Indian Judgements

Indian Judgements

Insolvency and Bankruptcy : Contravention of the provisions of any law

Supreme Court judgment outlines multiple civil appeals concerning the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) of Dewan Housing Finance Corporation Limited (DHFL). The core disputes revolve around a Resolution Plan (RP) approved by the Committee of Creditors (CoC) and the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT). Key issues addressed include whether the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) erred in modifying the RP’s provisions regarding the allocation of recoveries from fraudulent and preferential transactions, the rights of fixed deposit holders to full repayment, and the standing of former directors in the insolvency proceedings. The document further explores the powers and limitations of the NCLT and NCLAT in reviewing such plans, emphasising the commercial wisdom of the CoC and the distinction between “avoidance applications” and “fraudulent trading” under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC).

(A) Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, Section 7, 16, 21, 30, 31, 43, 44, 45, 50, 61, 66 – Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016, Regulation 37 and 39 – Insolvency and Bankruptcy – Contravention of the provisions of any law – Whether the RP in question approved by the CoC and the NCLT was in contravention of the provisions of any law, for the time being in force, requiring the NCLAT to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 61 of the IBC?” – Impugned judgment and order dated 27.01.2022 passed by the NCLAT in Company Appeal Nos. 454-455 and 750 of 2021 is set aside, and the judgment and order dated 07.06.2021 passed by the Adjudicating Authority/ NCLT granting its approval to the Plan Approval Application, and thereby approving the Resolution Plan, is upheld – However, it is clarified and directed that the NCLT shall decide the Avoidance Applications filed by the Administrator under Section 43, 45, and 50, and shall separately decide the Applications under Section 66, and it shall pass the orders in accordance with the powers conferred upon it under Section 44, 48, 49, 50, and under Section 66, as the case may be – The recoveries/benefits that may follow from such Applications shall be appropriated in favour of the CoC in case of Avoidance Applications under Section 43, 45 and 50, and in favour of SRA-Piramal Capital in case of Applications under Section 66 of IBC – The Civil Appeal Nos. 1632-1634 of 2022 filed by the Piramal Capital and Housing Finance Limited and the Civil Appeal Nos. 2989-2991 of 2022 filed by the Union Bank of India stand allowed.

(Para 111)

(B) Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, Section 7, 30(2), 31, 60 and 61 – Insolvency and Bankruptcy – Judicial review – Scope of judicial review by the NCLT under Section 31 and by NCLAT under Section 61 of IBC – Held that the legislature has given paramount importance to the “commercial wisdom” of CoC, and that the scope of the judicial review by the Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) is limited to the extent provided under Section 31, and that of the Appellate Authority (NCLAT) is limited to the extent provided under sub-section (3) of Section 61 of the IBC – After a RP is approved by the requisite majority of the CoC, it must pass the muster of Adjudicating Authority under Section 31(1) of the IBC – Section 31 also makes it abundantly clear that once the RP is approved by the Adjudicating Authority, after it is satisfied that the RP as approved by the CoC meets the requirements as referred to in sub-section (2) of Section 30, it shall be binding on the CD and its employees, members, creditors, guarantors and stakeholders – The legislature has consciously not provided for a ground to challenge the justness of the “commercial decision” taken by the Financial Creditors, because one of the dominant purposes of the IBC is revival of the CD and to make it a running concern – While considering the feasibility and viability of the Prospective Resolution Plans, the CoC can always suggest a modification therein and exercise its commercial wisdom – However, once the RP is approved by the requisite majority of CoC, and when such RP is placed before the Adjudicating Authority for its approval under Section 31, the Adjudicating Authority has to only see whether such RP as approved by the CoC meets the requirements as referred to in Section 30(2) – It is only where the Adjudicating Authority is satisfied that the RP does not confirm to the requirements of sub-section (1) of Section 31, it may by an order reject the RP – It is true that the NCLT has to decide all the questions on law or fact arising out of or in relation to the insolvency resolution or liquidation under the residuary jurisdiction vested in NCLT under Section 60(5), however, such residual jurisdiction does not in any manner impact – Section 30(2) of the Code, which circumscribes the jurisdiction of the Adjudicating Authority, when it comes to the confirmation of RP, as has been mandated by Section 31(1) of the Code –  Similarly, the scope of interference by the Appellate Authority i.e., NCLAT under Section 61 in the Appeals arising out of the order approving a RP under Section 31, is also very limited and restricted to the specific grounds mentioned in sub-section (3) of Section 61 – The grounds for filing Appeal under Section 61 have to be confined to sub-section (3) thereof.

