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Constitution Law : Repeal of Act – Validity of

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This Supreme Court judgment, addresses two primary issues arising from appeals concerning road transport regulations in Karnataka. The first issue examines the constitutional validity of the 2003 Repeal Act, which abolished the 1976 Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act, with the Court ultimately upholding its constitutionality. The second key point revolves around whether the State Transport Authority (STA) can delegate the power to grant certain vehicle permits to its Secretary, a practice the Court affirms as permissible under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, and the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989. The ruling dismisses the appeals from the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation (KSRTC), which sought to invalidate the repeal and prevent delegation, while allowing the appeals from private bus operators and the State Transport Authority, confirming the Secretary’s authority to issue non-stage carriage permits.

(A) Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976 – Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation and Certain Other Law (Amendment) Act, 2003, Section 3 – Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, Section 2(7), 2(40), 68(2), 68(3)(b), 68(5), 96 – Karnataka Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989, Rule 55 and 56 – Constitution Law – Repeal of Act – Whether the 2003 Repeal Act repealing the KCCA Act is constitutionally valid, particularly given that the 1976 Act had earlier been upheld by this Court? – KCCA Act, 1976 was enacted under Entry 42 (Acquisition and requisition of property), and its repeal by the 2003 Repeal Act was effected under Entry 57 of List II, which deals with taxation—a subject area where the State has independent legislative competence – The repeal does not alter or contradict the judicial interpretation of the KCCA Act; rather, it reflects a conscious legislative choice to adapt to new economic and social conditions – Rationale underlying the 2003 Repeal Act is sound and consistent with the principles of legislative power – 2003 Repeal Act, was to improve public transport services and to rectify the shortcomings of the earlier regulatory regime – Held that Section 3 of the Act, 2003, which repeals the KCCA Act, is constitutional – The KSRTC challenging the repeal on these grounds have failed to establish any defect in the exercise of the Legislature’s power – View taken by the Division Bench of the High Court on this issue upheld.

(Para 16 to 18)

(B) Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976 – Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation and Certain Other Law (Amendment) Act, 2003, Section 3 – Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, Section 2(7), 2(40), 68(2), 68(3)(b), 68(5), 96  – Karnataka Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989, Rule 55 and 56 – Motor Vehicles – Delegation of Power to Grant Permits – Whether, under Section 68(5) of the MV Act, read with Rule 56 of the KMV Rules, the STA and RTAs can lawfully delegate the power to grant contract carriage permits (and related permits) to the Secretary, or whether such power must remain with the multi-member authorities due to its quasi-judicial character – Language of Rule 56(1)(d) explicitly differentiates between the grant of stage carriage permits, which involve complex and inherently quasi- judicial considerations, and other types of permits that are essentially administrative in nature – The fact that only the grant of stage carriage permits is excluded from delegation underscores the Legislature’s intention: routine and time-sensitive permits such as contract carriage, special, tourist, and temporary permits can be efficiently processed through delegation to a competent officer like the Secretary, thereby ensuring that administrative functions are not unduly delayed by the need for a full board’s involvement – Held that the power of the STA to delegate the issuance of contract carriage, special, tourist, and temporary permits to its Secretary is fully supported by the statutory provisions of Section 68(5) of the MV Act, and Rule 56(1)(d) of the KMV Rules, 1989 – The delegation is a rational and necessary administrative measure that facilitates prompt and efficient processing of permit applications without undermining the oversight function of the STA – Held that the High Court’s reasoning on the non- delegability of permit-granting power is flawed – The power to delegate, as provided by law, remains intact, and any decision to the contrary is unsustainable in light of both legislative intent and practical necessity. impugned orders of the High Court that denied the delegation power of the STA are set aside, and it is confirmed that the Secretary of the STA is empowered to grant non-stage carriage permits (including contract carriage, special, tourist, and temporary permits) in accordance with Section 68(5) of the MV Act and Rule 56(1)(d) of the KMV Rules, subject to the limitations and conditions prescribed therein.

(Para 21 to 30)

(C) Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, Section 2(7), 2(40), 68(5)  – Karnataka Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989, 56(1)(d) – Motor Vehicles – Delegation of quasi-judicial power to Grant Permits – Contention on behalf of the appellant that permit-granting is a quasi-judicial function that must be exercised solely by the composite body of the STA or RTA, as such functions require deliberation by multiple high- ranking officials, ensuring that decisions are made with due consideration and dissenting opinions and that delegating this power to a single officer would undermine the judicial character of the decision-making process – Held that even if one accepts that the grant of permits has a quasi-judicial element, it is an established principle of administrative law that quasi-judicial functions may be delegated if the enabling statute expressly provides for such delegation – Here, Section 68(5) of the MV Act, coupled with the specific language of Rule 56(1)(d) of the KMV Rules makes it clear that the Legislature intended for the STA to delegate certain routine permit functions – The exclusion of stage carriage permits from this delegation does not imply that all permit functions are inherently non-delegable; rather, it reflects a calibrated approach that distinguishes between complex adjudicatory functions and routine administrative tasks.

