Indian Judgements

Indian Judgements

Service Law: Mere empanelment/enlistment of an aspirant’s name for filling up a public post, no right accrues

Cancellation of a recruitment process for 104 Forest Protection Force Constables. The initial selection, conducted in 2016, was invalidated by the Assam Government due to alleged violations of reservation policy and other irregularities. The Gauhati High Court had previously sided with the selected candidates, ruling that the irregularities could be rectified without fully canceling the list. However, the Supreme Court, upon review, reversed the High Court’s decision, finding the government’s cancellation to be a reasonable response to the systemic flaws identified in the selection process, which included a lack of candidates from many districts and improper application of reservation policies. The Court emphasized that while selected candidates don’t have an absolute right to appointment, the government’s decision to cancel the process was justified given the detected irregularities. The Supreme Court ultimately granted the appellants, the State of Assam, the liberty to initiate a fresh recruitment process, with certain concessions for the original respondents.

(A) Constitution of India, Articles 14 and 16 – Service Law – Recruitment – Judicial review – Whether the High Court was justified in its interference with the decision to cancel the select list and to require the process to be carried forward in the manner directed by it? – It is not that the High Court was called upon by any unsuccessful candidate to test the bona fide of the earlier Government decision not to frame recruitment rules and/or not to prescribe a written examination and/or to require the aspiring candidates to only go through an interview; on the contrary, the facts presented evince that it is the successor Government that had taken an informed decision not to proceed with the earlier process and to start a new process – At that stage of decision making, possibly, three options were available to the Government, being –

(i) allow the process to be taken to its logical conclusion, without being unduly bothered by the illegalities/irregularities detected and referred to by the PCCF;

(ii) cancel the entire process and start it anew; and

(iii) separate the grain from the chaff and to proceed with the former and complete the process. No doubt, the Government could have set right the process by preferring the third option – However, once the Government arrived at the decision considering the illegalities/irregularities detected by the PCCF that the process ought to be started afresh and preferred the second option to the first and third options, thereby cancelling the previous process, the High Court ought to have applied the proportionality test to adjudge whether the perfect balance was struck by preferring that option out of the other available options. Sadly, such test has not been applied.

Held that the approach of the single Judge of the High Court has evinced an exercise of appellate jurisdiction – Resting on the sole premise that no allegation of corrupt practice or unfair means adopted by the candidates (read, the respondents herein) had been levelled, the single Judge found force in the submission advanced by learned counsel for the respondents that the selection process cannot be said to be vitiated by malpractice – The single Judge also expressed the opinion that mere over-representation or under-representation, though may be suggestive of irregularity or malpractice, that by itself was not sufficient to arrive at a definitive conclusion that malpractice had occurred – Government itself felt that the selection being entirely based on interview, the same admitted an element of arbitrariness and that the assessment of candidates being based merely on the basis of marks at the interview, was reasonable for drawing a presumption of being misused for favouritism and could well be regarded as suffering from the vice of arbitrariness. In such circumstances, it is indeed difficult, if not impossible, for a court to law to substitute its decision for the one taken by the Government reasoning that the selection has not been challenged by any unsuccessful candidate.

(Para 36 to 40)

(B) Constitution of India, Articles 14 and 16 – Service Law – Judicial review – Recruitment – Whether the decision of the appellants to cancel the select list was either vulnerable on application of the doctrine of Wednesbury unreasonableness or suspect applying the doctrine of proportionality and, therefore, liable to invalidation? – Held that no person of reasonable prudence would be left in doubt that the process had a coat of discernible taint suggesting impropriety and bias, if not corruption – Applying the test of proportionality, the decision taken by the successor Government of cancelling the process initiated by the earlier Government cannot be said to be so disproportionate and incommensurate with the illegalities/irregularities detected that interference could have been said to be legitimately warranted – Division Bench arrived at its own conclusion that the select list should not have been cancelled without any detailed inquiry having been conducted to find out the veracity of the irregularities or illegalities alleged –  Whether or not a detailed inquiry was needed, despite the note of the PCCF, ought to have been left undisturbed since the successor Government reached a satisfaction of its own that for the various reasons highlighted in the said note, it would be unjust to proceed further – Such satisfaction could not have been tinkered by the Division Bench on the ground that a detailed inquiry ought to have been conducted – Held that that based on the note of the PCCF dated 4th July, 2016 and the recommendation made by him for cancellation of the select list, the decision of the Government to approve the said note and, thereby, cancel the select list did not stand vitiated to attract its invalidation either by application of the doctrine of Wednesbury unreasonableness or proportionality – It has not been proved to our satisfaction that the impugned decision of cancelling the select list is the neat result of an injudicious exercise of discretion and was ill- directed in the guise of achieving the sanctity of the entire selection process – Impugned decision of cancellation was neither unjustified nor was one which could be upset by applying the doctrines of either Wednesbury unreasonableness or proportionality.

