Indian Judgements

Indian Judgements

Industrial Incentive: Existing industrial units undergoing substantial expansion

Whether the 15% concessional electricity charge incentive under Clause 16(a) of the Himachal Pradesh Industrial Policy, 2019 was intended for existing industrial units undergoing substantial expansion.

Whether the amendment notification dated April 29, 2022 (substituting “eligible enterprises” with “new enterprises”) applied retrospectively.

Whether the doctrine of promissory estoppel prevents the State from denying this concession to an expanding existing enterprise.

Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal filed by the State of Himachal Pradesh, setting aside the judgment of the Himachal Pradesh High Court. The Court ruled that the expanding existing unit was only entitled to the power-consumption rebate under Clause 16(b), not the general tariff concession under Clause 16(a).

  1. Factual Matrix & Background

The State of Himachal Pradesh notified the Industrial Policy of 2019 and the corresponding 2019 Rules to attract industrial investment by offering various incentives.

Under Clause 16 of the unamended Policy, electricity incentives were divided into two categories:

  • Clause 16(a): Provided that “eligible enterprises” would be charged energy charges 15% lower than the approved rate for a period of 3 years.
  • Clause 16(b): Provided existing industrial consumers a rebate of 15% on energy charges specifically for additional power consumption beyond the level of the preceding financial year.

The Respondent (M/s Kundlas Loh Udyog), an existing industrial unit established in 2006, undertook a massive, government-approved expansion in 2020. The State issued a Commencement of Commercial Production (COP) Certificate on February 12, 2021, verifying that the expansion satisfied the necessary guidelines.

The Respondent claimed that as an “eligible enterprise” under the overall policy definitions, it was entitled to both the general 15% concession under Clause 16(a) and the incremental rebate under Clause 16(b). When the State electricity board resisted giving the Clause 16(a) concession, the Respondent approached the High Court. During the pendency of the writ petition, the State issued an amendment notification on April 29, 2022, replacing the phrase “eligible enterprises” with “new enterprises” in Clause 16(a) to clear any ambiguity. The High Court ruled in favor of the industry, striking down restrictive clauses and holding the amendment to be prospective. The State appealed to the Supreme Court.

  1. Arguments of the Parties
  • The Appellants (State of Himachal Pradesh): Argued that the word “eligible” in the unamended Clause 16(a) was a typographical/drafting error that should have read “new”. The policy explicitly compartmentalized benefits for “new units” (general tariff reduction to help them launch) and “existing expanding units” (rebates on additional power consumption to encourage capacity upgrades). They contended the 2022 amendment was purely clarificatory and retrospective. Granting both benefits would result in an unintended, double fiscal concession.
  • The Respondent (M/s Kundlas Loh Udyog): Argued that its rights had crystallized on February 12, 2021, when the COP Certificate was issued, long before the 2022 amendment. Because the amendment notification explicitly stated it would come into force with “immediate effect,” it must operate prospectively. Furthermore, they claimed the State was bound by the doctrine of promissory estoppel, as the company had irretrievably altered its position by investing heavily based on the clear text of the unamended 2019 Policy.
  1. Court’s Observations and Analysis
  2. True Scope of the Industrial Policy and Intent of Clause 16

The Supreme Court analyzed the structure of the policy alongside historical and contemporaneous tariff orders passed by the State Electricity Board. The Court observed that the scheme built a clear wall of separation between new and existing enterprises:

  • Clause 16(a) was meant to act as a launchpad for fresh investments by granting a flat reduction on power charges.
  • Clause 16(b) was structured around incremental consumption linked directly to expanded operations.

If the respondent’s interpretation were accepted, expanding units would reap a dual, overlapping financial windfall. The Court noted that the policy never intended to place an excessive and disproportionate fiscal burden on the State by letting a single class of industrial enterprise double-dip into cumulative electricity concessions.

  1. Nature and Effect of the 2022 Amendment

The Court held that the substitution of “eligible” with “new” in Clause 16(a) was purely clarificatory and did not create or destroy any substantive rights.