(Para 22 and 23)

M/S S.R.S Travels By Its Proprietor K.T. V. Karnataka State Road Transport

Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 152: (DoJ 06-02-2025)

2025 INSC 152 Click here to View Full Text of Judgment

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Delayed Death: When ‘Attempted Murder’ Becomes More

September 13, 2025 No Comments

Maniklall Sahu, the appellant, along with three co-accused, trespassed into the house of Rekhchand Verma, assaulted him with sticks and fisticuffs, and flung him from a terrace. The injured person, Rekhchand Verma, initially survived but was in a critical condition. He eventually succumbed to his injuries approximately nine months after the incident, dying on 8th November 2022 due to septicaemia and pneumonia, leading to cardiorespiratory arrest. The trial court had initially convicted the appellant under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) for murder. However, the High Court altered this conviction to Section 307 IPC for attempt to murder, sentencing the appellant to 7 years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000/-. The appellant subsequently filed this appeal challenging the Section 307 IPC conviction.

Law Involved The primary legal provisions under consideration are Sections 299, 300, 302, and 307 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

Section 307 IPC (Attempt to Murder): This section deals with acts done with the intention or knowledge that it might cause death, and if death occurs, the act would be murder.

Section 299 IPC (Culpable Homicide): Defines culpable homicide.

Section 300 IPC (Murder): Specifies when culpable homicide amounts to murder, including acts done with the intention of causing death, or causing bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or knowing the act is so imminently dangerous that it will most probably cause death.

Section 302 IPC (Punishment for Murder): Prescribes the punishment for murder. The core legal question revolves around the “Application of Theory of Causation where death ensues after some delay” and whether the High Court correctly applied Section 307 IPC despite the victim’s eventual death.

Reasoning The Supreme Court critically analysed the High Court’s decision to alter the conviction from Section 302 IPC to Section 307 IPC, especially given the victim’s death.

  1. Medical Evidence and Causation: The Court reviewed extensive medical evidence, which consistently showed that the deceased, Rekhchand Verma, suffered severe injuries, including a head injury, spinal cord injury leading to paraplegia, and multiple complications such as infected bedsores, septic shock, and bilateral pneumonia. Medical experts testified that these complications were a direct result of the initial injuries sustained during the assault and were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The Court highlighted that the injured person received medical treatment for nine months before his demise. The Court concluded that the injuries suffered were grievous and that the death was a consequence of these injuries, with complications like septicaemia and pneumonia not breaking the chain of causation.
  2. High Court’s Error: The Supreme Court determined that the High Court committed a serious error in bringing the case under the ambit of “attempt to commit murder” (Section 307 IPC) on the premise that the victim survived for about nine months, and his death was due to complications during treatment and not directly from the initial injuries. The Supreme Court stressed that if the injury was fatal and intended to cause death, or if death occurred after some delay due to septicaemia or other complications stemming from the injury, the offence would fall under the first limb of Section 300 IPC (murder) [36a]. Furthermore, if the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and death occurred due to septicaemia or other complications, the act would amount to culpable homicide punishable under Section 302 IPC, falling under the third limb of Section 300 IPC [36b, 37c, 37d].
  3. Jurisprudence on Delayed Death: Drawing on various precedents, the Court reiterated that delayed death or intervening medical conditions (like septicaemia or pneumonia) do not automatically absolve an accused of murder charges if the initial injuries were the proximate cause of death. The Court concluded that the cause of death was indeed due to the injuries suffered, and the contention that the death resulted from a lack of proper treatment or was disconnected from the initial assault was unfounded.

Holding The Supreme Court dismissed Maniklall Sahu’s appeal . While the appellant’s conviction under Section 307 IPC (attempt to murder) as altered by the High Court stands affirmed due to the dismissal of his appeal, the Supreme Court clearly stated that the High Court committed a serious error in altering the conviction from Section 302 IPC to Section 307 IPC . The Supreme Court’s detailed reasoning underscored that given the medical evidence and the established chain of causation, the offence should have been considered murder or culpable homicide amounting to murder, punishable under Section 302 IPC, because the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.