(Para 42 to 44)

(C) Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, Section 7, 25(2), 43, 45, 50, 66, 67 – Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016, Regulation 37 and 39 – IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016, Regulation 37A – Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934, Section 45-IE, 45QA – National Housing Bank, 1987, Section 56A – Insolvency and Bankruptcy – Applications for Avoidance of transactions – What are the Applications for Avoidance of transactions required to be filed by the Resolution Professional in accordance with Chapter III, and what are the Applications in respect of Fraudulent trading or Wrongful trading required to be filed by the Resolution Professional under Section 66 of the IBC? – Held that there is a clear distinction between the Avoidance Applications that may be filed by the Resolution Professional in view of Section 25(2)(j), for avoidance of transactions in accordance with Chapter III of the Code, and the Applications that may be filed by the Resolution Professional in respect of the Fraudulent trading or Wrongful trading under Section 66, which falls under Chapter VI of the Code – The legislature has consciously kept the Applications in respect of Fraudulent trading or Wrongful trading falling in Chapter VI, outside the purview of Section 25(2), which requires the Resolution Professional to undertake the actions and file applications for the avoidance of transactions in accordance with Chapter III – Both, the Avoidance Applications under Chapter III and the Applications in respect of Fraudulent trading or Wrongful trading under Chapter VI, operate in different situations – The powers of the Adjudicating Authority in respect of the Avoidance Applications filed under Chapter III and the powers of the Adjudicating Authority in respect of the Applications pertaining to the Fraudulent and Wrongful trading filed under Chapter VI, have also been separately circumscribed – Applications filed in respect of “Fraudulent and Wrongful trading” carried on by the CD, could not be termed as “Avoidance Applications” used for the Applications filed under Sections 43, 45 and 50 to avoid or set aside the Preferential, Undervalued or Extortionate transactions, as the case may be – There is clear demarcation of powers of the Adjudicating Authority to pass orders in the Avoidance Applications filed by the Resolution Professional under Section 43, 45 and 50 falling under Chapter III and the Applications filed by the Resolution Professional in respect of the Fraudulent and Wrongful trading of CD, under Section 66 falling under Chapter VI of the IBC – If the Resolution Professional has filed common applications under Sections 43, 45, 50 and also under Section 66, the Adjudicating Authority shall have to distinguish the same and decide as to which provision would be attracted to which of the Applications, and then shall exercise the powers and pass the orders in terms of the provisions of IBC.

(Para 56 and 61)

(D) Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, Section 7, 29(A), 30(1), 30(2), 31 – Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016, Regulation 38 and 39 – IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016, Regulation 37A – Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934, Section 45-IE, 45QA – National Housing Bank, 1987, Section 56A – Insolvency and Bankruptcy – Mandatory requirements – What are the mandatory requirements as referred in sub-section (2) of Section 30 read with Regulation 38 of the Regulations, 2016? – As per sub-section (1) of Section 30, a RA may submit a RP along with an affidavit stating that he is eligible under Section 29(A), to the Resolution Professional prepared on the basis of the information memorandum – On the receipt of RPs from the eligible RAs, the Resolution Professional has to examine each RP to confirm that each RP provides for the payment of Insolvency Resolution Process cost in the manner specified by the Board in priority to the payment of other debts of the CD, and provides for the payment of debts of operational creditors in such manner as may be prescribed by the Board, as required under sub-section (2) of Section 30 – The Resolution Professional has also to confirm that each RP provides for the management of the affairs of CD after the approval of the RP; the implementation and supervision of the RP; and also that the plan does not contravene any of the provisions of the law for the time being in force, and such other requirements specified by the Board – The other mandatory contents of a RP have been specified in Regulation 38 of the Regulations, 2016 – Entire process right from the submission of RPs by the PRAs till the final approval/rejection of the Plan by the Adjudicating Authority has been duly prescribed, which is mandatory in nature – If there is any non-compliance of the mandatory requirements stated in Section 30(2) of IBC, read with Regulation 38 of the Regulations, 2016, the Adjudicating Authority is empowered to reject the plan as envisaged in sub-section (2) of Section 31 – If however, the plan approved by the CoC as per Section 30(4), meets with the requirements under Section 30(2), the Adjudicating Authority has to approve such plan under Section 31(1), which would be binding to all the stakeholders as stated therein.