(Para 42 to 52)

(C) Constitution of India, Articles 14 and 16 – Service Law – Judicial review – Recruitment – Whether the decision of the appellants to cancel the select list infringed the legal rights of the respondents for which a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution could be maintained? Contention that by dint of mere empanelment/enlistment of an aspirant’s name for filling up a public post, no right accrues in favour of such an aspirant to move the writ court for redress repelled –  Held do not consider that an empanelled or a selected candidate has absolutely no right to move the writ court – Conscious of the line of decisions of this Court which lay down the law that mere empanelment/enlistment does not result in accrual of any indefeasible right in favour of such empanelled/selected candidate as well as the law that the employer may, in its wisdom, either decide to cancel the select list or not carry on the process further resulting in the notified/advertised vacancy/vacancies not being filled up pursuant to the selection process, which has been conducted – What it means is that an empanelled/selected candidate can claim no right of appointment, if the State has cogent and germane grounds for not making the appointment – However, at the same time, it is also the law that the appointing authority cannot ignore the select panel or decline to make the appointment on its whims – Any decision taken not to appoint despite there being vacancies and a valid select list, obviously, is in the nature of a policy decision – Policy decision not to carry the process forward must be taken bona fide, there has to be justifiable reason if the process is abandoned mid-way, and such decision must not suffer from the vice of arbitrariness or the whims of the decision maker – This acts as a check on the employer’s power deciding against not making any appointment from the select list despite availability of vacancy/vacancies on the advertised/notified public post(s) – A writ court may, upon reaching the requisite satisfaction, intervene in such manner and make such directions as the facts and circumstances warrant – Held that do not find it acceptable that the aspirants, not having an indefeasible or vested right of appointment, do not also have the right to question any decision adverse to their interest affecting achievement of their goals to secure public employment – Whether, and to what extent, any relief should be granted, must depend on the facts of each case –  On facts and in the circumstances, however, the respondents’ legal rights were not infringed because of absence of grant of legitimacy to the select list by way of an approval from the Government; hence, the writ petition should not have been allowed.

(Para 53 to 55)

(D) Constitution of India, Articles 14 and 16 – Service Law – Recruitment – Judicial review Held that the factors of “when”, “which”, “what”, “who” and “how” that are associated with a recruitment/selection process is the prerogative of the recruiting authority and the selectors; however, at the same time, the process has to be conducted consistent with statutory provisions governing the same, if any, as well as principles of absolute fairness and complete non-arbitrariness – Though it is true that the law does not postulate a fetter on the authority of the employer-State and it is within the domain of the Government when to initiate a process of recruitment for public employment, either according to recruitment rules or even in the absence thereof, it is for the Government of the day to decide in which manner it proposes to conduct selection, what would be the various stages the candidates aspiring for appointment have to pass through in order to be placed in the select list, who would be the selectors, and how weightage is to be given to each of the testing methods, a great deal of credence is lent to a process if it is fairly and transparently conducted in accordance with rules, whatever be its source, without the slightest hint of any bias or favouritism or nepotism – Normally, it is not for the courts to interfere unless the process smacks of mala fides – However, the right to be considered for public employment being a Fundamental Right, it would be safe and prudent to have recruitment rules to govern the process of selection so that the best possible talent is appointed in public service – Obviously, assessing the merit of the candidates aspiring for public employment on the basis of a prescribed standard would not only provide a level playing field for each of them, the excellence of any institution to which the appointment is to be made would depend directly on the proficiency of its members/staff and that would, in turn, depend on the quality and merit of those who offer themselves for selection and ultimately get selected, necessitating the selection to be conducted without any hidden taint or masked mala fides – Last but not the least, having regard to present times when corruption has been held to be a walk of life by certain responsible citizens of the country, it would have been desirable if the process of recruitment of 104 Constables were conducted after framing of recruitment rules and also prescribing a written examination to keep the process absolutely above board.

