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Forest Land Grab: SC Upholds Public Trust, Quashes Illegal Allotment for Multi-Storeyed Buildings

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This case concerns the illegal conversion of Reserved Forest Land for commercial development in Village Kondhwa Budruk, Pune District, Maharashtra. An area of 32 Acres 35 Gunthas at Survey No. 20 was originally notified as a Reserved Forest in 1879 under the Indian Forest Act, 1878. While a small portion (3 Acres 20 Gunthas) was de-reserved in 1934, the remaining 29 Acres 15 Gunthas (11.89 ha) continued to be Forest Land.

In the 1960s, a parcel of land in Survey No. 37 belonging to the ‘Chavan Family’ was acquired for a hospital, and they sought alternative land for resettlement2. Consequently, in 1968-69, the subject land (Survey No. 21, formerly Survey No. 20-A) was allotted to the ‘Chavan Family’ on an “Eksali” (yearly) lease basis for cultivation, with strict conditions prohibiting its sale, mortgage, or transfer without prior approval and mandating it be used only for agricultural purposes.

Despite these conditions and the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 (FC Act) coming into effect in 1980 (requiring Central Government permission for de-reservation or non-forest use)5, the ‘Chavan Family’ was granted permanent release of the land in 19885. In 1998, the Revenue Minister of Maharashtra sanctioned the allotment of the entire subject land to the ‘Chavan Family’ without obtaining the necessary prior sanction from the Central Government as mandated by the FC Act. The allotment order reiterated that the land was for agricultural purposes and could not be used for any other purpose.

Immediately after this, the ‘Chavan Family’ began selling parts of the land. In October 1999, the Divisional Commissioner granted permission to the ‘Chavan Family’ to sell the land to Richie Rich Co-operative Housing Society (RRCHS) for residential purposes8. In 2005, the District Collector granted permission for non-agricultural use for residential buildings. In 2007, the Ministry of Environment and Forest (MoEF) granted environmental clearance for the construction of “Raheja Richmond Park,” a residential, shopping, and IT complex.

These actions led to Interlocutory Applications (I.A.s) being filed in the Supreme Court, including I.A. No. 2079-2080 of 2007 in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 202 of 1995, challenging the allotment and construction as a violation of the 1980 FC Act1011. The Central Empowered Committee (CEC) was directed to inquire, and its report recommended cancellation of the allotment, restoration of the land to forest status, and prosecution of officials involved. It was also discovered through a CID inquiry that a Gazette Notification from 1944, cited by RRCHS, was a fabricated document. The case highlights a “classic example” of the nexus between politicians, bureaucrats, and builders converting precious forest land for commercial use under the garb of resettling backward class people.

Laws Involved The judgment extensively deals with:

The Indian Forest Act, 1878 (specifically Section 34): Pertains to the original notification and management of Reserved Forests.

The Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 (FC Act): Crucially, this Act stipulates that forest land cannot be de-reserved or used for non-forest purposes without prior approval from the Central Government.

The Doctrine of Public Trust: This fundamental principle asserts that the State holds natural resources, such as forests, in trust for the benefit of the public. The Court emphasized that this doctrine prohibits the State from converting public resources for private commercial gain, particularly when such actions are taken by officials in breach of trust.

Relevant Supreme Court precedents like T.N. Godavarman Thirumalpad v. Union of India, M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, State of Bihar v. Banshi Ram Modi, and Ambica Quarry Works v. State of Gujarat, which discuss the FC Act and the public trust doctrine.

The Doctrine of Desuetude: The argument that the Indian Forest Act, 1878, or parts thereof, might have become inoperative due to long non-use was considered and rejected by the Court.

Reasoning The Supreme Court’s reasoning was based on several critical findings:

1. Undisputed Forest Land Status: The Court established that the subject land consistently remained Reserved Forest Land despite the 1934 de-reservation of a small portion. Revenue and Forest Department records confirmed its status as Forest Land.

