Indian Judgements

Indian Judgements

Summoning as an additional accused after conclusion of trial on High Court order Held Valid

Appeal concerning the summoning of additional accused under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). The core issue revolves around whether a trial court can summon new accused parties long after the main trial has concluded and the original accused have been convicted. The Supreme Court analyzes the scope and legislative history of Section 319, emphasizing that a High Court’s revisional order, which overturns a trial court’s rejection of a summoning application, “relates back” to the date of the original rejection. This ensures that the summoning is deemed to have occurred before the trial’s conclusion, upholding the statute’s intent to bring all perpetrators to justice, even if it necessitates a separate, de novo trial for the newly added individuals.

(A) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 319, 397, 401 – Criminal Procedure – Summoning as an additional accused after conclusion of trial – Offence punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149 and 302 IPC –  Held that the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction was justified in setting aside the order passed by the Trial Court rejecting the second application preferred by respondent no. 2 under Section 319 of the CrPC as the same was found to have been passed contrary to the settled position of law, suffering from a patent illegality, thus, leading to serious miscarriage of justice –  Once a superior court deems fit to interfere with an order passed by a subordinate court, then any rectifications to such order passed in exercise of revisional powers under Section 401 read with Section 397 of the CrPC must be treated on the same footing as rectifications made by an appellate court and as a result would relate back to the time the original order was passed – By virtue of relating back of the order passed by the High Court in a revision petition, the summoning order passed by the Trial Court in compliance with the order of the High Court would also relate back to the initial order rejecting the second application under Section 319, and therefore could be said to have been passed before the conclusion of the trial –  Unlike cases where an application under Section 319 is being decided in the first instance by the Trial Court, the conclusion of trial will have no bearing on the adjudication of an application under Section 319 in terms of the directions of the High Court passed in exercise of revisional jurisdiction –  The legal effect of the order passed by the High Court relating back to the original order of the Trial Court is that the Trial Court would not be rendered functus officio for the purpose of considering the application under Section 319 after the conclusion of the trial  because the Trial Court, in considering the application under Section 319 after the conclusion of the trial, merely gave effect to a revisional order directing it to consider the application afresh which it had originally rejected –  The summoning order dated 21.02.2024 was passed by the Trial Court in pursuance of the directions issued by the High Court vide the revisional order dated 14.09.2021 – Therefore, the same should be construed as an extension of the revisional order passed by the High Court – The combined effect of the revisional order passed by the High Court and the summoning order passed by the Trial Court dated 21.02.2024 would be that the order of the Trial Court dated 19.07.2010 rejecting the second Section 319 application stood replaced and substituted by the summoning order dated 21.02.2024 – Thus, although the summoning order in the present case came to be passed on 21.02.2024, that is, after the conclusion of the trial, yet, it would be deemed to have been passed on 19.07.2010 by virtue of the law expounded by this Court in Maru Ram  and Krishnaji Dattatreya Bapat

(Para 115)

(B) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 319, 397, 401 – Criminal Procedure – Summoning as an additional accused – Opportunity of being heard – Section 319 does not contemplate that a summoned person must be given an opportunity of being heard before being added as an accused to face the trial – A right of hearing would accrue only to a person who is already discharged in the very same proceeding prior to the commencement of the trial – This is different from holding that a person who has been summoned as per Section 319 CrPC has a right of being heard in accordance with the principles of natural justice before being added as an accused to be tried along with the other accused – However, after the rejection of an application under Section 319, a right enures in favour of the proposed accused – Thereafter, if in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High Court is to pass an order which is prejudicial to the benefit which had already enured in favour of the proposed accused, then the High Court is obligated in law to provide an opportunity of hearing to the proposed accused – This is also the mandate as contained in sub-section (2) of Section 401 of the CrPC.