(Para 35)

State Of Assam V. Arabinda Rabha

Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 334: (DoJ 07-03-2025)

2025 INSC 334 Click here to View Full Text of Judgment

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Delayed Death: When ‘Attempted Murder’ Becomes More

Maniklall Sahu, the appellant, along with three co-accused, trespassed into the house of Rekhchand Verma, assaulted him with sticks and fisticuffs, and flung him from a terrace. The injured person, Rekhchand Verma, initially survived but was in a critical condition. He eventually succumbed to his injuries approximately nine months after the incident, dying on 8th November 2022 due to septicaemia and pneumonia, leading to cardiorespiratory arrest. The trial court had initially convicted the appellant under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) for murder. However, the High Court altered this conviction to Section 307 IPC for attempt to murder, sentencing the appellant to 7 years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000/-. The appellant subsequently filed this appeal challenging the Section 307 IPC conviction.

Law Involved The primary legal provisions under consideration are Sections 299, 300, 302, and 307 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

Section 307 IPC (Attempt to Murder): This section deals with acts done with the intention or knowledge that it might cause death, and if death occurs, the act would be murder.

Section 299 IPC (Culpable Homicide): Defines culpable homicide.

Section 300 IPC (Murder): Specifies when culpable homicide amounts to murder, including acts done with the intention of causing death, or causing bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or knowing the act is so imminently dangerous that it will most probably cause death.

Section 302 IPC (Punishment for Murder): Prescribes the punishment for murder. The core legal question revolves around the “Application of Theory of Causation where death ensues after some delay” and whether the High Court correctly applied Section 307 IPC despite the victim’s eventual death.

Reasoning The Supreme Court critically analysed the High Court’s decision to alter the conviction from Section 302 IPC to Section 307 IPC, especially given the victim’s death.

  1. Medical Evidence and Causation: The Court reviewed extensive medical evidence, which consistently showed that the deceased, Rekhchand Verma, suffered severe injuries, including a head injury, spinal cord injury leading to paraplegia, and multiple complications such as infected bedsores, septic shock, and bilateral pneumonia. Medical experts testified that these complications were a direct result of the initial injuries sustained during the assault and were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The Court highlighted that the injured person received medical treatment for nine months before his demise. The Court concluded that the injuries suffered were grievous and that the death was a consequence of these injuries, with complications like septicaemia and pneumonia not breaking the chain of causation.
  2. High Court’s Error: The Supreme Court determined that the High Court committed a serious error in bringing the case under the ambit of “attempt to commit murder” (Section 307 IPC) on the premise that the victim survived for about nine months, and his death was due to complications during treatment and not directly from the initial injuries. The Supreme Court stressed that if the injury was fatal and intended to cause death, or if death occurred after some delay due to septicaemia or other complications stemming from the injury, the offence would fall under the first limb of Section 300 IPC (murder) [36a]. Furthermore, if the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and death occurred due to septicaemia or other complications, the act would amount to culpable homicide punishable under Section 302 IPC, falling under the third limb of Section 300 IPC [36b, 37c, 37d].
  3. Jurisprudence on Delayed Death: Drawing on various precedents, the Court reiterated that delayed death or intervening medical conditions (like septicaemia or pneumonia) do not automatically absolve an accused of murder charges if the initial injuries were the proximate cause of death. The Court concluded that the cause of death was indeed due to the injuries suffered, and the contention that the death resulted from a lack of proper treatment or was disconnected from the initial assault was unfounded.

Holding The Supreme Court dismissed Maniklall Sahu’s appeal . While the appellant’s conviction under Section 307 IPC (attempt to murder) as altered by the High Court stands affirmed due to the dismissal of his appeal, the Supreme Court clearly stated that the High Court committed a serious error in altering the conviction from Section 302 IPC to Section 307 IPC . The Supreme Court’s detailed reasoning underscored that given the medical evidence and the established chain of causation, the offence should have been considered murder or culpable homicide amounting to murder, punishable under Section 302 IPC, because the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.

Maniklall Sahu Vs State of Chhattisgarh

Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 1107: (DoJ 12-09-2025)

2025 INSC 1107 Download Supreme Court File

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Tender Troubles: Supreme Court Upholds Bid Sanctity, Overturns Rectification

The case originated from an electronic bid (No. 7 of 2023-24) issued by the Superintending Engineer and Project Director, Project Implementation Unit – I, Public Works (Roads) Directorate, Government of West Bengal, on 17.10.2023. The tender was for collecting Road User Fee (RUF) from commercial vehicles for 1095 days. The earnest money deposit was fixed at Rs. 25,00,000.00. Seven bidders participated. The technical bids were evaluated, and four bidders were technically qualified, including Prakash Asphaltings and Toll Highways (India) Limited (appellant) and Mandeepa Enterprises (respondent No. 1).

