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Victim’s Welfare Paramount: India’s Supreme Court on Adolescent Privacy and State Accountability

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The case originated from Criminal Appeal No. 1451 of 2024, preferred by the State of West Bengal, challenging a High Court judgment of 18th October 2023. The Supreme Court also initiated a Suo Motu Writ Petition (C) No. 3 of 2023 due to objectionable observations in the High Court’s judgment.

The victim, a minor girl, was fourteen years old at the time of the incident (May 2018). Her mother lodged a First Information Report (FIR) on 29th May 2018, stating the victim had escaped from home and was enticed by the accused.

The accused, who is the victim’s biological father, was convicted by a Special Judge under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, and Sections 363 and 366 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). He was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for twenty years and a fine of Rs. 10,000/- for the POCSO Act offence, and four years and a fine of Rs. 2,000/- and Rs. 5,000/- respectively for the IPC offences.

The High Court, in its judgment dated 18th October 2023, later set aside the conviction of the accused for the aforementioned offences.

The Supreme Court noted a “gross delay in the investigation” and that the charge-sheet was filed in January 2022, despite the accused’s arrest in December 2021.

The victim was found to have been abandoned by her parents from early 2019. The family’s economic condition was very poor, and the accused was staying in a temporary shelter, suggesting the victim and her family were living in extremely challenging circumstances.

Law Involved: The judgment involves several key legal frameworks and principles:

  • The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act): Under which the accused was initially convicted. The Court emphasised that the POCSO Act specifically applies to children who are under fourteen years old.
  • The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC): Sections 363 (kidnapping) and 366 (kidnapping, abducting or inducing woman to compel her marriage, etc.).
  • The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC): Particularly Section 482, which grants High Courts inherent powers to quash criminal proceedings. The Court referenced that under Section 482 CrPC, the High Court could set aside the conviction of the accused.
  • Article 21 of the Constitution of India: Encompasses the right to lead a healthy and dignified life, which applies to minor children and victims of POCSO offences. The State has a constitutional obligation to protect these rights.
  • The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (JJ Act): The Court referred to its provisions regarding taking care of such children and rehabilitating them. Section 46 of the JJ Act provides a framework for scheme benefits.
  • The Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006: Mentioned in the context of the victim’s minor daughter, for which the charge under Section 9 of this Act was not substantiated.
  • Precedents: The Court referred to Gian Singh v. State of Punjab & Anr., (2012) 10 SCC 303 regarding the High Court’s power to quash criminal proceedings, noting that serious offences like murder or sexual offences are not compoundable and settlement between parties cannot defeat justice.

Reasoning: 

  • Systemic Failure & Lack of Victim Protection: The Supreme Court strongly noted the “systemic failure of the State to protect the victim”, which resulted in her well-being being tied to that of the accused. It highlighted that society often fails to provide necessary support, shelter, food, and education for victims of offences, despite the State’s duty to provide them a dignified life.
  • High Court’s Erroneous Judgment: The Court found the High Court’s judgment “objectionable” and expressed concern that the High Court had exercised its power under Section 482 of the CrPC to quash the conviction without adequately considering the victim’s welfare. The High Court effectively forced the victim to live with the accused by setting him free. The Court pointed out that quashing a criminal proceeding solely based on the victim’s settlement with the offender is not permissible for serious offences.
  • Importance of Victim’s Best Interest: The Court emphasised that the victim’s best interest, particularly concerning her right to a dignified life and rehabilitation, must be paramount. The amicus curiae (Court-appointed counsel, Ms. Madhavi Divan and Ms. Liz Mathew) highlighted that the victim’s welfare was compromised, and she had no real choice in her situation.
  • Expert Committee Findings: An expert committee, including Dr. Pekham Basu and Smt. Jayita Saha, was appointed to assess the situation. Their preliminary and final reports revealed significant shortcomings:

The victim’s financial struggles and lack of educational or vocational opportunities.

The family’s continued cohabitation with the accused’s family, creating a vulnerable situation for the victim.

“Inadequate, inefficient implementation of the POCSO Act”.

“Collective failure of the systems that are there to protect a girl child”.

Specific loopholes and irregularities identified included:

Failure of Child Protection Committees.