(Para 62 and 65)

(E) Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, Section 7 – Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016, Regulation 37 and 39 – Insolvency and Bankruptcy – What is maximization of the value of assets of the Corporate Debtor  – Held that in CIRP, the role of the CoC is that of a protagonist, who takes the key decisions in its commercial wisdom and also takes the consequences thereof – It cannot be gainsaid that the decisions of CoC must reflect the fact that it has taken into account the maximization of the value of the assets of the CD, and that the interest of all the stakeholders has been adequately balanced – However, “What is maximization of the assets” has not been defined in the Code though stated in the Preamble – Of course, it has been referred in Regulation 37 of the Regulations, 2016, which states that RPs shall provide for the measures as may be necessary for insolvency resolution of the CD, for maximization of the value of its assets, which may include the measures as provided in Clauses (a) to (l) thereof – Since the Preamble of IBC envisages “maximization of the value of the assets of the Corporate Debtor,” and to promote entrepreneurship, the measures necessary for maximization of assets stated in Regulation 37, amongst others, will have to be taken into consideration by the CoC while considering the proposed RPs for approval.

(Para 66)

(F) Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, Section 7, 31, 61 – Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016, Regulation 37 and 39 – Insolvency and Bankruptcy – Appeal – Whether the NCLAT should have entertained the Appeals of the 63 Moons under Section 61 of the Code and interfered with the commercial wisdom exercised by the CoC? – As per the legislative intent and as per the broad contours of the provisions of IBC, the commercial wisdom of CoC has been given the prominent status, with the least judicial intervention, for ensuring the completion of Resolution Process within the prescribed timelines – In Essar Steel (supra), this Court after discussing earlier judgments had observed that what is left to the majority decision of the CoC is the “feasibility and viability” of a RP, which obviously takes into account all aspects of the plan, including the manner of distribution of funds among the various classes of Creditors – The legislature has consciously not provided for a ground to challenge the justness of the commercial decision expressed by the Financial Creditors – be it to approve or reject the RP – Similar view is taken by the Three Judge Bench in Ghanashyam Mishra (supra) to the effect that the legislature has given paramount importance to the commercial wisdom of the CoC and the scope of judicial review by the Adjudicating Authority is limited to the extent provided under Section 31 and by the Appellate Authority limited to the extent provided under sub-section (3) of Section 61 of IBC – Appellants’ respective classes had voted overwhelmingly in favour of the RP of SRA – Neither the 63 Moons nor Roopjyot & Ors. had voted against the RP nor any justification was offered by them for not voting against the RP – Under the circumstances the said Appellants – NCD Holders before the NCLAT were bound by the decision of their classes in approving the RP, and were estopped from raising any objection against the RP approved by the CoC – Vote cast by the Authorized Representative – M/s. Catalyst Trusteeship on behalf of the class of Financial Creditors he represented, was binding on the 63 Moons and other Appellants before the NCLAT, and therefore they were estopped from raising any objection before the NCLT or NCLAT against the RP approved by the requisite majority of CoC b- All the Appeals in this category deserve to be allowed by setting aside the impugned order dated 27.01.2022 passed by the NCLAT and restoring the order dated 07.06.2021 passed by the NCLT in the Plan Approval Order.

(Para 77, 84 to 87)

