Indian Judgements

Indian Judgements

Gift or Settlement : Difference between the Gift and the Settlement is the existence of consideration in the settlement

Civil appeal concerning the nature of a property document executed in 1985 by a father in favour of his daughter. The core issue is whether the document is a gift deed, a settlement, or a will, as this classification determines its revocability and the validity of subsequent transactions. The court examines the definitions and legal characteristics of gifts, settlements, and wills under Indian law, noting their distinctions regarding consideration, present transfer of interest, and revocability. Ultimately, the judgment affirms the High Court’s decision that the document is a gift by settlement, concluding that it effected an immediate transfer of interest to the daughter despite the father retaining a life interest, and therefore, its unilateral cancellation was invalid.

(A) Transfer of Property Act, 1882, Section 11, 122, 126 to 128 – Indian Succession Act, 1925, Section 2(h), 59, 61 to 63, 70, 89 -Indian Stamp Act, 1899, Section 2(q); Article 33 – Kerala Stamp Act, 1959, Section 2(q); Article 31 – Registration Act, 1908, Section 17 – Specific Relief Act, 1963, Section 2(b) – Gift – Settlement – Whether the document of the year 1985 is a gift or Settlement or Will? and whether the requirements under law or conditions in the deed have been satisfied to vest a legal right? – Held that there is consideration, conveyance, imposition of conditions and reservation of life interest by the executant, Defendant No. 1/father satisfying the requirements to classify the document as a “settlement” – The conditions to construct a house, to reside in the house, retention of life interest, the right of mortgage up to a sum of Rs.2,000/- and avail loan on that basis, cannot alter the gift, by which in unequivocal terms, the property stood vested in the plaintiff by earlier part – The condition, creating a life interest in favour of father and mother and the restriction regarding mortgage, would further imply that Defendant No. 1 had ceased to be the absolute owner – The postponement of delivery by creation of life interest is not an anathema to absolute conveyance in praesenti – Defendant No.1 has not only expressed that the property is being conveyed on account of love and affection, by vesting the rights in the property in praesenti in favour of the plaintiff, but also enabled the plaintiff to construct the house from then on and no outer time has been fixed for the construction of the house – Since the life interest was reserved in favour of Defendant No.1 and his wife, Defendant No.1 was only holding an ostensible possession and ownership as contemplated under Section 41, while the true owner being the plaintiff, after the clear conveyance by earlier clause – Held that  the instrument of 1985 is a gift by settlement – Delivery of possession is not sine qua non to validate a gift or settlement – Not in dispute that the plaintiff has registered the instrument – Such registration by the plaintiff is possible only if the document was handed over by Defendant No.1 – The factum of acceptance can be derived from the conduct of the parties – Once the document is declared as “gift”, Defendant No. 1 had no right to cancel the same unilaterally and the Sub Registrar had no right to register the cancellation deed – Once the document is categorized as a gift, in the absence of any clause or reservation to cancel, the executant has no right to cancel the same – The reasons for cancellation or revocation of gift have to be proved in a court of law – Therefore, according to us, the unilateral cancellation of the document is void and as a natural corollary, the sale deed dated 19.10.1993 executed by Defendant No. 1 / father also, is invalid – Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court had erroneously come to the conclusion that Ext.A1 document was a Will, without appreciating the law – High Court rightly set aside the concurrent judgments of the Courts below by treating the document as settlement in the judgment impugned herein.

(Para 15.1, 16, 18 to 20)

(B) Transfer of Property Act, 1882, Section 122 – Transfer of Property – Interplay between Gift and Settlement – Held that primary difference between the Gift and the Settlement is the existence of consideration in the settlement – Consideration is nothing but the quid pro quo, that each party to a contract is to perform or render a part of their obligation under the contract – In view of the fact that a gift is a voluntary disposition, it is essentially not an agreement and hence, the element of consideration is taken away from it – Settlement on the other hand is always coupled with consideration as it is mostly executed in favour of a family member – The gift or settlement of an immovable property has to be registered as per Section 17 of the Registration Act – The conditions regarding acceptance, reservation of life interest and restriction on revocation are applicable to both “gift and settlement” – The vesting of the right also takes place in praesenti in both the cases – Therefore, there is an element of gift in every settlement.

