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Inter State Sale: Gas transported through Pipeline

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Whether the State of Uttar Pradesh has the constitutional and statutory jurisdiction to levy local Value Added Tax (VAT) on natural gas extracted off-shore in Andhra Pradesh and transported via a common carrier pipeline to buyers in Uttar Pradesh, or whether the transaction constitutes an “inter-State sale” governed exclusively by the Central Sales Tax (CST) Act, 1956.

The Supreme Court affirmed the Allahabad High Court’s judgment, holding that the sale is a concluded inter-State sale finalized at Gadimoga, Andhra Pradesh. The subsequent co-mingling and processing of the gas during pipeline transit do not alter its inter-State character; hence, the State of Uttar Pradesh has zero jurisdiction to levy VAT. The State was directed to expeditiously refund any tax realized under the quashed assessment.

1. Factual Matrix and Commercial Infrastructure

The dispute originates from the New Exploration and Licensing Policy (NELP) announced by the Government of India in 1999, under which an international consortium led by Reliance Industries Limited (RIL) as the “Operator” was awarded a deep-water exploration block (KG-D6) off the coast of Andhra Pradesh. RIL entered into a Production Sharing Contract (PSC) with the Government of India, which mandated that the title to the extracted natural gas vests in the Government until it reaches a designated delivery point.

Subject to the Government’s Gas Utilization Policy, RIL entered into separate Gas Sales and Purchase Agreements (GSPAs) with industrial fertilizer and chemical manufacturing buyers located in the State of Uttar Pradesh. The cross-border infrastructure functions as follows:

  • Natural gas is extracted off-shore and brought to an onshore processing terminal at Gadimoga, Andhra Pradesh.
  • Under the GSPA, the “Delivery Point” is expressly defined as the outlet flange of RIL’s facilities at Gadimoga, where the natural gas is metered for quantity and quality, and where legal title and risk of loss permanently pass from RIL to the buyers.
  • To transport the gas from Andhra Pradesh to Uttar Pradesh, the buyers entered into separate Gas Transportation Agreements (GTAs) with independent pipeline operators acting as common carriers: Reliance Gas Transportation Infrastructure Ltd. (RGTIL) and the Gas Authority of India Limited (GAIL).
  • The gas moves through the pipelines in a co-mingled, fungible stream and undergoes processing at GAIL’s plant in Pata (Auraiya District, U.P.) to remove specific hydrocarbons, leaving a predominantly “lean gas” that is finally channelled into the buyers’ individual factories.

2. Procedural History

On June 11, 2010, the Commercial Tax Assessing Authority of Uttar Pradesh passed a fresh assessment order imposing a local VAT liability at the rate of 21% on RIL. The state tax authority reasoned that because natural gas travels in a co-mingled, fungible form, it represents “unascertained goods” that can only be identified and legally appropriated to the contract at the exit meters within Uttar Pradesh, making it a taxable intra-State sale.

RIL challenged this assessment via a writ petition before the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench). On September 7, 2012, the High Court quashed the assessment order and directed the State of U.P. to refund the realized tax, concluding that the transaction was purely an inter-State sale completed outside U.P. boundaries. Aggrieved, the State of Uttar Pradesh filed the present civil appeals.

3. Legal Arguments Advanced by the Parties

  • For the Appellants (State of Uttar Pradesh): Senior Counsel Dr. Dinesh Dwivedi argued that the GSPAs were executed prior to extraction and therefore merely constituted agreements to sell “future and unascertained goods”. He claimed that under Section 4(2)(b) of the CST Act, the legal situs of a sale for unascertained goods is fixed at the place of physical appropriation. Because the gas moves in an unidentifiable, co-mingled form through a single common carrier pipeline and requires processing at Auraiya, its legal ascertainment and final appropriation happen exclusively in U.P.. He also invoked the Public Trust Doctrine, asserting that since natural resources vest in the Union in trust, RIL acts only as an agent, and the sale cannot be legally finalized until it reaches its final destination.
  • For the Respondents (RIL and Buyers): Senior Counsel Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi countered that the sale is cleanly covered under Section 3(a) of the CST Act because the GSPA contract explicitly caused and occasioned the physical movement of the gas from Andhra Pradesh to Uttar Pradesh. He highlighted that under Section 3(a), the location where property passes is legally irrelevant. Furthermore, the State of U.P. was barred from taking a contrary stance because it had already acknowledged the inter-State nature of the transaction by issuing statutory “Form-C” declarations to the buyers.

