statement due to the presence of the appellant in the hospital – PW13 deposed that the deceased had told him that she caught fire while cooking – In his cross examination, this witness admitted that there was no smell of kerosene oil emanating from her body – PW11, the doctor who conducted the postmortem, deposed that the deceased died due to burn injuries and complications therefrom – In the cross examination, PW11 deposed that there were no external injuries on the body of the deceased except the burn injuries – This rules out any possibility of an assault on the deceased before she had caught fire.
Deceased had given two statements which are totally different from her subsequent statements including the statement made before PW12 on 18.09.2008, which has been considered a dying declaration based on which the appellant has been convicted – The first statement was made to the doctor (PW13) on the day of the incident itself where she told PW13 that the incident occurred while she was cooking – On the same day, the second statement was made to the police constable (PW9) where the deceased said the same thing i.e. she caught fire by accident while cooking in the kitchen – Variances in deceased’s statements cast serious doubts on the veracity of her subsequent statement of 18.09.2008 made before the Judicial Magistrate (PW12) where the deceased had blamed the appellant for the incident – The deceased tried to explain her conduct by stating that she made false statements on the day of the incident as she could not tell the truth in the presence of her husband.
Held that it is very difficult to believe this version of the deceased because no other evidence corroborates the deceased’s statement that the appellant had poured kerosene on her and then set her on fire – It is not a case of dowry harassment as all such possibilities were already ruled out during the investigation – Relations between the two families i.e., the family of the accused and the family of the deceased, had soured – In 2006, barely two years before the incident, the appellant’s brother had filed a criminal case of assault against the appellant’s father in-law (PW2) and brother in-law – In that case, PW2 and his son were convicted – Held that inspite of a dying declaration here, for the reasons stated above, total reliance on it would be misplaced. Consequently, the appellant deserves to be given the benefit of doubt and liable to be acquitted.
(Para 8 to 18)
Suresh V. State Rep.By Inspector Of Police
Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 318: (DoJ 04-03-2025)
