Indian Judgements

Indian Judgements

Central Excise: High Court Jurisdiction – Manufacture

In M/s Alupro Building Systems Pvt. Ltd v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Bangalore-II (Civil Appeal No. 8030 of 2010, decided on May 27, 2026), the Supreme Court of India adjudicated a vital dual-pronged dispute concerning the jurisdictional limits of High Courts in fiscal matters and the statutory thresholds of “manufacture” under Section 2(f) of the Central Excise Act, 1944. The appeal was preferred by the assessee against a Karnataka High Court order that had overturned a CESTAT ruling and restored an assessment demanding excise duty on Aluminum Composite Panels (ACPs) subjected to cutting, grooving, and routing for building façades.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court’s judgment, resolving two major questions of law. First, on the Jurisdictional Issue, the Court held that the High Court lacked jurisdiction under Section 35G because thresholds of taxability or excisability are intrinsically tied to the “rate of duty” for assessment, making such orders appealable exclusively to the Supreme Court under Section 35L. It affirmed that the 2014 insertion of Section 35L(2) was purely clarificatory and therefore retrospective. Second, on the Merits of Excisability, the Court ruled that cutting and routing ACPs to fit specific dimensions does not alter their essential characteristics or bring into existence a commercially distinct product, failing the primary transformation test required to trigger a taxable event under excise law.

1. Factual Matrix & Judicial Trajectory

  • The Commercial Activity: The appellant is a construction contractor that imports pre-coated ACPs (made of a rigid polyethylene sheet core bonded between two aluminum sheets) in standard sizes. At its premises, the appellant cuts these sheets into required rectangular/square panels and carves grooves on the back side (routing/grooving) to enable them to be mechanically affixed onto masonry framing structures at client sites.
  • The Tax Dispute: The appellant initially paid excise duty but discontinued it after April 2002 under the bona fide belief that this customization process did not constitute “manufacture”. On September 14, 2004, the Revenue issued a Show Cause Notice (SCN) demanding Rs. 21,46,437/- in duty, plus interest and penalties, asserting that the structural transformation made the product dutiable.
  • The Fora Below: The Additional Commissioner confirmed the demand, which was partially upheld by the Commissioner (Appeals) who deleted the penalties but sustained the duty classification. On further appeal, the CESTAT reversed this finding, ruling that the process did not create a new product and that the Revenue failed to discharge its burden of proving that the processed panels were independently “marketable”.
  • High Court Intervention: The Revenue filed an appeal under Section 35G before the Karnataka High Court, which allowed the appeal on April 1, 2010, holding that since the panels underwent irreversible geometric alterations to suit custom site conditions, a commercially distinct product had emerged. The assessee appealed this decision to the Supreme Court.

2. Legal Issues & Determinations

A. Jurisdictional Competence of the High Court & Retrospectivity of Section 35L(2)

The first critical inquiry was whether the High Court possessed the statutory authority under Section 35G to entertain an appeal centered on the excisability of goods.

  • The Exclusive Scheme: A collective reading of Section 35G(1) and Section 35L(1)(b) establishes a mutually exclusive appellate framework. High Courts are explicitly barred from deciding cases that involve “the determination of any question having a relation to the rate of duty of excise or to the value of goods for purposes of assessment”.
  • Excisability as a Precursor to Rate of Duty: Justice J.B. Pardiwala rejected the idea that “excisability” is independent of the “rate of duty”. Determining whether a product is subject to a tax levy is a mandatory, logical precursor to the assessment itself. The statutory exclusion uses the expansive words “any” and “in relation to,” indicating that even peripheral questions going to the root of a fiscal assessment fall outside the High Court’s jurisdiction.
  • Retrospective Nature of the 2014 Amendment: The Court examined sub-section (2) of Section 35L, inserted via the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2014, which explicitly states that questions relating to the rate of duty include determinations of taxability or excisability. The Court declared that this amendment did not create a new right or create a new liability; it merely made explicit what was already implicit in the law. Because it was declaratory and curative, designed to prevent conflicting judicial views across different states, Section 35L(2) operates retrospectively. Thus, the Revenue’s appropriate remedy was to appeal the CESTAT order directly to the Supreme Court, rendering the High Court’s judgment void for want of jurisdiction.

B. The Transformation Test under Section 2(f) “Manufacture”

On the merits, the Court evaluated whether cutting and routing ACPs met the legal definition of “manufacture” under Section 2(f).