Inadequate implementation of State schemes.

Inaction of designated Child Welfare Officer and local police.

Lack of free legal aid, counsellors, and effective welfare homes.

High frequency of elopements by children.

Stigmatisation of girls in similar situations.

Irregularities in investigation and inadequate accessibility to judicial forums.

Lack of awareness and sensitisation among family, public officials, and police.

The committee found that the “legal crime caused trauma” to the victim and the family unit was not intact. The family was found to have a triangular theory of love, intimacy, passion and commitment, which the committee described as “perverse”.

The committee recommended financial assistance, legal support, and educational/vocational training for the victim.

  • State’s Constitutional Obligation: The Court reiterated that it is the “constitutional obligation of the State” to ensure victims of heinous offences live a dignified life and receive adequate care and rehabilitation, guaranteed under Article 21.

Holding and Directions The Supreme Court issued the following key orders and directions:

  • The impugned judgment of the High Court dated 18th October 2023 was set aside, and the verdict of conviction by the Special Court was restored.
  • The issue regarding the sentencing of the accused was postponed, pending a report from a committee.
  • The Government of West Bengal was directed to constitute a committee of three experts (a clinical psychologist, a social scientist, and a child welfare officer) within three weeks to assess and recommend on the victim’s well-being and her family’s rehabilitation. This committee must ensure the victim does not feel insecure and ascertain the kind of support needed.
  • The State Government and its officials must render all possible facilities and help to the committee members. The committee coordinator must submit a report within two months.
  • The Registry was directed to forward a copy of the judgment to the Secretaries of Law and Justice Departments of all States and Union Territories, who shall convene meetings to implement the provisions of Section 19(6) of the POCSO Act and relevant provisions of the JJ Act.
  • The Ministry of Women and Child Development was directed to frame Rules under Section 46 of the JJ Act and ensure compliance reports are forwarded to them.
  • The State was directed to act as a “true guardian of the victim and her child”.
  • Specific measures for the victim’s rehabilitation were ordered:

Educational facilities: Enrolment in welfare schemes, admission to Bhadrapara Gilarchat High School (31st December 2024), and continued study in the 10th standard.

Nutritional support: Enrollment under the Supplementary Nutrition Programme of Integrated Child Development Services.

Financial support: The victim is enrolled under the Sponsorship Programme of Mission Vatsalya (January 2025), with an amount of Rs. 4,000/- transferred to the beneficiary’s account monthly until she attains 18 years.

Vocational training: The State is to offer vocational training, at its cost.

Shelter: Provide a better shelter to the victim and her family within a few months.

Expenditure on education: Bear the entire expenditure for her education up to 10th standard and beyond if she desires further studies.

Assistance for NGOs/public-spirited citizens: To secure debts incurred by the victim as a one-time measure.

  • Compliance reports regarding these directions are to be filed by 15th July 2025, and thereafter, every six months. The case will be listed on 25th July 2025.
  • The Court also directed the Secretary of the Ministry of Women and Child Development to appoint a Committee of Experts to deal with the suggestions of the amicus curiae related to adolescent welfare and sexual/reproductive health education.
  • The final report of the Committee of Experts submitted on 28th January 2025, detailing interviews with the victim, accused, their families, teachers, and police personnel, was acknowledged.

In Re: Right To Privacy Of Adolescents

Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 778: (DoJ 23-05-2025)

2025 INSC 778 Download Supreme Court File

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Delayed Death: When ‘Attempted Murder’ Becomes More

September 13, 2025 No Comments

Maniklall Sahu, the appellant, along with three co-accused, trespassed into the house of Rekhchand Verma, assaulted him with sticks and fisticuffs, and flung him from a terrace. The injured person, Rekhchand Verma, initially survived but was in a critical condition. He eventually succumbed to his injuries approximately nine months after the incident, dying on 8th November 2022 due to septicaemia and pneumonia, leading to cardiorespiratory arrest. The trial court had initially convicted the appellant under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) for murder. However, the High Court altered this conviction to Section 307 IPC for attempt to murder, sentencing the appellant to 7 years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000/-. The appellant subsequently filed this appeal challenging the Section 307 IPC conviction.

