



REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1148 OF 2013

DIDAR SINGH @ DARI **...APPELLANT(S)**
VERSUS

THE STATE OF HARYANA **...RESPONDENT(S)**
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 786 OF 2017

RANJEET SINGH @ JEETA **...APPELLANT(S)**
VERSUS

THE STATE OF HARYANA **...RESPONDENT(S)**

J U D G M E N T

MANOJ MISRA, J.

1. These two appeals impugn common judgment and order of the High Court¹ dated 06.12.2012 passed in Criminal Appeal No. 941 of 2008, whereby the appeal of the appellants against the judgment and order of the Trial Court², dated 27.11.2008, in Sessions Case No.32 of 2008, convicting and sentencing the

¹ The High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh

² Additional Sessions Judge, Karnal

appellants under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860³, was dismissed.

Facts

2. On 25.05.2004, at 09:45 AM, PW-1, father of the deceased, lodged a first information report (for short, FIR) at Police Station Assandh, *inter alia*, alleging that on 24.05.2004 at about 08:00 PM Ranjeet *alias* Jeeta (Appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 786 of 2017) and Didar Singh (Appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 1148 of 2013) came, and took his son Mohinder (the deceased) on their motorcycle. The deceased did not return thereafter. The next morning, when PW-1 and members of his family went looking for the deceased, they found the dead body of the deceased lying face up in a field owned by Sardar Baksha Singh, near the bus stand on GT Road, Karnal, at village Thari. Injuries were noticed on the head and there were scratches on the toe and legs, indicating that the body had been dragged. In the FIR suspicion was expressed

³ IPC

against the appellants and one Kaka (nephew of Ranjeet).

3. The third accused Kaka was declared a juvenile, and therefore, his trial was separated. Later, he was found not guilty.

4. In so far as the appellants are concerned, they were tried for offences punishable under Sections 302 and 201 read with Section 34 of IPC.

5. In the trial, prosecution led evidence to prove few circumstances to bring home the charge(s) framed against the appellants. Those circumstances were:

(i) The accused-appellants took the deceased from home in the evening, between 7.30 and 8.00 PM, of 24.05.2004 on a motorcycle whereafter the deceased was not seen alive and his body was found in the fields next morning. Besides, accused-appellants gave no explanation as to when they parted company of the deceased.

(ii) A damaged red colour Yamaha motorcycle and two pairs of chappals were found lying in the fields of Kulwant Singh. One pair of chappal was

identified to be that of the deceased and the motorcycle was proved to have been purchased by Ranjeet i.e., one of the appellants.

(iii) Post arrest, the accused suffered a disclosure statement based on which the crime scene was constructed and another Honda motorcycle was recovered which was allegedly used for carrying the dead body of the deceased from the place where the deceased was killed to the place where the body was dumped.

(iv) Accused-appellants had motive to kill the deceased as they suspected the deceased of providing information to the police regarding their involvement in trade of contraband products i.e., poppy husk. The police record disclosed that appellant Ranjeet Singh was accused of an offence under The Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985⁴ and Didar Singh had suffered conviction under Section 294 IPC.

⁴ NDPS Act

6. Based on the above circumstances and upon finding that though the accused had denied the incriminating circumstances appearing against them, they had offered no explanation either in their statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973⁵ or in the defence evidence as to when they parted company of the deceased, the Trial Court convicted the appellants under Sections 302/ 34 of IPC. However, the appellants were acquitted of the charge under Section 201/34 of IPC.
7. Aggrieved by their conviction, the appellants preferred Criminal Appeal No. 941-DB of 2008 in the High Court which stood dismissed by the impugned judgment and order.
8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the records.

Submissions on behalf of the appellants

9. Aggrieved by their conviction and dismissal of their appeal, on behalf of the appellants it was submitted:

⁵ CrPC

- (a) No missing report or information about deceased being taken from home and of not returning by the night was given on 24.05.2004. Even the FIR was lodged with delay, at about 9.45 PM, on 25.05.2004 despite the body of the deceased being discovered in the early morning of 25.05.2004.
- (b) The statement in the FIR that the dead body of the deceased appeared to have been dragged to the spot raises doubt about the FIR being contrived, and lodged after consultation with the police.
- (c) There was no reason for the killers to remove the body of the deceased from near the motorcycle to the spot. Rather, it appears to be a case where the deceased died in a road accident, and after his body was found in the morning it was shifted to the spot to contrive a story that the deceased was murdered by the accused-appellants. Besides, if the accused were keen to remove the body from near the

motorcycle they would not have left the chappals of the deceased behind. The High Court overlooked all these vital circumstances while analysing and evaluating the evidence.