  • No New Substance: Relying on the landmark Constitution Bench ruling in Delhi Cloth & General Mills (1962), the Court reiterated that manufacture requires a transformation that brings a new substance into existence, rather than a mere physical change in an existing material.
  • Adaptation is Not Transformation: What entered the appellant’s workshop were aluminum composite panels, and what left were still aluminum composite panels. Cutting them down to size and drilling placement holes merely adapted their dimensions to fit specific architectural grids. The essential material properties, chemical composition, and commercial identity of the panels remained entirely unaltered. Drawing parallels to R. Tissues (2005) (cutting jumbo tissue rolls) and Aman Marble Industries (2005) (cutting marble blocks into slabs), the Court held that sizing and installation activities do not cross the threshold of manufacture.

C. The Marketability Doctrine & Burden of Proof

The Court reviewed the secondary requirement of excisability: the marketability test.

  • The Standalone Inquiry: Summarizing the legal positions in Servo-Med Industries (2015) and Quippo Energy (2025), the Court outlined a matrix of four scenarios, emphasizing that transformation and marketability must be satisfied cumulatively. To be marketable, an item must be capable of standing alone in trade as an independent commercial product.
  • The Standard of Proof: The Court ruled that the burden of proving that an item is marketable lies squarely on the Revenue and must be discharged using objective evidence, not mere assertions or dictionary definitions. The standard of proof required is a preponderance of probabilities, calibrated to the nature and rarity of the goods. In this case, the customized, cut-to-size panels were tailored exclusively for specific building façades and were not commodities traded generally in the open market. However, since the panels failed the primary transformation test, the question of marketability became secondary.

3. Conclusion & Final Order

  • The Process Rules: The Court concluded that superficial, geometric modifications to facilitate the fitting and installation of goods without altering their core commercial identity do not amount to a manufacturing activity under Section 2(f) of the Act.

Decretal Mandate: The Civil Appeal filed by the assessee is allowed, and the impugned judgment of the Karnataka High Court dated April 1, 2010, is formally set aside. All connected pending applications are disposed of accordingly.

2026 INSC 582

M/S Alupro Building Systems Pvt. Ltd V. Commissioner of Central Excise Bangalore-ii (D.O.J. 27.05.2026)

2026 INSC 582 click here to view full text of judgment

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Liberty Overlooked: Supreme Court Quashes Preventive Detention Order and Imposes Costs

In this criminal appeal, the Supreme Court of India set aside a judgment of the Allahabad High Court and quashed an order of preventive detention issued under the National Security Act, 1980 (NSA) against the appellant. The bench held that a confessional statement made to a police officer—particularly one alleged to have been extracted under torture and threats of death—cannot form the sole or primary basis for forming subjective satisfaction to sustain preventive detention, as it violates Article 20(3) of the Constitution and Section 23 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA). The Court further ruled that the detaining authority relied heavily on undisclosed and unsupplied material (such as missing CCTV footage and erased phone data), and that the detention order was an improper attempt to subvert judicial orders granting bail in regular criminal cases, effectively making the process a punishment. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, ordered the immediate release of the appellant, and imposed costs of Rs. 10 lakhs on the State.

  • Inadmissibility of Police Confessions for Detention: The Supreme Court held that an extra-judicial or police confessional statement, which is inherently suspect and barred as substantive evidence under Section 23 of the BSA and Article 20(3) of the Constitution, cannot serve as the sole foundation for subjective satisfaction in preventive detention. The court overruled contrary views in earlier precedents like Suman v. State of Tamil Nadu to this extent.
  • Missing and Undisclosed Material: The detaining authority’s reliance on crucial material such as CCTV footage, video recordings, and mobile communications allegedly linking the appellant as a “mastermind” was vitiated because these documents were neither supplied to the detenu nor produced before the court.
  • Misuse to Subvert Bail Orders: The Court observed that preventive detention was invoked merely to frustrate the judicial process and keep the appellant in custody despite his acquisition of bail in all regular criminal cases. The state cannot blur the line between punitive and preventive jurisdictions by using ongoing criminal investigation materials to justify detention.
  • Strict Scrutiny on Personal Liberty: Reaffirming principles from Ameena Begum and Vijay Narain Singh, the Court emphasized that preventive detention is an extraordinary measure that departs from ordinary constitutional guarantees of liberty under Article 21 and must be invoked with the utmost circumspection.
  • Relief and Costs: The detention and confirmation orders were quashed, and the appellant was directed to be released forthwith. Additionally, considering the loss of liberty and misuse of the process, the Supreme Court imposed costs of Rs. 10 lakhs on the State to be paid to the appellant within one month.

