Indian Judgements

Indian Judgements

Environment Law : Pollution caused by the tanneries due to the discharge of effluents in river

Case concerning environmental pollution, primarily caused by tanneries in the Vellore District. The Court addresses the long-standing issue of untreated effluent discharge into the Palar River, which has significantly impacted groundwater, agriculture, and public health. It emphasizes fundamental environmental principles such as the “Polluter Pays” principle, sustainable development, and the right to a healthy environment. The ruling establishes the continuing liability of polluters for environmental damage, directs the government to pay compensation to affected individuals while recovering funds from polluters, and mandates the formation of committees to ensure strict compliance with environmental regulations and the reversal of ecological harm.

(A) Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, Section 3(3) – Environment (Protection) Rules, 1986, Rule 6 -Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974, Section 24 and 25 – Hazardous Wastes (Management, Handling and Transboundary Movement) Rules, 2008 (now the Hazardous and Other Wastes (Management and Transboundary Movement) Rules, 2016) –  Environment Law – Pollution caused by the tanneries due to the discharge of effluents in river – Damage to the environment and ecology by tanneries – ‘Polluter Pays Principle’ – Compensation – Held that Vellore’s current status highlights the critical consequences of unchecked industrialization and exploitation of natural resources – The district, once known for its agricultural prosperity and natural resources, now faces a grave environmental crisis driven by pollution from the tanning industries, illegal sand mining, and poor waste management – These activities have degraded vital ecosystems, polluted water bodies like the River Palar and reduced the groundwater availability, severely impacting the livelihoods of farmers, fishermen, and local communities – Until the damage caused by the tanneries to the ecology is reversed, the polluters have a continuing duty to pay compensation and further, it is the bounden duty of both the Central and State Governments and local authorities to prevent, protect and preserve natural resources and maintain a healthy and clean environment – LoEA was tasked with duty to assess the damage, identify the areas and the individuals/families affected by the pollution – While the LoEA was empowered to identify the individuals/families that have suffered during the relevant period, it goes without saying that the LoEA would have the authority to admit new claims if they are found to be genuine – The Doctrine of Implied Authority would automatically come into operation – The error or lapse, if any, on the part of the LoEA cannot affect the right of the residents who have been left out, more so considering that the right persists in view of the continuing pollution – Vide award dated 24.08.2009, the LoEA identified 1,377 persons and determined the compensation amount to be Rs. 2,91,01,278/- for them – It was clearly stated in the said award that it was passed only in respect of the individuals / families, who were left out of the earlier award dated 07.03.2001, which has attained finality – It is also evident that the award was passed after issuing due notice to all the parties and that, the AISHTMA did not raise any grounds relating to non-adherence to the procedure for taking samples, as provided in Rule 6 of the Rules, 1986, before the LoEA either in its reply or at the time of personal hearing – It is not the case of the AISHTMA that the samples tested are not from the tanneries – Therefore, the technical objection raised now is only an after thought – Hence, the other grounds raised by the AISHTMA with respect to violation of the principles of natural justice and the Rules, against the award dated 24.08.2009, cannot be countenanced.

(Para 91 and 102)