4. Constitutional and Statutory Framework Analysed

The Supreme Court contextualized the tax dispute within the fundamental tenets of Indian cooperative fiscal federalism:

  • Principle of Mutual Exclusivity: Under Entry 54 of List II (State List) read with Entry 92-A of List I (Union List) and Article 269, the Constitution maintains strict separation of taxing powers. The states enjoy absolute power over local, intra-State sales, but the exclusive competence to levy taxes on sales in the course of inter-State trade vests entirely in the Parliament.
  • The Primacy of Section 3 over Section 4: The Court analyzed the statutory interplay within the CST Act. Section 3 defines an inter-State sale based on whether a contract occasions the cross-border movement of goods. Section 4 provides criteria to locate whether a sale takes place “inside” or “outside” a state. Reaffirming its landmark ruling in Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. S.R. Sarkar, the Court noted that Section 4 is expressly made “subject to Section 3”. If a sale satisfies the cross-border movement test under Section 3, it is automatically an inter-State transaction, and a state cannot bypass this by using the artificial “situs/appropriation” tests of Section 4(2) to claim it as a local sale.
  • Retrospective Status of Explanation 3: In 2016, Parliament added Explanation 3 to Section 3 of the CST Act, stating that natural gas transported through a common carrier pipeline remains an inter-State movement even if it undergoes physical co-mingling and is fungible. The Supreme Court rejected U.P.’s claim that this rule only applies prospectively. Citing Sedco Forex and Sree Sankaracharya University of Sanskrit, the Court ruled that the amendment was purely clarificatory and declaratory of implicit, pre-existing law, meaning it applies retrospectively from the inception of the main provision.

5. Factual and Legal Findings of the Supreme Court

The Apex Court dismissed the State of Uttar Pradesh’s arguments on both factual and legal accounts:

  • Completion of Sale at Gadimoga: A clear reading of the GSPA and GTA provisions proved that RIL’s contractual obligations and liabilities ended completely at Gadimoga, Andhra Pradesh, where the gas was delivered and priced based on entry-point meter readings. The transporters (RGTIL and GAIL) explicitly acquired no title to the gas and acted strictly as carriers on behalf of the buyers.
  • Irrelevance of Co-mingling and Processing: Following the international legal standard set by the US Supreme Court in Peoples Natural Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission, the Court ruled that when natural gas is fed into a common pipeline under statutory open-access regulations, its physical co-mingling is a mere incident of transit. It does not disrupt the legal continuity of the cross-border movement or alter a sale that was already legally concluded at the point of origin. Fulfilling Section 3(a) does not require a distinction between ascertained and future goods.
  • The Inapplicability of the Public Trust Doctrine: The Court held that the Public Trust Doctrine belongs strictly to environmental jurisprudence (e.g., C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath) to guide public resource management. It cannot be stretched or distorted to manipulate the taxable situs of a transaction or to override constitutional boundaries of legislative competence.
  • The Estoppel of Form-C: The Court affirmed that by issuing “Form-C” certificates to the buyers, the State of Uttar Pradesh had explicitly processed and recognized the gas supply as an inter-State transaction. It could not subsequently “blow hot and cold” by trying to recharacterize it as an intra-State sale to levy local VAT.

6. Final Order

The Supreme Court found that the assessment order passed by the Uttar Pradesh tax authorities was arbitrary, perverse, and reflected a total non-application of the law. Holding that the State of Uttar Pradesh has no jurisdiction under Section 7 of its local VAT Act to penalize or tax an inter-State transaction, the Supreme Court dismissed Civil Appeal No. 3910 of 2016 and all connected appeals, affirming the High Court’s order for a full tax refund to the assesses.