2026 INSC 1067

Mulla Afroz v. Union of India and Ors. (D.O.J. 29.09.2026)

2026 INSC 1067 click here to view full text of judgment

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Oral Agreements and Barred Suits: Supreme Court Sets Aside Specific Performance Decree

In this civil appeal, the Supreme Court of India addressed the legality of concurrent decrees granting specific performance based solely on an oral agreement. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside both the Trial Court and High Court judgments. The bench held that the subsequent suit for specific performance was fundamentally not maintainable under the rigours of Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), because the plaintiff had previously filed and withdrawn a suit for permanent injunction without seeking leave of the court to reserve the claim for specific performance. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the plaintiff failed to meet the heavy burden of proof required to establish a concluded oral contract, noting critical inconsistencies in pleadings, lack of proper corporate authorization, and unencashed advance instruments.

  • Maintainability and Order II Rule 2 CPC: The Court emphasized that when a plaintiff files a suit for a lesser relief (such as a permanent injunction) while a broader cause of action for specific performance has already accrued, omitting to claim specific performance or failing to obtain leave of the court at the time of institution bars a subsequent suit under Order II Rule 2. A subsequent withdrawal of the first suit with a general liberty to file afresh does not cure the initial defect of failing to seek leave under Order II Rule 2.
  • Strict Proof for Oral Contracts: Reaffirming precedents like Brij Mohan and Nanjappa, the Court reiterated that while a suit for specific performance can legally be based on an oral agreement, a heavy burden lies on the plaintiff to provide strict proof of a concluded contract where vital and fundamental terms were settled. Mere inferences or evasive/dishonest testimonies from defence witnesses cannot be used to fill gaps in the plaintiff’s case.
  • Discrepancies and Evidence: The record revealed shifting stances across plaints regarding the number of meetings, dates of refusal, and identities of participants. Crucially, a large advance cheque of Rs. 5 crores was never presented to the bank for encashment, indicating that the parties never finalized or acted upon a concluded contract.
  • Inadmissibility of Hearsay and Status: The testimony of high-ranking political figures or independent witnesses cannot substitute for lack of formal pleadings or direct legal authorization. The involvement of a family member (son-in-law) lacking official capacity or authorization from the company board cannot bind a corporate entity under Section 46 of the Companies Act, 1956.
  • Final Outcome: The Supreme Court concluded that the concurrent findings of the lower courts were perverse. The appeal was allowed, and the suit for specific performance was dismissed with parties bearing their own costs.

2026 INSC 1066

Bombay Garage Ahmedabad Limited & Ors. v. JP Iscon Private Ltd. & Anr. (D.O.J. 29.09.2026)

2026 INSC 1066 click here to view full text of judgment

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Unraveling the PHED Scam: SC Grants Regular Bail to Accused Public Servant and Private Intermediary

In these criminal appeals arising from the dismissal of regular bail applications by the Rajasthan High Court, a bench comprising Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Sheel Nagu considered the cases of two appellants—Shubhanshu Dixit, a former public servant who served as Secretary of the Rajasthan Water Supply and Sewerage Management Board (RWSSMB), and Sanjay Badaya, a private individual alleged to be an intermediary for the former Public Health Engineering Department (PHED) Minister—who were implicated in a massive financial scam involving forged IRCON certificates and tender irregularities. Noting that both appellants had already undergone substantial pre-trial detention ( Dixit arrested on February 17, 2026, and Badaya on May 11, 2026), that co-accused individuals including the principal political executive had already been granted bail or protection, and that continued incarceration would serve no fruitful purpose, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s orders and granted regular bail to both appellants subject to specific terms and conditions.

  • Background and FIR: The prosecution’s case stems from a preliminary enquiry initiated on 18th January 2024, culminating in an FIR registered on 30th October 2024 at the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) Police Station in Jaipur for offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and various sections of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, concerning financial irregularities within the Public Health Engineering Department (PHED), Rajasthan.
  • Role of Shubhanshu Dixit: Appellant Shubhanshu Dixit served as the Secretary of RWSSMB and de facto Secretary of the PHED Finance Committee; he was accused of suppressing whistleblower complaints regarding forged IRCON certificates and participating in meetings that awarded tenders to ineligible firms. He was arrested on 17th February 2026, and his regular bail application was dismissed by the High Court on 1st June 2026.
  • Role of Sanjay Badaya: Appellant Sanjay Badaya, a private individual, was alleged to be a central broker for the then PHED Minister, exercising undue influence over departmental files, transfers, and postings, and routing bribe monies through family bank accounts to a firm owned by the former Minister’s son. He was arrested on 11th May 2026, and his bail application was rejected by the High Court on 13th August 2026.
  • Grounds for Bail: While acknowledging the gravity of deep-rooted economic offences, the Supreme Court emphasized that pre-trial detention cannot be used as a punitive measure, especially when incarceration serves no further purpose.
  • Parity with Co-Accused: The Court was persuaded by the fact that other co-accused persons, such as Mr. Arun Srivastava, had been granted bail by the High Court, and the principal political executive (the former PHED Minister) had already been granted bail in the corresponding PMLA case by the Supreme Court.
  • Directions and Conditions: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s orders and directed that both Sanjay Badaya and Shubhanshu Dixit be released on regular bail upon furnishing satisfactory bail bonds to the Trial Court. The appellants were directed to join the investigation if called upon by the investigating officer, diligently participate in the trial proceedings without default, and avoid any breach of bail conditions.

