Indian Judgements

Indian Judgements

Summoning as an additional accused after conclusion of trial on High Court order Held Valid

Appeal concerning the summoning of additional accused under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). The core issue revolves around whether a trial court can summon new accused parties long after the main trial has concluded and the original accused have been convicted. The Supreme Court analyzes the scope and legislative history of Section 319, emphasizing that a High Court’s revisional order, which overturns a trial court’s rejection of a summoning application, “relates back” to the date of the original rejection. This ensures that the summoning is deemed to have occurred before the trial’s conclusion, upholding the statute’s intent to bring all perpetrators to justice, even if it necessitates a separate, de novo trial for the newly added individuals.

(A) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 319, 397, 401 – Criminal Procedure – Summoning as an additional accused after conclusion of trial – Offence punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149 and 302 IPC –  Held that the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction was justified in setting aside the order passed by the Trial Court rejecting the second application preferred by respondent no. 2 under Section 319 of the CrPC as the same was found to have been passed contrary to the settled position of law, suffering from a patent illegality, thus, leading to serious miscarriage of justice –  Once a superior court deems fit to interfere with an order passed by a subordinate court, then any rectifications to such order passed in exercise of revisional powers under Section 401 read with Section 397 of the CrPC must be treated on the same footing as rectifications made by an appellate court and as a result would relate back to the time the original order was passed – By virtue of relating back of the order passed by the High Court in a revision petition, the summoning order passed by the Trial Court in compliance with the order of the High Court would also relate back to the initial order rejecting the second application under Section 319, and therefore could be said to have been passed before the conclusion of the trial –  Unlike cases where an application under Section 319 is being decided in the first instance by the Trial Court, the conclusion of trial will have no bearing on the adjudication of an application under Section 319 in terms of the directions of the High Court passed in exercise of revisional jurisdiction –  The legal effect of the order passed by the High Court relating back to the original order of the Trial Court is that the Trial Court would not be rendered functus officio for the purpose of considering the application under Section 319 after the conclusion of the trial  because the Trial Court, in considering the application under Section 319 after the conclusion of the trial, merely gave effect to a revisional order directing it to consider the application afresh which it had originally rejected –  The summoning order dated 21.02.2024 was passed by the Trial Court in pursuance of the directions issued by the High Court vide the revisional order dated 14.09.2021 – Therefore, the same should be construed as an extension of the revisional order passed by the High Court – The combined effect of the revisional order passed by the High Court and the summoning order passed by the Trial Court dated 21.02.2024 would be that the order of the Trial Court dated 19.07.2010 rejecting the second Section 319 application stood replaced and substituted by the summoning order dated 21.02.2024 – Thus, although the summoning order in the present case came to be passed on 21.02.2024, that is, after the conclusion of the trial, yet, it would be deemed to have been passed on 19.07.2010 by virtue of the law expounded by this Court in Maru Ram  and Krishnaji Dattatreya Bapat

(Para 115)

(B) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 319, 397, 401 – Criminal Procedure – Summoning as an additional accused – Opportunity of being heard – Section 319 does not contemplate that a summoned person must be given an opportunity of being heard before being added as an accused to face the trial – A right of hearing would accrue only to a person who is already discharged in the very same proceeding prior to the commencement of the trial – This is different from holding that a person who has been summoned as per Section 319 CrPC has a right of being heard in accordance with the principles of natural justice before being added as an accused to be tried along with the other accused – However, after the rejection of an application under Section 319, a right enures in favour of the proposed accused – Thereafter, if in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High Court is to pass an order which is prejudicial to the benefit which had already enured in favour of the proposed accused, then the High Court is obligated in law to provide an opportunity of hearing to the proposed accused – This is also the mandate as contained in sub-section (2) of Section 401 of the CrPC.

(Para 110, 111, 115)

(C) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 319 – Criminal Procedure – Summoning as an additional accused – Offence punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149 and 302 IPC – Stage at which power under Section 319 of the CrPC can be exercised – Whether the Trial Court could have entertained an application filed under Section 319 of the CrPC almost twelve years after the conclusion of the main trial and in the absence of any proceedings pending before it? – A bare perusal of the sub-section (1) of Section 319 of the CrPC indicates that the power thereunder can be exercised “in the course of an inquiry into, or trial of, an offence” – “Trial” means determination of issues adjudging the guilt or the innocence of a person, the person has to be aware of what is the case against him and it is only at the stage of framing of the charges that the court informs him of the same, the “trial” commences only on charges being framed  and not from  stage of cognizance being taken – Word “inquiry” is, therefore, not any inquiry relating to the investigation of the case by the investigating agency but is an inquiry after the case is brought to the notice of the court on the filing of the charge-sheet – The court can thereafter proceed to make inquiries and it is for this reason that an inquiry has been given to mean something other than the actual trial –  Even the word “course” occurring in Section 319 CrPC, clearly indicates that the power can be exercised only during the period when the inquiry has been commenced and is going on or the trial which has commenced and is going on – It covers the entire wide range of the process of the pre-trial and the trial stage – The word “course” therefore, allows the court to invoke this power to proceed against any person from the initial stage of inquiry up to the stage of the conclusion of the trial – The court does not become functus officio even if cognizance is taken so far as it is looking into the material qua any other person who is not an accused.

