Indian Judgements

Indian Judgements

Local Language as a medium of instruction – Directions issued

The Supreme Court of India allowed the civil appeal filed by Padam and another, setting aside a judgment of the Rajasthan High Court that had dismissed a Public Interest Litigation (PIL). The appellants sought a directive to include the Rajasthani language in the syllabus for the Rajasthan Eligibility Examination for Teachers (REET) 2021 and to mandate primary instruction for children in their mother tongue.

While the Court noted that the relief concerning the REET 2021 examination was technically infructuous as the recruitment process had already concluded, it heavily criticized the State of Rajasthan’s continued linguistic inertia. The Supreme Court ruled that the right to receive primary education in one’s mother tongue or regional language is a vital facet of individual autonomy and is judicially located within the right to receive comprehensible information under Article $19(1)(a)$ and the right to quality education under Article $21\text{A}$ of the Constitution. Consequently, the Court directed the State of Rajasthan to formulate a comprehensive policy to progressively adopt Rajasthani as a medium of instruction and introduce it as a school subject.

I. Factual Background

  • The Petition: The appellants filed a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) before the Jodhpur Bench of the Rajasthan High Court. They sought a writ of mandamus directing the State to include the Rajasthani language in the recruitment syllabus for Grade-III (Level-I and Level-II) teachers under the REET 2021 framework. Additionally, they prayed for directions ensuring children receive elementary education in their local mother tongue.
  • High Court Dismissal: On November 27, 2024, the Rajasthan High Court dismissed the PIL on the ground that a writ of mandamus requires the establishment of an existing, enforceable legal right and a corresponding failure of statutory duty by the State. The appellants challenged this final order before the Supreme Court under Article 136.

II. Submissions of the Parties

  • The Appellants: Contended that the Rajasthani-speaking population constitutes a “linguistic minority” relative to Hindi (the State’s official language) under Article 350A. They argued that receiving instruction in one’s mother tongue is an essential part of the freedom of speech and expression under Article $19(1)(a)$ and quality education under Article $21\text{A}$. They also pointed out hostile discrimination, noting that languages like Punjabi, Gujarati, and Sindhi were included in school curricula while Rajasthani was excluded.
  • The Respondents (State of Rajasthan): Argued that education and teacher recruitments are strictly limited to languages formally recognized in the Eighth Schedule to the Constitution. Since Rajasthani is not in the Eighth Schedule, no administrative framework or policy exists for its adoption. They further asserted that Article 350A is merely directory, and the National Education Policy (NEP) 2020 is an executive statement lacking statutory force.

III. Key Issues Considered by the Supreme Court

  1. Whether the primary relief concerning REET 2021 survived or was rendered infructuous by the efflux of time.
  2. Whether the state’s failure to implement mother tongue-based elementary education violates the constitutional mandates of Articles $19(1)(a)$ and $21\text{A}$.
  3. Whether statutory recognition in the Eighth Schedule is a mandatory prerequisite for a language to be used as a medium of instruction or a school subject.

IV. Supreme Court’s Analysis and Legal Findings

A. Status of the Specific Examination Relief

The Court observed that because the REET 2021 recruitment process had already been fully conducted, concluded, and finalized, the primary relief seeking syllabus modification for that specific year was entirely infructuous. Unsettling it at this stage would disrupt settled public employment. However, the Court emphasized that the broader constitutional issue regarding linguistic inclusion survived.

B. Constitutional Matrix of Language and Quality Education

  • The Right to Be Understood: The Court underscored that comprehension must precede meaningful social participation. Under Article $21\text{A}$, the right to education explicitly means the right to quality Instruction delivered in a language alien or unfamiliar to a child inflicts an unnatural, torturous strain and reduces education to a hollow formality.
  • The Article $19(1)(a)$ Nexus: Relying on State of Karnataka v. Associated Management of English Medium Primary & Secondary Schools, the Court reaffirmed that the freedom of speech and expression includes both the right to impart and the right to receive This encompasses a child’s freedom to be educated at the primary stage in a comprehensible language of choice.
  • Statutory and Policy Frameworks: The Court highlighted Section $29(2)(f)$ of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education (RTE) Act, 2009, which explicitly mandates that the medium of instruction shall, as far as practicable, be in the child’s mother tongue. This mandate is strongly reinforced by the National Education Policy (NEP) 2020.