(B) Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, Section 3(3) – Environment (Protection) Rules, 1986, Rule 6 -Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974, Section 24 and 25 – Hazardous Wastes (Management, Handling and Transboundary Movement) Rules, 2008 (now the Hazardous and Other Wastes (Management and Transboundary Movement) Rules, 2016) –  Environment Law – Pollution caused by the tanneries due to the discharge of effluents in river – Damage to the environment and ecology by tanneries – ‘Polluter Pays Principle’ – Compensation – It is the specific case of the appellant in SLP(C)No.23633 of 2010 that only a part of the compensation has been disbursed to the identified affected individuals / families and crores of rupees are yet to be collected; no scheme has been implemented for the reversal of the damage caused to ecology and environment; the industries continue to discharge effluents and they are not maintaining the standard expected of them and thus, the damage caused to the environment has only been exacerbated – Thus, this according to the appellant, entitles the affected individuals/ families to receive compensation beyond 31.12.1998 till the damage to the ecology is reversed – It is also submitted that a large number of tanneries are operating beyond the permissible limit and hence, they should be closed – Though the appellant in SLP (C)No.23633 of 2010 sought multiple reliefs by filing Public Interest Litigation in W.P.No.8335 of 2008, the High Court rejected the same on the ground that except for asserting that a number of affected persons had not received the compensation amount, the appellant had not taken any steps to furnish the details of the individuals / families, who had received either only a part of the compensation amount or had not received any compensation amount at all and in the absence of supportive material, the claim of the appellant could not be entertained – Held that the details of the affected individuals / families are already available with the District Collector, and the LoEA after obtaining those particulars, has awarded compensation to them – Hence, the failure of the appellant to furnish the details regarding the receipt of compensation by the affected individuals / families, cannot be a reason to reject the claim of the appellant concerning the disbursement of compensation to all the affected individuals / families – High Court must have directed either the District Collector or the LoEA to produce the details or in the alternative, must have directed LoEA to verify the claims and issued appropriate directions.

(Para 104 to 106)

(C) Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, Section 3(3) – Environment (Protection) Rules, 1986, Rule 6 -Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974, Section 24 and 25 – Hazardous Wastes (Management, Handling and Transboundary Movement) Rules, 2008 (now the Hazardous and Other Wastes (Management and Transboundary Movement) Rules, 2016) –  Environment Law – Damage to the environment and ecology by tanneries – ‘Polluter Pays Principle’ – Compensation – Government Pay Principle – Admittedly, the standard upper limit of pollution in treated effluent is 2100 mg/1 of TDS content and the same has not been maintained by the industries – The same level of pollution is present in wells and other water sources in the areas – Hence, the industries which continue to pollute the environment, and thereby violate Section 24 of the Act, 1974, cannot absolve themselves of their liability, merely on the ground that some payment was made by them to the Government in compliance with the directions of this Court – The liability of the industries for the pollution caused by them did not cease in the year 1998 by merely paying the compensation amount – Rather it is a continuing liability that persists until the actual pollution is curbed/ its effects reversed. In other words, the polluting industries are liable to reverse the damage to the environment and ecology as long as the tanneries continue to pollute the environment – At the same time, the Government has not implemented the scheme for reversal and restoration of ecology till date, despite the LoEA having drafted the same in the year 2001 itself – While it may be true that the details of the affected individuals / families cannot be ascertained at this distant point of time, this alone cannot be a reason to withhold the compensation amount payable to the affected individuals / families, until the damage caused to the ecology is reversed – Held that no hesitation to hold that by applying the Government Pay Principle, it is for the Government to pay compensation to the affected individuals / families and recover the same from the polluters, until the damage caused to the ecology is fully reversed – Accordingly, the order passed by the High Court is liable to be modified by this Court.

(Para 113)

(D) Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, Section 3(3) – Environment (Protection) Rules, 1986, Rule 6 -Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974, Section 24 and 25 – Hazardous Wastes (Management, Handling and Transboundary Movement) Rules, 2008 (now the Hazardous and Other Wastes (Management and Transboundary Movement) Rules, 2016) –  Environment Law – Damage to the environment and ecology by tanneries – Following directions issued  to the stake holders:

(i) The State government is directed to pay the compensation amount to all the affected families / individuals, if not already paid, in terms of the awards dated 07.03.2001 and 24.08.2009 passed by the LoEA within six weeks from today,

(ii) The State government is also directed to recover the compensation amount from the polluters, if not already recovered, by initiating proceedings under the Revenue Recovery Act or through any other means permissible by law.

(iii) The State government in consultation with the Central Government, shall within a period of four weeks, constitute a committee, under the chairmanship of a retired High Court Judge and members, comprising of the Secretaries of both the State and Central Departments, environmental experts, representatives from the affected communities, and any other person as it deems fit, for the purpose of conducting an audit to identify, maintain and create a clean and healthy environment in Vellore District.