(Para 47 to 51)

(D) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 319(1), (4) – Criminal Procedure – Summoning as an additional accused – Offence punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149 and 302 IPC – De novo trial – Stage at which power under Section 319 of the CrPC can be exercised – Conducting a fresh trial in respect of the proposed accused after the conclusion of the main trial is not permissible unless an order separating the trial of the original accused with that of the proposed accused is passed by the court before the original trial stands concluded – This stage is reached after the summoning order has been made during the pendency of the trial in respect of the original accused – Passing of a summoning order before the conclusion of trial is a requirement that flows from sub-section (1) of Section 319 – This requirement is in no way qualified by the provision of a fresh trial under sub- section (4) and thus, cannot be the basis to allow a summoning order to be passed after the conclusion of trial in the absence of a decision by the court  to proceed against the proposed accused under sub-section (1) of Section 319 of the CrPC during the pendency of the trial.

(Para 60)

(E) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 319(1), (4) – Criminal Procedure – Summoning as an additional accused – Expression “could be tried together” –  Held that for offences committed in the same transaction, the court should ideally arraign all the concerned persons as accused at the same time – Even if a person is not arraigned as an accused, he could be arraigned as an accused under Section 319 provided, inter alia, he “could be tried together” with the originally charge-sheeted accused – Therefore, what follows is that a person must be arraigned as an accused under Section 319 when the persons originally charge-sheeted are still accused persons and their culpability is yet to be decided – The power under Section 319 can only be exercised in a situation where the Trial Court is seized of the offence committed in the “same transaction” – When the trial is concluded, such court becomes functus officio and the power to summon persons under Section 319 for the offences alleged to have been committed in the same transaction no longer vests with the said court as the new persons sought to be summoned cannot be tried together with the original accused – Requirement placed by the expression “could be tried together with the accused” for exercise of power under sub-section (1) of Section 319 is mandatory in the sense that a joint trial of the original accused and proposed accused must be possible – However, whether a joint trial, or a separate trial, is held is left to the discretion of the Trial Court – As a result, passing of the summoning order before the conclusion of trial is mandatory – It cannot be said for a moment that passing of the summoning order before the conclusion of trial is directory merely because sub-section (4) provides for conduct of a fresh trial in respect of the additional accused.

(Para 63, 64 and 66)

(F) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 319(1) – Summoning as an additional accused – Essential ingredients – Held three essential requirements that must be fulfilled for invoking the powers under Section 319(1):

  1. First, there must be an ongoing inquiry or trial in respect of the original accused person(s); and
  1. Secondly, in the course of such proceedings, evidence must have come on record to show

that any person other than the original accused has committed any offence; and

  1. Thirdly, the person sought to be summoned could be tried together with the original accused for such offence.

(Para 39)

(G) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 319(1) – Criminal Procedure – Summoning as an additional accused – Section 319 CrPC can be exercised against a person not subjected to investigation, or a person placed in Column 2 of the chargesheet and against whom cognizance had not been taken, or even a person who has been discharged – However, as regards a person who has been discharged, no proceedings can be commenced against him directly under Section 319 CrPC without taking recourse to provisions of Section 300(5) read with Section 398 CrPC – Such a person can be proceeded against under Section 319 only if during or after an inquiry under Section 300(5) read with Section 398, there appears to be evidence against such person which may indicate that they committed any offence for which they could be tried together with the accused – Therefore, a summoning order issued under Section 319 of the CrPC cannot be quashed only on the ground that even though the proposed accused were named in the FIR or complaint, the police did not include their names in the chargesheet – In other words, if the evidence tendered in the course of any inquiry or trial shows that any person not being the accused has committed any offence for which he could be tried together with the accused, he can be summoned to face trial even though he may not have been chargesheeted by the investigating agency or may have been discharged at an earlier stage.