2. Blatant Violation of FC Act, 1980: The most significant aspect of the reasoning was the finding that the allotment and subsequent transactions were in flagrant breach of the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980. The FC Act, which came into force in 1980, explicitly mandates prior approval from the Central Government for any de-reservation or use of forest land for non-forest purposes. Such approval was never obtained.

3. Application of Public Trust Doctrine: The Court heavily relied on the Doctrine of Public Trust, highlighting how the actions of the State Government, particularly the Revenue Minister and Divisional Commissioner, constituted a total breach of this public trust2243. The conversion of forest land for private commercial development under the guise of resettlement exemplified the misuse of power and public resources.

4. No Bona Fide Purchaser Status for RRCHS: The Court rejected RRCHS’s claim of being a bona fide purchaser. It noted that the original allotment was for a specific, limited agricultural purpose with clear non-transferability clauses. The subsequent transactions leading to RRCHS’s acquisition were illegal and violated the original conditions. Furthermore, the evidence of a fabricated Gazette Notification used in the process undermined any claim of good faith.

5. Rejection of Doctrine of Desuetude: The argument that the 1878 Act was rendered inoperative by desuetude was dismissed. The Court affirmed that the provisions concerning forest protection and conservation remained active and relevant, adapting to evolving environmental needs.

6. Illegal Environmental Clearance: The environmental clearance granted for the construction was deemed illegal due to the underlying illegality of the land allotment itself.

Holding The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, issuing the following directives:

  • The allotment of 11.89 ha of Reserved Forest land in Survey No. 21 (old Survey No. 20A) Kondhwa Budruk, Pune, originally made for agricultural purposes in 1998, and its subsequent permission for sale to RRCHS in October 1999, are declared totally illegal.
  • The Environmental Clearance granted by the Ministry of Environment and Forest (MoEF) on 3rd July 2007 to RRCHS is quashed and set aside as illegal.
  • The State of Maharashtra is directed to immediately recall the communication dated 4th August 1998 that approved the illegal allotment of the land.
  • The possession of the subject land, which is Reserved Forest Land, must be handed over to the Forest Department within a period of three months from the date of the judgment.
  • The Court directed the Chief Secretaries of all States and the Administrators of all Union Territories to constitute Special Investigation Teams within one month to examine all cases where Reserved Forest Land has been illegally transferred to private individuals or institutions for non-forestry purposes. These teams are tasked with ensuring all such illegal transfers are reversed and possession is recovered within a period of one year from today.
  • The State Governments/Union Territories are mandated to recover the cost of the illegally allotted land from the involved persons/institutions and utilize these funds solely for the purpose of afforestation.
  • The recovered land itself should also be used only for afforestation.

In Re: Construction Of Multi Storeyed Buildings  In Forest Land Maharashtra V. Union Of India

Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 701: (DoJ 15-05-2025)

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Delayed Death: When ‘Attempted Murder’ Becomes More

September 13, 2025 No Comments

Maniklall Sahu, the appellant, along with three co-accused, trespassed into the house of Rekhchand Verma, assaulted him with sticks and fisticuffs, and flung him from a terrace. The injured person, Rekhchand Verma, initially survived but was in a critical condition. He eventually succumbed to his injuries approximately nine months after the incident, dying on 8th November 2022 due to septicaemia and pneumonia, leading to cardiorespiratory arrest. The trial court had initially convicted the appellant under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) for murder. However, the High Court altered this conviction to Section 307 IPC for attempt to murder, sentencing the appellant to 7 years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000/-. The appellant subsequently filed this appeal challenging the Section 307 IPC conviction.

Law Involved The primary legal provisions under consideration are Sections 299, 300, 302, and 307 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

Section 307 IPC (Attempt to Murder): This section deals with acts done with the intention or knowledge that it might cause death, and if death occurs, the act would be murder.

Section 299 IPC (Culpable Homicide): Defines culpable homicide.

Section 300 IPC (Murder): Specifies when culpable homicide amounts to murder, including acts done with the intention of causing death, or causing bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or knowing the act is so imminently dangerous that it will most probably cause death.