(iv) The Committee shall carry out the following tasks and ensure its implementation until the damage caused to the ecology is reversed:

(a) In view of the decision arrived at by us, the committee shall scrutinize applications received from affected individuals/families seeking compensation beyond 1998, assess their claims, award compensation, and disburse it from the fund maintained by the Government.

(b) Formulate a comprehensive scheme to reverse the ecological damage in the affected areas. Such a scheme shall incorporate advanced techniques and best practices, as applicable, adopted by other State Governments and foreign countries.

(c) Issue appropriate directions to the State/Central Pollution Control Board and departments to prohibit industries and municipalities from discharging untreated effluents into the River Palar and other water bodies.

(d) Identify critical zones in the district as No Discharge Zones to safeguard the quality of water resources, particularly groundwater, from contamination by industrial and domestic waste.

(e) Identify locations where new CETPs and IETPs are required, and where industries can be feasibly connected to these systems. Based on the same, direct the establishment of such plants to strengthen the pollution control infrastructure.

(f) Address the deficiencies of existing CETPs, IETPs, and other pollution control mechanisms by ensuring their effective functioning and proper maintenance.

(g) Make any other recommendations that may be required to ensure continuous monitoring and compliance of the standards to ensure ZLD within a period of three months and submit a report to the State and central Governments/Boards which shall be implemented by the State/Central Government/Board,

(h) Ensure that State Pollution Control Board / Central Pollution Control Board is strictly complying with the relevant guidelines for monitoring and regulating the industries and file a report before this Court within four months from the date of constitution,

(v) Since pollution is a continuing wrong until the condition is reversed, the polluters shall be liable to compensate the victims and liable for the damage and the Committee constituted as per direction (iii) LoEA (present) is directed to periodically assess and pass appropriate orders till then,

(vi) the State shall implement the suggestions of the committee to formulate and implement a comprehensive rejuvenation plan for the Palar River, which includes removing pollutants, desilting, and ensuring adequate water flow and direct the concerned authorities and bodies to accomplish the same within a time frame,

(vii) The State shall ensure quarterly inspections of tanning industries in the district to assess compliance with environmental regulations and publish a report in its website disclosing all the material particulars. The inspection team shall verify whether the industries are established within permissible distances from prohibited zones, the status of ZLD compliance by the industries, and other relevant aspects.

(viii) the State shall facilitate a conduct of environment audit of each river in the State, ascertain the pollution, degradation, change in storage capacity, depletion of groundwater level and publish the results in the website, newspapers, media, and other public platforms,

(ix) the State shall mandate the installation of IoT-based sensors at discharge points, rivers, and groundwater wells to monitor water quality in real time.

(x) the State shall direct that AI systems shall be employed to analyze the data collected from IoT sensors and industry discharge reports, and any discrepancies from prescribed discharge limits shall be flagged for prompt regulatory response,

(xi) The State Pollution Control Board / Central Pollution Control Board shall in co-ordination with State government, set emission standards for the tannery industry in alignment with international environmental standards and take into consideration the recommendations of national and international regulatory bodies. Additionally, assess the feasibility of imposing effluent charges, which would be levied per unit of waste or discharge released, as a penal measure to enforce compliance,

(xii) The State Pollution Control Board /Central Pollution Control Board shall direct the industries to display effluent and discharge data, including chemical composition, on a publicly accessible notice board every three days and in case the standards are not met, direct the authorities to ensure compliance with the prescribed norms.

(xiii) The Central Government/Central Pollution Control Board shall issue appropriate directions to align the ESG and CSR of the industry/tannery towards voluntary disclosure and compliance of environmental norms,

(xiv) the State Pollution Control Board shall establish platforms through which citizens can report pollution incidents and monitor the corrective actions taken.

(xv) the authorities concerned shall take immediate and strict action against industries that fail to meet compliance standards, including closure in cases of persistent violations.