(Para 43, 44)

(H) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 319(4) – Criminal Procedure – Summoning as an additional accused – De novo trial – Sub-section (4) of Section 319 mandates that a fresh trial or a de novo trial is to be conducted in respect of the persons summoned under sub-section (1) so as to ensure that such persons are not deprived of the opportunity to present their case and examine the witnesses properly – The requirement of a de novo trial in sub-section (4)(a) is quite different from the notion of a split- up or separate trial as provided under Section 317 of the CrPC – The provision of a de novo trial is to safeguard the right of fair trial to be provided to the new persons summoned under Section 319(1) –  However, while the provision of de novo or fresh trial under Section 319(4) is mandatory, the said sub-section is applicable only in cases where the court proceeds against any person under sub-section (1) – Thus, a de novo trial can be commenced in respect of the proposed accused only if the power under sub-section (1) has been validly exercised by the court – In other words, sub- section (4) is subject to sub-section (1) and thus also to the expression “could be tried together with the accused” mentioned in sub-section (1).

(Para 45 and 46)

Jamin V. State Of Uttar Pradesh

Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 330: (DoJ 06-03-2025)

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Delayed Death: When ‘Attempted Murder’ Becomes More

Maniklall Sahu, the appellant, along with three co-accused, trespassed into the house of Rekhchand Verma, assaulted him with sticks and fisticuffs, and flung him from a terrace. The injured person, Rekhchand Verma, initially survived but was in a critical condition. He eventually succumbed to his injuries approximately nine months after the incident, dying on 8th November 2022 due to septicaemia and pneumonia, leading to cardiorespiratory arrest. The trial court had initially convicted the appellant under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) for murder. However, the High Court altered this conviction to Section 307 IPC for attempt to murder, sentencing the appellant to 7 years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000/-. The appellant subsequently filed this appeal challenging the Section 307 IPC conviction.

Law Involved The primary legal provisions under consideration are Sections 299, 300, 302, and 307 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

Section 307 IPC (Attempt to Murder): This section deals with acts done with the intention or knowledge that it might cause death, and if death occurs, the act would be murder.

Section 299 IPC (Culpable Homicide): Defines culpable homicide.

Section 300 IPC (Murder): Specifies when culpable homicide amounts to murder, including acts done with the intention of causing death, or causing bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or knowing the act is so imminently dangerous that it will most probably cause death.

Section 302 IPC (Punishment for Murder): Prescribes the punishment for murder. The core legal question revolves around the “Application of Theory of Causation where death ensues after some delay” and whether the High Court correctly applied Section 307 IPC despite the victim’s eventual death.

Reasoning The Supreme Court critically analysed the High Court’s decision to alter the conviction from Section 302 IPC to Section 307 IPC, especially given the victim’s death.

  1. Medical Evidence and Causation: The Court reviewed extensive medical evidence, which consistently showed that the deceased, Rekhchand Verma, suffered severe injuries, including a head injury, spinal cord injury leading to paraplegia, and multiple complications such as infected bedsores, septic shock, and bilateral pneumonia. Medical experts testified that these complications were a direct result of the initial injuries sustained during the assault and were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The Court highlighted that the injured person received medical treatment for nine months before his demise. The Court concluded that the injuries suffered were grievous and that the death was a consequence of these injuries, with complications like septicaemia and pneumonia not breaking the chain of causation.
  2. High Court’s Error: The Supreme Court determined that the High Court committed a serious error in bringing the case under the ambit of “attempt to commit murder” (Section 307 IPC) on the premise that the victim survived for about nine months, and his death was due to complications during treatment and not directly from the initial injuries. The Supreme Court stressed that if the injury was fatal and intended to cause death, or if death occurred after some delay due to septicaemia or other complications stemming from the injury, the offence would fall under the first limb of Section 300 IPC (murder) [36a]. Furthermore, if the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and death occurred due to septicaemia or other complications, the act would amount to culpable homicide punishable under Section 302 IPC, falling under the third limb of Section 300 IPC [36b, 37c, 37d].
  3. Jurisprudence on Delayed Death: Drawing on various precedents, the Court reiterated that delayed death or intervening medical conditions (like septicaemia or pneumonia) do not automatically absolve an accused of murder charges if the initial injuries were the proximate cause of death. The Court concluded that the cause of death was indeed due to the injuries suffered, and the contention that the death resulted from a lack of proper treatment or was disconnected from the initial assault was unfounded.

Holding The Supreme Court dismissed Maniklall Sahu’s appeal . While the appellant’s conviction under Section 307 IPC (attempt to murder) as altered by the High Court stands affirmed due to the dismissal of his appeal, the Supreme Court clearly stated that the High Court committed a serious error in altering the conviction from Section 302 IPC to Section 307 IPC . The Supreme Court’s detailed reasoning underscored that given the medical evidence and the established chain of causation, the offence should have been considered murder or culpable homicide amounting to murder, punishable under Section 302 IPC, because the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.

