Indian Judgements

Indian Judgements

Limits on Section 37 Court Modifying Arbitral Awards

The Supreme Court of India held that a Division Bench exercising narrow jurisdiction under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, could not modify an arbitral award to 50% and reduce interest to 6% merely because additional work claims exceeded 70% of the original contract value and “shocked the conscience” of the Court. Setting aside the impugned Section 37 judgment, the Court restored the arbitral award dated 03.11.2003 in full.

Background and Procedural History

  • The contractor was entrusted with dredging/evacuation work for the approach channel and basin of a shore-based pilot station at Sagar Island, completed by 17.04.2001 when inaugurated by the Chairman of the Port Trust of Calcutta, despite delay due to force majeure conditions.
  • Additional dredging work became necessary due to force majeure weather, soil-data mismatch, siltation, and lack of protective walls, reflected in the Port Trust’s letter dated 19.07.2000.
  • An arbitral award was passed on 03.11.2003 regarding the additional work, which was affirmed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, by a Single Judge.
  • On the awarder’s appeal under Section 37, a Division Bench of the High Court of Calcutta recorded that the award was not based on “no evidence” or “insufficient evidence,” nor perverse, patently illegal, or contrary to the fundamental policy of Indian law, yet modified it to 50% of the quantified amount with 6% interest from 08.02.2002 because additional work claims exceeded 70% of the original contract value.
  • Cross-appeals were filed before the Supreme Court by the contractor (seeking restoration of the award) and the Port Trust (seeking complete setting aside or, alternatively, upholding the modified award).

Key Issues

  • Whether the High Court Division Bench acted within its Section 37 jurisdiction in modifying the arbitral award based on the quantum of additional work exceeding 70% of the original contract and “shocking the conscience” of the Court.
  • Whether the absence of a formal completion certificate or the public/government status of the awarder justified interference or partial severance.

Legal Analysis and Ruling

  • Narrow Scope Under Section 37: Relying on Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI and Somdatt Builders-NCC-NEC (JV) v. NHAI, the Court held that “shocking the conscience” or conflict with basic notions of morality or justice requires substantive, blatant grounds—not mere invocation of phrases because additional work exceeded 70% of the original contract or re-adjudication of evidence/merits.
  • Evidentiary Basis and Non-Issuance of Completion Certificate: The Arbitrator relied on measurements and invoices for additional re-dredging work, and non-issuance of a completion certificate by the Port Trust did not bar recovery for work actually executed. Batliboi Environmental Engineers Ltd. v. HPCL was distinguished as concerning damages rather than valid invoices for additional work.
  • No Special Treatment for State Entities & Inseparability: Under Pam Developments Private Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, parties in arbitration must be treated equally without special leniency merely because the award debtor is a government/statutory entity. Under Gayatri Balasamy v. M/s ISG Novasoft Technologies Limited, the invoices and measurements for additional dredging formed a single integrated character and could not be arbitrarily halved.

Disposition

  • The Supreme Court set aside the impugned Section 37 judgment, allowed the contractor’s appeal, restored the arbitral award, disposed of the Port Trust’s appeal, and disposed of pending applications.

2026 INSC 1238

M/s Marino Dredgeco Limited v. The Board of Trustees of the Port of Kolkata (D.O.J 18.11.2026)

2026 INSC 1238 click here to vbiew full text of judgment

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Circumstantial Chain Fails in Murder Conviction Appeal

The Supreme Court of India set aside the conviction and life sentence of the appellant under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), holding that the prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence beyond reasonable doubt. Reversing the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the High Court of Karnataka, the Court acquitted the appellant under Section 302 IPC and ordered his immediate release.

Background and Procedural History

  • On the morning of 05.09.2013, complainant Ramappa (PW-1) was informed by phone that a woman’s body was inside an iron drum near a lime kiln in Harapanahalli Town; FIR Crime No. 178 of 2013 was registered under Sections 302 and 201 IPC against unknown persons, and the body was later identified as Sharadamma.
  • The prosecution alleged that the appellant, who had an illicit relationship with the deceased, suspected her of an affair with another man, strangled her with a plastic strap on the night of 04.09.2013, robbed her gold and silver ornaments, and placed her body in the drum.
  • Following the appellant’s arrest on 12.09.2013, ornaments were allegedly recovered from his house at Yarabalu village.
  • In Sessions Case No. 101 of 2014 (judgment dated 27.04.2017 and sentence order dated 28.04.2017), the Sessions Judge found homicidal death by ligature strangulation, rejected the “last seen” witnesses (PW-13 and PW-14) due to a nearly two-month delay in recording statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C., acquitted the appellant under Section 201 IPC (an acquittal that became final), and convicted him under Section 302 IPC solely on recovery under Section 27 of the Evidence Act.
  • By judgment dated 09.07.2024 in Criminal Appeal No. 1355 of 2017, the High Court of Karnataka dismissed the appeal, relying on PW-13 and PW-14 as well as the recovery of ornaments. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court.