(Para 11.3)

(C) Transfer of Property – Interplay between Gift and Will – Held that a will is the declaration of the intention of the testator to give away his property – Such Will comes into force after the death of the testator. The most important requirement for a valid will is that it must again be a voluntary disposition in sound mind, which must be explicit from the instrument itself. Therefore, it can be concluded that every will also has an element of gift, with the difference being the disposition deferred until the death of the testator. Insofar as the revocation is concerned, the testator is at liberty to revoke or alter the will any number of times until his demise, but it is essential that he remains of sound mind while doing so.

(Para 11.4)

(D) Transfer of Property – Interplay between Gift, Settlement and Will – Held that the element of voluntary disposition is common to all the three deeds. – The element of gift is traceable to both “settlement” and “will” – As settled in law, the nomenclature of an instrument is immaterial and the nature of the document is to be derived from its contents – While so, a voluntary disposition can transfer the interest in praesenti and in future, in the same document – In such a case, the document would have the elements of both the settlement and will – Such document, then has to be registered and by operation of the doctrine of severability, becomes a composite document and has to be treated as both, a settlement and will and the respective rights will flow with regard to each disposition from the same document – Reservation of life interest or any condition in the instrument, even if it postpones the physical delivery of possession to the donee/settlee, cannot be treated as a will, as the property had already been vested with the donee/settlee.

(Para 11.5)

(E) Transfer of Property – Interplay between Gift, Settlement and Will – There must be a transfer of interest in praesenti for a gift or a settlement and in case of postponement of such transfer until the death of the testator, the document is to be treated as a will – The fact that a document is registered, cannot be the sole ground to discard the contents and to treat the document as a gift, just because the law does not require a will to be registered – The act and effect of registration depends upon the nature of the document, which is to be ascertained from a wholesome reading of the recitals – The nomenclature given to the document is irrelevant – The contents of the document have to be read as a whole and understood, while keeping in mind the object and intent of the testator – In case of a gift, it is a gratuitous grant by the owner to another person; in case of a settlement, the consideration is the mutual love, care, affection and satisfaction, independent and resulting out of the preceding factors; in case of a will, it is declaration of the intention of the testator in disposition of his property in a particular manner – Therefore, even when there is any ambiguity in understanding the nature of the documents from its contents the subsequent conduct of the executant must also be considered to take a decision – It is possible that in a single document, there could be multiple directions in different clauses though seemingly repugnant but in reality, it could only be ancillary or a qualification of the earlier clause – Therefore, the document must be harmoniously read to not only understand the true intent and purport, but also to give effect to each and every word and direction.

(Para 14.1)

N.P. Saseendran V. N.P. Ponnamma & Ors.

Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 388: (DoJ 24-03-2025)

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Trust Betrayed: Deceased Appellant’s Fortune Redirected to Child Welfare

The appellant was convicted by the trial court on charges of criminal breach of trust, criminal breach of trust by public servant, criminal breach of trust by banker, merchant or agent, and criminal misappropriation. These charges stemmed from the misappropriation of funds designated for welfare schemes aimed at children with disabilities. The funds were reportedly sanctioned for non-existent schools and children without proper audit or inspection, with the incident occurring between 2004 and 2007. The total misappropriated amount cited in court discussions reached Rs. 7,00,00,000.

Trial Court Sentence: The appellant was sentenced to 7 years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,00,000. Failure to pay the fine would result in an additional 6 months of simple imprisonment. Other co-accused individuals were acquitted.

Appeal and Abatement: The appellant filed an appeal against her conviction and sentence. However, during the pendency of the appeal, Annapurani, the appellant, passed away in 2022. Consequently, her appeal stood abated.

Law Involved

The primary legal provisions cited in the case were from the Indian Penal Code (IPC), specifically:

Section 409 IPC: Dealing with criminal breach of trust by a public servant, or by a banker, merchant, or agent.

Section 34 IPC: Pertaining to acts done by several persons in furtherance of a common intention.

The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (JJ Act) was referenced in relation to the utilisation of the fine amount for the welfare and rehabilitation of children in need of care and protection, or those in conflict with the law.

Reasoning and Holding of the Judgment

Abatement of Proceedings: The appeal formally abated due to the death of the appellant, Annapurani, while the appeal was still under consideration.

