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Corruption Conviction Upheld: SC Affirms Graft, Modifies Sentence for Septuagenarian

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The case is a criminal appeal challenging a judgment and order dated 3rd September, 2024, by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Bench at Aurangabad.

The High Court had dismissed the appellant’s criminal appeal, thereby maintaining his conviction under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act).

The original conviction was by the Special Judge, Parbhani, in Special Case No. 05/2000, on 26th April, 2004.

The appellant was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment (R.I.) of two years and a fine of Rs. 2,000/- for the offence under Section 7, and R.I. of one year and a fine of Rs. 1,000/- for the offence under Section 13, with default stipulations.

The incident leading to the offence occurred over 25 years ago, and the appellant has become a septuagenarian.

Law Involved

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act): Sections 7, 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) (offences and punishment), Section 17 (investigation by officers), Section 19 (sanction to prosecute).

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr. PC): Section 313 (examination of accused), Section 465 (effect of errors in proceedings).

Indian Evidence Act, 1872: Section 56 (facts judicially noticeable need not be proved), Section 57 (courts to take judicial notice of laws in force).

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023: Section 218 (sanction to prosecute, mentioned in context of repealed Cr. PC).

Constitution of India: Article 142 (plenary power of the Supreme Court).

Reasoning :

The Supreme Court addressed four main contentions raised by the appellant’s counsel, Ms. Meenakshi Arora.

  1. Sanction to Prosecute was Mechanically Granted:

Contention: Ms. Arora argued that the sanctioning authority approved a draft order without changes.

Court’s Reasoning: The Court found no merit in this. The Sub-Divisional Officer, Parbhani (PW-3), who was the sanctioning authority, categorically asserted that he did not change the wording because he found it unnecessary. The grant of sanction is an administrative function based on subjective satisfaction and a prima facie case. Mere omission, error, or irregularity in granting sanction does not affect validity unless it results in a failure of justice. PW-3 made minor corrections without altering the substance, proving application of mind, and no failure of justice was shown.

2. Investigation Conducted by an Inspector of Police (PW-4) instead of a Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP):

Contention: Section 17 of the PC Act mandates investigation by an officer no lower than a DSP.

Court’s Reasoning: The Special Court referred to a Government Order dated 19th April, 1989 (No. MIS/0389/767/CR-140/POL-3) issued under the first proviso to Section 17 of the PC Act, authorizing all police inspectors in the Anti-Corruption Bureau of Maharashtra to investigate such offences. The Court found this order, having the force of a statute, to be law of which courts must take judicial notice under Sections 56 and 57 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Therefore, it was not necessary to bring the order on record as evidence. As PW-4 was an Inspector of Police, the investigation was deemed competently conducted.

3. Demand was Not Proved, citing Neeraj Dutta v. State (NCT Delhi):

Contention: The demand for a bribe was not established.

Court’s Reasoning: The Court was unimpressed, stating that evidence tendered by prosecution witnesses and the appellant’s answers during his Section 313 Cr. PC examination proved the demand without a doubt. The appellant’s frank answers were appreciated, and the acceptance of Rs. 500/-, when the actual arrears were Rs. 5/-, was not justified, especially given the complainant’s assertion of bargaining down from Rs. 2,000/-.

4. One of the Seizure Witnesses (PW-2) was Related to the Complainant:

Contention: The evidence of the seizure witness should be discarded due to alleged relation to the complainant.

Court’s Reasoning: The Court held that PW-2’s evidence need not be discarded merely due to alleged relationship, as his testimony was found creditworthy and unshaken during cross-examination. Furthermore, other evidence on record supported the conviction even apart from the seizure witness.

Plea for Alteration of Sentence due to Advanced Age and Passage of Time:

Contention: Ms. Arora sought indulgence similar to H.P. Venkatesh v. State of Karnataka, citing the appellant’s advanced age and the incident being over 25 years old, asking for a modification of sentence under Article 142 of the Constitution.

Court’s Reasoning: The Court first noted that the appellant was not given the maximum sentence, and the State had not challenged the imposed sentence. The Court then extensively cited precedents (Narendra Champaklal Trivedi, Mohd. Hashim, State of Madhya Pradesh v. Vikram Das) establishing that Article 142 cannot be invoked to reduce a sentence below the statutory minimum, as this would amount to supplanting statutory mandate and usurpation of legislative function. Corruption cases do not deserve sympathy or leniency, as corruption “corrodes the spine of a nation”. The Court stated that prison-term waivers under Article 142 are only for rare and extraordinary cases, such as a convict being too ill to serve prison time, which was not the case here.

Holding

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of the appellant under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act, finding all contentions on merit to have failed.