Law Involved The primary legal provisions under consideration are Sections 299, 300, 302, and 307 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

Section 307 IPC (Attempt to Murder): This section deals with acts done with the intention or knowledge that it might cause death, and if death occurs, the act would be murder.

Section 299 IPC (Culpable Homicide): Defines culpable homicide.

Section 300 IPC (Murder): Specifies when culpable homicide amounts to murder, including acts done with the intention of causing death, or causing bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or knowing the act is so imminently dangerous that it will most probably cause death.

Section 302 IPC (Punishment for Murder): Prescribes the punishment for murder. The core legal question revolves around the “Application of Theory of Causation where death ensues after some delay” and whether the High Court correctly applied Section 307 IPC despite the victim’s eventual death.

Reasoning The Supreme Court critically analysed the High Court’s decision to alter the conviction from Section 302 IPC to Section 307 IPC, especially given the victim’s death.

  1. Medical Evidence and Causation: The Court reviewed extensive medical evidence, which consistently showed that the deceased, Rekhchand Verma, suffered severe injuries, including a head injury, spinal cord injury leading to paraplegia, and multiple complications such as infected bedsores, septic shock, and bilateral pneumonia. Medical experts testified that these complications were a direct result of the initial injuries sustained during the assault and were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The Court highlighted that the injured person received medical treatment for nine months before his demise. The Court concluded that the injuries suffered were grievous and that the death was a consequence of these injuries, with complications like septicaemia and pneumonia not breaking the chain of causation.
  2. High Court’s Error: The Supreme Court determined that the High Court committed a serious error in bringing the case under the ambit of “attempt to commit murder” (Section 307 IPC) on the premise that the victim survived for about nine months, and his death was due to complications during treatment and not directly from the initial injuries. The Supreme Court stressed that if the injury was fatal and intended to cause death, or if death occurred after some delay due to septicaemia or other complications stemming from the injury, the offence would fall under the first limb of Section 300 IPC (murder) [36a]. Furthermore, if the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and death occurred due to septicaemia or other complications, the act would amount to culpable homicide punishable under Section 302 IPC, falling under the third limb of Section 300 IPC [36b, 37c, 37d].
  3. Jurisprudence on Delayed Death: Drawing on various precedents, the Court reiterated that delayed death or intervening medical conditions (like septicaemia or pneumonia) do not automatically absolve an accused of murder charges if the initial injuries were the proximate cause of death. The Court concluded that the cause of death was indeed due to the injuries suffered, and the contention that the death resulted from a lack of proper treatment or was disconnected from the initial assault was unfounded.

Holding The Supreme Court dismissed Maniklall Sahu’s appeal . While the appellant’s conviction under Section 307 IPC (attempt to murder) as altered by the High Court stands affirmed due to the dismissal of his appeal, the Supreme Court clearly stated that the High Court committed a serious error in altering the conviction from Section 302 IPC to Section 307 IPC . The Supreme Court’s detailed reasoning underscored that given the medical evidence and the established chain of causation, the offence should have been considered murder or culpable homicide amounting to murder, punishable under Section 302 IPC, because the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.

Maniklall Sahu Vs State of Chhattisgarh

Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 1107: (DoJ 12-09-2025)

2025 INSC 1107 Download Supreme Court File

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Tender Troubles: Supreme Court Upholds Bid Sanctity, Overturns Rectification

September 13, 2025 No Comments

The case originated from an electronic bid (No. 7 of 2023-24) issued by the Superintending Engineer and Project Director, Project Implementation Unit – I, Public Works (Roads) Directorate, Government of West Bengal, on 17.10.2023. The tender was for collecting Road User Fee (RUF) from commercial vehicles for 1095 days. The earnest money deposit was fixed at Rs. 25,00,000.00. Seven bidders participated. The technical bids were evaluated, and four bidders were technically qualified, including Prakash Asphaltings and Toll Highways (India) Limited (appellant) and Mandeepa Enterprises (respondent No. 1).

Financial bids were opened on 08.12.2023. The appellant, Prakash Asphaltings, was found to be the highest bidder (H1) with a quoted amount of Rs. 91,19,00,000.00 for 1095 days. Respondent No. 1, Mandeepa Enterprises, was the lowest bidder (H4) with an offered amount of Rs. 9,72,999.00 per day.