(G) Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, Section 7, 16, Section 21 (6A) (b) – Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016, Regulation 16A- – Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934, Section 45-IE, 45QA – National Housing Bank, 1987, Section 56A – Insolvency and Bankruptcy – Appeals – Filed by several Fixed Deposit Holders and one Non-Convertible Debenture Holder of the CD, challenging the RP dated 22.12.2020 – Both the Sections 36(A) of NHB Act and 45(QA) of the RBI Act containing almost similar provisions, require the Housing Finance Institution or the Non-Banking Financial Company, as the case may be, to repay the deposits accepted by it in accordance with the terms and conditions of such deposit – However from the bare reading of the said provisions it clearly transpires that in case of nonpayment of such deposits, the authorized officer or the CLB as the case may be on being satisfied that it is necessary to safeguard the interest of the company, or of the depositors in the public interest may direct such institution or the company to make repayment of such deposit or part thereof – None of the said provisions mandates full payment of deposits or confers any right upon the depositors to have full payment of such deposits – There is also nothing on record to suggest that any authorized officer under the NHB Act or the CLB under the RBI Act has passed any order to make full payment of deposits to the Appellants. Hence, it could not be said, by any stretch of imagination, that the RP in question, providing for the Distribution mechanism, was contrary to any of the provisions of the RBI Act or of the NHB Act – Appellants – FD Holders were represented in the CoC by their Authorized Representative and the NCD Holders were represented in the CoC by their Authorized Representative, as permitted under Section 21 (6A) (b) of IBC read with Regulation 16 (A) of the CIRP Regulations, 2016 – FD Holders, as a class, had voted against the RP and the Distribution mechanism, and were thus classified as the “Dissenting Financial Creditors.” – However, the said Distribution mechanism was approved by a majority of 86.95% of CoC – The Appellants – FD Holders therefore had filed applications before the NCLT – The NCLT vide the order dated 07.06.2021 approved the RP by passing Plan Approval Order, and by separate order disposed of the Applications filed by the FD Holders, recommending the CoC to reconsider the Distribution mechanism in the interest of various creditors viz. Public Depositors, FD Holders, NCD Holders, Small Investors, EPF Trust etc. – NCLAT also vide the impugned order dismissed the same by holding inter alia that the Administrator was under no obligation to ensure full payment of deposits to the FD Holders under the RBI Act or the NHB Act, and that the decision about the payments to the creditors fell within the commercial wisdom of CoC which was not amenable to judicial review, subject to fair and equitable play – Held that do not find any legal infirmity in the said impugned order passed by the NCLAT – Appeals filed by the Appellants in this Second Category of Appeals being devoid of merits deserve to be dismissed.

(Para 95 to 99)

(H) Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, Section 7, 31 – Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016, Regulation 37 and 39 – IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016, Regulation 37A – Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934, Section 45-IE, 45QA – National Housing Bank, 1987, Section 56A – Insolvency and Bankruptcy – Value maximization of assets and businesses – Contention that Resolution Professional, that is the Administrator in this case, and the CoC had not undertaken any efforts for value maximization of DHFL’s assets and businesses, which is the underlying object of the IBC – According to him the Appellants – Ex-Promoters/ Directors were kept out of the entire CIRP proceedings and were not given any opportunity to participate in the said proceedings under the guise that the entire Board of Directors of DHFL was superseded under the RBI Act, and therefore the Ex-Directors did not have any right, which suspended Directors would have under the IBC – Held that RBI having superseded the Board of Directors and appointed the Administrator, the Appellants – Ex-Directors had deemed to have vacated their offices – They having been arrested in connection with the criminal proceedings filed against them, were in the judicial custody all throughout the CIRP proceedings – The said Administrator having initiated the CIRP proceedings, was thereafter continued by the CoC as the Resolution Professional to conduct the CIRP under the provisions contained in the IBC – Under the circumstances, the Appellants – KW and DW, who were the Directors of DHFL at the relevant time, having deemed to have vacated their offices on the supersession of the Board of Directors under the RBI Act, could not have claimed any right to attend the meetings of CoC or to participate in the CIRP proceedings initiated under the IBC, which right otherwise would have been available to the Directors suspended under the IBC – In absence of any specific provision in the IBC or the Regulations 2016, they, as the members of the superseded Board of Directors, could not have made any claim to have a copy of proposed RPs submitted by the PRAs during the CIRP proceedings – Nonetheless, pertinently the RP after having been approved by the NCLT under Section 31 of IBC, would become a “Public Document” within the meaning of Section 74 of the Indian Evidence Act, and therefore, they would be entitled to get, at the most, a certified copy of the approved RP.