Maniklall Sahu Vs State of Chhattisgarh

Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 1107: (DoJ 12-09-2025)

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Tender Troubles: Supreme Court Upholds Bid Sanctity, Overturns Rectification

The case originated from an electronic bid (No. 7 of 2023-24) issued by the Superintending Engineer and Project Director, Project Implementation Unit – I, Public Works (Roads) Directorate, Government of West Bengal, on 17.10.2023. The tender was for collecting Road User Fee (RUF) from commercial vehicles for 1095 days. The earnest money deposit was fixed at Rs. 25,00,000.00. Seven bidders participated. The technical bids were evaluated, and four bidders were technically qualified, including Prakash Asphaltings and Toll Highways (India) Limited (appellant) and Mandeepa Enterprises (respondent No. 1).

Financial bids were opened on 08.12.2023. The appellant, Prakash Asphaltings, was found to be the highest bidder (H1) with a quoted amount of Rs. 91,19,00,000.00 for 1095 days. Respondent No. 1, Mandeepa Enterprises, was the lowest bidder (H4) with an offered amount of Rs. 9,72,999.00 per day.

Respondent No. 1 subsequently claimed a typographical error in their financial bid, stating they intended to quote Rs. 106,54,33,905.00 for the entire contract period instead of Rs. 9,72,999.00 per day. They requested the tendering authority to treat the figure of Rs. 9,72,999.00 as a typographical error and read it as Rs. 106,54,33,905.00. The tendering authority rejected this request on 20.12.2023, stating that correction of a financial bid after opening was not possible and would impeach the sanctity of the tender process.

Aggrieved, Respondent No. 1 filed a writ petition (WPA No. 29001 of 2023) before a Single Judge of the High Court, which was dismissed on 03.01.2024, as the Single Judge found no scope for interference. Respondent No. 1 then filed an intra-court appeal (MAT No. 93 of 2024). A Division Bench of the High Court allowed the appeal on 23.02.2024, observing that the error in quoting the figure by respondent No. 1 was inadvertent. The Division Bench directed the tendering authority to evaluate Respondent No. 1’s BOQ at Rs. 106,54,33,905.00 and offer other bidders the opportunity to match this figure. This civil appeal was directed against the Division Bench’s judgment and order.

Law Involved

Clause 4(g) of the Notice Inviting Electronic Bid: This clause specifically states that any change in the template of the Bill of Quantity (BOQ) will not be accepted under any circumstances.

Clause 5B(v) of the Instructions to Bidders: This clause outlines that during bid evaluation, if bidders fail to submit supporting documents or original hard copies within the stipulated timeframe, their proposals will be liable for rejection.

Article 226 of the Constitution of India: Pertains to the High Court’s jurisdiction to issue writs.

Principles of Equity and Natural Justice in Tender Processes: The judgment refers to the importance of these principles in tender and contract awards, but also emphasises that these principles should be kept at a distance when there is a violation of rules.

Judicial Review of Administrative Action: The Court reiterated that judicial review in administrative action, particularly tenders, is limited to preventing arbitrariness, irrationality, bias, and mala fides. Courts should not interfere with a decision unless it is “unlawful” or “unsound”.

Public Interest: Tenders are a cornerstone of governmental procurement processes, aiming for competitiveness, fairness, and transparency in resource allocation. Adherence to rules and conditions and the sanctity of the tender process are paramount.

Reasoning The Supreme Court reasoned that the Division Bench’s interpretation was erroneous for several key reasons:

Sanctity of Tender Process: The Court held that allowing rectification of financial bids after they have been opened would impeach the sanctity and integrity of the entire tender process.

Strict Adherence to Tender Conditions: Clause 4(g) explicitly prohibits any change in the BOQ template under any circumstances. The Division Bench’s broad interpretation of “bona fide mistake” to allow rectification was held to be incorrect and would put “shackles on the functioning of the tendering authority”.

Nature of the Mistake: While Respondent No. 1 claimed an inadvertent mistake, it was effectively a unilateral or systematic computer typographical transmission failure, not one attributable to the tendering authority. Such a mistake, even if unintentional, cannot be a ground to allow post-bid modifications that would undermine the competitive bidding process.

Adverse Consequences to Public Exchequer: The Division Bench’s decision to re-evaluate Respondent No. 1’s bid at a significantly higher amount (Rs. 106,54,33,905.00) meant that the appellant, who was originally the H1 bidder, would be displaced. This would lead to a considerable loss of revenue to the state exchequer (approximately 15 crores) by not accepting the higher bid of the appellant and giving an opportunity to Respondent No. 1 to correct its bid post-opening.