Key Issues

  • Whether the prosecution proved a complete, unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence—covering motive, “last seen together,” body discovery/concealment, and Section 27 ornament recovery—pointing solely to the appellant’s guilt under Section 302 IPC.
  • Whether doubtful recovery of ornaments could sustain a murder conviction under Section 302 IPC.

Legal Analysis and Ruling

  • Motive Based on Conjecture: General awareness of an alleged relationship did not prove motive to kill over suspected intimacy with another man, especially where close relatives admitted lack of personal knowledge of any affair or suspicion/quarrel.
  • “Last Seen” Delayed and Unexplained: Statements of PW-13 and PW-14 under Section 161 Cr.P.C. were recorded on 01.11.2013—nearly two months after the incident—without explanation, and the High Court reversed the Trial Court’s rejection without addressing the 58-day delay.
  • Body Discovery Inconsistencies: The phone informant alerting PW-1 was neither traced nor examined, and neither the inquest report nor the post-mortem report showed limestone stains on the deceased or her clothes.
  • Doubtful Recovery and Sanwat Khan Principle: Independent proof of disclosure under Section 27 Evidence Act was lacking; panch/appraiser testimonies and the recovery timeline conflicted (PW-13 stated police told him the day after the incident that ornaments were already found at the appellant’s house, whereas recovery was claimed eight days later). Applying Sanwat Khan v. State of Rajasthan and Raj Kumar @ Raju v. State (NCT of Delhi), unexplained possession of stolen articles does not by itself establish murder absent proof that robbery/theft and murder formed part of the same transaction.

Disposition

  • The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, quashed and set aside the conviction and life sentence under Section 302 IPC, maintained the acquittal under Section 201 IPC, acquitted the appellant under Section 302 IPC, directed his immediate release if not required in any other case, and disposed of pending applications.

2026 INSC 1239

Bheemanagouda @ Bheemajja v. State by Harapanahalli Police (D.O.J. 18.11.2026)

2026 INSC 1239 click here to view full text of judgment

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Limits on Section 37 Court Modifying Arbitral Awards

The Supreme Court of India held that a Division Bench exercising narrow jurisdiction under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, could not modify an arbitral award to 50% and reduce interest to 6% merely because additional work claims exceeded 70% of the original contract value and “shocked the conscience” of the Court. Setting aside the impugned Section 37 judgment, the Court restored the arbitral award dated 03.11.2003 in full.

Background and Procedural History

  • The contractor was entrusted with dredging/evacuation work for the approach channel and basin of a shore-based pilot station at Sagar Island, completed by 17.04.2001 when inaugurated by the Chairman of the Port Trust of Calcutta, despite delay due to force majeure conditions.
  • Additional dredging work became necessary due to force majeure weather, soil-data mismatch, siltation, and lack of protective walls, reflected in the Port Trust’s letter dated 19.07.2000.
  • An arbitral award was passed on 03.11.2003 regarding the additional work, which was affirmed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, by a Single Judge.
  • On the awarder’s appeal under Section 37, a Division Bench of the High Court of Calcutta recorded that the award was not based on “no evidence” or “insufficient evidence,” nor perverse, patently illegal, or contrary to the fundamental policy of Indian law, yet modified it to 50% of the quantified amount with 6% interest from 08.02.2002 because additional work claims exceeded 70% of the original contract value.
  • Cross-appeals were filed before the Supreme Court by the contractor (seeking restoration of the award) and the Port Trust (seeking complete setting aside or, alternatively, upholding the modified award).

Key Issues

  • Whether the High Court Division Bench acted within its Section 37 jurisdiction in modifying the arbitral award based on the quantum of additional work exceeding 70% of the original contract and “shocking the conscience” of the Court.
  • Whether the absence of a formal completion certificate or the public/government status of the awarder justified interference or partial severance.