However, considering the date of the incident, the appellant’s advanced age, and the prolonged mental anxiety and stress due to the pendency of proceedings, the Court decided that imposing a sentence for the minimum period would serve the interests of justice.

Accordingly, the Court altered the sentence for the offence under Section 7 from 2 years Rigorous Imprisonment (R.I.) to a term of 1 year Simple Imprisonment (S.I.).

The sentence of imprisonment for the offence under Section 13(1)(d) was not altered, and both sentences are to run concurrently.

This is in addition to the fine imposed by the Special Court.

The appellant is ordered to surrender within 6 weeks to serve his sentence and pay the fine, failing which the alteration of sentence will be recalled, and he will be obligated to serve the original 2 years R.I. imposed by the trial court.

The appeal was partly allowed .

Dashrath V. State Of Maharashtra

Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 654: (DoJ 24-04-2025)

2025 INSC 654 Download Supreme Court File

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Delayed Death: When ‘Attempted Murder’ Becomes More

September 13, 2025 No Comments

Maniklall Sahu, the appellant, along with three co-accused, trespassed into the house of Rekhchand Verma, assaulted him with sticks and fisticuffs, and flung him from a terrace. The injured person, Rekhchand Verma, initially survived but was in a critical condition. He eventually succumbed to his injuries approximately nine months after the incident, dying on 8th November 2022 due to septicaemia and pneumonia, leading to cardiorespiratory arrest. The trial court had initially convicted the appellant under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) for murder. However, the High Court altered this conviction to Section 307 IPC for attempt to murder, sentencing the appellant to 7 years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000/-. The appellant subsequently filed this appeal challenging the Section 307 IPC conviction.

Law Involved The primary legal provisions under consideration are Sections 299, 300, 302, and 307 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

Section 307 IPC (Attempt to Murder): This section deals with acts done with the intention or knowledge that it might cause death, and if death occurs, the act would be murder.

Section 299 IPC (Culpable Homicide): Defines culpable homicide.

Section 300 IPC (Murder): Specifies when culpable homicide amounts to murder, including acts done with the intention of causing death, or causing bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or knowing the act is so imminently dangerous that it will most probably cause death.

Section 302 IPC (Punishment for Murder): Prescribes the punishment for murder. The core legal question revolves around the “Application of Theory of Causation where death ensues after some delay” and whether the High Court correctly applied Section 307 IPC despite the victim’s eventual death.

Reasoning The Supreme Court critically analysed the High Court’s decision to alter the conviction from Section 302 IPC to Section 307 IPC, especially given the victim’s death.

  1. Medical Evidence and Causation: The Court reviewed extensive medical evidence, which consistently showed that the deceased, Rekhchand Verma, suffered severe injuries, including a head injury, spinal cord injury leading to paraplegia, and multiple complications such as infected bedsores, septic shock, and bilateral pneumonia. Medical experts testified that these complications were a direct result of the initial injuries sustained during the assault and were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The Court highlighted that the injured person received medical treatment for nine months before his demise. The Court concluded that the injuries suffered were grievous and that the death was a consequence of these injuries, with complications like septicaemia and pneumonia not breaking the chain of causation.
  2. High Court’s Error: The Supreme Court determined that the High Court committed a serious error in bringing the case under the ambit of “attempt to commit murder” (Section 307 IPC) on the premise that the victim survived for about nine months, and his death was due to complications during treatment and not directly from the initial injuries. The Supreme Court stressed that if the injury was fatal and intended to cause death, or if death occurred after some delay due to septicaemia or other complications stemming from the injury, the offence would fall under the first limb of Section 300 IPC (murder) [36a]. Furthermore, if the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and death occurred due to septicaemia or other complications, the act would amount to culpable homicide punishable under Section 302 IPC, falling under the third limb of Section 300 IPC [36b, 37c, 37d].
  3. Jurisprudence on Delayed Death: Drawing on various precedents, the Court reiterated that delayed death or intervening medical conditions (like septicaemia or pneumonia) do not automatically absolve an accused of murder charges if the initial injuries were the proximate cause of death. The Court concluded that the cause of death was indeed due to the injuries suffered, and the contention that the death resulted from a lack of proper treatment or was disconnected from the initial assault was unfounded.

Holding The Supreme Court dismissed Maniklall Sahu’s appeal . While the appellant’s conviction under Section 307 IPC (attempt to murder) as altered by the High Court stands affirmed due to the dismissal of his appeal, the Supreme Court clearly stated that the High Court committed a serious error in altering the conviction from Section 302 IPC to Section 307 IPC . The Supreme Court’s detailed reasoning underscored that given the medical evidence and the established chain of causation, the offence should have been considered murder or culpable homicide amounting to murder, punishable under Section 302 IPC, because the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.