Court’s Direction on Funds: Despite the abatement, the Court acknowledged the large-scale criminal misappropriation and breach of trust involved in the case. It was noted that the appellant had voluntarily offered to deposit an enhanced fine amount of Rs. 7,00,00,000. This amount comprised an initial Rs. 1,00,00,000 and a subsequent direction for an additional Rs. 6,00,00,000.

Utilisation for Child Welfare: The Court directed that the entire deposited sum of Rs. 7,00,00,000, including any interest it accrues, should be utilised for the benefit of Government-aided or Government-managed childcare institutions in the State of Odisha. This was intended to serve the rehabilitation and welfare needs of children. The Juvenile Justice Committee of the High Court of Odisha was specifically authorised to oversee and direct the utilisation of these funds. The amount has been complied with and deposited.

Tr. A. Babu V. State of Tamil Nadu

Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 799: (DoJ 18-03-2025)

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“Discretionary Dismissal: Supreme Court Declines CBI Probe into Alleged Multi-Crore Infrastructure Fraud”

The petition concerned allegations of fraudulent re-raising or revision of the value of Electro Mechanical (EME) Equipments for the Palamuru Ranga Reddy  lift irrigation Schemes.

The estimated value, initially between Rs. 5960.79 Crores and Rs. 8386.86 Crores as estimated by the Engineering Staff College of India, was allegedly inflated.

This alleged inflation was deemed to have caused a significant loss to the public/exchequer.

The fraudulent actions were attributed to official respondents (U to V, or Nos. 1 to 4), who were accused of colluding with contractors to artificially inflate these estimates.

Law Involved

The petitioner sought a Writ of Mandamus to declare the actions of the respondents (Nos. 1 to 4) as fraudulent.

A primary prayer was for an investigation by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) into the alleged illegal, unreasonable, and capricious actions of the official respondents. The petitioner also sought the submission of the CBI report to the High Court.

The case subsequently proceeded as a Special Leave Petition (SLP) before a higher court, challenging the High Court’s decision to dismiss the writ petition.

Reasoning

High Court’s Stance: The High Court considered the two prayers but ultimately dismissed the writ petition. The High Court’s decision was based on its discretion not to intervene. It was deemed justified in not exercising its discretion or jurisdiction to order further investigation or grant the CBI probe. The reasons for dismissal were outlined in the impugned order and possibly related to the maintainability of the writ petition.

Petitioner’s Argument: The petitioner contended that the High Court should not have summarily dismissed the writ petition. They argued that the High Court ought to have:

Delved into the records of the case.

Considered referring the matter for investigation to the CBI.

Devised a procedure to uncover the truth regarding the alleged fraud in the estimates.

The petitioner highlighted that documents, papers, and records clearly indicated fraud in the revised estimates, resulting in a grave loss to the State exchequer, which warranted the granting of their prayers.

Holding

Upon challenge via Special Leave Petition, the Supremer Court affirmed the High Court’s decision, stating that it would not ordinarily interfere with the non-exercise of discretion by the High Court in favour of the petitioner.

Consequently, the Special Leave Petition was dismissed, thereby upholding the High Court’s original decision.

Nagam Janardhan Reddy V. State Of Telangana And Others

Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 798: (DoJ 21-05-2025)

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Conviction Affirmed, Sentence Reduced: A Key POCSO Act Appeal

The appellants were convicted concurrently under Section 8 of the POCSO Act and Section 294 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). While the High Court affirmed the conviction, the appellants had previously been acquitted of charges under Section 6 of the POCSO Act. The Trial Court had originally imposed a sentence of life imprisonment for the remainder of the appellants’ natural life.

At the time the incident occurred, the appellants were in their twenties. By the time of the appeal, they had already served a little over five years of incarceration.

Law Involved:

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act (POCSO Act):

Section 8 (Sexual Assault): This section relates to sexual assault.

Section 6 (Aggravated Penetrative Sexual Assault): This section deals with aggravated penetrative sexual assault. The punishment specified is rigorous imprisonment for not less than ten years but which may extend to life imprisonment, with a fine. If the victim is a child below twelve years, the punishment can be rigorous imprisonment for the remainder of natural life or even the death penalty.

Indian Penal Code (IPC):

Section 294: The appellants were also convicted under this section.

Reasoning

The learned counsel for the appellants presented a two-fold submission, initially contending that the very conviction by the Additional Sessions Judge was flawed.