(Para 101, 109 and 110)

Piramal Capital And Housingfinance Limited (Formerly Knownas Dewan Housing Finance Corporationlimited) V. 63 Moons Technologies Limited & Others

Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 421: (DoJ 01-04-2025)

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Delayed Death: When ‘Attempted Murder’ Becomes More

Maniklall Sahu, the appellant, along with three co-accused, trespassed into the house of Rekhchand Verma, assaulted him with sticks and fisticuffs, and flung him from a terrace. The injured person, Rekhchand Verma, initially survived but was in a critical condition. He eventually succumbed to his injuries approximately nine months after the incident, dying on 8th November 2022 due to septicaemia and pneumonia, leading to cardiorespiratory arrest. The trial court had initially convicted the appellant under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) for murder. However, the High Court altered this conviction to Section 307 IPC for attempt to murder, sentencing the appellant to 7 years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000/-. The appellant subsequently filed this appeal challenging the Section 307 IPC conviction.

Law Involved The primary legal provisions under consideration are Sections 299, 300, 302, and 307 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

Section 307 IPC (Attempt to Murder): This section deals with acts done with the intention or knowledge that it might cause death, and if death occurs, the act would be murder.

Section 299 IPC (Culpable Homicide): Defines culpable homicide.

Section 300 IPC (Murder): Specifies when culpable homicide amounts to murder, including acts done with the intention of causing death, or causing bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or knowing the act is so imminently dangerous that it will most probably cause death.

Section 302 IPC (Punishment for Murder): Prescribes the punishment for murder. The core legal question revolves around the “Application of Theory of Causation where death ensues after some delay” and whether the High Court correctly applied Section 307 IPC despite the victim’s eventual death.

Reasoning The Supreme Court critically analysed the High Court’s decision to alter the conviction from Section 302 IPC to Section 307 IPC, especially given the victim’s death.

  1. Medical Evidence and Causation: The Court reviewed extensive medical evidence, which consistently showed that the deceased, Rekhchand Verma, suffered severe injuries, including a head injury, spinal cord injury leading to paraplegia, and multiple complications such as infected bedsores, septic shock, and bilateral pneumonia. Medical experts testified that these complications were a direct result of the initial injuries sustained during the assault and were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The Court highlighted that the injured person received medical treatment for nine months before his demise. The Court concluded that the injuries suffered were grievous and that the death was a consequence of these injuries, with complications like septicaemia and pneumonia not breaking the chain of causation.
  2. High Court’s Error: The Supreme Court determined that the High Court committed a serious error in bringing the case under the ambit of “attempt to commit murder” (Section 307 IPC) on the premise that the victim survived for about nine months, and his death was due to complications during treatment and not directly from the initial injuries. The Supreme Court stressed that if the injury was fatal and intended to cause death, or if death occurred after some delay due to septicaemia or other complications stemming from the injury, the offence would fall under the first limb of Section 300 IPC (murder) [36a]. Furthermore, if the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and death occurred due to septicaemia or other complications, the act would amount to culpable homicide punishable under Section 302 IPC, falling under the third limb of Section 300 IPC [36b, 37c, 37d].
  3. Jurisprudence on Delayed Death: Drawing on various precedents, the Court reiterated that delayed death or intervening medical conditions (like septicaemia or pneumonia) do not automatically absolve an accused of murder charges if the initial injuries were the proximate cause of death. The Court concluded that the cause of death was indeed due to the injuries suffered, and the contention that the death resulted from a lack of proper treatment or was disconnected from the initial assault was unfounded.

Holding The Supreme Court dismissed Maniklall Sahu’s appeal . While the appellant’s conviction under Section 307 IPC (attempt to murder) as altered by the High Court stands affirmed due to the dismissal of his appeal, the Supreme Court clearly stated that the High Court committed a serious error in altering the conviction from Section 302 IPC to Section 307 IPC . The Supreme Court’s detailed reasoning underscored that given the medical evidence and the established chain of causation, the offence should have been considered murder or culpable homicide amounting to murder, punishable under Section 302 IPC, because the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.

Maniklall Sahu Vs State of Chhattisgarh

Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 1107: (DoJ 12-09-2025)

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Tender Troubles: Supreme Court Upholds Bid Sanctity, Overturns Rectification

The case originated from an electronic bid (No. 7 of 2023-24) issued by the Superintending Engineer and Project Director, Project Implementation Unit – I, Public Works (Roads) Directorate, Government of West Bengal, on 17.10.2023. The tender was for collecting Road User Fee (RUF) from commercial vehicles for 1095 days. The earnest money deposit was fixed at Rs. 25,00,000.00. Seven bidders participated. The technical bids were evaluated, and four bidders were technically qualified, including Prakash Asphaltings and Toll Highways (India) Limited (appellant) and Mandeepa Enterprises (respondent No. 1).