Key Distinction on Retrospectivity: While the overarching notification stated it had “immediate effect” (making some changes prospective), the correction in Clause 16 merely refined what the state had originally intended from day one. Because it was clarificatory, it naturally related back to the inception of the original 2019 policy. However, the Court marked a caveat that the specific 2022 amendment limiting the duration of Clause 16(b) benefits to three years for the first time was a substantive change and would apply prospectively.

  1. Inapplicability of Promissory Estoppel

The Court meticulously laid down 12 structural principles governing the doctrine of promissory estoppel against state entities. It reaffirmed that while governments can be bound to unequivocal promises if a citizen acts on them to their detriment, the doctrine cannot be weaponized to force the State into executing an interpretation that runs completely contrary to the text’s actual purpose.

Furthermore, the COP Certificate merely recognized the respondent as an expanded enterprise; it did not equal an official sanction or disbursement of a Clause 16(a) benefit, which requires distinct approvals under Rule 27 of the 2019 Rules. Since the respondent had already successfully received its legitimate expansion rebates under Clause 16(b), no inequity survived.

  1. Conclusion

The Supreme Court concluded that:

  1. Clause 16(a) benefits were always reserved exclusively for new enterprises.
  2. The 2022 amendment to Clause 16 was clarificatory and retrospective.
  3. The COP certificate did not create a vested right to a double benefit, and the plea of promissory estoppel failed.

The appeal by the State of Himachal Pradesh was allowed, and the judgment of the High Court was set aside.

2026 INSC 534

State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. V. M/S Kundlas Loh Udyog (D.O.J. 25.05.2026)

2026 INSC 534 click here to view full text of judgment

Next Story

Admissibility of Deceased Witness Testimony Against Absconding Accused

Supreme Court allowed the appeals filed by the State of West Bengal, ruling that the deposition of a deceased witness recorded in an earlier trial is admissible in a subsequent trial against an absconding accused, provided the requirements of Section 299 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) are met. The Court clarified that the provision serves to preserve evidence when an accused deliberately absconds, preventing them from benefiting from the unavailability of material witnesses due to the passage of time. The Court set aside the High Court’s order, which had denied the admission of the victim’s testimony, confirming that the statutory preconditions—the accused absconding and no immediate prospect of arrest—were satisfied at the time the witness deposed.

  • Background: In a 2012 gang-rape case, the respondent and another accused were absconding while three others were tried and convicted. The victim, a key witness, testified in the first trial but passed away in 2015. After the respondent was arrested in 2016, the prosecution sought to admit the victim’s earlier deposition as evidence under Section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act read with Section 299 of the CrPC.
  • High Court Order: The High Court of Calcutta had rejected the application, observing that the prosecution had a duty to obtain a specific direction from the Trial Court to record evidence against the absconder during the first trial, and thus the earlier deposition could not be used against the respondent.
  • Interpretation of Section 299 CrPC: The Supreme Court held that Section 299 CrPC acts as an exception to the general rule requiring a witness to be examined in the presence of the accused. It does not mandate a formal, prior order from a Magistrate to record that the accused is absconding; rather, what is relevant is whether the conditions—that the accused is absconding and there is no immediate prospect of arrest—were established at the time the evidence was recorded.
  • Preventing Misuse of Process: The Court reasoned that taking a restrictive view of Section 299 would jeopardize the criminal justice system by incentivizing accused persons to wilfully abscond and await the death or unavailability of material witnesses.
  • Application to Facts: The Court noted that the respondent was a declared absconder when the victim’s testimony was recorded (2013), and he remained at large until his arrest in 2016. As the two essential conditions of Section 299(1) were met, the deceased victim’s evidence is admissible in the trial against the respondent.

Legislative Continuity: The Court noted that the legislature has maintained this principle in Section 335 of the recently enacted Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, reinforcing the intent to ensure evidence is preserved against those who evade trial.

