Indian Judgements

Indian Judgements

High Court Granting Bail: While his previous bail was cancelled by Supreme Court

Whether the Allahabad High Court was legally justified in granting regular bail to the accused/Respondent No. 2 (Jeeshan). This must be evaluated considering that his previous bail was cancelled by the Supreme Court, he had continuously evaded arrest for 42 days following that cancellation, and he faced serious charges under Section 307 (Attempt to murder) of the IPC and the Arms Act for firing a weapon to intimidate eyewitnesses of a murder case.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court’s bail order. The Court held that the High Court committed a manifest error of law by completely ignoring the Supreme Court’s prior bail cancellation order, misapplying the principle of parity, and failing to examine the accused’s contumacious conduct of absconding. Respondent No. 2’s bail was cancelled, and he was directed to surrender before the Trial Court forthwith.

1. Factual Background & Prosecution Case

  • The Backdrop Murder Case: The appellant’s brother, Aamir, was murdered by certain individuals, including co-accused Aabaad and Aurangzeb (FIR No. 143/2023). Both Aabaad and Aurangzeb were subsequently convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment in November 2025. Because the appellant refused to compromise in the murder case, he was threatened inside the court premises on February 27, 2024, leading to a criminal intimidation case (FIR No. 67/2024).
  • The Incident on May 12, 2024: While the appellant’s uncle and cousin were returning home, they were intercepted by five accused persons, including Jeeshan (Respondent No. 2), who demanded they withdraw the murder case. The accused assaulted them with weapons, chased them into their house, and Jeeshan went to an adjacent rooftop and fired multiple gunshots at them with a country-made pistol with the intent to kill.
  • Investigative Evidence: CCTV footage verified Jeeshan retrieving a country-made pistol, brandishing it on the road, and moving to the roof just before multiple gunshots were recorded. Based on his confession, a functional .315 bore pistol and a live cartridge were recovered, adding Sections 3, 25, and 27 of the Arms Act to his charges.

2. Judicial History and Absconding Conduct

  • First Round of Bail: The High Court initially granted regular bail to Jeeshan on October 23, 2024, describing his role as “vague and general”. Aggrieved, the appellant approached the Supreme Court, which set aside the bail order on January 27, 2025, noting that the High Court had ignored the serious nature of the case and the specific role assigned to Jeeshan. Jeeshan was ordered to surrender forthwith.
  • Evasion of Law: Instead of surrendering, Jeeshan absconded for approximately 42 days. This forced the Trial Court to issue a Non-Bailable Warrant (NBW) on February 10, 2025, and subsequently initiate proclamation proceedings under Section 82 of the CrPC on February 28, 2025. Jeeshan finally surrendered on March 10, 2025.
  • The Impugned High Court Order: Jeeshan approached the Allahabad High Court again, and a Single Judge granted him bail on September 22, 2025, citing a 7-hour delay in lodging the FIR, the absence of any physical firearm injuries on the victims, and the fact that co-accused Aurangzeb had been granted bail.

3. Key Observations & Findings of the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court, through a bench consisting of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, strongly rebuked the High Court’s approach on several grounds:

  • Disregard for Supreme Court Orders: The Court observed that the High Court’s primary infirmity was its complete lack of engagement with the Supreme Court’s prior order dated January 27, 2025, which had cancelled Jeeshan’s first bail. A High Court cannot grant bail after a Supreme Court cancellation unless there is a material change in circumstances or fresh supervening grounds, neither of which existed here.
  • Contumacious Conduct of the Accused: Jeeshan’s failure to comply with the immediate surrender order and his subsequent 42-day evasion—compelling the execution of NBWs and Section 82 CrPC proceedings—proved that he was a flight risk who actively defied the judicial process. His excuse that a Review Petition was pending was rejected, as filing a review does not act as an automatic stay.
  • Absence of Injury Does Not Negate Section 307 IPC: The Court reiterated the established legal principle that a physical firearm injury is not a mandatory prerequisite to attract Section 307 IPC. The intention and knowledge are what matter. If an accused fires a gun at victims with the intent to kill, and they escape purely by chance, the offense of attempt to murder is legally complete.
  • Mechanical and Erroneous Application of Parity: The High Court’s reliance on parity with co-accused Aurangzeb was held to be completely misplaced. Aurangzeb was accused of a knife assault, whereas Jeeshan was explicitly captured on CCTV retrieving, brandishing, and firing a firearm, leading to an Arms Act recovery against him. Parity is not an inflexible rule and cannot be applied when roles are materially distinct.
  • Systemic Threat to Witnesses: The Court noted that the crime was not an isolated altercation but a premeditated, coordinated attempt to terrorize and coerce eyewitnesses into compromising a separate murder trial. Granting bail under such circumstances places the life and liberty of victims and witnesses at grave risk, thwarting the course of justice.