2026 INSC 1065

Sanjay Badaya v. State of Rajasthan (With Criminal Appeal No. of 2026 arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 13461 of 2026 – Shubhanshu Dixit v. State of Rajasthan)(D.O.J. 29.09.2026)

2026 INSC 1065 click here to view full text of judgment

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Safeguarding Women’s Dignity: Supreme Court Intervenes Suo Motu on Systemic Safety Lapses in Delhi-NCR

Taking suo motu cognizance of alarming media reports detailing brutal crimes against women and minors across Delhi-NCR—including the gang rape and murder of a teenager in Swaroop Nagar and the sexual assault of a minor inside a moving sleeper bus—the Supreme Court bench comprising Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice K. Vinod Chandran expressed deep anguish over systemic law enforcement failures. Highlighting that public safety is an intrinsic facet of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution, the Court emphasized that mere expressions of concern by public authorities are insufficient. It mandated a measurable response with fixed institutional accountability, directing comprehensive status reports on existing safety infrastructure, laying down immediate interim measures such as specialized vulnerability mapping and strict enforcement against tinted vehicle windows, and appointing Ms. Liz Mathew, Senior Counsel, as Amicus Curiae to assist the Court.

  • Suo Motu Cognizance & Triggering Incidents: The Supreme Court initiated the suo motu writ petition following horrific incidents in Delhi-NCR, notably the gang rape and murder of a teenage girl in Swaroop Nagar and the sexual assault of a minor in a moving sleeper bus that traversed over 47 kilometers from Greater Noida to Delhi unchecked, drawing painful parallels to the 2012 Nirbhaya case.
  • Violation of Article 21: The Court underscored that the right to live with dignity and free from violence is a core component of Article 21. It ruled that public spaces (such as roads, buses, parks, and subways) cannot be permitted to become high-risk zones due to poor illumination, inadequate surveillance, or administrative laxity.
  • Call for Accountability: Moving beyond symbolic solidarity and expressions of concern, the Court stressed the urgent need for measurable responses, clear institutional responsibility, and proactive crime prevention.
  • Information Sought from Authorities: The Supreme Court directed the Chief Secretary of Delhi and the Commissioner of Police to submit comprehensive status reports within four weeks on critical safety mechanisms, including:
    • The Nirbhaya Fund implementation and women safety umbrella programs.
    • Operational status of emergency response systems, specifically ERSS Number 112 and Women Helpline 181.
    • The Safe City Project (covering CCTV networks, command-and-control centers, smart lighting, and maintenance mechanisms).
    • Functionality and staffing of Women Help Desks across police stations.
    • Operational parameters of Fast Track Special Courts (FTSCs) and Exclusive POCSO Courts.
  • Immediate Interim Measures (Within 4 Weeks):
    • Specialized Police Task Force: Constitution of a dedicated task force by the Delhi Police Commissioner for vulnerability mapping of dark, isolated, and unsafe public stretches.
    • Citizen Feedback Mechanism: Establishment of an accessible, tech-enabled platform for citizens to report non-functional lights, blind spots, or inadequate CCTV coverage with geo-tagging capabilities and trackable action taken reports.
    • Intensified Enforcement: Deployment of mobile check-posts and strict enforcement of the total prohibition on black, tinted, or solar-control window films on vehicles in compliance with Avishek Goenka v. Union of India.
  • Judicial and Administrative Directions: The Delhi High Court Registrar General was ordered to place on record the status, pendency, and disposal rates of FTSCs and Exclusive POCSO Courts, with instructions to assign the subject cases to a designated court for expeditious trial within one year. Furthermore, the media was urged to proactively run pro-bono awareness columns and helpline details, and Ms. Liz Mathew, Senior Counsel, was appointed as Amicus Curiae.
  • Next Date of Hearing: The matter has been posted for further hearing on 5th October 2026.

2026 INSC 1063

In Re: Safety, Security and Protection of Women and Children in Public Spaces (Suo Motu Writ Petition (Criminal)) (D.O.J. 28.09.2026)

2026 INSC 1063 click here to view full text of judgment

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