C. Rejection of the State’s Technical Defense

The Court strongly condemned the State’s lackadaisical, “myopic” response that it cannot act because Rajasthani is absent from the Eighth Schedule. The Court exposed an internal contradiction in the State’s setup: Rajasthani is actively taught as an academic subject at higher educational levels in prominent state institutions (such as Jai Narain Vyas University and the University of Rajasthan), proving it possesses institutional and pedagogical acceptance. Using the absence of an elementary policy not as a problem to fix, but as a shield to defend executive inertia, was deemed completely unacceptable.

V. Final Decision and Directives

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the Rajasthan High Court’s order, and issued the following structural directives to the State of Rajasthan on May 12, 2026:

  • Policy Formulation: The State must formulate a comprehensive policy to effectively implement mother tongue-based education, giving due status to the Rajasthani language as a local/regional language.
  • Medium of Instruction: The State must progressively facilitate the adoption of Rajasthani as a medium of instruction, starting at the foundational and preparatory stages of schooling.
  • Curriculum Inclusion: The State must take time-bound, affirmative, and phased steps to introduce and provide Rajasthani as an optional or additional subject in all public and private schools.
  • Compliance Timeline: The State of Rajasthan is ordered to file a formal compliance affidavit detailing its structural progress by September 25, 2026. The matter is listed for review on September 30, 2026.

2026 INSC 476

Padam Mehta And Another V. State of Rajasthan And Others (D.O.J. 12.05.2026)

2026 INSC 476 clcick here to view full text of judgment

Next Story

Bribes Carry No Immunity: Inapplicability of Section 17A Prior Approval to Demands for Illegal Gratification

This appeal arose from a judgment of the Rajasthan High Court which dismissed the appellant’s criminal revision petition challenging the framing of charges under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act). The appellant, a police constable, was accused of demanding a bribe of Rs. 1.5 lakhs on behalf of a Superintendent of Police. The primary contention raised by the appellant was that the inquiry and investigation were vitiated for want of prior approval under Section 17A of the PC Act.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the concurrent orders of the High Court and the Trial Court. The Court held that Section 17A of the PC Act—which mandates prior approval before investigating a public servant—applies strictly to recommendations made or decisions taken in the discharge of official functions or duties, and by no stretch of imagination can it be extended to cases involving the demand or acceptance of illegal gratification, which are pure criminal acts unrelated to official duties.

Summary of the Judgment

  • Scope and Intent of Section 17A of the PC Act:
    • Section 17A prohibits police officers from conducting inquiries or investigations into offences alleged against a public servant where the offence is relatable to any recommendation made or decision taken in discharge of official functions or duties, without prior approval from the competent authority.
    • The provision is designed to protect public servants from malicious interference in bona fide administrative or quasi-judicial decision-making, but it does not provide an omnibus protective umbrella or blanket immunity for criminal misconduct.
  • Exclusion of Bribery and Illegal Gratification:
    • Criminal acts such as misappropriation, cheating, criminal breach of trust, and receiving bribes or demanding illegal gratification are completely foreign to the discharge of official duties.
    • Reaffirming precedents like Central Bureau of Investigation v. Santosh Karnani and Anil Daima v. State of Rajasthan, the Court reiterated that demanding a bribe is a pure criminal act that has no linkage with official recommendations or decisions, thereby rendering Section 17A completely inapplicable.
  • Validity of Prosecution Sanction:
    • The record indicated that valid prosecution sanction under Section 19 of the PC Act had been duly granted prior to the taking of cognizance. The Court noted that even if any procedural irregularity were claimed regarding sanction timing, it would not vitiate the trial on merits.
  • Final Outcome:
    • The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the lack of prior approval under Section 17A did not vitiate the proceedings because the provision was never attracted to allegations of bribery.