2026 INSC 718

The State of West Bengal v. Kader Khan – (D.O.J. 17.07.2026)

2026 INSC 718 click here to view full text of judgment

Next Story

Insolvency and Bankruptcy: Finality of Resolution Plans and Extinguishment of Sub-judice Claims

Supreme Court allowed the appeals filed by the Successful Resolution Applicant (Appellant-SRA), ruling that upon the approval of a Resolution Plan under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC), all claims—including those pending adjudication (sub-judice)—that are not specifically provided for in the plan stand extinguished. The Court held that the “clean slate” doctrine is fundamental to the IBC, preventing unresolved or contingent claims from resurfacing and undermining the revival of the corporate debtor. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court orders and dismissed the civil suit and arbitration proceedings initiated by operational creditors, affirming that they are bound by the terms of the approved Resolution Plan.

  • Background: The Appellant-SRA challenged Bombay High Court orders that allowed a civil recovery suit and arbitration proceedings to continue against the corporate debtor (Bhushan Steel Limited) despite the approval of its Resolution Plan. The respondents, operational creditors, sought to pursue claims that were pending at the time of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP).
  • Treatment of Claims: During the CIRP, the Resolution Professional admitted the respondents’ disputed claims at a notional value of Rupee One (1) each. The approved Resolution Plan stipulated that because the liquidation value was NIL, no amounts were due to operational creditors; however, a settlement fund was provided for those with admitted claims.
  • The “Clean Slate” Doctrine: The Court emphasized that a successful resolution applicant must start on a “clean slate,” free from “hydra-headed” surprise claims. Once a Resolution Plan is approved under Section 31(1) of the IBC, it becomes binding on all stakeholders, and claims not incorporated therein are deemed extinguished, withdrawn, or abated.
  • Finality of the Plan: The Court noted that the Final List of Creditors attained finality, and the respondents could not seek to reopen or question the commercial wisdom of the Committee of Creditors after the plan’s approval. The Court found no merit in the allegations of fraud, noting that no proceedings had been initiated under Rule 11 of the NCLT Rules to challenge the plan’s integrity.
  • No Express Carve-out: Upon a harmonious reading of the Resolution Plan, the Court concluded there was no express “carve-out” protecting sub-judice claims from extinguishment. The plan explicitly mandated that all legal proceedings relating to the period prior to the effective date stand extinguished, except to the extent of the specific settlement amount provided.
  • Observation on MSMEs: In an “Afterword,” the Court observed that the current insolvency framework does not adequately account for the position of small operational creditors and MSMEs, who are often placed at the bottom of the repayment waterfall. The Court suggested that the Legislature and Law Commission examine this to ensure a more balanced repayment mechanism.
  • Outcome: The Court allowed the appeals, set aside the contrary High Court orders, and dismissed the pending civil suit and arbitration proceedings, enforcing the finality of the Resolution Plan.

2026 INSC 717

M/S Tata Steel Ltd. v. Varsha & Anr. (D.O.J. 17.07.2026)

2026 INSC 717 click here to view full text of judgment

Next Story

Excluding Nominated Members from Local Authority Elections

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court of Karnataka’s decision to exclude nominated members of Town Panchayats from participating in Legislative Council elections for Local Authorities’ Constituencies. The Court ruled that under the constitutional framework established by the 74th Amendment (Part IX-A), nominated members, who serve only in an advisory capacity, lack the democratic mandate of elected representatives. Consequently, their inclusion in the electoral roll was declared unconstitutional, and the Court affirmed the direction to conduct a recount of votes after segregating the invalid votes cast by these nominated members.