Maniklall Sahu Vs State of Chhattisgarh

Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 1107: (DoJ 12-09-2025)

2025 INSC 1107 Download Supreme Court File

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Tender Troubles: Supreme Court Upholds Bid Sanctity, Overturns Rectification

September 13, 2025 No Comments

The case originated from an electronic bid (No. 7 of 2023-24) issued by the Superintending Engineer and Project Director, Project Implementation Unit – I, Public Works (Roads) Directorate, Government of West Bengal, on 17.10.2023. The tender was for collecting Road User Fee (RUF) from commercial vehicles for 1095 days. The earnest money deposit was fixed at Rs. 25,00,000.00. Seven bidders participated. The technical bids were evaluated, and four bidders were technically qualified, including Prakash Asphaltings and Toll Highways (India) Limited (appellant) and Mandeepa Enterprises (respondent No. 1).

Financial bids were opened on 08.12.2023. The appellant, Prakash Asphaltings, was found to be the highest bidder (H1) with a quoted amount of Rs. 91,19,00,000.00 for 1095 days. Respondent No. 1, Mandeepa Enterprises, was the lowest bidder (H4) with an offered amount of Rs. 9,72,999.00 per day.

Respondent No. 1 subsequently claimed a typographical error in their financial bid, stating they intended to quote Rs. 106,54,33,905.00 for the entire contract period instead of Rs. 9,72,999.00 per day. They requested the tendering authority to treat the figure of Rs. 9,72,999.00 as a typographical error and read it as Rs. 106,54,33,905.00. The tendering authority rejected this request on 20.12.2023, stating that correction of a financial bid after opening was not possible and would impeach the sanctity of the tender process.

Aggrieved, Respondent No. 1 filed a writ petition (WPA No. 29001 of 2023) before a Single Judge of the High Court, which was dismissed on 03.01.2024, as the Single Judge found no scope for interference. Respondent No. 1 then filed an intra-court appeal (MAT No. 93 of 2024). A Division Bench of the High Court allowed the appeal on 23.02.2024, observing that the error in quoting the figure by respondent No. 1 was inadvertent. The Division Bench directed the tendering authority to evaluate Respondent No. 1’s BOQ at Rs. 106,54,33,905.00 and offer other bidders the opportunity to match this figure. This civil appeal was directed against the Division Bench’s judgment and order.

Law Involved

Clause 4(g) of the Notice Inviting Electronic Bid: This clause specifically states that any change in the template of the Bill of Quantity (BOQ) will not be accepted under any circumstances.

Clause 5B(v) of the Instructions to Bidders: This clause outlines that during bid evaluation, if bidders fail to submit supporting documents or original hard copies within the stipulated timeframe, their proposals will be liable for rejection.

Article 226 of the Constitution of India: Pertains to the High Court’s jurisdiction to issue writs.

Principles of Equity and Natural Justice in Tender Processes: The judgment refers to the importance of these principles in tender and contract awards, but also emphasises that these principles should be kept at a distance when there is a violation of rules.

Judicial Review of Administrative Action: The Court reiterated that judicial review in administrative action, particularly tenders, is limited to preventing arbitrariness, irrationality, bias, and mala fides. Courts should not interfere with a decision unless it is “unlawful” or “unsound”.

Public Interest: Tenders are a cornerstone of governmental procurement processes, aiming for competitiveness, fairness, and transparency in resource allocation. Adherence to rules and conditions and the sanctity of the tender process are paramount.

Reasoning The Supreme Court reasoned that the Division Bench’s interpretation was erroneous for several key reasons:

Sanctity of Tender Process: The Court held that allowing rectification of financial bids after they have been opened would impeach the sanctity and integrity of the entire tender process.

Strict Adherence to Tender Conditions: Clause 4(g) explicitly prohibits any change in the BOQ template under any circumstances. The Division Bench’s broad interpretation of “bona fide mistake” to allow rectification was held to be incorrect and would put “shackles on the functioning of the tendering authority”.

Nature of the Mistake: While Respondent No. 1 claimed an inadvertent mistake, it was effectively a unilateral or systematic computer typographical transmission failure, not one attributable to the tendering authority. Such a mistake, even if unintentional, cannot be a ground to allow post-bid modifications that would undermine the competitive bidding process.

Adverse Consequences to Public Exchequer: The Division Bench’s decision to re-evaluate Respondent No. 1’s bid at a significantly higher amount (Rs. 106,54,33,905.00) meant that the appellant, who was originally the H1 bidder, would be displaced. This would lead to a considerable loss of revenue to the state exchequer (approximately 15 crores) by not accepting the higher bid of the appellant and giving an opportunity to Respondent No. 1 to correct its bid post-opening.