(Para 110, 111, 115)

(C) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 319 – Criminal Procedure – Summoning as an additional accused – Offence punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149 and 302 IPC – Stage at which power under Section 319 of the CrPC can be exercised – Whether the Trial Court could have entertained an application filed under Section 319 of the CrPC almost twelve years after the conclusion of the main trial and in the absence of any proceedings pending before it? – A bare perusal of the sub-section (1) of Section 319 of the CrPC indicates that the power thereunder can be exercised “in the course of an inquiry into, or trial of, an offence” – “Trial” means determination of issues adjudging the guilt or the innocence of a person, the person has to be aware of what is the case against him and it is only at the stage of framing of the charges that the court informs him of the same, the “trial” commences only on charges being framed  and not from  stage of cognizance being taken – Word “inquiry” is, therefore, not any inquiry relating to the investigation of the case by the investigating agency but is an inquiry after the case is brought to the notice of the court on the filing of the charge-sheet – The court can thereafter proceed to make inquiries and it is for this reason that an inquiry has been given to mean something other than the actual trial –  Even the word “course” occurring in Section 319 CrPC, clearly indicates that the power can be exercised only during the period when the inquiry has been commenced and is going on or the trial which has commenced and is going on – It covers the entire wide range of the process of the pre-trial and the trial stage – The word “course” therefore, allows the court to invoke this power to proceed against any person from the initial stage of inquiry up to the stage of the conclusion of the trial – The court does not become functus officio even if cognizance is taken so far as it is looking into the material qua any other person who is not an accused.

(Para 47 to 51)

(D) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 319(1), (4) – Criminal Procedure – Summoning as an additional accused – Offence punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149 and 302 IPC – De novo trial – Stage at which power under Section 319 of the CrPC can be exercised – Conducting a fresh trial in respect of the proposed accused after the conclusion of the main trial is not permissible unless an order separating the trial of the original accused with that of the proposed accused is passed by the court before the original trial stands concluded – This stage is reached after the summoning order has been made during the pendency of the trial in respect of the original accused – Passing of a summoning order before the conclusion of trial is a requirement that flows from sub-section (1) of Section 319 – This requirement is in no way qualified by the provision of a fresh trial under sub- section (4) and thus, cannot be the basis to allow a summoning order to be passed after the conclusion of trial in the absence of a decision by the court  to proceed against the proposed accused under sub-section (1) of Section 319 of the CrPC during the pendency of the trial.

(Para 60)

(E) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 319(1), (4) – Criminal Procedure – Summoning as an additional accused – Expression “could be tried together” –  Held that for offences committed in the same transaction, the court should ideally arraign all the concerned persons as accused at the same time – Even if a person is not arraigned as an accused, he could be arraigned as an accused under Section 319 provided, inter alia, he “could be tried together” with the originally charge-sheeted accused – Therefore, what follows is that a person must be arraigned as an accused under Section 319 when the persons originally charge-sheeted are still accused persons and their culpability is yet to be decided – The power under Section 319 can only be exercised in a situation where the Trial Court is seized of the offence committed in the “same transaction” – When the trial is concluded, such court becomes functus officio and the power to summon persons under Section 319 for the offences alleged to have been committed in the same transaction no longer vests with the said court as the new persons sought to be summoned cannot be tried together with the original accused – Requirement placed by the expression “could be tried together with the accused” for exercise of power under sub-section (1) of Section 319 is mandatory in the sense that a joint trial of the original accused and proposed accused must be possible – However, whether a joint trial, or a separate trial, is held is left to the discretion of the Trial Court – As a result, passing of the summoning order before the conclusion of trial is mandatory – It cannot be said for a moment that passing of the summoning order before the conclusion of trial is directory merely because sub-section (4) provides for conduct of a fresh trial in respect of the additional accused.

(Para 63, 64 and 66)

(F) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 319(1) – Summoning as an additional accused – Essential ingredients – Held three essential requirements that must be fulfilled for invoking the powers under Section 319(1):

  1. First, there must be an ongoing inquiry or trial in respect of the original accused person(s); and
  1. Secondly, in the course of such proceedings, evidence must have come on record to show

that any person other than the original accused has committed any offence; and

  1. Thirdly, the person sought to be summoned could be tried together with the original accused for such offence.

(Para 39)

