Indian Judgements

Indian Judgements

Bail Cancelled: Omission of allegations against him during the preliminary inquest proceedings.

Whether the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad was justified in granting regular bail to the accused (Respondent No. 2) based on the omission of allegations against him during the preliminary inquest proceedings.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court’s bail order. The matter was remanded back to the High Court for fresh, independent consideration, and the accused was directed to surrender within one week.

1. Introduction and Background

The Appellant, Bhagat Singh, filed a criminal appeal challenging an order dated January 22, 2026, passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. The High Court had granted bail to Respondent No. 2 (Kunwarpal Singh / Accused No. 1) in connection with FIR No. 118 of 2025. The FIR was registered under Sections 103(1) (murder), 352, 351(2), and 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023, along with relevant sections of the Arms Act, 1959.

2. Case of the Prosecution

According to the prosecution, on March 8, 2025, Respondent No. 2 and two co-accused ambushed the Appellant and his uncle, Bharat Singh (alias Pappu), while they were heading to their agricultural field. Armed with country-made pistols, they surrounded the uncle and fired multiple shots, causing his instantaneous death. Respondent No. 2 was arrested on March 9, 2025, and a country-made .315 bore pistol with an empty cartridge was subsequently recovered at his instance. A chargesheet was filed on May 29, 2025.

3. Procedural History

  • Sessions Court: The Sessions Judge, Mathura, rejected the accused’s bail application on September 26, 2025, citing the gravity of the offense, the post-mortem findings, and the weapon recovery.
  • High Court: The High Court subsequently allowed the bail application. Its primary reasoning was that the Appellant and the deceased’s brother—who acted as Panch Witnesses—had not made explicit allegations against Respondent No. 2 during the initial inquest proceedings.

4. Key Findings and Observations of the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court accepted the Appellant’s argument that the High Court’s order was cryptic, unreasoned, and suffered from a non-application of mind.

  • Scope of Inquest Proceedings: The Court heavily emphasized that the scope of an inquiry under Section 174 of the CrPC (now Section 194 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) is strictly limited to discovering the apparent cause of death. Citing precedents like Pedda Narayana v. State of A.P. and Amar Singh v. Balwinder Singh, the Court reiterated that an inquest report is not meant to provide details of how an assault happened or list the names of the accused. Therefore, omitting the names of the accused in the inquest document cannot be used to doubt their involvement later.
  • Overlooking Material Evidence: The Supreme Court noted that the High Court completely isolated the inquest proceedings while ignoring critical circumstantial evidence gathered by investigators. This evidence included:
    • A specific overt act of firing attributed to Respondent No. 2 in the FIR.
    • Post-mortem records showing firearm entry/exit wounds with blackening and tattooing.
    • The physical recovery of the murder weapon from the accused’s possession.
    • Incriminating statements from multiple eye-witnesses and relatives recorded under Section 180 of the BNSS, 2023.

5. Conclusion and Directions

The Supreme Court ruled that judicial discretion regarding bail must be exercised logically and according to settled parameters, especially in grave offenses like murder.

Consequently, the Supreme Court:

  1. Set aside the High Court’s bail order.
  2. Remanded the case back to the Allahabad High Court for a fresh, independent evaluation on its merits.
  3. Ordered Respondent No. 2 to surrender to jail authorities within one week and remain in judicial custody pending the High Court’s new decision.

2026 INSC 527

Bhagat Singh V. State of Uttar Pradesh And Anr. (D.O.J. 22.05.2026)

2026 INSC 527 click here to view full text of judgment

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Electricity Regulation: Supreme Court Declines to Interfere with Interim Order Permitting Third-Party Participation

This special leave petition challenges an interim order passed by the High Court of Jharkhand, which rejected the petitioners’ preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) filed by ‘Energy Watchdog’ and allowed the respondent to participate in departmental proceedings. The Supreme Court declined to interfere with the interim measure under Article 136 of the Constitution, noting that the High Court’s cautious approach aimed to ensure transparency in an inquiry involving alleged unauthorized power supplies and massive cross-subsidy surcharge defaults.