4. Final Directions Issued

  1. Bail Cancelled: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the Allahabad High Court’s order dated September 22, 2025. The bail granted to Respondent No. 2 (Jeeshan) was officially cancelled.
  2. Immediate Surrender: Respondent No. 2 was directed to surrender before the Trial Court immediately.
  3. Coercive Action on Failure: If the accused fails to surrender, the Trial Court is mandated to take immediate necessary legal steps, including the issuance of a Non-Bailable Warrant, to secure his physical custody.

2026 INSC 526

Mohseen V. State of Uttar Pradesh  & Anr. (D.O.J. 22.05.2026)

2026 INSC 526 click here to view full text of judgment

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Electricity Regulation: Supreme Court Declines to Interfere with Interim Order Permitting Third-Party Participation

This special leave petition challenges an interim order passed by the High Court of Jharkhand, which rejected the petitioners’ preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) filed by ‘Energy Watchdog’ and allowed the respondent to participate in departmental proceedings. The Supreme Court declined to interfere with the interim measure under Article 136 of the Constitution, noting that the High Court’s cautious approach aimed to ensure transparency in an inquiry involving alleged unauthorized power supplies and massive cross-subsidy surcharge defaults.

  • Brief of Judgment: Petitioner No. 1 entered into an agreement with Jharkhand Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. (JBVNL) for surplus captive power supply, which later triggered complaints by Energy Watchdog alleging lack of valid ‘captive user’ status and unauthorized power transmission. After JBVNL issued show cause and demand notices for cross-subsidy surcharges exceeding Rs. 280 crores total, a PIL was instituted. The High Court held the PIL maintainable and permitted the complainant to take part in the proceedings to ensure full disclosure of facts. The Supreme Court upheld this interim arrangement while clarifying that JBVNL must act independently and that all legal questions regarding third-party intervention under the Electricity Act, 2003 remain open for final adjudication.
  • Statutory Framework of the Electricity Act: Reaffirming precedents like PTC India Ltd. and Southern Power Distribution Company, the Electricity Act is an exhaustive code leaving no unallocated regulatory residue outside commissions like the State Commission, which is mandated to ensure transparency under Section 86.
  • Justification for Interim Measure: The High Court adopted a pragmatic interim measure because the circumstances suggested that prior administrative inaction warranted third-party inputs to bring full facts before JBVNL.
  • Preservation of Legal Contentions: The Supreme Court explicitly refrained from commenting on the merits, leaving it open for the High Court to comprehensively examine the scope and ambit of third-party intervention during the final hearing of the writ petition.

2026 INSC 954

M/s. Amalgam Steels and Power Ltd. and Anr. v. Energy Watchdog and Ors. (D.O.J. 03.09.2026)

2026 INSC 954 click here to view full text of judgment

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Empowering Educational Regulators: Upholding NCTE’s Mandate to Mandate Performance Appraisal Reports for Teacher Training Institutions

This civil appeal addresses the statutory authority of the National Council for Teacher Education (NCTE) to mandate the online submission of annual Performance Appraisal Reports (PAR) along with a processing fee from recognized Teacher Education Institutions (TEIs). The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the Delhi High Court’s Division Bench judgment, ruling that the NCTE and its Executive Committee possess full statutory and ancillary powers under the NCTE Act, 1993, to enforce accountability and regulatory oversight over educational institutions.

  • Brief of Judgment: The litigation originated when TEIs challenged a 2019 Public Notice issued by the Member Secretary of the NCTE’s Executive Committee requiring them to submit online PARs and nominal processing fees. While a single judge dismissed the challenge, the Division Bench quashed the notice on the premise that the specific proforma had not been explicitly approved by the general body of the Council and that delegation to the Member Secretary was improper. The Supreme Court strongly disapproved of the High Court’s pedantic approach, holding that statutory regulators must be empowered to enforce institutional transparency, performance audits, and accountability without judicial overreach.
  • Statutory Framework and Duty Bearers: The judgment emphasizes that following the enactment of Article 21A and the Right of Education (RTE) Act, 2009, elementary school teachers, TEIs, and the NCTE act as critical constitutional duty bearers responsible for upholding high standards of educational quality.
  • Scope of Regulatory Powers: Section 12(k) of the NCTE Act expressly empowers the Council to evolve suitable performance appraisal systems and mechanisms to enforce accountability, which includes the incidental power to collect processing fees and utilize digital portals for management information systems.
  • Role of the Executive Committee: The Executive Committee, operating as the executive arm of the Council, is fully competent to implement decisions made by the General Body, such as substituting cumbersome annual renewal regimes with streamlined PAR submissions.
  • Reversal of High Court Judgment: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order, reaffirming that courts must support and enable the effective functioning of statutory regulators rather than restrict them through hyper-technical interpretations.