2026 INSC 491

State of Uttar Pradesh And Others V. Reliance Industries Limited And Others (D.O.J. 15.05.2026)

2026 INSC 491 click here to view full text of judgment

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Hindu Minority and Guardianship: Power to alienate a minor’s immovable property

June 11, 2026 No Comments

The Supreme Court of India, in Shephali Chakraborty v. The State of West Bengal (2026 INSC 621), addressed a critical legal issue concerning the boundaries of a natural guardian’s power to alienate a minor’s immovable property under Section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956. The appellant, a widowed mother, sought judicial permission to sell her minor son’s inherited share in a property to secure their financial livelihood and ensure the child’s future education. Both the District Court and the Calcutta High Court had rejected her application.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, clarifying that statutory restrictions under Section 8(2) are intended to safeguard the minor from exploitative alienations, not to paralyze a natural guardian from acting in situations of genuine “evident advantage” or “necessity”. The Court ruled that lower courts must adopt a realistic, holistic, and child-centric approach—rather than a pedantic one—when evaluating what constitutes the “benefit of the minor”.

1. Factual Background of the Case

  • The Parties: The appellant, Shephali Chakraborty, is the mother and natural guardian of the minor, Master Basab Chakraborty.
  • The Property: The minor inherited a fractional share of an ancestral property located in Darjeeling following the intestate demise of his father, Late Mr. Basudeb Chakraborty. The property had originally been acquired by the minor’s paternal great-grandfather in 1957.
  • The Necessity to Sell: Following her husband’s death, the appellant faced acute financial distress, lacking any stable stream of income to sustain herself and provide for her minor son’s upkeep and higher education. She sought to sell the minor’s share along with her own to relocate, stabilize their lives, and invest the proceeds into a secure fixed deposit for the minor’s exclusive benefit.

2. Procedural History

  • Trial Court (District Judge, Darjeeling): The appellant filed an application seeking prior judicial permission to dispose of the minor’s share as mandated under Section 8(2) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956. The District Judge rejected the application, taking a strict view that an immediate, pressing financial emergency or “evident danger” to the property had not been demonstrated.
  • High Court Appeal: The Calcutta High Court affirmed the District Court’s rejection, holding that a future educational requirement did not constitute an immediate legal necessity sufficient to alienate minor-owned immovable property. Aggrieved by these orders, the mother filed a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court.

3. Statutory Framework Analyzed

The Supreme Court meticulously unpacked the structure of Section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, dividing it into operational parts:

  • Section 8(1) – Managerial Powers: Empowers a natural guardian to perform all acts necessary or reasonable for the benefit, protection, or proper management of the minor’s estate.
  • Section 8(2) – Absolute Restrictions: Explicitly prohibits a natural guardian from selling, gifting, exchanging, mortgaging, or encumbering the minor’s immovable property without obtaining prior permission from the Court. It also restricts long-term leases exceeding 5 years.
  • Section 8(3) – Voidable Nature: Declares that any disposal of immovable property by a natural guardian in violation of sub-section (1) or (2) is voidable at the instance of the minor or any person claiming under him.

4. Observations and Legal Reasoning of the Court

  • The True Purpose of Legislative Caution: The Court observed that the requirement of prior judicial approval under Section 8(2) acts as a protective shield against reckless or self-serving transactions by guardians that permanently erode a minor’s proprietary rights. However, this caution cannot be transformed into an insurmountable barrier when a mother is acting in absolute good faith for her child’s survival and growth.
  • Defining “Benefit of the Minor”: The Supreme Court rejected the rigid interpretation applied by the lower courts. It held that “benefit of the minor” is a broad concept that encompasses not just the physical protection of an estate, but the overall socio-economic well-being, nutrition, clothing, housing, and structural education of the child.
  • Correction of a Pedantic Approach: The Court noted that forcing a widowed mother to retain a fractional, un-demarcated share of property while depriving her of the liquid funds required to raise the child defeats the very spirit of welfare legislation. Funding higher education and migrating away from financial distress are valid components of “evident advantage” to the minor.

5. Final Conclusion and Directions

The Supreme Court granted leave, set aside the orders of the Calcutta High Court and the District Judge, Darjeeling, and allowed the appellant’s application to sell the minor’s share. To ensure the minor’s financial security, the Court imposed the following protective conditions:

  1. The sale must be executed at a fair market value or higher.
  2. The entire sale proceeds corresponding to the minor’s share must be directly deposited into a long-term fixed deposit scheme in a nationalized bank under the minor’s name, with the mother designated as the guardian.
  3. The minor shall be entitled to the absolute proceeds upon attaining majority, while the mother can utilize the accruing interest strictly for the child’s educational expenses upon satisfying the bank’s requirements.