(d) Even the last seen circumstance was not satisfactorily proved. It is a very weak piece of evidence which alone cannot sustain a conviction. Moreover, there was a large time-gap between the deceased being last seen with the accused and discovery of his body far away from the place where they were last seen together.

(e) Injuries found on the body of the deceased could have been caused in an accident by falling on a hard surface while riding a motorcycle as is the opinion of Dr. S.C. Nawal (PW7). Moreover, the motorcycle was found damaged. Therefore, after the accident, upon discovering the body, the prosecution story was contrived in consultation with the police to nail the accused, and to lend credence to

the story, the body of the deceased was dragged and shifted to another place.

- (f) The High Court as well as the Trial Court had overlooked an important aspect of the case, which is, that, according to PW1 and PW4, the deceased had left the house on or about 07:30 - 08:00 PM after having meals. The autopsy report reveals that the stomach of the deceased was empty. Post meal, stomach empties in about 4 to 6 hours. Thus, there was huge time-gap between last seen and probable time of death and, therefore, intervening circumstances cannot be ruled out. Besides, the autopsy report does not report presence of faecal matter in the large intestines. It only shows presence of foul smelling gas. This suggests that the death may have occurred in the wee hours of the morning and certainly not within a short span of time when the deceased was allegedly last seen alive with the accused.

(g) In a case based on circumstantial evidence, motive assumes importance. Except for the statement of PW-4 that the accused suspected the deceased of leaking out information of their illicit acts to the police, there is no cogent material to prove the motive for the crime. Besides, if the deceased was leaking information against the accused to the police he would not have gone with the accused. Admittedly, there is no evidence that the accused forcibly took away the deceased from home. Thus, on the face of it prosecution story appears improbable.

(h) The so-called disclosure statement to construct the crime scene and which led to discovery of another motor cycle used for carrying the dead body, is of no consequence. Because, firstly, the alleged place of murder is adjacent to the place where the damaged motorcycle and chappals were found and already seized, therefore there was no

discovery of any fact; and, secondly, the other motorcycle could not be linked to the crime by any evidence, forensic or ocular.

(i) There is no recovery of the murder weapon.

Even the blood-stained clothes of the accused were not recovered to link them to the crime.

(j) The FSL team and finger print expert had gone to the spot along with the Investigating Officer, but did not collect any sample, though it collected samples of blood-stained earth from the spot.

(k) Based on the above submissions, it was contended that neither the circumstances were proved beyond reasonable doubt nor they were of conclusive nature and tendency; besides, if put together, they do not constitute a chain so complete as to reasonably infer that it was the accused and no one else who committed the murder. Thus, according to the appellants' counsel, there was no justification to convict the appellants.

Submissions on behalf of the Respondent

10. *Per contra*, on behalf of the Respondent-State, it was argued that PW-1 had established that the deceased was taken from home by the appellants on their motorcycle. Thereafter the deceased was not seen alive. In the morning, the body of the deceased was found which reflected injuries making out a case of homicide. Chappals of the deceased were found near the motorcycle of one of the accused. Accident theory is ruled out because there was a post mortem injury. The post mortem injury could be caused due to dragging the body. Therefore, in absence of any explanation as to when the accused parted company of the deceased, conviction of the accused cannot be faulted. Accordingly, the appeals are liable to be dismissed.

Analysis

11. As the prosecution case rests on circumstantial evidence, it would be useful to remind ourselves of the conditions that must be fulfilled before a conviction can be sustained on circumstantial evidence. In the

oft-quoted decision of this Court in ***Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra***⁶ it was held that following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to fully established on circumstantial evidence:

- (i) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established;
- (ii) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty;
- (iii) the circumstance should be of a conclusive nature and tendency;
- (iv) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved and;
- (v) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the

⁶ (1984) 4 SCC 116, paragraph 153

accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.

