The Supreme Court of India, led by a bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, put an end to a long-standing judicial conflict among various High Courts regarding the role of regular State Police in investigating offences under the Pre-conception and Prenatal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 (PCPNDT Act).
The Court definitively held that regular police have no authority to independently register an FIR, conduct investigations, or file a chargesheet for violations strictly falling under the PCPNDT Act. The statutory architecture of this social-welfare legislation vests the exclusive primary investigating and prosecuting powers in the statutory “Appropriate Authority” (AA). Consequently, a competent Magistrate is legally barred under Section 28 of the Act from taking judicial cognizance of a PCPNDT offence based solely on a standard police report or chargesheet.
- Background and Origin of the Reference
The appeal reached the Supreme Court via a certificate granted under Article 134-A read with Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution of India by the Allahabad High Court. It emerged from an incident where secret information regarding illegal fetal sex determination was received by the District Magistrate of Bulandshahar (acting as the Appropriate Authority). A decoy operation led by a Tehsildar was conducted at a hospital, which resulted in a raid and the subsequent lodging of FIR No. 628 of 2017.
The police filed a chargesheet incorporating regular penal provisions (Sections 315 and 511 of the IPC) alongside core violations of the PCPNDT Act (Sections 4, 5(2), 6(a), 23, and 25). The Single Judge of the High Court accepted the doctor’s quashing petition but framed three critical constitutional/legal reference questions for the Apex Court due to diametrically opposite views prevailing across different state High Courts.
- The High Court Conflict
The Supreme Court analyzed the split in previous jurisprudence across the states:
- In Favor of Police Intervention: High Courts of Allahabad, Delhi, and Punjab & Haryana previously ruled that because Section 27 makes PCPNDT violations cognizable and non-bailable, regular police are mandated under Section 154 of the CrPC to register FIRs and investigate. They opined that Section 28’s bar only impacts the stage of taking cognizance in court, not the investigative phase.
- Against Police Intervention: High Courts of Chhattisgarh, Orissa, Telangana/Andhra Pradesh, Bombay, Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan ruled that the PCPNDT Act creates an isolated, regulator-led mechanism. They emphasized that specialized technical evidence requires medical experts, not ordinary police infrastructure.
- Core Findings and Statutory Analysis
The Supreme Court analyzed the interplay between Sections 17, 17A, 27, 28, and 30 of the Act, alongside Rule 18A(3) of the PCPNDT Rules, 1996:
- Exclusivity of the Appropriate Authority (AA): Section 17(4) and Rule 18A(3) explicitly mandate that the AA is the sole body tasked with receiving, processing, and investigating complaints within strict time constraints (investigation must begin within 24 hours and finish within 48 hours).
- The Misconception of ‘Cognizability’ (Section 27): The Supreme Court clarified that declaring an offence ‘cognizable’ under Section 27 does not automatically hand over unilateral power to the state police. Instead, it highlights the structural seriousness of the offense and dictates bail parameters.
- Absolute Bar on Cognizance (Section 28): Section 28 acts as a strict jurisdictional filter. A Court can only take cognizance of an offence under the Act via a formal written complaint filed by the AA, an authorized government officer, or a citizen/social organization providing a mandatory 15-day notice. Since a ‘police report’ (chargesheet) is legally distinct from a ‘complaint’, a Magistrate cannot summon an accused using a police chargesheet for PCPNDT violations.
- Parallel Tracks and Judicial Precedents: Drawing natural parallels to similar restrictive special laws like the Transplantation of Human Organs and Tissues Act, 1994 (TOHO) and the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (DCA), the Apex Court noted that special statutory provisions override general procedural laws (CrPC/BNSS) when an enforcement mechanism is explicitly detailed by Parliament.
- The Coordination Protocol for “Mixed” Offences
While the regular police are completely kept out of the standalone prosecution loop under the PCPNDT Act to insulate medical practitioners from arbitrary harassment, they are not a shield against standalone regular crimes.
The Court provided a harmonized, dual-track structure for overlapping situations:
- PCPNDT Only: If a police station receives a tip-off showing purely a PCPNDT violation, they must make a diary entry and transmit the data directly to the notified AA without conducting a police investigation.
- Mixed Offences: If the transaction contains independent penal infractions under the IPC/BNS (such as illegal termination of pregnancy or fraud), the police are fully authorized to independently register an FIR and investigate those general penal offences. However, they must restrict their operations solely to those penal boundaries, share the relevant technical material with the AA, and allow the AA to independently file the statutory complaint for the PCPNDT violations.
If you require any specific aspect of this landmark ruling expanded, please let me know if you would like to focus on:
- The 7-point coordination protocol issued for the police and Appropriate Authorities.
- The explicit impact of this ruling on pending trials initiated via older police chargesheets.
- A direct tabular comparison with the TOHO or Drugs & Cosmetics Act provisions applied by the Court.
2026 INSC 901
State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. v. Brij Pal Singh & Anr. (D.O.J. 20.08.2026)