(xvi) The licencing authorities couched with the power to issue licences, are by virtue of the implied authority, entitled to cancel such licence/permits, not only for the fraud or the misrepresentation made to secure to such licence, but also for violation of the terms and conditions of such licence and any other applicable law, as any licence granted by an authority cannot be used to violate any law of the land and there cannot be any estoppel against law,

(xvii) the State Pollution Control Board shall direct industries and relevant authorities to prioritize the reuse and recycling of waste generated, and work towards the development of sustainable solutions.

(xviii) the State Pollution Control Board shall publish real-time water quality data on an open-access platform to ensure transparency.

(xix) the State/Pollution Control Board shall order the construction and operationalisation of adequate Sewage Treatment Plants (STPs) in urban and peri-urban areas to address wastewater management.

(xx) the State/ Pollution Control Board shall issue appropriate directions to ensure that all workers are provided with protective gear and that adequate emergency protocols are in place to prevent untoward incidents and the provisions of the Factories Act and other labour laws, including coverage of health and life insurance schemes, are followed in strict compliance,

(xxi) the State shall direct that every industry/tanner is to conduct annual health checkups for workers to detect potential risks of cancer and other severe diseases and ensure that prompt medical assistance should be provided, ensuring that workers are not left to fend for themselves.

(xxii) The CLRI, MoeF etc., shall invest more resources in training and promoting their eco-friendly technologies to ensure their wide adoption by the industries. The State shall ensure that the industries adopt and follow technologies, suggest by CLRI, MoEF and other relevant authorities to ensure strict compliance with the norms and to ensure ZLD and meet the prescribed standards,

(xxiii) The authority concerned shall direct the Bureau of Indian Standards and relevant industries to explore the possibility of an ethical and sustainability mark/tag, enabling consumers to make informed choices.

(xxiv) The State government shall ensure the implementation of the ban on illegal sand mining and establish a monitoring committee to oversee sand mining operations, utilizing real-time surveillance mechanisms such as drones and GPS, implement stringent action against offenders, including the perpetual seizure of equipment and vehicles involved in illegal mining activities.

(xxv) The State shall form a state-level committee comprising representatives from the Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB), the State Pollution Control Board (SPCB), and the Secretary of Home. This committee should be responsible for presenting an annual compliance report to the concerned High Court or National Green Tribunal (NGT). The CPCB must ensure and render complete co-operation,

(xxvi) The primary task of enforcement lies with the State Pollution Control Boards and concerned District Magistrates. Hence, the State government shall set up a District Level Committee. Any complaint to the District Level Committee headed by the District Magistrate and comprising of SPCB officials must be addressed within 30 days, if there is delay, grounds be conveyed to the complainant. Any complaints against the action which includes inaction shall lie before the State Level Committee and if still the issue is not resolved, NGT may be approached.

(xxvii) the State shall promote schemes/programmes and seminars to promote, encourage, and raise awareness regarding an ecosystem-based approach to water management, co- ordinate with concerned bodies to rehabilitate wetlands, protect riparian zones, and enhance the overall ecological health of water bodies.

(xxviii) The Central and State Governments shall take adequate measures and allocate funds to maintain a clean and healthy environment.

(Para 115)

Vellore Dist.Environment V. District Collector Vellore

Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 131: (DoJ 30-01-2025)

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Delayed Death: When ‘Attempted Murder’ Becomes More

Maniklall Sahu, the appellant, along with three co-accused, trespassed into the house of Rekhchand Verma, assaulted him with sticks and fisticuffs, and flung him from a terrace. The injured person, Rekhchand Verma, initially survived but was in a critical condition. He eventually succumbed to his injuries approximately nine months after the incident, dying on 8th November 2022 due to septicaemia and pneumonia, leading to cardiorespiratory arrest. The trial court had initially convicted the appellant under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) for murder. However, the High Court altered this conviction to Section 307 IPC for attempt to murder, sentencing the appellant to 7 years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000/-. The appellant subsequently filed this appeal challenging the Section 307 IPC conviction.

Law Involved The primary legal provisions under consideration are Sections 299, 300, 302, and 307 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

Section 307 IPC (Attempt to Murder): This section deals with acts done with the intention or knowledge that it might cause death, and if death occurs, the act would be murder.