A primary argument was that the life imprisonment sentence imposed by the Trial Court was a “harsh punishment”, particularly considering the appellants had been acquitted under the more severe Section 6 of the POCSO Act.

The appellants’ counsel emphasised that they were young, in their twenties, at the time of the incident and had already completed over five years of imprisonment, suggesting that the appeal “may be allowed”.

In contrast, the learned standing counsel for the respondent “vehemently objected” to the appellants’ contentions, arguing that the High Court had “rightly affirmed the Judgment of conviction” and that the life imprisonment sentence was “in accordance with Section 8 of the POCSO Act”.

The Court ultimately determined that the “interest of justice would be served” by reducing the sentence.

Holding of this Judgment

The appeals were allowed in part.

The sentence imposed on the appellants was reduced to ten years.

Pintu Thakur @ Ravi V. State Of Chhattisgarh

Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 797: (DoJ 27-05-2025)

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Bail Overturned: Supreme Court Sets Aside High Court’s Grant of Regular Bail

Bail Cancelled. The Appellant filed a complaint alleging that on 11 August 2023, around 11:30 PM, they received a call about the Respondents (accused) and 6-7 others being present on the Appellant’s land in Village Karial, Haripur.

It was alleged that the Respondents used abusive language, threatened the Appellant, and dismantled a barbed wire fence on his property.

Later, when the Appellant, his driver (Anil Thatheria – the deceased), and others went to the land, the Respondents allegedly rammed their car into the Appellant’s car.

When the Appellant exited his car, Accused No. 1 (along with others) allegedly hit the deceased (Anil Thatheria) with their car and threw him down, then hit the deceased on the head with a wooden stick.

All the accused were reportedly armed with wooden sticks.

The deceased was taken to the hospital where he was declared dead.

An FIR was registered, and subsequently, a chargesheet and a supplementary chargesheet were filed by the Police.

The Respondents sought regular bail from the Trial Court, but their applications were dismissed.

The High Court then granted regular bail to the Respondents via an order dated 06 October 2023.

The Appellant subsequently filed an appeal before the Supreme Court challenging the High Court’s bail order.

Law Involved: 

The case involved offences under various sections of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and considerations under the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.):

IPC Sections: The FIR and chargesheets included sections such as 302 (murder), 307 (attempt to murder), 120-B (criminal conspiracy), 34 (acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention), 147 (rioting), 148 (rioting, armed with deadly weapon), 149 (unlawful assembly guilty of offence committed in prosecution of common object), 323 (voluntarily causing hurt), 504 (intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of peace), and 506 (criminal intimidation).

Cr.P.C. Sections: The respondents’ applications for bail were made under Section 439 (special powers of High Court or Court of Session regarding bail) of the Cr.P.C.. The High Court’s order also included a direction to the Trial Court to adjourn proceedings under Section 309 of the Cr.P.C..

Reasoning

The Supreme Court noted that the High Court had set aside the Trial Court’s order which had refused regular bail to the Respondents.

Despite previously dismissing bail applications by the Respondents, the High Court later allowed their petition, leading to their enlargement on bail.

The High Court granted bail even though Accused No. 1 was identified as a “habitual offender” with eight other criminal cases registered against him.

The Supreme Court highlighted that the High Court’s order was “cryptic” and lacked sufficient reasoning to justify the grant of bail, especially given the gravity of the offences.

The reasoning provided by the High Court was considered “inadequate” and did not establish a proper case for granting bail.

The Supreme Court found that the High Court’s order suffered from a “patent non-application of mind”.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court stated that the High Court’s direction to the Trial Court to adjourn proceedings beyond a fixed date (25 October 2023) constituted interference with the trial process.

Holding

The Supreme Court, in its judgment dated 08 November 2023, set aside the High Court’s order dated 06 October 2023, which had granted regular bail to the Respondents.

Consequently, the effect of the High Court’s bail order was reversed.

The Supreme Court directed the Respondents (accused) to surrender and be taken into custody by the police on or before 16 June 2025.

They were also directed to deposit their passports at the Police Station.

The Supreme Court clarified that its decision to set aside the bail order should not influence the merits of the case during the trial.

The Trial Court was directed to proceed with and conclude the trial without being swayed by the Supreme Court’s order, and to endeavour to conclude the trial within one year and eight months.

Baljnder Singh Alias Aman V. State Of Punjab

Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 796: (DoJ 16-05-2025)

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