Legal Analysis and Ruling

  • Narrow Scope Under Section 37: Relying on Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI and Somdatt Builders-NCC-NEC (JV) v. NHAI, the Court held that “shocking the conscience” or conflict with basic notions of morality or justice requires substantive, blatant grounds—not mere invocation of phrases because additional work exceeded 70% of the original contract or re-adjudication of evidence/merits.
  • Evidentiary Basis and Non-Issuance of Completion Certificate: The Arbitrator relied on measurements and invoices for additional re-dredging work, and non-issuance of a completion certificate by the Port Trust did not bar recovery for work actually executed. Batliboi Environmental Engineers Ltd. v. HPCL was distinguished as concerning damages rather than valid invoices for additional work.
  • No Special Treatment for State Entities & Inseparability: Under Pam Developments Private Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, parties in arbitration must be treated equally without special leniency merely because the award debtor is a government/statutory entity. Under Gayatri Balasamy v. M/s ISG Novasoft Technologies Limited, the invoices and measurements for additional dredging formed a single integrated character and could not be arbitrarily halved.

Disposition

  • The Supreme Court set aside the impugned Section 37 judgment, allowed the contractor’s appeal, restored the arbitral award, disposed of the Port Trust’s appeal, and disposed of pending applications.

2026 INSC 1238

M/s Marino Dredgeco Limited v. The Board of Trustees of the Port of Kolkata (D.O.J 18.11.2026)

2026 INSC 1238 click here to vbiew full text of judgment

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Transmission Tariff Liability for LILO Lines Before DTL

The Supreme Court of India held that Power Grid Corporation of India Limited (PGCIL) was entitled to recover transmission tariff on a non-PoC basis for two Line-In Line-Out (LILO) assets commissioned in January 2015 up to 27.10.2016, when the generating company commissioned its Dedicated Transmission Line (DTL). Setting aside the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (APTEL) orders, the Court restored the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) order and ruled that delay in upstream lines to Salem and Madhugiri did not negate actual evacuation and use of the LILOs while the generator delayed its DTL.

Background and Procedural History

  • The dispute involved PGCIL’s tariff claim for two LILOs on both circuits of the Tuticorin JV–Madurai 400 kV D/C (Quad) transmission line at the Tuticorin Pooling Station, commissioned on 04.01.2015 and 08.01.2015, for the period up to 27.10.2016 when the generating company (Moxie Power Generation Ltd., formerly Coastal Energen Pvt. Ltd.) commissioned its DTL directly to the Tuticorin Pooling Station.
  • Under the 24.02.2010 Bulk Power Transmission Agreement (BPTA) (amended 08.09.2011) and Standing Committee on Power System Planning in Southern Region (SCPSPSR) meetings, the generator was to build its DTL to the Tuticorin Pooling Station, while PGCIL was to establish the Tuticorin Pooling Station and LILOs of both circuits of the Tuticorin JV–Madurai line (Part-A) and upstream lines toward Salem and Madhugiri (Part-B).
  • Power generation commenced on 23.12.2014 and was evacuated through a temporary LILO on the Tuticorin JV–Madurai line and supplied to distribution licensee TANGEDCO.
  • By order dated 29.07.2016, the CERC accepted the Commercial Operation Dates (CODs) of 04.01.2015 and 08.01.2015 and directed liability for the LILO transmission charges on the generating companies (including Coastal Energen) until their DTL became commercially operational, while declining to condone time over-run at that stage subject to truing-up.
  • APTEL overturned the CERC’s view on usage and COD (and on review remanded the COD issue), holding that the LILOs had no “beneficial use” before the upstream Salem–Madhugiri lines were operationalized and that Regulation 4(3)(ii) of the CERC Tariff Regulations, 2014 required redetermination/review of COD. PGCIL appealed to the Supreme Court.

Key Issues

  • Whether PGCIL was entitled to transmission tariff (on a non-PoC basis) for the two LILOs from 04.01.2015/08.01.2015 until 27.10.2016, given their inclusion in the BPTA and statutory planning under Section 29(4) of the Electricity Act, 2003.
  • Whether APTEL correctly interpreted Regulation 4(3)(ii) of the Tariff Regulations, 2014 in directing CERC to revisit the already-approved COD of the LILOs.
  • Whether the generator’s delay in constructing its DTL warranted placing liability on the generating company for the period between commissioning of the LILOs and commissioning of the DTL on 27.10.2016.