Section 299 IPC (Culpable Homicide): Defines culpable homicide.

Section 300 IPC (Murder): Specifies when culpable homicide amounts to murder, including acts done with the intention of causing death, or causing bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or knowing the act is so imminently dangerous that it will most probably cause death.

Section 302 IPC (Punishment for Murder): Prescribes the punishment for murder. The core legal question revolves around the “Application of Theory of Causation where death ensues after some delay” and whether the High Court correctly applied Section 307 IPC despite the victim’s eventual death.

Reasoning The Supreme Court critically analysed the High Court’s decision to alter the conviction from Section 302 IPC to Section 307 IPC, especially given the victim’s death.

  1. Medical Evidence and Causation: The Court reviewed extensive medical evidence, which consistently showed that the deceased, Rekhchand Verma, suffered severe injuries, including a head injury, spinal cord injury leading to paraplegia, and multiple complications such as infected bedsores, septic shock, and bilateral pneumonia. Medical experts testified that these complications were a direct result of the initial injuries sustained during the assault and were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The Court highlighted that the injured person received medical treatment for nine months before his demise. The Court concluded that the injuries suffered were grievous and that the death was a consequence of these injuries, with complications like septicaemia and pneumonia not breaking the chain of causation.
  2. High Court’s Error: The Supreme Court determined that the High Court committed a serious error in bringing the case under the ambit of “attempt to commit murder” (Section 307 IPC) on the premise that the victim survived for about nine months, and his death was due to complications during treatment and not directly from the initial injuries. The Supreme Court stressed that if the injury was fatal and intended to cause death, or if death occurred after some delay due to septicaemia or other complications stemming from the injury, the offence would fall under the first limb of Section 300 IPC (murder) [36a]. Furthermore, if the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and death occurred due to septicaemia or other complications, the act would amount to culpable homicide punishable under Section 302 IPC, falling under the third limb of Section 300 IPC [36b, 37c, 37d].
  3. Jurisprudence on Delayed Death: Drawing on various precedents, the Court reiterated that delayed death or intervening medical conditions (like septicaemia or pneumonia) do not automatically absolve an accused of murder charges if the initial injuries were the proximate cause of death. The Court concluded that the cause of death was indeed due to the injuries suffered, and the contention that the death resulted from a lack of proper treatment or was disconnected from the initial assault was unfounded.

Holding The Supreme Court dismissed Maniklall Sahu’s appeal . While the appellant’s conviction under Section 307 IPC (attempt to murder) as altered by the High Court stands affirmed due to the dismissal of his appeal, the Supreme Court clearly stated that the High Court committed a serious error in altering the conviction from Section 302 IPC to Section 307 IPC . The Supreme Court’s detailed reasoning underscored that given the medical evidence and the established chain of causation, the offence should have been considered murder or culpable homicide amounting to murder, punishable under Section 302 IPC, because the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.

Maniklall Sahu Vs State of Chhattisgarh

Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 1107: (DoJ 12-09-2025)

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Tender Troubles: Supreme Court Upholds Bid Sanctity, Overturns Rectification

The case originated from an electronic bid (No. 7 of 2023-24) issued by the Superintending Engineer and Project Director, Project Implementation Unit – I, Public Works (Roads) Directorate, Government of West Bengal, on 17.10.2023. The tender was for collecting Road User Fee (RUF) from commercial vehicles for 1095 days. The earnest money deposit was fixed at Rs. 25,00,000.00. Seven bidders participated. The technical bids were evaluated, and four bidders were technically qualified, including Prakash Asphaltings and Toll Highways (India) Limited (appellant) and Mandeepa Enterprises (respondent No. 1).

Financial bids were opened on 08.12.2023. The appellant, Prakash Asphaltings, was found to be the highest bidder (H1) with a quoted amount of Rs. 91,19,00,000.00 for 1095 days. Respondent No. 1, Mandeepa Enterprises, was the lowest bidder (H4) with an offered amount of Rs. 9,72,999.00 per day.