  • Brief of Judgment: Petitioner No. 1 entered into an agreement with Jharkhand Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. (JBVNL) for surplus captive power supply, which later triggered complaints by Energy Watchdog alleging lack of valid ‘captive user’ status and unauthorized power transmission. After JBVNL issued show cause and demand notices for cross-subsidy surcharges exceeding Rs. 280 crores total, a PIL was instituted. The High Court held the PIL maintainable and permitted the complainant to take part in the proceedings to ensure full disclosure of facts. The Supreme Court upheld this interim arrangement while clarifying that JBVNL must act independently and that all legal questions regarding third-party intervention under the Electricity Act, 2003 remain open for final adjudication.
  • Statutory Framework of the Electricity Act: Reaffirming precedents like PTC India Ltd. and Southern Power Distribution Company, the Electricity Act is an exhaustive code leaving no unallocated regulatory residue outside commissions like the State Commission, which is mandated to ensure transparency under Section 86.
  • Justification for Interim Measure: The High Court adopted a pragmatic interim measure because the circumstances suggested that prior administrative inaction warranted third-party inputs to bring full facts before JBVNL.
  • Preservation of Legal Contentions: The Supreme Court explicitly refrained from commenting on the merits, leaving it open for the High Court to comprehensively examine the scope and ambit of third-party intervention during the final hearing of the writ petition.

2026 INSC 954

M/s. Amalgam Steels and Power Ltd. and Anr. v. Energy Watchdog and Ors. (D.O.J. 03.09.2026)

2026 INSC 954 click here to view full text of judgment

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Empowering Educational Regulators: Upholding NCTE’s Mandate to Mandate Performance Appraisal Reports for Teacher Training Institutions

This civil appeal addresses the statutory authority of the National Council for Teacher Education (NCTE) to mandate the online submission of annual Performance Appraisal Reports (PAR) along with a processing fee from recognized Teacher Education Institutions (TEIs). The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the Delhi High Court’s Division Bench judgment, ruling that the NCTE and its Executive Committee possess full statutory and ancillary powers under the NCTE Act, 1993, to enforce accountability and regulatory oversight over educational institutions.

  • Brief of Judgment: The litigation originated when TEIs challenged a 2019 Public Notice issued by the Member Secretary of the NCTE’s Executive Committee requiring them to submit online PARs and nominal processing fees. While a single judge dismissed the challenge, the Division Bench quashed the notice on the premise that the specific proforma had not been explicitly approved by the general body of the Council and that delegation to the Member Secretary was improper. The Supreme Court strongly disapproved of the High Court’s pedantic approach, holding that statutory regulators must be empowered to enforce institutional transparency, performance audits, and accountability without judicial overreach.
  • Statutory Framework and Duty Bearers: The judgment emphasizes that following the enactment of Article 21A and the Right of Education (RTE) Act, 2009, elementary school teachers, TEIs, and the NCTE act as critical constitutional duty bearers responsible for upholding high standards of educational quality.
  • Scope of Regulatory Powers: Section 12(k) of the NCTE Act expressly empowers the Council to evolve suitable performance appraisal systems and mechanisms to enforce accountability, which includes the incidental power to collect processing fees and utilize digital portals for management information systems.
  • Role of the Executive Committee: The Executive Committee, operating as the executive arm of the Council, is fully competent to implement decisions made by the General Body, such as substituting cumbersome annual renewal regimes with streamlined PAR submissions.
  • Reversal of High Court Judgment: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order, reaffirming that courts must support and enable the effective functioning of statutory regulators rather than restrict them through hyper-technical interpretations.

2026 INSC 953

The National Council for Teacher Education v. Association of NCTE Approved Colleges Trust and Ors. (D.O.J. 03.09.2026)

2026 INSC 953 click here to view full text of judgment

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Relief for Homebuyers: Waiver of Time Extension and Penalty Charges in Corporate Insolvency Resolution

This civil appeal addresses the plight of homebuyers and the Successful Resolution Applicant (SRA) who faced severe liabilities in the form of time extension and penalty charges imposed by NOIDA after a real estate developer (“Granite Gate Properties Private Limited”) was subjected to Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP). The Supreme Court allowed the appeal filed by the homebuyers’ Authorized Representative and dismissed NOIDA’s appeal, ruling that penal time extension charges resulting from the original developer’s defaults cannot be validly mulcted on the innocent homebuyers and the SRA as CIRP costs.