(G) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 319(1) – Criminal Procedure – Summoning as an additional accused – Section 319 CrPC can be exercised against a person not subjected to investigation, or a person placed in Column 2 of the chargesheet and against whom cognizance had not been taken, or even a person who has been discharged – However, as regards a person who has been discharged, no proceedings can be commenced against him directly under Section 319 CrPC without taking recourse to provisions of Section 300(5) read with Section 398 CrPC – Such a person can be proceeded against under Section 319 only if during or after an inquiry under Section 300(5) read with Section 398, there appears to be evidence against such person which may indicate that they committed any offence for which they could be tried together with the accused – Therefore, a summoning order issued under Section 319 of the CrPC cannot be quashed only on the ground that even though the proposed accused were named in the FIR or complaint, the police did not include their names in the chargesheet – In other words, if the evidence tendered in the course of any inquiry or trial shows that any person not being the accused has committed any offence for which he could be tried together with the accused, he can be summoned to face trial even though he may not have been chargesheeted by the investigating agency or may have been discharged at an earlier stage.

(Para 43, 44)

(H) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 319(4) – Criminal Procedure – Summoning as an additional accused – De novo trial – Sub-section (4) of Section 319 mandates that a fresh trial or a de novo trial is to be conducted in respect of the persons summoned under sub-section (1) so as to ensure that such persons are not deprived of the opportunity to present their case and examine the witnesses properly – The requirement of a de novo trial in sub-section (4)(a) is quite different from the notion of a split- up or separate trial as provided under Section 317 of the CrPC – The provision of a de novo trial is to safeguard the right of fair trial to be provided to the new persons summoned under Section 319(1) –  However, while the provision of de novo or fresh trial under Section 319(4) is mandatory, the said sub-section is applicable only in cases where the court proceeds against any person under sub-section (1) – Thus, a de novo trial can be commenced in respect of the proposed accused only if the power under sub-section (1) has been validly exercised by the court – In other words, sub- section (4) is subject to sub-section (1) and thus also to the expression “could be tried together with the accused” mentioned in sub-section (1).

(Para 45 and 46)

Jamin V. State Of Uttar Pradesh

Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 330: (DoJ 06-03-2025)

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Trust Betrayed: Deceased Appellant’s Fortune Redirected to Child Welfare

The appellant was convicted by the trial court on charges of criminal breach of trust, criminal breach of trust by public servant, criminal breach of trust by banker, merchant or agent, and criminal misappropriation. These charges stemmed from the misappropriation of funds designated for welfare schemes aimed at children with disabilities. The funds were reportedly sanctioned for non-existent schools and children without proper audit or inspection, with the incident occurring between 2004 and 2007. The total misappropriated amount cited in court discussions reached Rs. 7,00,00,000.

Trial Court Sentence: The appellant was sentenced to 7 years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,00,000. Failure to pay the fine would result in an additional 6 months of simple imprisonment. Other co-accused individuals were acquitted.

Appeal and Abatement: The appellant filed an appeal against her conviction and sentence. However, during the pendency of the appeal, Annapurani, the appellant, passed away in 2022. Consequently, her appeal stood abated.

Law Involved

The primary legal provisions cited in the case were from the Indian Penal Code (IPC), specifically:

Section 409 IPC: Dealing with criminal breach of trust by a public servant, or by a banker, merchant, or agent.

Section 34 IPC: Pertaining to acts done by several persons in furtherance of a common intention.

The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (JJ Act) was referenced in relation to the utilisation of the fine amount for the welfare and rehabilitation of children in need of care and protection, or those in conflict with the law.

Reasoning and Holding of the Judgment

Abatement of Proceedings: The appeal formally abated due to the death of the appellant, Annapurani, while the appeal was still under consideration.

Court’s Direction on Funds: Despite the abatement, the Court acknowledged the large-scale criminal misappropriation and breach of trust involved in the case. It was noted that the appellant had voluntarily offered to deposit an enhanced fine amount of Rs. 7,00,00,000. This amount comprised an initial Rs. 1,00,00,000 and a subsequent direction for an additional Rs. 6,00,00,000.