Respondent No. 1 subsequently claimed a typographical error in their financial bid, stating they intended to quote Rs. 106,54,33,905.00 for the entire contract period instead of Rs. 9,72,999.00 per day. They requested the tendering authority to treat the figure of Rs. 9,72,999.00 as a typographical error and read it as Rs. 106,54,33,905.00. The tendering authority rejected this request on 20.12.2023, stating that correction of a financial bid after opening was not possible and would impeach the sanctity of the tender process.

Aggrieved, Respondent No. 1 filed a writ petition (WPA No. 29001 of 2023) before a Single Judge of the High Court, which was dismissed on 03.01.2024, as the Single Judge found no scope for interference. Respondent No. 1 then filed an intra-court appeal (MAT No. 93 of 2024). A Division Bench of the High Court allowed the appeal on 23.02.2024, observing that the error in quoting the figure by respondent No. 1 was inadvertent. The Division Bench directed the tendering authority to evaluate Respondent No. 1’s BOQ at Rs. 106,54,33,905.00 and offer other bidders the opportunity to match this figure. This civil appeal was directed against the Division Bench’s judgment and order.

Law Involved

Clause 4(g) of the Notice Inviting Electronic Bid: This clause specifically states that any change in the template of the Bill of Quantity (BOQ) will not be accepted under any circumstances.

Clause 5B(v) of the Instructions to Bidders: This clause outlines that during bid evaluation, if bidders fail to submit supporting documents or original hard copies within the stipulated timeframe, their proposals will be liable for rejection.

Article 226 of the Constitution of India: Pertains to the High Court’s jurisdiction to issue writs.

Principles of Equity and Natural Justice in Tender Processes: The judgment refers to the importance of these principles in tender and contract awards, but also emphasises that these principles should be kept at a distance when there is a violation of rules.

Judicial Review of Administrative Action: The Court reiterated that judicial review in administrative action, particularly tenders, is limited to preventing arbitrariness, irrationality, bias, and mala fides. Courts should not interfere with a decision unless it is “unlawful” or “unsound”.

Public Interest: Tenders are a cornerstone of governmental procurement processes, aiming for competitiveness, fairness, and transparency in resource allocation. Adherence to rules and conditions and the sanctity of the tender process are paramount.

Reasoning The Supreme Court reasoned that the Division Bench’s interpretation was erroneous for several key reasons:

Sanctity of Tender Process: The Court held that allowing rectification of financial bids after they have been opened would impeach the sanctity and integrity of the entire tender process.

Strict Adherence to Tender Conditions: Clause 4(g) explicitly prohibits any change in the BOQ template under any circumstances. The Division Bench’s broad interpretation of “bona fide mistake” to allow rectification was held to be incorrect and would put “shackles on the functioning of the tendering authority”.

Nature of the Mistake: While Respondent No. 1 claimed an inadvertent mistake, it was effectively a unilateral or systematic computer typographical transmission failure, not one attributable to the tendering authority. Such a mistake, even if unintentional, cannot be a ground to allow post-bid modifications that would undermine the competitive bidding process.

Adverse Consequences to Public Exchequer: The Division Bench’s decision to re-evaluate Respondent No. 1’s bid at a significantly higher amount (Rs. 106,54,33,905.00) meant that the appellant, who was originally the H1 bidder, would be displaced. This would lead to a considerable loss of revenue to the state exchequer (approximately 15 crores) by not accepting the higher bid of the appellant and giving an opportunity to Respondent No. 1 to correct its bid post-opening.

Limited Scope of Judicial Review: The Court reiterated that interference by a writ court in ongoing tender processes is not permissible unless there is a clear violation of principles of natural justice, or the decision is arbitrary or mala fide. The Division Bench’s decision was deemed a clear violation of natural justice principles.

Non-Joinder of Party: The appellant (Prakash Asphaltings), as the highest bidder and a directly affected party, was not made a party respondent in the intra-court appeal before the Division Bench, which was viewed as prejudicial and a violation of natural justice.

