Indian Judgements

Indian Judgements

SC Directs Transfer and Clubbing of Interlinked Cases to NIA Special Court, New Delhi

The Union of India filed Transfer Petitions under Section 13(2) of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008, and Section 446 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, seeking to transfer and club two separate state-investigated cases (the J&K Case and the Haryana Case) with the main Lal Qila Blast Case pending before the Special Court (NIA Act) at Patiala House Court, New Delhi. The matters originated from a series of interlinked terrorist incidents, including provocative posters pasted in Srinagar by Jaish-e-Mohammad, large explosive recoveries in Faridabad involving medical professionals, and the subsequent Red Fort Metro Station car bomb explosion on November 10, 2025. While respondents opposed the transfer and clubbing—arguing that the cases were not part of the same transaction—the Supreme Court allowed the petitions, emphasizing that the overarching conspiracy, overlapping evidence, common accused, and severe national security risks warranted a joint trial in a single Special Court.

  • Factual Background & Interconnectivity: The legal proceedings stem from a web of connected terrorist incidents aimed at threatening India’s sovereignty. It began with inflammatory Jaish-e-Mohammad posters in Srinagar (FIR No. 162/2025). During the investigation, Jammu & Kashmir Police arrested medical professionals from Al-Falah University in Faridabad, leading to massive recoveries of explosives, live ammunition, and prohibited weapons, and triggering a separate Haryana Police case (FIR No. 229/2025). Meanwhile, accused Umer-un-Nabi escaped in an explosives-laden car and carried out the Lal Qila blast near the Red Fort Metro Station. The Central Government subsequently directed the NIA to take over investigation of both the Haryana and J&K cases as connected offenses to the Lal Qila Blast Case.
  • Arguments of the Parties:
    • The petitioner (Union of India/NIA), represented by the learned ASG, argued that all three cases form part of an overarching terrorist conspiracy involving proscribed organizations like Ansar Gazwat-Ul-Hind, sharing common accused persons, witnesses, and overlapping evidence, thereby necessitating a joint trial.
    • The respondents opposed the petitions, relying on State (NCT) of Delhi v. Khimji Bhai Jadeja to contend that the cases did not form part of the same transaction and that clubbing them was premature.
  • Reasoning and Findings of the Supreme Court:
    • The Supreme Court noted that conducting separate trials across different States when accused persons, witnesses, and evidence overlap would lead to a multiplicity of proceedings, duplication of evidence, and potential conflicting findings.
    • The Court highlighted severe security concerns regarding the repeated shifting of accused persons across multiple States, especially since several suspects remain absconding.
    • Addressing the precedent cited by the respondents (Khimji Bhai Jadeja), the Court clarified that while that case dealt with offences in the same series of transactions, the NIA’s primary footing here is the existence of a larger conspiracy and deep connectivity across all three cases.
    • Given the threat to national peace, security, and sovereignty, the Court ruled that clubbing and transferring the cases to the Special Court at Patiala House Court, New Delhi, is fully permissible and expedient in the interests of justice.
  • Final Outcome: The Transfer Petitions filed by the Union of India were allowed in entirety.

2026 INSC 1210

Union of India v. Arif Nisar @ Sahil and Others Etc. (D.O.J. 16.11.2026)

2026 INSC 1210 click here to view full text of judgment

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Transmission Tariff Liability for LILO Lines Before DTL

The Supreme Court of India held that Power Grid Corporation of India Limited (PGCIL) was entitled to recover transmission tariff on a non-PoC basis for two Line-In Line-Out (LILO) assets commissioned in January 2015 up to 27.10.2016, when the generating company commissioned its Dedicated Transmission Line (DTL). Setting aside the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (APTEL) orders, the Court restored the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) order and ruled that delay in upstream lines to Salem and Madhugiri did not negate actual evacuation and use of the LILOs while the generator delayed its DTL.