Financial bids were opened on 08.12.2023. The appellant, Prakash Asphaltings, was found to be the highest bidder (H1) with a quoted amount of Rs. 91,19,00,000.00 for 1095 days. Respondent No. 1, Mandeepa Enterprises, was the lowest bidder (H4) with an offered amount of Rs. 9,72,999.00 per day.

Respondent No. 1 subsequently claimed a typographical error in their financial bid, stating they intended to quote Rs. 106,54,33,905.00 for the entire contract period instead of Rs. 9,72,999.00 per day. They requested the tendering authority to treat the figure of Rs. 9,72,999.00 as a typographical error and read it as Rs. 106,54,33,905.00. The tendering authority rejected this request on 20.12.2023, stating that correction of a financial bid after opening was not possible and would impeach the sanctity of the tender process.

Aggrieved, Respondent No. 1 filed a writ petition (WPA No. 29001 of 2023) before a Single Judge of the High Court, which was dismissed on 03.01.2024, as the Single Judge found no scope for interference. Respondent No. 1 then filed an intra-court appeal (MAT No. 93 of 2024). A Division Bench of the High Court allowed the appeal on 23.02.2024, observing that the error in quoting the figure by respondent No. 1 was inadvertent. The Division Bench directed the tendering authority to evaluate Respondent No. 1’s BOQ at Rs. 106,54,33,905.00 and offer other bidders the opportunity to match this figure. This civil appeal was directed against the Division Bench’s judgment and order.

Law Involved

Clause 4(g) of the Notice Inviting Electronic Bid: This clause specifically states that any change in the template of the Bill of Quantity (BOQ) will not be accepted under any circumstances.

Clause 5B(v) of the Instructions to Bidders: This clause outlines that during bid evaluation, if bidders fail to submit supporting documents or original hard copies within the stipulated timeframe, their proposals will be liable for rejection.

Article 226 of the Constitution of India: Pertains to the High Court’s jurisdiction to issue writs.

Principles of Equity and Natural Justice in Tender Processes: The judgment refers to the importance of these principles in tender and contract awards, but also emphasises that these principles should be kept at a distance when there is a violation of rules.

Judicial Review of Administrative Action: The Court reiterated that judicial review in administrative action, particularly tenders, is limited to preventing arbitrariness, irrationality, bias, and mala fides. Courts should not interfere with a decision unless it is “unlawful” or “unsound”.

Public Interest: Tenders are a cornerstone of governmental procurement processes, aiming for competitiveness, fairness, and transparency in resource allocation. Adherence to rules and conditions and the sanctity of the tender process are paramount.

Reasoning The Supreme Court reasoned that the Division Bench’s interpretation was erroneous for several key reasons:

Sanctity of Tender Process: The Court held that allowing rectification of financial bids after they have been opened would impeach the sanctity and integrity of the entire tender process.

Strict Adherence to Tender Conditions: Clause 4(g) explicitly prohibits any change in the BOQ template under any circumstances. The Division Bench’s broad interpretation of “bona fide mistake” to allow rectification was held to be incorrect and would put “shackles on the functioning of the tendering authority”.

Nature of the Mistake: While Respondent No. 1 claimed an inadvertent mistake, it was effectively a unilateral or systematic computer typographical transmission failure, not one attributable to the tendering authority. Such a mistake, even if unintentional, cannot be a ground to allow post-bid modifications that would undermine the competitive bidding process.

Adverse Consequences to Public Exchequer: The Division Bench’s decision to re-evaluate Respondent No. 1’s bid at a significantly higher amount (Rs. 106,54,33,905.00) meant that the appellant, who was originally the H1 bidder, would be displaced. This would lead to a considerable loss of revenue to the state exchequer (approximately 15 crores) by not accepting the higher bid of the appellant and giving an opportunity to Respondent No. 1 to correct its bid post-opening.

Limited Scope of Judicial Review: The Court reiterated that interference by a writ court in ongoing tender processes is not permissible unless there is a clear violation of principles of natural justice, or the decision is arbitrary or mala fide. The Division Bench’s decision was deemed a clear violation of natural justice principles.