Financial bids were opened on 08.12.2023. The appellant, Prakash Asphaltings, was found to be the highest bidder (H1) with a quoted amount of Rs. 91,19,00,000.00 for 1095 days. Respondent No. 1, Mandeepa Enterprises, was the lowest bidder (H4) with an offered amount of Rs. 9,72,999.00 per day.

Respondent No. 1 subsequently claimed a typographical error in their financial bid, stating they intended to quote Rs. 106,54,33,905.00 for the entire contract period instead of Rs. 9,72,999.00 per day. They requested the tendering authority to treat the figure of Rs. 9,72,999.00 as a typographical error and read it as Rs. 106,54,33,905.00. The tendering authority rejected this request on 20.12.2023, stating that correction of a financial bid after opening was not possible and would impeach the sanctity of the tender process.

Aggrieved, Respondent No. 1 filed a writ petition (WPA No. 29001 of 2023) before a Single Judge of the High Court, which was dismissed on 03.01.2024, as the Single Judge found no scope for interference. Respondent No. 1 then filed an intra-court appeal (MAT No. 93 of 2024). A Division Bench of the High Court allowed the appeal on 23.02.2024, observing that the error in quoting the figure by respondent No. 1 was inadvertent. The Division Bench directed the tendering authority to evaluate Respondent No. 1’s BOQ at Rs. 106,54,33,905.00 and offer other bidders the opportunity to match this figure. This civil appeal was directed against the Division Bench’s judgment and order.

Law Involved

Clause 4(g) of the Notice Inviting Electronic Bid: This clause specifically states that any change in the template of the Bill of Quantity (BOQ) will not be accepted under any circumstances.

Clause 5B(v) of the Instructions to Bidders: This clause outlines that during bid evaluation, if bidders fail to submit supporting documents or original hard copies within the stipulated timeframe, their proposals will be liable for rejection.

Article 226 of the Constitution of India: Pertains to the High Court’s jurisdiction to issue writs.

Principles of Equity and Natural Justice in Tender Processes: The judgment refers to the importance of these principles in tender and contract awards, but also emphasises that these principles should be kept at a distance when there is a violation of rules.

Judicial Review of Administrative Action: The Court reiterated that judicial review in administrative action, particularly tenders, is limited to preventing arbitrariness, irrationality, bias, and mala fides. Courts should not interfere with a decision unless it is “unlawful” or “unsound”.

Public Interest: Tenders are a cornerstone of governmental procurement processes, aiming for competitiveness, fairness, and transparency in resource allocation. Adherence to rules and conditions and the sanctity of the tender process are paramount.

Reasoning The Supreme Court reasoned that the Division Bench’s interpretation was erroneous for several key reasons:

Sanctity of Tender Process: The Court held that allowing rectification of financial bids after they have been opened would impeach the sanctity and integrity of the entire tender process.

Strict Adherence to Tender Conditions: Clause 4(g) explicitly prohibits any change in the BOQ template under any circumstances. The Division Bench’s broad interpretation of “bona fide mistake” to allow rectification was held to be incorrect and would put “shackles on the functioning of the tendering authority”.

Nature of the Mistake: While Respondent No. 1 claimed an inadvertent mistake, it was effectively a unilateral or systematic computer typographical transmission failure, not one attributable to the tendering authority. Such a mistake, even if unintentional, cannot be a ground to allow post-bid modifications that would undermine the competitive bidding process.

Adverse Consequences to Public Exchequer: The Division Bench’s decision to re-evaluate Respondent No. 1’s bid at a significantly higher amount (Rs. 106,54,33,905.00) meant that the appellant, who was originally the H1 bidder, would be displaced. This would lead to a considerable loss of revenue to the state exchequer (approximately 15 crores) by not accepting the higher bid of the appellant and giving an opportunity to Respondent No. 1 to correct its bid post-opening.

Limited Scope of Judicial Review: The Court reiterated that interference by a writ court in ongoing tender processes is not permissible unless there is a clear violation of principles of natural justice, or the decision is arbitrary or mala fide. The Division Bench’s decision was deemed a clear violation of natural justice principles.