Legal Analysis and Ruling

  • Actual Use and Evacuation Through Pooling Station: Examining the evacuation arrangement and the generator’s own pleadings before APTEL, the Court found that power evacuated via the Tuticorin JV–Madurai line was routed through the LILOs and Tuticorin Pooling Station for onward transmission and supply to TANGEDCO. Delay in the upstream Tuticorin–Salem–Madhugiri transmission line did not prevent evacuation or use of the LILOs during the disputed period.
  • Statutory Scheme, DTL Obligation, and COD: Under Section 10 of the Electricity Act, 2003, constructing the DTL was the generating company’s duty. Under Regulation 3(53) and Regulation 4 of the Tariff Regulations, 2014, COD was validly accepted by CERC based on RLDC trial operation certification, CEA safety certification, and scheme approvals, and Regulation 4(3)(ii) did not require reopening COD where regular service of the LILOs was not prevented.
  • CERC’s Regulatory and Adjudicatory Powers: Relying on PGCIL v. Madhya Pradesh Power Transmission Co. Ltd., PTC India Ltd. v. CERC, and Energy Watchdog v. CERC, the Court held that CERC’s imposition of liability on the defaulting generator for the period prior to DTL commissioning (up to 27.10.2016) was valid and within jurisdiction.
  • Reading of CERC Order: The Court noted that paragraph 72 of CERC’s order recorded TANGEDCO’s submission rather than CERC’s final finding, whereas paragraphs 73–77 placed liability on the generating company based on the 30th SCM and BPTA framework.

Disposition

  • The Supreme Court answered the questions of law in favour of PGCIL, set aside the impugned APTEL orders in the appeals, restored the CERC order, allowed the appeals, and disposed of pending applications.

2026 INSC 1237

Power Grid Corporation of India Limited v. Tamil Nadu Generation and Distribution Corporation Limited (TANGEDCO) & Ors. (D.O.J. 18.11.2026)

2026 INSC 1237 click here to view full text of judgment

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Grandson’s Birth Right in Father’s Partitioned Property

The Supreme Court of India held that property inherited by a Hindu male as a Class I heir under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, and allotted to him in a partition among Class I heirs, becomes his exclusive individual property rather than joint family or coparcenary property vis-à-vis his own son. Consequently, a grandson born after the grandfather’s death has no birth right to seek partition of his living father’s share.

Background and Procedural History

  • The appellant, a minor represented by his mother and natural guardian, filed Original Suit No. 1698 of 1997 seeking partition and possession of a half share in 1,811 sq. ft. of land, pleading that it was joint family property of his grandfather, late N. Ramakrishnan, inherited along with his father (first defendant).
  • The first defendant’s sister, G. Lalitha, had filed partition suit C.S. No. 1728 of 1993 regarding N. Ramakrishnan’s property, resulting in a compromise decree dated 03.02.1994 under which the first defendant received 1,811 sq. ft. of land.
  • The appellant was born on 06.01.1994, after the 1993 suit was filed and before the 03.02.1994 compromise decree.
  • The first defendant executed sale deeds on 03.04.1997 and 17.04.1997 in favour of defendant nos. 2 and 3, who contested the suit claiming absolute ownership under the compromise decree and bona fide purchase. The appellant’s suit did not challenge the compromise decree or the sale deeds.
  • The Trial Court granted a preliminary decree for partition, which the First Appellate Court (High Court) set aside on 11.08.2010, holding that under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the first defendant took his share as an absolute owner and the appellant acquired no right by birth. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court.

Key Issue

  • Whether the appellant could claim a half share and seek partition by birth in land allotted to his still-living father upon partition of property originally belonging to the appellant’s grandfather.

Legal Analysis and Ruling

  • Succession Under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956: Following CWT v. Chander Sen, Yudhisthir v. Ashok Kumar, and Radha Bai v. Ram Narayan, the Court reiterated that under Section 8, a male Hindu’s property devolves upon Class I heirs to the exclusion of others. A living son’s son (grandson) is excluded from Class I heirs, and a son inheriting property under Section 8 takes it in his individual capacity rather than as karta of his own Hindu Undivided Family vis-à-vis his son.
  • Effect of Partition and Tenancy in Common: Upon N. Ramakrishnan’s death prior to the 1993 suit, Class I heirs succeeded as tenants in common rather than joint tenants, and the compromise decree dated 03.02.1994 allotted exclusive shares to the heirs, ending joint coparcenary character in the allotted share.
  • Inapplicability of Pre-2005 Section 6 and Tamil Nadu Amendment (Section 29-A): Unamended Section 6 and Section 29-A inserted by the Hindu Succession (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act, 1989 did not apply on the facts, as succession had opened upon N. Ramakrishnan’s death before the appellant was born, and the appellant was not a surviving coparcener at his grandfather’s death. Once the property became the first respondent’s exclusive individual property after partition, the appellant could not claim coparcenary rights by birth during his father’s lifetime.

Disposition

  • The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal with no order as to costs and disposed of pending applications.

2026 INSC 1208

J. Rajesh (Minor) Thr. His Mother and Natural Guardian J. Gomathi v. M. Kumaran (Dead) Thr. LRs. & Ors. (D.O.J. 06.11.2026)

2026 INSC 1208 click here to view full text of judgment

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