Respondent No. 1 subsequently claimed a typographical error in their financial bid, stating they intended to quote Rs. 106,54,33,905.00 for the entire contract period instead of Rs. 9,72,999.00 per day. They requested the tendering authority to treat the figure of Rs. 9,72,999.00 as a typographical error and read it as Rs. 106,54,33,905.00. The tendering authority rejected this request on 20.12.2023, stating that correction of a financial bid after opening was not possible and would impeach the sanctity of the tender process.

Aggrieved, Respondent No. 1 filed a writ petition (WPA No. 29001 of 2023) before a Single Judge of the High Court, which was dismissed on 03.01.2024, as the Single Judge found no scope for interference. Respondent No. 1 then filed an intra-court appeal (MAT No. 93 of 2024). A Division Bench of the High Court allowed the appeal on 23.02.2024, observing that the error in quoting the figure by respondent No. 1 was inadvertent. The Division Bench directed the tendering authority to evaluate Respondent No. 1’s BOQ at Rs. 106,54,33,905.00 and offer other bidders the opportunity to match this figure. This civil appeal was directed against the Division Bench’s judgment and order.

Law Involved

Clause 4(g) of the Notice Inviting Electronic Bid: This clause specifically states that any change in the template of the Bill of Quantity (BOQ) will not be accepted under any circumstances.

Clause 5B(v) of the Instructions to Bidders: This clause outlines that during bid evaluation, if bidders fail to submit supporting documents or original hard copies within the stipulated timeframe, their proposals will be liable for rejection.

Article 226 of the Constitution of India: Pertains to the High Court’s jurisdiction to issue writs.

Principles of Equity and Natural Justice in Tender Processes: The judgment refers to the importance of these principles in tender and contract awards, but also emphasises that these principles should be kept at a distance when there is a violation of rules.

Judicial Review of Administrative Action: The Court reiterated that judicial review in administrative action, particularly tenders, is limited to preventing arbitrariness, irrationality, bias, and mala fides. Courts should not interfere with a decision unless it is “unlawful” or “unsound”.

Public Interest: Tenders are a cornerstone of governmental procurement processes, aiming for competitiveness, fairness, and transparency in resource allocation. Adherence to rules and conditions and the sanctity of the tender process are paramount.

Reasoning The Supreme Court reasoned that the Division Bench’s interpretation was erroneous for several key reasons:

Sanctity of Tender Process: The Court held that allowing rectification of financial bids after they have been opened would impeach the sanctity and integrity of the entire tender process.

Strict Adherence to Tender Conditions: Clause 4(g) explicitly prohibits any change in the BOQ template under any circumstances. The Division Bench’s broad interpretation of “bona fide mistake” to allow rectification was held to be incorrect and would put “shackles on the functioning of the tendering authority”.

Nature of the Mistake: While Respondent No. 1 claimed an inadvertent mistake, it was effectively a unilateral or systematic computer typographical transmission failure, not one attributable to the tendering authority. Such a mistake, even if unintentional, cannot be a ground to allow post-bid modifications that would undermine the competitive bidding process.

Adverse Consequences to Public Exchequer: The Division Bench’s decision to re-evaluate Respondent No. 1’s bid at a significantly higher amount (Rs. 106,54,33,905.00) meant that the appellant, who was originally the H1 bidder, would be displaced. This would lead to a considerable loss of revenue to the state exchequer (approximately 15 crores) by not accepting the higher bid of the appellant and giving an opportunity to Respondent No. 1 to correct its bid post-opening.

Limited Scope of Judicial Review: The Court reiterated that interference by a writ court in ongoing tender processes is not permissible unless there is a clear violation of principles of natural justice, or the decision is arbitrary or mala fide. The Division Bench’s decision was deemed a clear violation of natural justice principles.

Non-Joinder of Party: The appellant (Prakash Asphaltings), as the highest bidder and a directly affected party, was not made a party respondent in the intra-court appeal before the Division Bench, which was viewed as prejudicial and a violation of natural justice.