Limited Scope of Judicial Review: The Court reiterated that interference by a writ court in ongoing tender processes is not permissible unless there is a clear violation of principles of natural justice, or the decision is arbitrary or mala fide. The Division Bench’s decision was deemed a clear violation of natural justice principles.

Non-Joinder of Party: The appellant (Prakash Asphaltings), as the highest bidder and a directly affected party, was not made a party respondent in the intra-court appeal before the Division Bench, which was viewed as prejudicial and a violation of natural justice.

Holding The Supreme Court allowed the civil appeal, thereby setting aside and quashing the judgment and order dated 23.02.2024 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court at Calcutta in MAT No. 93 of 2024. The Court sustained the order of the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition. Consequently, Prakash Asphaltings and Toll Highways (India) Limited (the appellant), being the H1 bidder, is to be awarded the contract in terms of the notice inviting electronic bid dated 17.10.2023. The Court also ruled that there shall be no order as to costs.

Prakash Asphaltings And Toll Highways (India) Limited Vs Mandeep Enterprises And Others

Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 1108: (DoJ 12-09-2025)

2025 INSC 1108 Download Supreme Court File

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“Speculative Investors” Barred from IBC Relief: Supreme Court Upholds Homebuyer Protections

September 13, 2025 No Comments

Four appeals were heard together, arising from orders of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT). The key appellants, Mansi Brar Fernandes and Sunita Agarwal, had entered into agreements with developers (Gayatri Infra Planner Pvt. Ltd. and Antriksh Infratech Pvt. Ltd., respectively) for property units. Both agreements included buy-back clauses and involved advance payments. The developers defaulted, and the appellants initiated proceedings under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC). The NCLAT reversed the admission of these applications, branding the appellants as “speculative investors” rather than genuine homebuyers or financial creditors.

Law Involved: The central legal framework is the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC), specifically Section 7, which governs the initiation of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) by financial creditors. The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Ordinance, 2019, and the subsequent Amendment Act, are also critical. These amendments introduced a threshold requirement for allottees to file a Section 7 application (requiring at least 10% of allottees or 100 allottees). The Court frequently referenced its earlier judgment in Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd v. Union of India, which distinguishes between genuine homebuyers and speculative investors. The judgment also emphasizes the Right to Shelter as a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution and the role of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (RERA).

Reasoning: The Supreme Court deliberated on the distinction between “speculative investors” and “genuine homebuyers” within the context of the IBC. It observed that the IBC is intended as a collective mechanism to revive viable projects and safeguard the fundamental right to shelter of genuine homebuyers, not as a recovery tool or a bargaining chip for individuals. The legislative intent behind recognizing allottees as financial creditors was to protect genuine homebuyers, while simultaneously preventing misuse by speculative investors seeking premature exits or exorbitant returns, which had burdened the real estate sector and the adjudicatory machinery.

The Court provided criteria to identify speculative investors, including: agreements that substitute possession with buy-back or refund options, insistence on refunds with high interest, purchase of multiple units (especially in double digits), demanding special rights or privileges, deviations from the RERA Model Agreement, and unrealistic interest rates or promises of returns. The transaction entered into by Mansi Brar Fernandes, involving a buy-back clause and the pursuit of commercial returns rather than possession, led the Court to conclude that she was indeed a speculative investor. Similarly, Sunita Agarwal’s agreement for an “investment” with a 25% per annum return over 24 months, coupled with a buy-back clause, indicated a speculative intent.

While affirming the NCLAT’s finding that the appellants were “speculative investors,” the Supreme Court clarified that the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Ordinance, 2019, was indeed applicable to the facts of the present case, correcting the NCLAT’s reasoning on this point [19, 20, 35, 36, 48(ii)]. The Court applied the doctrine of Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit (an act of the Court shall prejudice no one) to address the procedural issues related to the Ordinance’s applicability and the delay it caused.

Holding: The Supreme Court affirmed the NCLAT’s findings that Mansi Brar Fernandes and Sunita Agarwal were “speculative investors” and therefore not entitled to initiate proceedings under Section 7 of the IBC [25, 34, 48(i)]. Consequently, the Court upheld the NCLAT’s orders setting aside the admission of their Section 7 applications by the NCLT [48(i)]. However, the Court clarified that the Ordinance/Amendment Act was applicable to the case, although this correction in reasoning did not alter the ultimate outcome given the appellants’ status as speculative investors [48(ii)]. The appellants remain free to pursue their remedies through other appropriate legal forums, without being barred by limitation [48(i)].

Mansi Brar Fernandes Vs Subha Sharma And Anr.

Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 1110: (DoJ 12-09-2025)

2025 INSC 1110 Download Supreme Court File

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