2026 INSC 621

Shephali Chakraborty V. State of West Bengal (D.O. J. 03.06.2026)

2026 INSC 621 click here to view full text of judgment

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Ddivorce: Denial of conjugal rights without a reasonable cause

June 11, 2026 No Comments

The Supreme Court of India, in Sonal Talpada v. Veerbhan Singh (2026 INSC 620), adjudicated a matrimonial dispute concerning an appeal filed by a wife against a High Court decree granting a divorce to her husband . Both parties were medical doctors. The central legal issue evaluated by the Court was whether the wife’s conduct during their short period of cohabitation—specifically, her persistent denial of conjugal rights, sleeping in a separate room locked from the inside, and failing to open the door upon knocking—legally amounted to “mental cruelty” under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 .

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s findings on the ground of cruelty, reiterating established jurisprudence that the persistent refusal of sexual intercourse and the unilateral denial of conjugal rights without a reasonable cause constitute severe mental cruelty, validating the dissolution of the marriage.

1. Factual Background of the Case

  • The Parties: The Appellant (wife), Dr. Sonal Talpada, was working as a gynecologist in a government hospital in Gujarat. The Respondent (husband), Dr. Veerbhan Singh, was in state medical service in Rajasthan.
  • Marriage and Separation: The couple married on December 5, 2007, according to Hindu rites. No children were born from the wedlock. Sociocultural differences arose rapidly, and the wife lived with the husband for a very brief duration of only two to three months at his matrimonial home in Bharatpur, Rajasthan, out of a total matrimonial period of two years .
  • The Husband’s Allegations: The husband filed a divorce petition in 2009 under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, alleging that he was subjected to extensive cruelty . He claimed the wife consistently denied the establishment of sexual relations and isolated herself from him.

2. Procedural History

  • Family Court Ruling: On August 21, 2018, the Family Court at Bharatpur dismissed the husband’s divorce petition, concluding that he had failed to legally prove the allegations of cruelty.
  • High Court Judgment: Aggrieved, the husband preferred an appeal before the High Court of Rajasthan at Jaipur. The High Court reversed the Family Court’s order, allowing the appeal and granting a divorce on multiple grounds, including mental cruelty through the denial of sexual relations, long-term desertion, and continuous separation for 15 years . The wife subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court.
  • Failed Mediation: While the appeal was pending, the Supreme Court referred the parties to mediation on May 23, 2025. However, the mediation proved unsuccessful, as detailed in a report dated November 27, 2025.

3. Arguments Presented by the Parties

  • On behalf of the Appellant (Wife): The wife’s counsel argued that she had never abandoned her husband and genuinely desired to continue her matrimonial life. It was argued that her extended stay in Gujarat was initially permitted by her father-in-law until a nursing home could be constructed in Bharatpur (which never materialized). She maintained that the husband was trying to take advantage of his own wrongs and that grounds like the irretrievable breakdown of marriage were never formally pleaded.
  • On behalf of the Respondent (Husband): The husband’s counsel strongly opposed the appeal, pointing out that the parties had cohabited for a mere 2–3 months out of an 18-year marriage span and had been living entirely separate lives for over 15 years. The counsel emphasized that the wife systematically denied him sexual relations, failed to build mutual trust or companionship, and that the marriage had completely disintegrated .

4. Legal Assessment by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court closely examined the elements of “mental cruelty” by relying heavily on its landmark ruling in Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh (2007).

  • The Samar Ghosh Principles: The Court highlighted critical instances from the Samar Ghosh precedent:
    • A unilateral decision to refuse intercourse for a considerable period without any physical incapacity or valid reason constitutes mental cruelty.
    • An exceptionally long period of continuous separation strongly indicates that the matrimonial bond is ruptured beyond repair, rendering the marriage a legal fiction. Refusing to sever such a hollow tie shows a disregard for the emotional well-being of the parties and inflicts further mental cruelty.