12. In the instant case, the prosecution relies on the following circumstances: (i) the deceased died a homicidal death; (ii) the deceased was taken from home in the evening of 24.5.2004 by the accused-appellants and thereafter, the deceased was not seen alive; rather, his dead body was found in the early morning hours of 25.05.2004; (iii) the chappals of the deceased were found near the motorcycle owned by one of the accused, where human blood was also found; (iv) disclosure statement suffered by the accused helped in reconstructing the crime scene as also led to discovery of the motorcycle used in taking the dead body of the deceased from the place where he was murdered to the place where his body was found; and (v) the accused held the motive to commit murder as they were apprehensive that the deceased might be leaking information to the police regarding their illicit activities.

13. We shall now deal with each of the above mentioned circumstances.

Homicidal or Accidental Death

14. Ex PW7/A is the autopsy report which recites injuries as follows:

(i) A lacerated wound of size 1 x 2 cm present on left side of parietal region of forehead. 4 cm above left ear. On dissection underlying bone was found fractured into many pieces;

(ii) Diffused swelling of size 6 x 4 cm on occipital region of head left side, 2 cm away from midline. On dissection underlying bone was fractured and haematoma was present.

(iii) A lacerated wound of size 2 x 4 cm present on left foot. No bleeding was present. Bone and muscle were visible.

(iv) Multiple abrasions were present on right foot fingers.

(v) There was abrasion in the left side of abdomen of size 6 x 3 cm.

Cause of death was due to haemorrhage and shock due to injury on vital organ. All injuries except injury No. (iii) were antemortem caused within the duration of 2 to 24 hours. Injury No. (iii) was found post mortem. It may be noted that internal examination, *inter alia*, revealed that (a) stomach was empty; (b) small intestine disclosed presence of chyle; and (b) large intestine had presence of foul smelling gas. Importantly, presence of faecal matter in the large intestine or rectum is not reported in the autopsy report.

15. The antemortem injuries which resulted in the death of the deceased are located on the head. In ***Modi's "A Text Book of Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology"***⁷, in Chapter 27 "Vehicular Traffic Injuries", under sub-heading "Injuries to Motor Cyclists / Scooter Riders", it is stated:

"A motorcyclist, who is subjected to sudden deceleration, could be thrown off his vehicle and could be flung to the ground, frequently head first. His injuries are determined by the part of the body that sustains the impact, the angle of impact and the object struck. Wearing a crash helmet will modify the impact of injury on the head. Hence, in order to protect the head, the wearing of crash

⁷ 24th Edition published by Lexis Nexis, at page 580

helmet by those driving a motorcycle and the pillion rider has now been made compulsory. The head injuries involve the vault and base of skull and facial bones.”

In light of what is stated in ***Modi’s Medical Jurisprudence (supra)*** we can safely conclude that the head injuries found on the body of the deceased which appear to be the cause of his death could also be a result of a motorcycle accident, though we cannot say with certainty that it is not homicidal inasmuch as it can also be caused by the impact of a hard heavy object hitting the head with force. Therefore, what is important is that the autopsy report does not rule out antemortem injuries being a result of an accident.

Last Seen Circumstance

16. The circumstance of the deceased being last seen together with the accused is a weak circumstance and on its own is ordinarily not sufficient to record conviction until and unless there is negligible time gap between the two events i.e., the deceased being seen together with the accused and discovery of the dead body of the deceased, which rules out any third party intervention in the crime. In cases where there

is a large time gap between the two events, intervening circumstances such as involvement of some third party in the crime cannot be ruled out, and therefore, this circumstance on its own would not be sufficient to sustain a conviction. However, the said circumstance becomes relevant when coupled with other circumstances it constitutes a chain so complete that it leads to an inference that in all human probability it is the accused and no one else who had committed the crime⁸. As to when such an inference can be drawn depends on the facts of each case. At times, the relationship between the accused and the deceased, place of residence of the accused and the deceased, motive for the crime, conduct of the deceased and accused etc. assume importance in drawing such an inference from the proven circumstances. When such an inference can be gathered, the onus, by virtue of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, shifts on the accused to prove those facts which are especially within his

⁸ See: *Boby v. State of Kerala*, (2023) 15 SCC 760; and *Nizam and Another v. State of Rajasthan*, (2016) 1 SCC 550

knowledge to explain the incriminating circumstances appearing against him, and in absence thereof, conviction may be recorded⁹. However, Section 106 of the Evidence Act does not absolve the prosecution of discharging its primary burden of proving its case beyond reasonable doubt. It is only when the prosecution has led evidence which, if believed, will sustain a conviction, or which makes out a *prima facie* case, the question arises of considering facts of which the burden of proof would lie upon the accused¹⁰.

