Supreme Court rulingfocusing on an appeal filed by the mother of a deceasedwoman against the acquittal of her daughter’s husband and in-laws, who were accused of abetting suicide. The Supreme Court upholds the High Court’s acquittal, finding insufficient evidence to prove abetment, noting that mere harassment or cruelty does not automatically imply instigation to suicide. The ruling further clarifies the admissibility of a First Information Report (FIR) when the informant has died, emphasizing that an FIR’s contents are not substantive evidence unless the informant’s death is directly linked to the FIR, and thus cannot be solely proved by the Investigating Officer if the informant died naturally. The Court references legal precedents, including the Evidence Act’s Section 113A and Section 32, to support its reasoning regarding presumptions of abetment and the use of statements from deceased persons.
(A) Penal Code, 1860, Section 306, 498A read with Section 34 – Evidence Act, 1872, Section 113A – Abetment of suicide – Presumption – Held no cogent or any reliable evidence on the basis of which it could be said that the accused persons abated the commission of suicide – Mere harassment or cruelty is not sufficient to infer abetment – There has to be some credible evidence that the accused persons aided or instigated the deceased in some manner to take the drastic step of putting an end to her life – Do not rule out the possibility of the husband pressurizing the deceased to transfer the land once again on his name – However, even such instances, by themselves, may not be sufficient to come to the conclusion that the deceased was left with no alternative but to commit suicide – Even with the aid of presumption under Section 113A of the Evidence Act, it is difficult to say that the accused persons abetted the commission of suicide – It is possible that the deceased might have felt bad because the first wife came back to the matrimonial home and being hyper sensitive might have taken the extreme step to commit suicide – No case is made out for interference – Appeal liable to be dismissed.
(Para 21 to 26, 39 and 40)
(B) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 154 – First Information Report – F.I.Rs. can be registered by a victim, a witness or some- one else with the knowledge of the crime – The police can record three different kinds of statements – The first kind of statement is one which can be recorded as an F.I.R., the second kind of statement is one which can be recorded by the police during the investigation, and the third kind of statement is any kind of statement which would not fall under any of the two categories mentioned above – Evidence is the matter of testimony manifesting the fact on a particular precision or circumstances – The First Information Report is not by itself a substantial piece of evidence and the statement made therein cannot be considered as evidence unless it falls within the purview of Section 32 of the Evidence Act – It is an admitted fact that the original first informant did not die because of the injuries caused by the applicants – The relative importance of a First Information Report is far greater than any other statement recorded by the police during the course of the investigation – It is the foremost information the police gets about the commission of an offence and which can be used to corroborate the story put-forward by the first informant under Section 157 of the Evidence Act or to contradict his version by facts under Section 145 of the Evidence Act in case he is summoned as a witness in the case by the Court – It may happen that the informant is the accused himself – In such cases, the First Information Report lodged by him cannot be used as an evidence against him because it is embodied in the basic structure of our Constitution that a person cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself – If the informant dies, the First Information Report can be, unquestionably, used as a substantive evidence – A prerequisite condition must be fulfilled before the F.I.R. is taken as a substantive piece of evidence i.e. the death of the informant must have nexus with the F.I.R. filed or somehow having some link with any evidence regarding the F.I.R
(Para 30 and 32)
(C) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 154 – Evidence Act, Section 154(3) – First Information Report – Death of first informant – Proof of contents of the FIR through Investigating Officer – Admissibility in evidence – Held that for an F.I.R. lodged by a deceased person to be treated as substantial, its contents must be proved – It has to be corroborated and proved for there to be any value of the same in the case – The F.I.R. can be used by the defence to impeach the credit of the person who lodged the F.I.R. under Section 154(3) of the Evidence Act – In case the death of the informant has no nexus with the complaint lodged i.e. he died a natural death and did not succumb to the injuries inflicted on him in relation to a matter, the contents of the F.I.R. would not be admissible in evidence – In such circumstances, the contents cannot be proved through the Investigating Officer – The Investigating Officer, in the course of his deposition, should not be permitted to depose the exact contents of the F.I.R. so as to make them admissible in evidence – All that is permissible in law is that the Investigating Officer can, in his deposition, identify the signature of the first informant and that of his own on the First Information Report and he can depose about the factum of the F.I.R. being registered by him on a particular date on a particular police station – It is absolutely incorrect on the part of the Trial Court and the High Court to say that in the absence of the first informant, the police officer can prove the contents of the F.I.R. as per Section 67 of the Evidence Act.
(Para 34 and 35)
Lalita V. Vishwanath & Ors.
Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 173: (DoJ 30-01-2025)