Section 302 IPC (Punishment for Murder): Prescribes the punishment for murder. The core legal question revolves around the “Application of Theory of Causation where death ensues after some delay” and whether the High Court correctly applied Section 307 IPC despite the victim’s eventual death.

Reasoning The Supreme Court critically analysed the High Court’s decision to alter the conviction from Section 302 IPC to Section 307 IPC, especially given the victim’s death.

  1. Medical Evidence and Causation: The Court reviewed extensive medical evidence, which consistently showed that the deceased, Rekhchand Verma, suffered severe injuries, including a head injury, spinal cord injury leading to paraplegia, and multiple complications such as infected bedsores, septic shock, and bilateral pneumonia. Medical experts testified that these complications were a direct result of the initial injuries sustained during the assault and were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The Court highlighted that the injured person received medical treatment for nine months before his demise. The Court concluded that the injuries suffered were grievous and that the death was a consequence of these injuries, with complications like septicaemia and pneumonia not breaking the chain of causation.
  2. High Court’s Error: The Supreme Court determined that the High Court committed a serious error in bringing the case under the ambit of “attempt to commit murder” (Section 307 IPC) on the premise that the victim survived for about nine months, and his death was due to complications during treatment and not directly from the initial injuries. The Supreme Court stressed that if the injury was fatal and intended to cause death, or if death occurred after some delay due to septicaemia or other complications stemming from the injury, the offence would fall under the first limb of Section 300 IPC (murder) [36a]. Furthermore, if the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and death occurred due to septicaemia or other complications, the act would amount to culpable homicide punishable under Section 302 IPC, falling under the third limb of Section 300 IPC [36b, 37c, 37d].
  3. Jurisprudence on Delayed Death: Drawing on various precedents, the Court reiterated that delayed death or intervening medical conditions (like septicaemia or pneumonia) do not automatically absolve an accused of murder charges if the initial injuries were the proximate cause of death. The Court concluded that the cause of death was indeed due to the injuries suffered, and the contention that the death resulted from a lack of proper treatment or was disconnected from the initial assault was unfounded.

Holding The Supreme Court dismissed Maniklall Sahu’s appeal . While the appellant’s conviction under Section 307 IPC (attempt to murder) as altered by the High Court stands affirmed due to the dismissal of his appeal, the Supreme Court clearly stated that the High Court committed a serious error in altering the conviction from Section 302 IPC to Section 307 IPC . The Supreme Court’s detailed reasoning underscored that given the medical evidence and the established chain of causation, the offence should have been considered murder or culpable homicide amounting to murder, punishable under Section 302 IPC, because the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.

Maniklall Sahu Vs State of Chhattisgarh

Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 1107: (DoJ 12-09-2025)

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Tender Troubles: Supreme Court Upholds Bid Sanctity, Overturns Rectification

September 13, 2025 No Comments

The case originated from an electronic bid (No. 7 of 2023-24) issued by the Superintending Engineer and Project Director, Project Implementation Unit – I, Public Works (Roads) Directorate, Government of West Bengal, on 17.10.2023. The tender was for collecting Road User Fee (RUF) from commercial vehicles for 1095 days. The earnest money deposit was fixed at Rs. 25,00,000.00. Seven bidders participated. The technical bids were evaluated, and four bidders were technically qualified, including Prakash Asphaltings and Toll Highways (India) Limited (appellant) and Mandeepa Enterprises (respondent No. 1).

Financial bids were opened on 08.12.2023. The appellant, Prakash Asphaltings, was found to be the highest bidder (H1) with a quoted amount of Rs. 91,19,00,000.00 for 1095 days. Respondent No. 1, Mandeepa Enterprises, was the lowest bidder (H4) with an offered amount of Rs. 9,72,999.00 per day.