  • Brief of Judgment: The developer took perpetual leases for two high-rise projects (“Lotus Boulevard” and “Lotus Panache”) in Sectors 100 and 110, Noida, but subsequently defaulted and became a Corporate Debtor. Homebuyers pooled their own resources under a “Pool and Build” mechanism to keep the project afloat, and a Resolution Plan was approved under an SRA. The National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) had directed time extension charges for up to three years to be treated as CIRP costs, while NOIDA sought even extended charges up to the tenth year under subsequent office orders. The Supreme Court set aside these directions, holding that penal charges intended to deter a defaulting developer cannot be shifted onto homebuyers and the SRA.
  • Role and Nature of NOIDA: While NOIDA operates as a local development authority engaged in commercial and urban planning ventures, its foundational purpose remains public welfare and infrastructural development rather than mere profit-seeking.
  • Exemption from Past Sins: The delay and default were committed by the erstwhile corporate debtor, not by the homebuyers or the SRA who stepped in to rescue the project; consequently, penalizing them for “past sins” is legally unjustified.
  • Rejection of CIRP Cost Classification: The Supreme Court set aside the NCLAT’s direction to treat the time extension charges as CIRP costs and flatly rejected NOIDA’s demand for extended delay penalties stretching up to the tenth year.

2026 INSC 952

The Authorised Representative for Granite Gate Properties Private Limited, Ms. Rakesh Verma v. M/s New Okhla Industrial Development Authority and Ors. (D.O.J. 03.09.2026)

2026 INSC 952 click here to view full text of judgment

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Overturning a Murder Conviction Based on Unsubstantiated Confessions

This criminal appeal challenges a High Court judgment that upheld the conviction of the sole appellant (A1) for kidnapping and murder while acquitting all co-accused. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction, ruling that the prosecution relied entirely on inadmissible confessions, unverified electronic evidence lacking mandatory Section 65B certificates, and a failure to prove the essential links connecting the appellant to the crime scene.

  • Brief of Judgment: Following a missing person report and a ransom demand, the police recovered the victim’s body from a refrigerator inside an apartment allegedly leased by the appellant. While the trial court convicted multiple accused, the High Court acquitted all except the appellant, grounding his conviction on the sole watchman testimony (PW3) and drawing an adverse inference under Section 106 of the Evidence Act regarding the presence of the body. The Supreme Court found the investigation to be shoddy, noting that crucial electronic records lacked Section 65B certificates, the ownership of the flat and the watchman’s employment were unproven, and the foundational reliance on police confessions rendered the prosecution’s case legally unsustainable.
  • Inadmissibility of Electronic Evidence: Both the call detail records and the ATM CCTV footage used to track financial transactions and movements were rendered inadmissible due to the complete absence of mandatory certificates under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, alongside a failure to examine the nodal or bank officers.
  • Unproven Flat Ownership and Watchman Testimony: The prosecution failed to establish the ownership of the apartment through documents or verify the employment of PW3 as a watchman, which completely undermined the “last seen” theory and invalidated the application of Section 106 of the Evidence Act.
  • Flawed Test Identification Parade (TIP): The TIP identifying the appellant was legally compromised because the witness (PW3) admitted that photographs of the suspects had been shown to him prior to the identification process in jail.
  • Reliance on Confessions: The entire prosecution theory stemmed from inadmissible police confessions and a speculative web of relationships, with zero substantive or independent corroborative evidence linking the appellant to the murder or the ransom money.

2026 INSC 951

Kondapaka Sridhar @ Shekar @ Madhu @ Gopi @ Chinna v. The State of Telangana (D.O.J. 03.09.2026)

2026 INSC 951 click here to view full text of judgment

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