Background and Procedural History

  • The dispute involved PGCIL’s tariff claim for two LILOs on both circuits of the Tuticorin JV–Madurai 400 kV D/C (Quad) transmission line at the Tuticorin Pooling Station, commissioned on 04.01.2015 and 08.01.2015, for the period up to 27.10.2016 when the generating company (Moxie Power Generation Ltd., formerly Coastal Energen Pvt. Ltd.) commissioned its DTL directly to the Tuticorin Pooling Station.
  • Under the 24.02.2010 Bulk Power Transmission Agreement (BPTA) (amended 08.09.2011) and Standing Committee on Power System Planning in Southern Region (SCPSPSR) meetings, the generator was to build its DTL to the Tuticorin Pooling Station, while PGCIL was to establish the Tuticorin Pooling Station and LILOs of both circuits of the Tuticorin JV–Madurai line (Part-A) and upstream lines toward Salem and Madhugiri (Part-B).
  • Power generation commenced on 23.12.2014 and was evacuated through a temporary LILO on the Tuticorin JV–Madurai line and supplied to distribution licensee TANGEDCO.
  • By order dated 29.07.2016, the CERC accepted the Commercial Operation Dates (CODs) of 04.01.2015 and 08.01.2015 and directed liability for the LILO transmission charges on the generating companies (including Coastal Energen) until their DTL became commercially operational, while declining to condone time over-run at that stage subject to truing-up.
  • APTEL overturned the CERC’s view on usage and COD (and on review remanded the COD issue), holding that the LILOs had no “beneficial use” before the upstream Salem–Madhugiri lines were operationalized and that Regulation 4(3)(ii) of the CERC Tariff Regulations, 2014 required redetermination/review of COD. PGCIL appealed to the Supreme Court.

Key Issues

  • Whether PGCIL was entitled to transmission tariff (on a non-PoC basis) for the two LILOs from 04.01.2015/08.01.2015 until 27.10.2016, given their inclusion in the BPTA and statutory planning under Section 29(4) of the Electricity Act, 2003.
  • Whether APTEL correctly interpreted Regulation 4(3)(ii) of the Tariff Regulations, 2014 in directing CERC to revisit the already-approved COD of the LILOs.
  • Whether the generator’s delay in constructing its DTL warranted placing liability on the generating company for the period between commissioning of the LILOs and commissioning of the DTL on 27.10.2016.

Legal Analysis and Ruling

  • Actual Use and Evacuation Through Pooling Station: Examining the evacuation arrangement and the generator’s own pleadings before APTEL, the Court found that power evacuated via the Tuticorin JV–Madurai line was routed through the LILOs and Tuticorin Pooling Station for onward transmission and supply to TANGEDCO. Delay in the upstream Tuticorin–Salem–Madhugiri transmission line did not prevent evacuation or use of the LILOs during the disputed period.
  • Statutory Scheme, DTL Obligation, and COD: Under Section 10 of the Electricity Act, 2003, constructing the DTL was the generating company’s duty. Under Regulation 3(53) and Regulation 4 of the Tariff Regulations, 2014, COD was validly accepted by CERC based on RLDC trial operation certification, CEA safety certification, and scheme approvals, and Regulation 4(3)(ii) did not require reopening COD where regular service of the LILOs was not prevented.
  • CERC’s Regulatory and Adjudicatory Powers: Relying on PGCIL v. Madhya Pradesh Power Transmission Co. Ltd., PTC India Ltd. v. CERC, and Energy Watchdog v. CERC, the Court held that CERC’s imposition of liability on the defaulting generator for the period prior to DTL commissioning (up to 27.10.2016) was valid and within jurisdiction.
  • Reading of CERC Order: The Court noted that paragraph 72 of CERC’s order recorded TANGEDCO’s submission rather than CERC’s final finding, whereas paragraphs 73–77 placed liability on the generating company based on the 30th SCM and BPTA framework.

Disposition

  • The Supreme Court answered the questions of law in favour of PGCIL, set aside the impugned APTEL orders in the appeals, restored the CERC order, allowed the appeals, and disposed of pending applications.

2026 INSC 1237

Power Grid Corporation of India Limited v. Tamil Nadu Generation and Distribution Corporation Limited (TANGEDCO) & Ors. (D.O.J. 18.11.2026)

2026 INSC 1237 click here to view full text of judgment

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Grandson’s Birth Right in Father’s Partitioned Property

The Supreme Court of India held that property inherited by a Hindu male as a Class I heir under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, and allotted to him in a partition among Class I heirs, becomes his exclusive individual property rather than joint family or coparcenary property vis-à-vis his own son. Consequently, a grandson born after the grandfather’s death has no birth right to seek partition of his living father’s share.