Respondent No. 1 subsequently claimed a typographical error in their financial bid, stating they intended to quote Rs. 106,54,33,905.00 for the entire contract period instead of Rs. 9,72,999.00 per day. They requested the tendering authority to treat the figure of Rs. 9,72,999.00 as a typographical error and read it as Rs. 106,54,33,905.00. The tendering authority rejected this request on 20.12.2023, stating that correction of a financial bid after opening was not possible and would impeach the sanctity of the tender process.

Aggrieved, Respondent No. 1 filed a writ petition (WPA No. 29001 of 2023) before a Single Judge of the High Court, which was dismissed on 03.01.2024, as the Single Judge found no scope for interference. Respondent No. 1 then filed an intra-court appeal (MAT No. 93 of 2024). A Division Bench of the High Court allowed the appeal on 23.02.2024, observing that the error in quoting the figure by respondent No. 1 was inadvertent. The Division Bench directed the tendering authority to evaluate Respondent No. 1’s BOQ at Rs. 106,54,33,905.00 and offer other bidders the opportunity to match this figure. This civil appeal was directed against the Division Bench’s judgment and order.

Law Involved

Clause 4(g) of the Notice Inviting Electronic Bid: This clause specifically states that any change in the template of the Bill of Quantity (BOQ) will not be accepted under any circumstances.

Clause 5B(v) of the Instructions to Bidders: This clause outlines that during bid evaluation, if bidders fail to submit supporting documents or original hard copies within the stipulated timeframe, their proposals will be liable for rejection.

Article 226 of the Constitution of India: Pertains to the High Court’s jurisdiction to issue writs.

Principles of Equity and Natural Justice in Tender Processes: The judgment refers to the importance of these principles in tender and contract awards, but also emphasises that these principles should be kept at a distance when there is a violation of rules.

Judicial Review of Administrative Action: The Court reiterated that judicial review in administrative action, particularly tenders, is limited to preventing arbitrariness, irrationality, bias, and mala fides. Courts should not interfere with a decision unless it is “unlawful” or “unsound”.

Public Interest: Tenders are a cornerstone of governmental procurement processes, aiming for competitiveness, fairness, and transparency in resource allocation. Adherence to rules and conditions and the sanctity of the tender process are paramount.

Reasoning The Supreme Court reasoned that the Division Bench’s interpretation was erroneous for several key reasons:

Sanctity of Tender Process: The Court held that allowing rectification of financial bids after they have been opened would impeach the sanctity and integrity of the entire tender process.

Strict Adherence to Tender Conditions: Clause 4(g) explicitly prohibits any change in the BOQ template under any circumstances. The Division Bench’s broad interpretation of “bona fide mistake” to allow rectification was held to be incorrect and would put “shackles on the functioning of the tendering authority”.

Nature of the Mistake: While Respondent No. 1 claimed an inadvertent mistake, it was effectively a unilateral or systematic computer typographical transmission failure, not one attributable to the tendering authority. Such a mistake, even if unintentional, cannot be a ground to allow post-bid modifications that would undermine the competitive bidding process.

Adverse Consequences to Public Exchequer: The Division Bench’s decision to re-evaluate Respondent No. 1’s bid at a significantly higher amount (Rs. 106,54,33,905.00) meant that the appellant, who was originally the H1 bidder, would be displaced. This would lead to a considerable loss of revenue to the state exchequer (approximately 15 crores) by not accepting the higher bid of the appellant and giving an opportunity to Respondent No. 1 to correct its bid post-opening.

Limited Scope of Judicial Review: The Court reiterated that interference by a writ court in ongoing tender processes is not permissible unless there is a clear violation of principles of natural justice, or the decision is arbitrary or mala fide. The Division Bench’s decision was deemed a clear violation of natural justice principles.

Non-Joinder of Party: The appellant (Prakash Asphaltings), as the highest bidder and a directly affected party, was not made a party respondent in the intra-court appeal before the Division Bench, which was viewed as prejudicial and a violation of natural justice.