2026 INSC 953

The National Council for Teacher Education v. Association of NCTE Approved Colleges Trust and Ors. (D.O.J. 03.09.2026)

2026 INSC 953 click here to view full text of judgment

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Relief for Homebuyers: Waiver of Time Extension and Penalty Charges in Corporate Insolvency Resolution

This civil appeal addresses the plight of homebuyers and the Successful Resolution Applicant (SRA) who faced severe liabilities in the form of time extension and penalty charges imposed by NOIDA after a real estate developer (“Granite Gate Properties Private Limited”) was subjected to Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP). The Supreme Court allowed the appeal filed by the homebuyers’ Authorized Representative and dismissed NOIDA’s appeal, ruling that penal time extension charges resulting from the original developer’s defaults cannot be validly mulcted on the innocent homebuyers and the SRA as CIRP costs.

  • Brief of Judgment: The developer took perpetual leases for two high-rise projects (“Lotus Boulevard” and “Lotus Panache”) in Sectors 100 and 110, Noida, but subsequently defaulted and became a Corporate Debtor. Homebuyers pooled their own resources under a “Pool and Build” mechanism to keep the project afloat, and a Resolution Plan was approved under an SRA. The National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) had directed time extension charges for up to three years to be treated as CIRP costs, while NOIDA sought even extended charges up to the tenth year under subsequent office orders. The Supreme Court set aside these directions, holding that penal charges intended to deter a defaulting developer cannot be shifted onto homebuyers and the SRA.
  • Role and Nature of NOIDA: While NOIDA operates as a local development authority engaged in commercial and urban planning ventures, its foundational purpose remains public welfare and infrastructural development rather than mere profit-seeking.
  • Exemption from Past Sins: The delay and default were committed by the erstwhile corporate debtor, not by the homebuyers or the SRA who stepped in to rescue the project; consequently, penalizing them for “past sins” is legally unjustified.
  • Rejection of CIRP Cost Classification: The Supreme Court set aside the NCLAT’s direction to treat the time extension charges as CIRP costs and flatly rejected NOIDA’s demand for extended delay penalties stretching up to the tenth year.

2026 INSC 952

The Authorised Representative for Granite Gate Properties Private Limited, Ms. Rakesh Verma v. M/s New Okhla Industrial Development Authority and Ors. (D.O.J. 03.09.2026)

2026 INSC 952 click here to view full text of judgment

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Overturning a Murder Conviction Based on Unsubstantiated Confessions

This criminal appeal challenges a High Court judgment that upheld the conviction of the sole appellant (A1) for kidnapping and murder while acquitting all co-accused. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction, ruling that the prosecution relied entirely on inadmissible confessions, unverified electronic evidence lacking mandatory Section 65B certificates, and a failure to prove the essential links connecting the appellant to the crime scene.

  • Brief of Judgment: Following a missing person report and a ransom demand, the police recovered the victim’s body from a refrigerator inside an apartment allegedly leased by the appellant. While the trial court convicted multiple accused, the High Court acquitted all except the appellant, grounding his conviction on the sole watchman testimony (PW3) and drawing an adverse inference under Section 106 of the Evidence Act regarding the presence of the body. The Supreme Court found the investigation to be shoddy, noting that crucial electronic records lacked Section 65B certificates, the ownership of the flat and the watchman’s employment were unproven, and the foundational reliance on police confessions rendered the prosecution’s case legally unsustainable.
  • Inadmissibility of Electronic Evidence: Both the call detail records and the ATM CCTV footage used to track financial transactions and movements were rendered inadmissible due to the complete absence of mandatory certificates under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, alongside a failure to examine the nodal or bank officers.
  • Unproven Flat Ownership and Watchman Testimony: The prosecution failed to establish the ownership of the apartment through documents or verify the employment of PW3 as a watchman, which completely undermined the “last seen” theory and invalidated the application of Section 106 of the Evidence Act.
  • Flawed Test Identification Parade (TIP): The TIP identifying the appellant was legally compromised because the witness (PW3) admitted that photographs of the suspects had been shown to him prior to the identification process in jail.
  • Reliance on Confessions: The entire prosecution theory stemmed from inadmissible police confessions and a speculative web of relationships, with zero substantive or independent corroborative evidence linking the appellant to the murder or the ransom money.

2026 INSC 951

Kondapaka Sridhar @ Shekar @ Madhu @ Gopi @ Chinna v. The State of Telangana (D.O.J. 03.09.2026)

2026 INSC 951 click here to view full text of judgment

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