Non-Joinder of Party: The appellant (Prakash Asphaltings), as the highest bidder and a directly affected party, was not made a party respondent in the intra-court appeal before the Division Bench, which was viewed as prejudicial and a violation of natural justice.

Holding The Supreme Court allowed the civil appeal, thereby setting aside and quashing the judgment and order dated 23.02.2024 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court at Calcutta in MAT No. 93 of 2024. The Court sustained the order of the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition. Consequently, Prakash Asphaltings and Toll Highways (India) Limited (the appellant), being the H1 bidder, is to be awarded the contract in terms of the notice inviting electronic bid dated 17.10.2023. The Court also ruled that there shall be no order as to costs.

Prakash Asphaltings And Toll Highways (India) Limited Vs Mandeep Enterprises And Others

Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 1108: (DoJ 12-09-2025)

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“Speculative Investors” Barred from IBC Relief: Supreme Court Upholds Homebuyer Protections

Four appeals were heard together, arising from orders of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT). The key appellants, Mansi Brar Fernandes and Sunita Agarwal, had entered into agreements with developers (Gayatri Infra Planner Pvt. Ltd. and Antriksh Infratech Pvt. Ltd., respectively) for property units. Both agreements included buy-back clauses and involved advance payments. The developers defaulted, and the appellants initiated proceedings under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC). The NCLAT reversed the admission of these applications, branding the appellants as “speculative investors” rather than genuine homebuyers or financial creditors.

Law Involved: The central legal framework is the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC), specifically Section 7, which governs the initiation of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) by financial creditors. The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Ordinance, 2019, and the subsequent Amendment Act, are also critical. These amendments introduced a threshold requirement for allottees to file a Section 7 application (requiring at least 10% of allottees or 100 allottees). The Court frequently referenced its earlier judgment in Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd v. Union of India, which distinguishes between genuine homebuyers and speculative investors. The judgment also emphasizes the Right to Shelter as a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution and the role of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (RERA).

Reasoning: The Supreme Court deliberated on the distinction between “speculative investors” and “genuine homebuyers” within the context of the IBC. It observed that the IBC is intended as a collective mechanism to revive viable projects and safeguard the fundamental right to shelter of genuine homebuyers, not as a recovery tool or a bargaining chip for individuals. The legislative intent behind recognizing allottees as financial creditors was to protect genuine homebuyers, while simultaneously preventing misuse by speculative investors seeking premature exits or exorbitant returns, which had burdened the real estate sector and the adjudicatory machinery.

The Court provided criteria to identify speculative investors, including: agreements that substitute possession with buy-back or refund options, insistence on refunds with high interest, purchase of multiple units (especially in double digits), demanding special rights or privileges, deviations from the RERA Model Agreement, and unrealistic interest rates or promises of returns. The transaction entered into by Mansi Brar Fernandes, involving a buy-back clause and the pursuit of commercial returns rather than possession, led the Court to conclude that she was indeed a speculative investor. Similarly, Sunita Agarwal’s agreement for an “investment” with a 25% per annum return over 24 months, coupled with a buy-back clause, indicated a speculative intent.

While affirming the NCLAT’s finding that the appellants were “speculative investors,” the Supreme Court clarified that the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Ordinance, 2019, was indeed applicable to the facts of the present case, correcting the NCLAT’s reasoning on this point [19, 20, 35, 36, 48(ii)]. The Court applied the doctrine of Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit (an act of the Court shall prejudice no one) to address the procedural issues related to the Ordinance’s applicability and the delay it caused.

Holding: The Supreme Court affirmed the NCLAT’s findings that Mansi Brar Fernandes and Sunita Agarwal were “speculative investors” and therefore not entitled to initiate proceedings under Section 7 of the IBC [25, 34, 48(i)]. Consequently, the Court upheld the NCLAT’s orders setting aside the admission of their Section 7 applications by the NCLT [48(i)]. However, the Court clarified that the Ordinance/Amendment Act was applicable to the case, although this correction in reasoning did not alter the ultimate outcome given the appellants’ status as speculative investors [48(ii)]. The appellants remain free to pursue their remedies through other appropriate legal forums, without being barred by limitation [48(i)].

Mansi Brar Fernandes Vs Subha Sharma And Anr.

Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 1110: (DoJ 12-09-2025)

2025 INSC 1110 Download Supreme Court File

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