A dispute over the refund of stamp duty paid under the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958. The appellants initially paid stamp duty on an agreement to sell property but later canceled the agreement and sought a refund, which was initially granted but subsequently revoked. The core legal issue revolves around whether the amended, shorter limitation period for seeking a refund applies when the cancellation deed was executed before the amendment but registered afterward. The Court ultimately finds in favor of the appellants, ruling that their right to a refund accrued upon execution of the cancellation deed and was therefore governed by the earlier, more generous limitation period. Furthermore, the Court held that the authority lacked the statutory power to recall its initial order granting the refund.
(A) Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958, Section 48(1) (as amended by the 24.04.2015 amendment) – Registration Act, 1908, Section 47 – Cancellation deed – Refund of stamp duty – Rejection of claim as time barred – Challenge as to – Whether the amended six-month limitation, introduced by the 24.04.2015 amendment to Section 48(1) of the Act governs the Appellants’ claim for stamp duty refund, particularly when the Cancellation Deed was executed prior to the amendment but registered thereafter? – Although the Cancellation Deed was registered on 28.04.2015, it was executed on 17.03.2015 i.e. prior to the amendment dated 24.04.2015, which curtailed the time limit for seeking a refund from two years to six months – Section 47 of the Registration Act, 1908, emphasize that “a registered document shall operate from the time from which it would have commenced to operate if no registration thereof had been required or made” – In other words, the operative date for their right to seek refund would be 17.03.2015, placing them under the un-amended regime – High Court laid undue emphasis on the registration date without fully appreciating that the Appellants’ accrued right to claim a refund arose the moment the Cancellation Deed was validly executed – The legislative scheme governing the earlier proviso to Section 48(1) of the Act, contemplated a broader two-year window – Constricting that window retroactively, merely because registration happened post-amendment, unduly defeats a vested cause of action – Held that the scheme of stamp duty refund provisions is designed to ensure fairness when the underlying transaction is rescinded for bona fide reasons – The Appellants were compelled to cancel the purchase due to the developer’s inability to deliver timely possession, and were in no way remiss or at fault – Appellants are entitled to the benefit of the un- amended proviso of Section 48(1) of the Act – Their refund application, therefore, cannot be repelled as time-barred merely because the deed’s registration was post-amendment – An amount of Rs.27,34,500/- had been wrongly retained by the State from 08.01.2018 for almost seven years Appellant would be entitled to simple interest @ 6 per cent per annum on the above amount from the date of the first order of CCRA dated 08.01.2018 till the date it is paid.
(Para 7, 8, 10 ,14 and 18)
(B) Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958, Section 48(1) (as amended by the 24.04.2015 amendment) – Cancellation deed – Refund of stamp duty order – Review of order – Jurisdiction – Appellants’ submission that the CCRA, having once granted a refund by its order dated 08.01.2018, lacked any express statutory power to review or recall that decision – Held that a quasi- judicial authority can only exercise such powers as the statute confers – There is no provision in the Act enabling the CCRA to sit in review of its own orders – In the absence of any enabling clause, the subsequent orders dated 03.03.2018, 16.04.2019, and ultimately 16.12.2022, reversing the earlier sanction of the refund, cannot be sustained solely because the Appellants participated in the proceedings – Unable to concur with the High Court’s reasoning that the Appellants “submitted themselves” to the authority’s review process or somehow acquiesced in the second decision – Jurisdiction cannot be created by consent or waiver – The law does not permit a statutory functionary to assume powers not conferred upon it, regardless of how the parties engage in subsequent litigation – See clear infirmity in the High Court’s endorsement of the CCRA’s review-like exercise – Further, its refusal to disturb the recall of the earlier refund order, despite acknowledging the absence of statutory review power, is difficult to sustain – Participation in an erroneous procedure cannot confer review jurisdiction upon the CCRA where none exists in law.
(Para 12 to 14)
Harshit Harish Jain V. State Of Maharashtra
Supreme Court: 2025 INSC 104: (DoJ 24-01-2025)