Limited Scope of Judicial Review: The Court reiterated that interference by a writ court in ongoing tender processes is not permissible unless there is a clear violation of principles of natural justice, or the decision is arbitrary or mala fide. The Division Bench’s decision was deemed a clear violation of natural justice principles.

Non-Joinder of Party: The appellant (Prakash Asphaltings), as the highest bidder and a directly affected party, was not made a party respondent in the intra-court appeal before the Division Bench, which was viewed as prejudicial and a violation of natural justice.

Holding The Supreme Court allowed the civil appeal, thereby setting aside and quashing the judgment and order dated 23.02.2024 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court at Calcutta in MAT No. 93 of 2024. The Court sustained the order of the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition. Consequently, Prakash Asphaltings and Toll Highways (India) Limited (the appellant), being the H1 bidder, is to be awarded the contract in terms of the notice inviting electronic bid dated 17.10.2023. The Court also ruled that there shall be no order as to costs.

Prakash Asphaltings And Toll Highways (India) Limited Vs Mandeep Enterprises And Others

Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 1108: (DoJ 12-09-2025)

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“Speculative Investors” Barred from IBC Relief: Supreme Court Upholds Homebuyer Protections

Four appeals were heard together, arising from orders of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT). The key appellants, Mansi Brar Fernandes and Sunita Agarwal, had entered into agreements with developers (Gayatri Infra Planner Pvt. Ltd. and Antriksh Infratech Pvt. Ltd., respectively) for property units. Both agreements included buy-back clauses and involved advance payments. The developers defaulted, and the appellants initiated proceedings under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC). The NCLAT reversed the admission of these applications, branding the appellants as “speculative investors” rather than genuine homebuyers or financial creditors.

Law Involved: The central legal framework is the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC), specifically Section 7, which governs the initiation of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) by financial creditors. The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Ordinance, 2019, and the subsequent Amendment Act, are also critical. These amendments introduced a threshold requirement for allottees to file a Section 7 application (requiring at least 10% of allottees or 100 allottees). The Court frequently referenced its earlier judgment in Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd v. Union of India, which distinguishes between genuine homebuyers and speculative investors. The judgment also emphasizes the Right to Shelter as a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution and the role of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (RERA).

Reasoning: The Supreme Court deliberated on the distinction between “speculative investors” and “genuine homebuyers” within the context of the IBC. It observed that the IBC is intended as a collective mechanism to revive viable projects and safeguard the fundamental right to shelter of genuine homebuyers, not as a recovery tool or a bargaining chip for individuals. The legislative intent behind recognizing allottees as financial creditors was to protect genuine homebuyers, while simultaneously preventing misuse by speculative investors seeking premature exits or exorbitant returns, which had burdened the real estate sector and the adjudicatory machinery.

The Court provided criteria to identify speculative investors, including: agreements that substitute possession with buy-back or refund options, insistence on refunds with high interest, purchase of multiple units (especially in double digits), demanding special rights or privileges, deviations from the RERA Model Agreement, and unrealistic interest rates or promises of returns. The transaction entered into by Mansi Brar Fernandes, involving a buy-back clause and the pursuit of commercial returns rather than possession, led the Court to conclude that she was indeed a speculative investor. Similarly, Sunita Agarwal’s agreement for an “investment” with a 25% per annum return over 24 months, coupled with a buy-back clause, indicated a speculative intent.

While affirming the NCLAT’s finding that the appellants were “speculative investors,” the Supreme Court clarified that the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Ordinance, 2019, was indeed applicable to the facts of the present case, correcting the NCLAT’s reasoning on this point [19, 20, 35, 36, 48(ii)]. The Court applied the doctrine of Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit (an act of the Court shall prejudice no one) to address the procedural issues related to the Ordinance’s applicability and the delay it caused.

Holding: The Supreme Court affirmed the NCLAT’s findings that Mansi Brar Fernandes and Sunita Agarwal were “speculative investors” and therefore not entitled to initiate proceedings under Section 7 of the IBC [25, 34, 48(i)]. Consequently, the Court upheld the NCLAT’s orders setting aside the admission of their Section 7 applications by the NCLT [48(i)]. However, the Court clarified that the Ordinance/Amendment Act was applicable to the case, although this correction in reasoning did not alter the ultimate outcome given the appellants’ status as speculative investors [48(ii)]. The appellants remain free to pursue their remedies through other appropriate legal forums, without being barred by limitation [48(i)].

Mansi Brar Fernandes Vs Subha Sharma And Anr.

Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 1110: (DoJ 12-09-2025)

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