5. Findings and Final Conclusion of the Court

  • Dismissal of Petty Conduct: The Court discarded a minor allegation raised by the husband that the wife had publicly insulted him in front of a shopkeeper during a trip to the Taj Mahal, validating the Family Court’s view that such interactions do not constitute matrimonial cruelty .
  • Establishment of Cruelty via Denial of Conjugal Rights: However, on the core issue of cohabitation, the Supreme Court found clear evidence that during their brief time together, the wife consistently went to sleep early, locked her bedroom door from the inside, and regularly refused to open the door when the husband knocked. The husband was forced to sleep in a separate room, a fact that the wife did not deny.
  • Final Ruling: The Court reaffirmed that the persistent, unjustified refusal of sexual intercourse and the denial of regular conjugal rights legally amount to mental cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act.

Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the High Court’s acceptance of cruelty as a valid ground for dissolving the marriage was entirely correct and sustainable. The wife’s appeal was dismissed.

2026 INSC 620

Sonal Talpada  V. Veerbhan Singh (D.O.J. 02.06.2026)

2026 INSC 620 click here to view full text of judgment

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NDPS: Bail Cancelled – Commercial quantity- Twin conditions stipulated under Section 37

June 11, 2026 No Comments

The Supreme Court of India, in State of Punjab v. Balraj Singh @ Billa (2026 INSC 618), allowed a criminal appeal filed by the State challenging a regular bail order granted by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana to an accused facing charges under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act). The matter involved the recovery of a commercial quantity of narcotics. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s bail order, emphasizing that whenever a case involves a commercial quantity, compliance with the stringent twin conditions stipulated under Section 37 of the NDPS Act is legally mandatory. The Court ruled that since the High Court completely failed to consider these statutory requirements and given the accused’s criminal antecedents of a similar nature, the bail could not be sustained.

1. Factual Background of the Case

  • The Incident and Registration: The case originated from an FIR (No. 06 dated January 10, 2024) registered under Sections 21(c), 29, 61, and 85 of the NDPS Act. The police had set up a checkpoint at a bridge where the alleged recovery took place.
  • Commercial Quantity: The recovery made from the accused/respondent involved a “commercial quantity” of narcotics under the statutory definitions of the NDPS Act.
  • Period of Incarceration: At the time of the Supreme Court’s evaluation, the respondent had undergone custody for a period of only 1 year and 7 months out of a potential maximum sentence of twenty years if convicted.

2. Procedural History

  • High Court Order: The Respondent (Balraj Singh) filed a criminal main petition (CRM-M No. 46383 of 2025) before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh seeking regular bail. The High Court allowed the petition and directed his release on regular bail via an order dated October 15, 2025.
  • Appeal by the State: Aggrieved by the regular bail order, the State of Punjab preferred a special leave petition (subsequently converted to a criminal appeal) before the Supreme Court of India.

3. Key Legal Issues Addressed

The primary issue before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court was justified in granting regular bail to an accused involving a commercial quantity of narcotics without checking compliance against the restrictive boundaries of Section 37 of the NDPS Act.

4. Legal Principles and Observations of the Court

A. Mandatory Application of Section 37 NDPS Act

  • The Supreme Court highlighted a consistent line of precedents reinforcing that in cases involving a “commercial quantity” of contraband, considering the twin conditions under Section 37 is not optional but strictly mandatory.
  • The Twin Conditions: Under Section 37, bail can only be granted if:
    1. The Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application.
    2. The Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe the accused is not guilty of the offense and that they are not likely to commit any offense while on bail.
  • Upon perusing the impugned bail order, the Supreme Court observed that the High Court had passed the order without any consideration or reference to these mandatory twin conditions. Consequently, the order was declared legally unsustainable.

B. Impact of Criminal Antecedents

  • The Court evaluated the respondent’s profile and noted that he possessed past criminal antecedents involving the commission of offenses of the exact same nature under the NDPS Act.
  • Due to these specific antecedents, the Court observed that it was impossible to conclude or satisfy the legal requirement that the respondent would not likely engage in similar criminal conduct if left out on bail.