Background and Procedural History

  • The appellant, a minor represented by his mother and natural guardian, filed Original Suit No. 1698 of 1997 seeking partition and possession of a half share in 1,811 sq. ft. of land, pleading that it was joint family property of his grandfather, late N. Ramakrishnan, inherited along with his father (first defendant).
  • The first defendant’s sister, G. Lalitha, had filed partition suit C.S. No. 1728 of 1993 regarding N. Ramakrishnan’s property, resulting in a compromise decree dated 03.02.1994 under which the first defendant received 1,811 sq. ft. of land.
  • The appellant was born on 06.01.1994, after the 1993 suit was filed and before the 03.02.1994 compromise decree.
  • The first defendant executed sale deeds on 03.04.1997 and 17.04.1997 in favour of defendant nos. 2 and 3, who contested the suit claiming absolute ownership under the compromise decree and bona fide purchase. The appellant’s suit did not challenge the compromise decree or the sale deeds.
  • The Trial Court granted a preliminary decree for partition, which the First Appellate Court (High Court) set aside on 11.08.2010, holding that under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the first defendant took his share as an absolute owner and the appellant acquired no right by birth. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court.

Key Issue

  • Whether the appellant could claim a half share and seek partition by birth in land allotted to his still-living father upon partition of property originally belonging to the appellant’s grandfather.

Legal Analysis and Ruling

  • Succession Under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956: Following CWT v. Chander Sen, Yudhisthir v. Ashok Kumar, and Radha Bai v. Ram Narayan, the Court reiterated that under Section 8, a male Hindu’s property devolves upon Class I heirs to the exclusion of others. A living son’s son (grandson) is excluded from Class I heirs, and a son inheriting property under Section 8 takes it in his individual capacity rather than as karta of his own Hindu Undivided Family vis-à-vis his son.
  • Effect of Partition and Tenancy in Common: Upon N. Ramakrishnan’s death prior to the 1993 suit, Class I heirs succeeded as tenants in common rather than joint tenants, and the compromise decree dated 03.02.1994 allotted exclusive shares to the heirs, ending joint coparcenary character in the allotted share.
  • Inapplicability of Pre-2005 Section 6 and Tamil Nadu Amendment (Section 29-A): Unamended Section 6 and Section 29-A inserted by the Hindu Succession (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act, 1989 did not apply on the facts, as succession had opened upon N. Ramakrishnan’s death before the appellant was born, and the appellant was not a surviving coparcener at his grandfather’s death. Once the property became the first respondent’s exclusive individual property after partition, the appellant could not claim coparcenary rights by birth during his father’s lifetime.

Disposition

  • The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal with no order as to costs and disposed of pending applications.

2026 INSC 1208

J. Rajesh (Minor) Thr. His Mother and Natural Guardian J. Gomathi v. M. Kumaran (Dead) Thr. LRs. & Ors. (D.O.J. 06.11.2026)

2026 INSC 1208 click here to view full text of judgment

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Balance Sheet Entries and Limitation in Civil Recovery Suits

The Supreme Court of India held that continuous reflection of unpaid dues in a defendant’s balance sheets can constitute a valid acknowledgment of liability under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963, renewing limitation and preventing threshold rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC). Setting aside the High Court’s order that had rejected the plaint as time-barred, the Court restored the recovery suit for trial while leaving all substantive merits open.

Background and Procedural History

  • The original plaintiff, Wazir Hussain, entered into a civil works contract dated 10.02.2000 with the respondent-society for construction work on a multi-story building in Mayur Vihar, Delhi, raising running bills between 2000 and 2003.
  • In 2014, he filed a suit under Order XXXVII CPC seeking recovery of Rs. 11,16,000/- along with Rs. 11,04,840/- interest (at 9% p.a.) and further interest until realization.
  • The defendant-society sought rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC on grounds including limitation, absence of a cause of action, and non-maintainability over alleged embezzlement.
  • On 06.01.2020, the Trial Court dismissed the rejection application, holding that entries in the defendant’s balance sheets from 2004–2005 up to 2013 amounted to acknowledgment of debt starting fresh limitation periods, while leaving maintainability and bill genuineness for trial.
  • On 04.11.2024, the High Court of Delhi allowed the defendant’s revision petition and rejected the plaint as barred by limitation, finding that the bank statements did not establish acknowledgment beyond 2005 and noting that the plaintiff had not produced a balance sheet or other document showing acknowledgment. The plaintiff’s legal heir appealed to the Supreme Court.