Non-Joinder of Party: The appellant (Prakash Asphaltings), as the highest bidder and a directly affected party, was not made a party respondent in the intra-court appeal before the Division Bench, which was viewed as prejudicial and a violation of natural justice.

Holding The Supreme Court allowed the civil appeal, thereby setting aside and quashing the judgment and order dated 23.02.2024 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court at Calcutta in MAT No. 93 of 2024. The Court sustained the order of the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition. Consequently, Prakash Asphaltings and Toll Highways (India) Limited (the appellant), being the H1 bidder, is to be awarded the contract in terms of the notice inviting electronic bid dated 17.10.2023. The Court also ruled that there shall be no order as to costs.

Prakash Asphaltings And Toll Highways (India) Limited Vs Mandeep Enterprises And Others

Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 1108: (DoJ 12-09-2025)

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“Speculative Investors” Barred from IBC Relief: Supreme Court Upholds Homebuyer Protections

Four appeals were heard together, arising from orders of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT). The key appellants, Mansi Brar Fernandes and Sunita Agarwal, had entered into agreements with developers (Gayatri Infra Planner Pvt. Ltd. and Antriksh Infratech Pvt. Ltd., respectively) for property units. Both agreements included buy-back clauses and involved advance payments. The developers defaulted, and the appellants initiated proceedings under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC). The NCLAT reversed the admission of these applications, branding the appellants as “speculative investors” rather than genuine homebuyers or financial creditors.

Law Involved: The central legal framework is the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC), specifically Section 7, which governs the initiation of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) by financial creditors. The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Ordinance, 2019, and the subsequent Amendment Act, are also critical. These amendments introduced a threshold requirement for allottees to file a Section 7 application (requiring at least 10% of allottees or 100 allottees). The Court frequently referenced its earlier judgment in Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd v. Union of India, which distinguishes between genuine homebuyers and speculative investors. The judgment also emphasizes the Right to Shelter as a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution and the role of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (RERA).

Reasoning: The Supreme Court deliberated on the distinction between “speculative investors” and “genuine homebuyers” within the context of the IBC. It observed that the IBC is intended as a collective mechanism to revive viable projects and safeguard the fundamental right to shelter of genuine homebuyers, not as a recovery tool or a bargaining chip for individuals. The legislative intent behind recognizing allottees as financial creditors was to protect genuine homebuyers, while simultaneously preventing misuse by speculative investors seeking premature exits or exorbitant returns, which had burdened the real estate sector and the adjudicatory machinery.

The Court provided criteria to identify speculative investors, including: agreements that substitute possession with buy-back or refund options, insistence on refunds with high interest, purchase of multiple units (especially in double digits), demanding special rights or privileges, deviations from the RERA Model Agreement, and unrealistic interest rates or promises of returns. The transaction entered into by Mansi Brar Fernandes, involving a buy-back clause and the pursuit of commercial returns rather than possession, led the Court to conclude that she was indeed a speculative investor. Similarly, Sunita Agarwal’s agreement for an “investment” with a 25% per annum return over 24 months, coupled with a buy-back clause, indicated a speculative intent.

While affirming the NCLAT’s finding that the appellants were “speculative investors,” the Supreme Court clarified that the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Ordinance, 2019, was indeed applicable to the facts of the present case, correcting the NCLAT’s reasoning on this point [19, 20, 35, 36, 48(ii)]. The Court applied the doctrine of Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit (an act of the Court shall prejudice no one) to address the procedural issues related to the Ordinance’s applicability and the delay it caused.

Holding: The Supreme Court affirmed the NCLAT’s findings that Mansi Brar Fernandes and Sunita Agarwal were “speculative investors” and therefore not entitled to initiate proceedings under Section 7 of the IBC [25, 34, 48(i)]. Consequently, the Court upheld the NCLAT’s orders setting aside the admission of their Section 7 applications by the NCLT [48(i)]. However, the Court clarified that the Ordinance/Amendment Act was applicable to the case, although this correction in reasoning did not alter the ultimate outcome given the appellants’ status as speculative investors [48(ii)]. The appellants remain free to pursue their remedies through other appropriate legal forums, without being barred by limitation [48(i)].

Mansi Brar Fernandes Vs Subha Sharma And Anr.

Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 1110: (DoJ 12-09-2025)

2025 INSC 1110 Download Supreme Court File

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