Maniklall Sahu Vs State of Chhattisgarh

Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 1107: (DoJ 12-09-2025)

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Tender Troubles: Supreme Court Upholds Bid Sanctity, Overturns Rectification

September 13, 2025 No Comments

The case originated from an electronic bid (No. 7 of 2023-24) issued by the Superintending Engineer and Project Director, Project Implementation Unit – I, Public Works (Roads) Directorate, Government of West Bengal, on 17.10.2023. The tender was for collecting Road User Fee (RUF) from commercial vehicles for 1095 days. The earnest money deposit was fixed at Rs. 25,00,000.00. Seven bidders participated. The technical bids were evaluated, and four bidders were technically qualified, including Prakash Asphaltings and Toll Highways (India) Limited (appellant) and Mandeepa Enterprises (respondent No. 1).

Financial bids were opened on 08.12.2023. The appellant, Prakash Asphaltings, was found to be the highest bidder (H1) with a quoted amount of Rs. 91,19,00,000.00 for 1095 days. Respondent No. 1, Mandeepa Enterprises, was the lowest bidder (H4) with an offered amount of Rs. 9,72,999.00 per day.

Respondent No. 1 subsequently claimed a typographical error in their financial bid, stating they intended to quote Rs. 106,54,33,905.00 for the entire contract period instead of Rs. 9,72,999.00 per day. They requested the tendering authority to treat the figure of Rs. 9,72,999.00 as a typographical error and read it as Rs. 106,54,33,905.00. The tendering authority rejected this request on 20.12.2023, stating that correction of a financial bid after opening was not possible and would impeach the sanctity of the tender process.

Aggrieved, Respondent No. 1 filed a writ petition (WPA No. 29001 of 2023) before a Single Judge of the High Court, which was dismissed on 03.01.2024, as the Single Judge found no scope for interference. Respondent No. 1 then filed an intra-court appeal (MAT No. 93 of 2024). A Division Bench of the High Court allowed the appeal on 23.02.2024, observing that the error in quoting the figure by respondent No. 1 was inadvertent. The Division Bench directed the tendering authority to evaluate Respondent No. 1’s BOQ at Rs. 106,54,33,905.00 and offer other bidders the opportunity to match this figure. This civil appeal was directed against the Division Bench’s judgment and order.

Law Involved

Clause 4(g) of the Notice Inviting Electronic Bid: This clause specifically states that any change in the template of the Bill of Quantity (BOQ) will not be accepted under any circumstances.

Clause 5B(v) of the Instructions to Bidders: This clause outlines that during bid evaluation, if bidders fail to submit supporting documents or original hard copies within the stipulated timeframe, their proposals will be liable for rejection.

Article 226 of the Constitution of India: Pertains to the High Court’s jurisdiction to issue writs.

Principles of Equity and Natural Justice in Tender Processes: The judgment refers to the importance of these principles in tender and contract awards, but also emphasises that these principles should be kept at a distance when there is a violation of rules.

Judicial Review of Administrative Action: The Court reiterated that judicial review in administrative action, particularly tenders, is limited to preventing arbitrariness, irrationality, bias, and mala fides. Courts should not interfere with a decision unless it is “unlawful” or “unsound”.

Public Interest: Tenders are a cornerstone of governmental procurement processes, aiming for competitiveness, fairness, and transparency in resource allocation. Adherence to rules and conditions and the sanctity of the tender process are paramount.

Reasoning The Supreme Court reasoned that the Division Bench’s interpretation was erroneous for several key reasons:

Sanctity of Tender Process: The Court held that allowing rectification of financial bids after they have been opened would impeach the sanctity and integrity of the entire tender process.

Strict Adherence to Tender Conditions: Clause 4(g) explicitly prohibits any change in the BOQ template under any circumstances. The Division Bench’s broad interpretation of “bona fide mistake” to allow rectification was held to be incorrect and would put “shackles on the functioning of the tendering authority”.

Nature of the Mistake: While Respondent No. 1 claimed an inadvertent mistake, it was effectively a unilateral or systematic computer typographical transmission failure, not one attributable to the tendering authority. Such a mistake, even if unintentional, cannot be a ground to allow post-bid modifications that would undermine the competitive bidding process.

Adverse Consequences to Public Exchequer: The Division Bench’s decision to re-evaluate Respondent No. 1’s bid at a significantly higher amount (Rs. 106,54,33,905.00) meant that the appellant, who was originally the H1 bidder, would be displaced. This would lead to a considerable loss of revenue to the state exchequer (approximately 15 crores) by not accepting the higher bid of the appellant and giving an opportunity to Respondent No. 1 to correct its bid post-opening.