  • Background: The election to the Karnataka Legislative Council (Chikkamagaluru Local Authorities Constituency) was challenged because 12 nominated members from four Town Panchayats were included in the electoral roll and participated in the voting. The appellant, who won by a narrow margin of 6 votes, contended that the electoral roll’s finality should be respected.
  • Constitutional Interpretation: The Court held that while Article 171(3)(a) mentions “members” of local authorities, this must be interpreted through the lens of the 74th Constitutional Amendment. Article 243-R establishes that while nominated members may be appointed for their expertise, they are expressly barred from voting in municipal meetings, underscoring their advisory rather than representative role.
  • Democratic Representation: The Supreme Court emphasized that allowing nominated members to vote in Legislative Council elections would undermine the democratic nature of the electoral process, as they are not democratically elected. The Court affirmed that “members” in the context of electoral colleges refers to democratically elected representatives.
  • Finality of Electoral Rolls: While acknowledging the principle that electoral rolls typically attain finality, the Court distinguished this case by noting that the inclusion of the nominated members was void ab initio and unconstitutional. Therefore, the finality of the roll could not be used to validate an illegality that strikes at the core of the electoral college’s composition.
  • Secrecy of the Ballot: The Court rejected the argument that segregating these votes would violate the secrecy of the ballot. It maintained that the higher constitutional goal of preserving free and fair elections and ensuring the purity of the electoral process outweighs the requirement for absolute secrecy in this specific context.
  • Outcome: The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and affirmed the High Court’s orders. The Court directed the authorities to proceed with the consequential actions based on the recount results already obtained, ensuring that the election outcome reflects only the valid votes cast by elected representatives.

2026 INSC 716

Pranesh M.K. v. Shanthegowda & Ors. – (D.O.J. 16.07.2026)

2026 INSC 716 click here to view full text of judgment

Next Story

Railway: Establishing Liability in Untoward Railway Incidents

The Supreme Court set aside the concurrent dismissal of a compensation claim by the Railway Claims Tribunal and the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. The Court held that when a passenger dies in an “untoward incident” (falling from a running train), the absence of a recovered ticket does not automatically negate the status of a bona fide passenger. Emphasizing the “no-fault liability” principle under Section 124A of the Railways Act, 1989, the Court ruled that once the claimant establishes the foundational facts through an affidavit, the burden shifts to the Railways. Technical lapses and the inability to recover personal belongings should not defeat the humanitarian and welfare objectives of the legislation.

  • Background: The appellant filed a claim for compensation following the death of her husband, who fell from a running train while traveling from Raipur to Ahmedabad. The Railway Claims Tribunal and the High Court previously rejected the claim, citing a lack of proof regarding the deceased being a bona fide passenger (specifically due to the missing ticket).
  • Legal Principle (No-Fault Liability): The Court reiterated that Section 124A of the 1989 Act is a beneficial, “no-fault” provision. It is designed to provide expeditious relief to victims of untoward incidents without requiring proof of negligence by the Railway Administration.
  • Burden of Proof: Relying on Union of India v. Rina Devi and Doli Rani Saha v. Union of India, the Court clarified that:
    • The mere absence of a ticket does not disprove that a person was a bona fide
    • The initial burden is on the claimant, which is sufficiently discharged by filing an affidavit stating the facts.
    • Once this is done, the burden shifts to the Railways to disprove the claim based on attending circumstances.
  • Operational Concerns: The Court highlighted the critical issue of chronic overcrowding in Indian Railways. It noted that while the Railway Manuals contain detailed safety and ticketing protocols, the execution often fails. The Court suggested that Railways should increase manpower to better manage safety and ticketing, which could simultaneously reduce such tragedies and provide employment.
  • Constitutional Perspective: The Court observed that using terms like “second class passenger” is outdated and potentially offensive to the spirit of the Constitution of India; it suggested that class designations should refer to the “coach” rather than the “passenger.”

Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the lower court judgments. It ordered the Railways to pay compensation of ₹8,00,000 to the appellant within four weeks, failing which the amount would attract interest at 8% from the date of the original claim filing.

2026 INSC 715

Lata v. Union of India & Anr. – (D.O.J. 17.07.2026)

2026 INSC 715 click here to view full text of judgment

Hi Judgments Online