Utilisation for Child Welfare: The Court directed that the entire deposited sum of Rs. 7,00,00,000, including any interest it accrues, should be utilised for the benefit of Government-aided or Government-managed childcare institutions in the State of Odisha. This was intended to serve the rehabilitation and welfare needs of children. The Juvenile Justice Committee of the High Court of Odisha was specifically authorised to oversee and direct the utilisation of these funds. The amount has been complied with and deposited.

Tr. A. Babu V. State of Tamil Nadu

Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 799: (DoJ 18-03-2025)

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“Discretionary Dismissal: Supreme Court Declines CBI Probe into Alleged Multi-Crore Infrastructure Fraud”

The petition concerned allegations of fraudulent re-raising or revision of the value of Electro Mechanical (EME) Equipments for the Palamuru Ranga Reddy  lift irrigation Schemes.

The estimated value, initially between Rs. 5960.79 Crores and Rs. 8386.86 Crores as estimated by the Engineering Staff College of India, was allegedly inflated.

This alleged inflation was deemed to have caused a significant loss to the public/exchequer.

The fraudulent actions were attributed to official respondents (U to V, or Nos. 1 to 4), who were accused of colluding with contractors to artificially inflate these estimates.

Law Involved

The petitioner sought a Writ of Mandamus to declare the actions of the respondents (Nos. 1 to 4) as fraudulent.

A primary prayer was for an investigation by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) into the alleged illegal, unreasonable, and capricious actions of the official respondents. The petitioner also sought the submission of the CBI report to the High Court.

The case subsequently proceeded as a Special Leave Petition (SLP) before a higher court, challenging the High Court’s decision to dismiss the writ petition.

Reasoning

High Court’s Stance: The High Court considered the two prayers but ultimately dismissed the writ petition. The High Court’s decision was based on its discretion not to intervene. It was deemed justified in not exercising its discretion or jurisdiction to order further investigation or grant the CBI probe. The reasons for dismissal were outlined in the impugned order and possibly related to the maintainability of the writ petition.

Petitioner’s Argument: The petitioner contended that the High Court should not have summarily dismissed the writ petition. They argued that the High Court ought to have:

Delved into the records of the case.

Considered referring the matter for investigation to the CBI.

Devised a procedure to uncover the truth regarding the alleged fraud in the estimates.

The petitioner highlighted that documents, papers, and records clearly indicated fraud in the revised estimates, resulting in a grave loss to the State exchequer, which warranted the granting of their prayers.

Holding

Upon challenge via Special Leave Petition, the Supremer Court affirmed the High Court’s decision, stating that it would not ordinarily interfere with the non-exercise of discretion by the High Court in favour of the petitioner.

Consequently, the Special Leave Petition was dismissed, thereby upholding the High Court’s original decision.

Nagam Janardhan Reddy V. State Of Telangana And Others

Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 798: (DoJ 21-05-2025)

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Conviction Affirmed, Sentence Reduced: A Key POCSO Act Appeal

The appellants were convicted concurrently under Section 8 of the POCSO Act and Section 294 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). While the High Court affirmed the conviction, the appellants had previously been acquitted of charges under Section 6 of the POCSO Act. The Trial Court had originally imposed a sentence of life imprisonment for the remainder of the appellants’ natural life.

At the time the incident occurred, the appellants were in their twenties. By the time of the appeal, they had already served a little over five years of incarceration.

Law Involved:

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act (POCSO Act):

Section 8 (Sexual Assault): This section relates to sexual assault.

Section 6 (Aggravated Penetrative Sexual Assault): This section deals with aggravated penetrative sexual assault. The punishment specified is rigorous imprisonment for not less than ten years but which may extend to life imprisonment, with a fine. If the victim is a child below twelve years, the punishment can be rigorous imprisonment for the remainder of natural life or even the death penalty.

Indian Penal Code (IPC):

Section 294: The appellants were also convicted under this section.

Reasoning

The learned counsel for the appellants presented a two-fold submission, initially contending that the very conviction by the Additional Sessions Judge was flawed.

A primary argument was that the life imprisonment sentence imposed by the Trial Court was a “harsh punishment”, particularly considering the appellants had been acquitted under the more severe Section 6 of the POCSO Act.

The appellants’ counsel emphasised that they were young, in their twenties, at the time of the incident and had already completed over five years of imprisonment, suggesting that the appeal “may be allowed”.