2026 INSC 1147

Tejaram v. State of Rajasthan (D.O.J. 16.10.2026)

2026 INSC 1147 click here to view full text of judgment

Next Story

Protection of Water Bodies vs. Bona Fide Flat Buyers: Balancing State Resumption with Equitable Relief

These civil appeals arose from orders passed by the Madras High Court which dismissed challenges against the Commissioner of Land Administration’s order setting aside a fraudulently granted ryotwari patta over a water body (Kanakkan Pillai Kuttai) and ordering the demolition of residential apartments built thereon. The land in question (Survey No. 572, Thirumullaivoyal Village) was historically classified in revenue records as Government Poramboke (tank/water body). Despite Section 14-A of the Tamil Nadu Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948, which strictly prohibits ryotwari pattas on private tanks or ooranis, a District Revenue Officer illegally granted a patta in 2011, leading to commercial subdivision, bank mortgaging, and construction of residential flats sold to innocent buyers.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, affirming that public water bodies vest in the State free from encumbrances and cannot be converted into ryoti land or alienated. However, taking cognizance of the plight of innocent flat buyers who purchased properties backed by municipal approvals and revenue mutations, the Supreme Court invoked equitable measures, directing the Chief Secretary and District Collector to allot a vacant, commensurate site to the flat owners within six months before proceeding with the demolition of the 0.22-acre constructed area.

  • Non-Ryoti Nature of Water Bodies and Section 14-A:
    • Beds and bunds of tanks, channels, and communal poramboke lands do not constitute “ryoti land” under Section 3(16) of the Tamil Nadu Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948.
    • Section 14-A of the Act explicitly prohibits the grant of ryotwari pattas for private tanks or ooranis and mandates the cancellation of any patta erroneously or mistakenly issued over such water bodies.
    • Historical revenue records (such as the 1911 RSR Register) take precedence, and municipal zoning notifications (such as “Mixed Residential Zone” under the Town and Country Planning Act) cannot efface the statutory character of public water bodies or transfer ownership.
  • Administrative Fraud and Unauthorized Patta:
    • The 2011 order granting a ryotwari patta was marred by fabricated file numbers, absent jurisdictional reports, and clear administrative malpractices, justifying its annulment by the Commissioner of Land Administration.
  • Protection of Bona Fide Flat Buyers and Equitable Relief:
    • While upholding the state’s power to reclaim water bodies and dismissing the appeals, the Court severely criticized state authorities and municipal bodies whose flawed revenue alterations and building approvals misled innocent purchasers.
    • To prevent severe financial injury and homelessness for families who purchased flats in good faith, the Supreme Court directed the Chief Secretary of Tamil Nadu and the District Collector of Tiruvallur to allot a vacant, commensurate alternative site to the flat owners’ association within six months prior to the demolition of the 0.22-acre construction.
  • Remedies and Final Outcome:
    • The civil appeals filed by the flat buyer and the mortgagee bank were dismissed.
    • The flat owners and the bank were granted liberty to pursue independent civil and criminal remedies for compensation against the developer, landowner, and mortgagor.
    • The State Government was granted freedom to conclude disciplinary and criminal proceedings against erring officials complicit in the fraudulent patta grant.

2026 INSC 1146

S. Gururaj v. The Additional Chief Secretary/Commissioner of Land Administration and Others (D.O.J. 16.10.2026)

2026 INSC 1146 click here to view full text of judgment

Next Story

Enhancing Compensation for Severe Motor Accident Disabilities

These civil appeals arose from a common judgment of the Kerala High Court modifying a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal award concerning a severe accident on October 22, 2016, involving two scooter riders. The first appellant (Sunil Kumar, a pillion rider) suffered debilitating head injuries resulting in total dependency, while the second appellant (Sreejith K.S., the driver) suffered multiple fractures and nerve injuries affecting his arm. Dissatisfied with the extent of enhancement granted by the High Court, both claimants approached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and substantially enhanced the compensation for both appellants. The Court held that when injuries cause cognitive dysfunction or total loss of earning capacity, assessment must shift from strict medical disability percentages to 100% functional disability. Furthermore, the Court established that future attendant/bystander charges for lifelong care must be calculated using the multiplier method, and recognized additional compensation for loss of marriage prospects in young injured claimants.