Holding The Supreme Court allowed the civil appeal, thereby setting aside and quashing the judgment and order dated 23.02.2024 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court at Calcutta in MAT No. 93 of 2024. The Court sustained the order of the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition. Consequently, Prakash Asphaltings and Toll Highways (India) Limited (the appellant), being the H1 bidder, is to be awarded the contract in terms of the notice inviting electronic bid dated 17.10.2023. The Court also ruled that there shall be no order as to costs.

Prakash Asphaltings And Toll Highways (India) Limited Vs Mandeep Enterprises And Others

Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 1108: (DoJ 12-09-2025)

2025 INSC 1108 Download Supreme Court File

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“Speculative Investors” Barred from IBC Relief: Supreme Court Upholds Homebuyer Protections

September 13, 2025 No Comments

Four appeals were heard together, arising from orders of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT). The key appellants, Mansi Brar Fernandes and Sunita Agarwal, had entered into agreements with developers (Gayatri Infra Planner Pvt. Ltd. and Antriksh Infratech Pvt. Ltd., respectively) for property units. Both agreements included buy-back clauses and involved advance payments. The developers defaulted, and the appellants initiated proceedings under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC). The NCLAT reversed the admission of these applications, branding the appellants as “speculative investors” rather than genuine homebuyers or financial creditors.

Law Involved: The central legal framework is the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC), specifically Section 7, which governs the initiation of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) by financial creditors. The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Ordinance, 2019, and the subsequent Amendment Act, are also critical. These amendments introduced a threshold requirement for allottees to file a Section 7 application (requiring at least 10% of allottees or 100 allottees). The Court frequently referenced its earlier judgment in Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd v. Union of India, which distinguishes between genuine homebuyers and speculative investors. The judgment also emphasizes the Right to Shelter as a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution and the role of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (RERA).

Reasoning: The Supreme Court deliberated on the distinction between “speculative investors” and “genuine homebuyers” within the context of the IBC. It observed that the IBC is intended as a collective mechanism to revive viable projects and safeguard the fundamental right to shelter of genuine homebuyers, not as a recovery tool or a bargaining chip for individuals. The legislative intent behind recognizing allottees as financial creditors was to protect genuine homebuyers, while simultaneously preventing misuse by speculative investors seeking premature exits or exorbitant returns, which had burdened the real estate sector and the adjudicatory machinery.

The Court provided criteria to identify speculative investors, including: agreements that substitute possession with buy-back or refund options, insistence on refunds with high interest, purchase of multiple units (especially in double digits), demanding special rights or privileges, deviations from the RERA Model Agreement, and unrealistic interest rates or promises of returns. The transaction entered into by Mansi Brar Fernandes, involving a buy-back clause and the pursuit of commercial returns rather than possession, led the Court to conclude that she was indeed a speculative investor. Similarly, Sunita Agarwal’s agreement for an “investment” with a 25% per annum return over 24 months, coupled with a buy-back clause, indicated a speculative intent.

While affirming the NCLAT’s finding that the appellants were “speculative investors,” the Supreme Court clarified that the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Ordinance, 2019, was indeed applicable to the facts of the present case, correcting the NCLAT’s reasoning on this point [19, 20, 35, 36, 48(ii)]. The Court applied the doctrine of Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit (an act of the Court shall prejudice no one) to address the procedural issues related to the Ordinance’s applicability and the delay it caused.

Holding: The Supreme Court affirmed the NCLAT’s findings that Mansi Brar Fernandes and Sunita Agarwal were “speculative investors” and therefore not entitled to initiate proceedings under Section 7 of the IBC [25, 34, 48(i)]. Consequently, the Court upheld the NCLAT’s orders setting aside the admission of their Section 7 applications by the NCLT [48(i)]. However, the Court clarified that the Ordinance/Amendment Act was applicable to the case, although this correction in reasoning did not alter the ultimate outcome given the appellants’ status as speculative investors [48(ii)]. The appellants remain free to pursue their remedies through other appropriate legal forums, without being barred by limitation [48(i)].

Mansi Brar Fernandes Vs Subha Sharma And Anr.

Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 1110: (DoJ 12-09-2025)

2025 INSC 1110 Download Supreme Court File

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