Holding The Supreme Court allowed the civil appeal, thereby setting aside and quashing the judgment and order dated 23.02.2024 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court at Calcutta in MAT No. 93 of 2024. The Court sustained the order of the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition. Consequently, Prakash Asphaltings and Toll Highways (India) Limited (the appellant), being the H1 bidder, is to be awarded the contract in terms of the notice inviting electronic bid dated 17.10.2023. The Court also ruled that there shall be no order as to costs.

Prakash Asphaltings And Toll Highways (India) Limited Vs Mandeep Enterprises And Others

Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 1108: (DoJ 12-09-2025)

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“Speculative Investors” Barred from IBC Relief: Supreme Court Upholds Homebuyer Protections

September 13, 2025 No Comments

Four appeals were heard together, arising from orders of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT). The key appellants, Mansi Brar Fernandes and Sunita Agarwal, had entered into agreements with developers (Gayatri Infra Planner Pvt. Ltd. and Antriksh Infratech Pvt. Ltd., respectively) for property units. Both agreements included buy-back clauses and involved advance payments. The developers defaulted, and the appellants initiated proceedings under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC). The NCLAT reversed the admission of these applications, branding the appellants as “speculative investors” rather than genuine homebuyers or financial creditors.

Law Involved: The central legal framework is the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC), specifically Section 7, which governs the initiation of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) by financial creditors. The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Ordinance, 2019, and the subsequent Amendment Act, are also critical. These amendments introduced a threshold requirement for allottees to file a Section 7 application (requiring at least 10% of allottees or 100 allottees). The Court frequently referenced its earlier judgment in Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd v. Union of India, which distinguishes between genuine homebuyers and speculative investors. The judgment also emphasizes the Right to Shelter as a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution and the role of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (RERA).

Reasoning: The Supreme Court deliberated on the distinction between “speculative investors” and “genuine homebuyers” within the context of the IBC. It observed that the IBC is intended as a collective mechanism to revive viable projects and safeguard the fundamental right to shelter of genuine homebuyers, not as a recovery tool or a bargaining chip for individuals. The legislative intent behind recognizing allottees as financial creditors was to protect genuine homebuyers, while simultaneously preventing misuse by speculative investors seeking premature exits or exorbitant returns, which had burdened the real estate sector and the adjudicatory machinery.

The Court provided criteria to identify speculative investors, including: agreements that substitute possession with buy-back or refund options, insistence on refunds with high interest, purchase of multiple units (especially in double digits), demanding special rights or privileges, deviations from the RERA Model Agreement, and unrealistic interest rates or promises of returns. The transaction entered into by Mansi Brar Fernandes, involving a buy-back clause and the pursuit of commercial returns rather than possession, led the Court to conclude that she was indeed a speculative investor. Similarly, Sunita Agarwal’s agreement for an “investment” with a 25% per annum return over 24 months, coupled with a buy-back clause, indicated a speculative intent.

While affirming the NCLAT’s finding that the appellants were “speculative investors,” the Supreme Court clarified that the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Ordinance, 2019, was indeed applicable to the facts of the present case, correcting the NCLAT’s reasoning on this point [19, 20, 35, 36, 48(ii)]. The Court applied the doctrine of Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit (an act of the Court shall prejudice no one) to address the procedural issues related to the Ordinance’s applicability and the delay it caused.

Holding: The Supreme Court affirmed the NCLAT’s findings that Mansi Brar Fernandes and Sunita Agarwal were “speculative investors” and therefore not entitled to initiate proceedings under Section 7 of the IBC [25, 34, 48(i)]. Consequently, the Court upheld the NCLAT’s orders setting aside the admission of their Section 7 applications by the NCLT [48(i)]. However, the Court clarified that the Ordinance/Amendment Act was applicable to the case, although this correction in reasoning did not alter the ultimate outcome given the appellants’ status as speculative investors [48(ii)]. The appellants remain free to pursue their remedies through other appropriate legal forums, without being barred by limitation [48(i)].

Mansi Brar Fernandes Vs Subha Sharma And Anr.

Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 1110: (DoJ 12-09-2025)

2025 INSC 1110 Download Supreme Court File

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