C. Proportionality of Incarceration under Article 21

  • The Court briefly touched upon the argument of prolonged detention vis-à-vis individual liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution.
  • It noted that an incarceration period of 1 year and 7 months against a potential maximum sentence of 20 years does not constitute an exceptionally long period of delay that would warrant overriding the statutory bars of the NDPS Act to grant bail on humanitarian or constitutional delays.

5. Final Conclusion of the Court

The Supreme Court granted leave, set aside the judgment and regular bail order passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, and dismissed the respondent’s case for bail.

2026 INSC 618

State of Punjab  V. Balraj Singh @ Billa (D.O.J. 02.06.2026)

2026 INSC 618 click here to view full text of judgment

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Arbitration: Calculation of the limitation period for filing an application under Section 34

June 11, 2026 No Comments

The Supreme Court of India, in National Highway Authority of India v. T. Younis & Anr. (2026 INSC 616), addressed an appeal concerning the calculation of the limitation period for filing an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The High Court of Karnataka had set aside a District Court order that condoned a delay in filing the Section 34 applications. The Supreme Court overturned the High Court’s decision, clarifying that when a party applies for the correction or interpretation of an arbitral award under Section 33 of the Act, the limitation period of three months for filing a challenge under Section 34(3) commences only from the date on which the order disposing of the Section 33 application is received by the applicant.

1. Factual Background of the Case

  • Land Acquisition: On December 15, 2009, the Ministry of Shipping, Road Transport and Highways issued a preliminary notification under Section 3A(1) of the National Highways Act, 1956, to acquire land in the Bellary District, which included land belonging to Respondent No. 1.
  • Arbitral Proceedings: Disputes arose regarding the compensation awarded for the acquired land, leading to arbitration proceedings.
  • Section 33 Applications: Following the passing of the initial arbitral award, applications were submitted under Section 33 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking corrections or interpretations of the award.
  • Disposal and Receipt of Order: The Arbitral Tribunal passed a common order disposing of these Section 33 applications on July 4, 2022. A certified copy of this disposal order was officially received by the Appellant, the National Highway Authority of India (NHAI), on September 15, 2022.
  • Filing of Section 34 Applications: NHAI subsequently instituted applications to challenge the award under Section 34 of the Act on November 7, 2022.

2. Procedural History

  • Principal District and Sessions Judge, Ballari: The Respondent asserted that NHAI’s Section 34 applications were barred by limitation. However, via orders dated August 5, 2023, the Principal District and Sessions Judge condoned the delay, finding the applications to be within the permissible timeline.
  • High Court of Karnataka (Dharwad Bench): The Respondents filed a writ petition challenging the District Judge’s condonation of delay. On January 22, 2024, the High Court allowed the writ petition and set aside the District Judge’s order, ruling that the Section 34 applications were time-barred. NHAI appealed this decision to the Supreme Court.

3. Key Legal Issue

The core issue before the Supreme Court was whether the limitation period for filing an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, is to be calculated from the date of the original arbitral award or from the date of the receipt of the order disposing of applications made under Section 33 of the Act.

4. Legal Principles and Framework

  • Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act: Generally, an application for setting aside an arbitral award must be made within three months from the date on which the party making the application receives the arbitral award.
  • The Section 33 Exception: Section 34(3) explicitly provides a proviso/exception: if a request has been made under Section 33 (for correction or interpretation of the award), the three-month limitation period begins from the date on which that request is disposed of by the Arbitral Tribunal.

5. Findings and Conclusion of the Court

  • Timely Institution: The Supreme Court observed that the certified copy of the common order disposing of the Section 33 applications was received by NHAI on September 15, 2022. The Section 34 applications were filed shortly thereafter on November 7, 2022.
  • Reckoning of Limitation: The Court held that even when reckoning the strict statutory limitation period from the actual date of receipt of the Section 33 disposal order, the applications under Section 34 were instituted well within the prescribed three-month timeframe contemplated under Section 34(3) of the Act.
  • Final Order: Consequently, the Supreme Court accepted NHAI’s appeal, set aside the High Court of Karnataka’s judgment, and restored the District Court’s orders. The Court directed that the Section 34 applications be decided on their own merits in accordance with law.

2026 INSC 616

National Highway Authority of India  V. T. Younis And Another (D.O.J. 02.06.2026)

2026 INSC 616 click here to view full text of judgment

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