Key Issue

  • Whether the suit could be rejected at the threshold as barred by limitation given the entries in the defendant’s balance sheets up to 2013.

Legal Analysis and Ruling

  • Acknowledgment Under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963: Under Section 18(1), a signed written acknowledgment of liability made before the expiration of the prescribed limitation period starts a fresh period of limitation from the date of acknowledgment.
  • Precedent on Balance Sheets: Relying on Asset Reconstruction Company (India) Ltd. v. Bishal Jaiswal and Axis Bank Ltd. v. Naren Sheth, the Court noted that balance sheet entries can constitute an acknowledgment of liability under Section 18, subject to reading the entry within the context of the balance sheet as a whole, including accompanying notes or the auditor’s report.
  • Contextual Link to Plaintiff’s Claim: The 2004–2005 balance sheet and bank reconciliation statement expressly recorded three cheques issued to Wazir Hussain Contractor, connecting him to the records, and subsequent balance sheets continued carrying forward balances pertaining to 2004–2005 through 2013. Section 18 does not require naming the specific creditor or following a rigid format so long as the entry, read with surrounding circumstances, indicates a subsisting jural relationship.
  • Scope of Order VII Rule 11 CPC & No Condonation Needed: Whether the exact sum claimed was owed, and how cheques and carried-forward figures interrelate, are evidentiary matters for trial rather than grounds for conclusive determination at the Order VII Rule 11 stage. Because valid Section 18 acknowledgments automatically renewed limitation on each subsequent acknowledgment date, no condonation of delay application was required.

Disposition

  • The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court’s order dated 04.11.2024, revived the suit before the Trial Court, and kept all questions on the merits open.

2026 INSC 1207

Yusuf v. Vigyapan Loke Delhi Advertising CGHS Ltd. (D.O.J. 06.11.2026)

2026 INSC 1207 click here to view full text of judgment

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Sanction Not Needed for Forgery and Fraudulent Acts

In this case, the appellant challenged the Bombay High Court’s order which had quashed criminal proceedings against Respondent No. 1 (a City Survey Officer) under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. The High Court had quashed the chargesheets on the ground that prior sanction under Section 197 of the Cr.P.C., read with the Maharashtra Amendment to Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., was mandatory for prosecuting a public servant and that the application for sanction was not made to the competent authority. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the High Court’s order, and held that acts involving the fabrication of records, forgery, and criminal conspiracy to illegally alter mutation entries and transfer property do not fall within the discharge or purported discharge of official duties. Consequently, prior sanction under Section 197 or the Maharashtra Amendment is not attracted, and the criminal proceedings before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhule, were ordered to be restored.

  • Background of the Dispute: The appellant, acting for charitable and cooperative housing bodies, alleged that Respondent No. 1 in collusion with others manipulated records and approved an illegal mutation entry (Mutation Entry No. 7062) based on a tampered and incomplete application, effectively removing the property ownership of the trust and society.
  • High Court’s Quashing Order: The High Court quashed the FIRs and resulting chargesheets (RCC Nos. 1020 of 2023 and 119 of 2024) pending before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhule, holding that prior sanction under Section 197 and the Maharashtra Amendment to Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. was required and had not been validly obtained from the competent authority.
  • Legal Test for Official Duty: Citing established precedents, the Supreme Court reiterated that protection under Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. applies only when the act complained of bears a reasonable nexus or direct link with the discharge of public duties. Acts involving criminal conspiracy, forgery, fabrication of documents, and fraud cannot form part of a public servant’s official duties.
  • Supreme Court’s Ruling: The Supreme Court concluded that the allegations against Respondent No. 1 involve fabricating documents and manipulating property records to cheat and illegally transfer land, which completely lie outside the scope of official duties. Therefore, the requirement of prior sanction does not arise.
  • Final Directions: The impugned order of the Bombay High Court was set aside, the appeals were allowed, and RCC Nos. 1020 of 2023 and 119 of 2024 were restored to the file of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhule, to proceed in accordance with law.

2026 INSC 1235

Ashok v. Mahesh & Anr. (D.O.J. 17.11.2026)

2026 INSC 1235 click here to view full text of judgment

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