Holding The Supreme Court allowed the civil appeal, thereby setting aside and quashing the judgment and order dated 23.02.2024 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court at Calcutta in MAT No. 93 of 2024. The Court sustained the order of the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition. Consequently, Prakash Asphaltings and Toll Highways (India) Limited (the appellant), being the H1 bidder, is to be awarded the contract in terms of the notice inviting electronic bid dated 17.10.2023. The Court also ruled that there shall be no order as to costs.

Prakash Asphaltings And Toll Highways (India) Limited Vs Mandeep Enterprises And Others

Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 1108: (DoJ 12-09-2025)

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“Speculative Investors” Barred from IBC Relief: Supreme Court Upholds Homebuyer Protections

Four appeals were heard together, arising from orders of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT). The key appellants, Mansi Brar Fernandes and Sunita Agarwal, had entered into agreements with developers (Gayatri Infra Planner Pvt. Ltd. and Antriksh Infratech Pvt. Ltd., respectively) for property units. Both agreements included buy-back clauses and involved advance payments. The developers defaulted, and the appellants initiated proceedings under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC). The NCLAT reversed the admission of these applications, branding the appellants as “speculative investors” rather than genuine homebuyers or financial creditors.

Law Involved: The central legal framework is the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC), specifically Section 7, which governs the initiation of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) by financial creditors. The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Ordinance, 2019, and the subsequent Amendment Act, are also critical. These amendments introduced a threshold requirement for allottees to file a Section 7 application (requiring at least 10% of allottees or 100 allottees). The Court frequently referenced its earlier judgment in Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd v. Union of India, which distinguishes between genuine homebuyers and speculative investors. The judgment also emphasizes the Right to Shelter as a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution and the role of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (RERA).

Reasoning: The Supreme Court deliberated on the distinction between “speculative investors” and “genuine homebuyers” within the context of the IBC. It observed that the IBC is intended as a collective mechanism to revive viable projects and safeguard the fundamental right to shelter of genuine homebuyers, not as a recovery tool or a bargaining chip for individuals. The legislative intent behind recognizing allottees as financial creditors was to protect genuine homebuyers, while simultaneously preventing misuse by speculative investors seeking premature exits or exorbitant returns, which had burdened the real estate sector and the adjudicatory machinery.

The Court provided criteria to identify speculative investors, including: agreements that substitute possession with buy-back or refund options, insistence on refunds with high interest, purchase of multiple units (especially in double digits), demanding special rights or privileges, deviations from the RERA Model Agreement, and unrealistic interest rates or promises of returns. The transaction entered into by Mansi Brar Fernandes, involving a buy-back clause and the pursuit of commercial returns rather than possession, led the Court to conclude that she was indeed a speculative investor. Similarly, Sunita Agarwal’s agreement for an “investment” with a 25% per annum return over 24 months, coupled with a buy-back clause, indicated a speculative intent.

While affirming the NCLAT’s finding that the appellants were “speculative investors,” the Supreme Court clarified that the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Ordinance, 2019, was indeed applicable to the facts of the present case, correcting the NCLAT’s reasoning on this point [19, 20, 35, 36, 48(ii)]. The Court applied the doctrine of Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit (an act of the Court shall prejudice no one) to address the procedural issues related to the Ordinance’s applicability and the delay it caused.

Holding: The Supreme Court affirmed the NCLAT’s findings that Mansi Brar Fernandes and Sunita Agarwal were “speculative investors” and therefore not entitled to initiate proceedings under Section 7 of the IBC [25, 34, 48(i)]. Consequently, the Court upheld the NCLAT’s orders setting aside the admission of their Section 7 applications by the NCLT [48(i)]. However, the Court clarified that the Ordinance/Amendment Act was applicable to the case, although this correction in reasoning did not alter the ultimate outcome given the appellants’ status as speculative investors [48(ii)]. The appellants remain free to pursue their remedies through other appropriate legal forums, without being barred by limitation [48(i)].

Mansi Brar Fernandes Vs Subha Sharma And Anr.

Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 1110: (DoJ 12-09-2025)

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