Limited Scope of Judicial Review: The Court reiterated that interference by a writ court in ongoing tender processes is not permissible unless there is a clear violation of principles of natural justice, or the decision is arbitrary or mala fide. The Division Bench’s decision was deemed a clear violation of natural justice principles.

Non-Joinder of Party: The appellant (Prakash Asphaltings), as the highest bidder and a directly affected party, was not made a party respondent in the intra-court appeal before the Division Bench, which was viewed as prejudicial and a violation of natural justice.

Holding The Supreme Court allowed the civil appeal, thereby setting aside and quashing the judgment and order dated 23.02.2024 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court at Calcutta in MAT No. 93 of 2024. The Court sustained the order of the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition. Consequently, Prakash Asphaltings and Toll Highways (India) Limited (the appellant), being the H1 bidder, is to be awarded the contract in terms of the notice inviting electronic bid dated 17.10.2023. The Court also ruled that there shall be no order as to costs.

Prakash Asphaltings And Toll Highways (India) Limited Vs Mandeep Enterprises And Others

Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 1108: (DoJ 12-09-2025)

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“Speculative Investors” Barred from IBC Relief: Supreme Court Upholds Homebuyer Protections

September 13, 2025 No Comments

Four appeals were heard together, arising from orders of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT). The key appellants, Mansi Brar Fernandes and Sunita Agarwal, had entered into agreements with developers (Gayatri Infra Planner Pvt. Ltd. and Antriksh Infratech Pvt. Ltd., respectively) for property units. Both agreements included buy-back clauses and involved advance payments. The developers defaulted, and the appellants initiated proceedings under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC). The NCLAT reversed the admission of these applications, branding the appellants as “speculative investors” rather than genuine homebuyers or financial creditors.

Law Involved: The central legal framework is the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC), specifically Section 7, which governs the initiation of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) by financial creditors. The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Ordinance, 2019, and the subsequent Amendment Act, are also critical. These amendments introduced a threshold requirement for allottees to file a Section 7 application (requiring at least 10% of allottees or 100 allottees). The Court frequently referenced its earlier judgment in Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd v. Union of India, which distinguishes between genuine homebuyers and speculative investors. The judgment also emphasizes the Right to Shelter as a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution and the role of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (RERA).

Reasoning: The Supreme Court deliberated on the distinction between “speculative investors” and “genuine homebuyers” within the context of the IBC. It observed that the IBC is intended as a collective mechanism to revive viable projects and safeguard the fundamental right to shelter of genuine homebuyers, not as a recovery tool or a bargaining chip for individuals. The legislative intent behind recognizing allottees as financial creditors was to protect genuine homebuyers, while simultaneously preventing misuse by speculative investors seeking premature exits or exorbitant returns, which had burdened the real estate sector and the adjudicatory machinery.

The Court provided criteria to identify speculative investors, including: agreements that substitute possession with buy-back or refund options, insistence on refunds with high interest, purchase of multiple units (especially in double digits), demanding special rights or privileges, deviations from the RERA Model Agreement, and unrealistic interest rates or promises of returns. The transaction entered into by Mansi Brar Fernandes, involving a buy-back clause and the pursuit of commercial returns rather than possession, led the Court to conclude that she was indeed a speculative investor. Similarly, Sunita Agarwal’s agreement for an “investment” with a 25% per annum return over 24 months, coupled with a buy-back clause, indicated a speculative intent.

While affirming the NCLAT’s finding that the appellants were “speculative investors,” the Supreme Court clarified that the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Ordinance, 2019, was indeed applicable to the facts of the present case, correcting the NCLAT’s reasoning on this point [19, 20, 35, 36, 48(ii)]. The Court applied the doctrine of Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit (an act of the Court shall prejudice no one) to address the procedural issues related to the Ordinance’s applicability and the delay it caused.

Holding: The Supreme Court affirmed the NCLAT’s findings that Mansi Brar Fernandes and Sunita Agarwal were “speculative investors” and therefore not entitled to initiate proceedings under Section 7 of the IBC [25, 34, 48(i)]. Consequently, the Court upheld the NCLAT’s orders setting aside the admission of their Section 7 applications by the NCLT [48(i)]. However, the Court clarified that the Ordinance/Amendment Act was applicable to the case, although this correction in reasoning did not alter the ultimate outcome given the appellants’ status as speculative investors [48(ii)]. The appellants remain free to pursue their remedies through other appropriate legal forums, without being barred by limitation [48(i)].

Mansi Brar Fernandes Vs Subha Sharma And Anr.

Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 1110: (DoJ 12-09-2025)

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