In contrast, the learned standing counsel for the respondent “vehemently objected” to the appellants’ contentions, arguing that the High Court had “rightly affirmed the Judgment of conviction” and that the life imprisonment sentence was “in accordance with Section 8 of the POCSO Act”.

The Court ultimately determined that the “interest of justice would be served” by reducing the sentence.

Holding of this Judgment

The appeals were allowed in part.

The sentence imposed on the appellants was reduced to ten years.

Pintu Thakur @ Ravi V. State Of Chhattisgarh

Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 797: (DoJ 27-05-2025)

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Bail Overturned: Supreme Court Sets Aside High Court’s Grant of Regular Bail

Bail Cancelled. The Appellant filed a complaint alleging that on 11 August 2023, around 11:30 PM, they received a call about the Respondents (accused) and 6-7 others being present on the Appellant’s land in Village Karial, Haripur.

It was alleged that the Respondents used abusive language, threatened the Appellant, and dismantled a barbed wire fence on his property.

Later, when the Appellant, his driver (Anil Thatheria – the deceased), and others went to the land, the Respondents allegedly rammed their car into the Appellant’s car.

When the Appellant exited his car, Accused No. 1 (along with others) allegedly hit the deceased (Anil Thatheria) with their car and threw him down, then hit the deceased on the head with a wooden stick.

All the accused were reportedly armed with wooden sticks.

The deceased was taken to the hospital where he was declared dead.

An FIR was registered, and subsequently, a chargesheet and a supplementary chargesheet were filed by the Police.

The Respondents sought regular bail from the Trial Court, but their applications were dismissed.

The High Court then granted regular bail to the Respondents via an order dated 06 October 2023.

The Appellant subsequently filed an appeal before the Supreme Court challenging the High Court’s bail order.

Law Involved: 

The case involved offences under various sections of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and considerations under the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.):

IPC Sections: The FIR and chargesheets included sections such as 302 (murder), 307 (attempt to murder), 120-B (criminal conspiracy), 34 (acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention), 147 (rioting), 148 (rioting, armed with deadly weapon), 149 (unlawful assembly guilty of offence committed in prosecution of common object), 323 (voluntarily causing hurt), 504 (intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of peace), and 506 (criminal intimidation).

Cr.P.C. Sections: The respondents’ applications for bail were made under Section 439 (special powers of High Court or Court of Session regarding bail) of the Cr.P.C.. The High Court’s order also included a direction to the Trial Court to adjourn proceedings under Section 309 of the Cr.P.C..

Reasoning

The Supreme Court noted that the High Court had set aside the Trial Court’s order which had refused regular bail to the Respondents.

Despite previously dismissing bail applications by the Respondents, the High Court later allowed their petition, leading to their enlargement on bail.

The High Court granted bail even though Accused No. 1 was identified as a “habitual offender” with eight other criminal cases registered against him.

The Supreme Court highlighted that the High Court’s order was “cryptic” and lacked sufficient reasoning to justify the grant of bail, especially given the gravity of the offences.

The reasoning provided by the High Court was considered “inadequate” and did not establish a proper case for granting bail.

The Supreme Court found that the High Court’s order suffered from a “patent non-application of mind”.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court stated that the High Court’s direction to the Trial Court to adjourn proceedings beyond a fixed date (25 October 2023) constituted interference with the trial process.

Holding

The Supreme Court, in its judgment dated 08 November 2023, set aside the High Court’s order dated 06 October 2023, which had granted regular bail to the Respondents.

Consequently, the effect of the High Court’s bail order was reversed.

The Supreme Court directed the Respondents (accused) to surrender and be taken into custody by the police on or before 16 June 2025.

They were also directed to deposit their passports at the Police Station.

The Supreme Court clarified that its decision to set aside the bail order should not influence the merits of the case during the trial.

The Trial Court was directed to proceed with and conclude the trial without being swayed by the Supreme Court’s order, and to endeavour to conclude the trial within one year and eight months.

Baljnder Singh Alias Aman V. State Of Punjab

Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 796: (DoJ 16-05-2025)

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