  • Functional Disability vs. Medical Disability:
    • Reaffirming principles from Shankar Dutt and Jithendran, the Supreme Court emphasized that courts must evaluate the real-world impact of injuries on an individual’s earning capacity and daily life rather than relying solely on medical board percentages.
    • For the first appellant (pillion rider), despite a 75.5% medical disability certificate, his severe head and brain injuries rendered him totally dependent for life, justifying a 100% functional disability For the second appellant (driver), functional disability was assessed at 80% due to permanent impairment of his arm.
  • Multiplier Method for Attendant/Bystander Charges:
    • Rejecting inadequate lump-sum bystander awards, the Court ruled that lifelong attendant charges must be factored using the multiplier method (matching the appropriate multiplier for the claimant’s age), as it effectively accounts for inflation, wage growth, and longevity.
  • Loss of Marriage Prospects:
    • Recognizing that the second appellant was an energetic 22-year-old youth at the time of the accident, the Court awarded 5,00,000/- specifically under the head of loss of future prospects of marriage, following the precedent in Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar.
  • Future Medical Expenses:
    • The Court upheld and reasonably scaled up future medical expenses to 10,00,000/- for the first appellant and Rs. 8,00,000/- for the second appellant to cover continuous long-term medical care.
  • Final Compensation and Directions:
    • First Appellant (Sunil Kumar): Total compensation was enhanced to 77,84,394/-, resulting in an additional payable amount of Rs. 41,61,750/-.
    • Second Appellant (Sreejith K.S.): Total compensation was enhanced to 69,60,880/-, resulting in an additional payable amount of Rs. 41,90,216/-.
    • The insurance company was directed to deposit the enhanced amounts with 5% interest per annum from the date of the claim petition within 6 weeks for direct bank transfer by the Tribunal.
2026 INSC 1145
Sunil Kumar (Totally Disable Rep. by Wife) v. IFFCO Tokio General Insurance Company Ltd. (D.O.J. 15.10.2026)

2026 INSC 1145 click here to view full text of judgment

Next Story

Guardianship vs. Usurpation: Striking Down Illegal Gifts of Temple Inam Land to the State

These appeals, filed by devotees of the Nagapalayam Mariamman-Ponnachiamman Temple, challenged the Madras High Court’s dismissal of a writ petition concerning the alienation of temple property. A temporary trustee of the temple had executed a gift deed on August 30, 2017, transferring 1 acre and 10 cents of temple inam land to the Government of Tamil Nadu for the construction of a Taluk Office. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court’s order, and declared the gift deed null and void. The Court held that the State, acting as a statutory custodian under the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959, cannot accept gifts of temple property or convert its role as a protector into a beneficiary. Although the Court declined to demolish the Taluk Office building constructed with public funds, it ordered the State to pay a revised monthly lease rent with arrears and penalized the State with costs for defending an unlawful transaction.

  • Character of Temple Property and Statutory Bar:
    • The subject land was an inam land granted for the support and maintenance of the deity under Inam Title Deed No. 388.
    • Under Section 41(1) of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959 (1959 Act), a gift of an inam property is expressly declared null and void, and unlike other transactions, the statute consciously withholds any possibility of subsequent validation or sanction for a gift.
    • Registration of the gift deed was also barred under Section 22-A of the Registration Act, 1908.
  • Fiduciary Duty of Trustees and Role of the State:
    • Trustees (whether permanent or temporary) are bound by Sections 27 and 28 of the 1959 Act to manage temple assets with ordinary prudence and fidelity; a gratuitous gift confers no benefit on the institution and violates their fiduciary duty.
    • The State is a statutory custodian and regulator of religious properties, not an owner; accepting a gift of temple land under the guise of administrative convenience or public purpose offends the 1959 Act.
  • Condemnation of State Conduct:
    • The Supreme Court strongly criticized the State Government for aggressively defending the invalid gift deed across judicial forums for years and only conceding its illegality after being specifically directed by the Supreme Court.
  • Equitable Relief and Lease Arrangements:
    • Because a public Taluk Office building had already been constructed on the land using public funds, the Court refused to annul the lease entirely.
    • However, applying the formula established by the Fair Rent Committee and government orders based on local market values (Rs. 167/- per sq. ft.), the Supreme Court enhanced and rounded off the monthly lease rent to 31,000/- per month, payable with arrears from March 8, 2019, to be revised every three years under Section 34-A.
  • Final Directions and Costs:
    • The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order, declared the gift deed void, ordered the State to pay arrears of rent within three months, and imposed costs of Rs. 1,00,000/- on the State payable to the Temple.

2026 INSC 1144

K. Ramalingam and Others v. Government of Tamil Nadu Rep. by its Secretary and Others (D.O.J. 16.10.2026)

2026 INSC 1144 click here to view full text of judgment

Hi Judgments Online