17. In the instant case, the evidence of the last scene circumstance comes from PW1 and PW4. PW1 is father of the deceased and PW4 is his brother. Both PW1 and PW4 state that at, or about, 7.30 PM on 24.5.2004, while they along with the deceased had had their meals, the accused-appellants came on a red colour motorcycle and took away the deceased with them. The deceased did not return in the night and his body was found next day morning in a field of

⁹ State of Rajasthan v. Kashi Ram, (2006) 12 SCC 254; and Satpal v. State of Haryana, (2018) 6 SCC 610.

¹⁰ Shivaji Chintappa Patil v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 5 SCC 626; State of Punjab v. Kewal Krishan, (2023) 13 SCC 695; and Md. Anowar Hussain v. State of Assam, (2022) 19 SCC 264

one Sardar Baksha Singh. What is important here is that in their previous statement they had not disclosed about the red colour of the motorcycle. Therefore, during their deposition in trial, they were confronted with this omission in their previous statement. The defence suggestion is that the entire prosecution story was developed after the body of the deceased was discovered. It is also their suggestion that the prosecution story was contrived in consultation with the police to convert a simple case of road accident into one of murder. In that context, we would carefully scrutinise the evidence.

18. To appropriately test the evidence of last seen in the context of the submissions noticed above, the estimated time of death, the time when the body of the deceased was discovered and the time when the FIR was lodged assumes importance.

19. As far as the time of death is concerned, the autopsy report, which was prepared on 25.5.2004 on the basis of examination conducted at 2.00 PM, states that death could be anytime within 2 to 24 hours before.

This gives rise to possibility of death occurring in the wee hours of the morning of 25.05.2004. There is an important circumstance which indicates occurrence of death not before midnight of 24.05.2004 and 25.05.2005. According to both PW1 and PW4 the deceased left the house at about 7.30 PM on 24.5.2004 after having meals. Autopsy report indicates an empty stomach. Although there is no absolute rule regarding the time-period within which the stomach empties as it depends on multiple factors including the nature of food consumed, however, in ordinary course, the stomach empties within 4 to 6 hours after a reasonable meal. In ***Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra***¹¹, this Court, however, added a word of caution on ascertainment of time of death by stomach contents. Therein it was observed:

“11. ... To quote *Modi's Medical Jurisprudence* that food would be completely digested in 4 to 5 hours or to swear by the doctor to deduce that death must have occurred within three hours of the eating and, therefrom, to argue that the presence of undigested food in the dead body spells the sure inference that death must have occurred before 2:00 PM is to mis-read the

¹¹ (1973) 2 SCC 793, paragraph 11

science on the subject of digestive processes. *Modi's Medical Jurisprudence*, extracts from which have been given by both the Courts, makes out that a mixed diet of animal and vegetable foods, normally taken by Europeans, takes four to five hours for complete digestion while a vegetable diet, containing mostly farinaceous food usually consumed by Indians, does not leave the stomach completely within 6 to 7 hours after its ingestion. Indeed, the learned author cautiously adds that the stomachic contents cannot determine with precision the time of death "in as much as the power of digestibility may remain in abeyance for a long time in states of profound shock and coma". He also states "it must also be remembered that the process of digestion in normal healthy persons may continue for a time after death". ... To impute exactitude to a medical statement oblivious to the variables noticed by experts and changes in dietary habits is to be unfair to the science. We are not prepared to run the judicial risk of staking the whole verdict on nebulous medical observations. ..."

20. However, there are two more circumstances here, which may indicate that the death could have occurred in the wee hours of the morning of 25.5.2004. First is the large intestine not showing presence of faecal matter, and the second is the doctor's opinion that the time of death could be between 2 to 24 hours before autopsy. Though we cannot estimate the precise time of death based on the absence of faecal matter in the large intestine as people may have different habits, and it is also possible that one may ease himself or herself in the

night after meals. Nevertheless, this can be a factor indicative of a possibility of the event occurring at the time suggested. And, if other circumstances indicate that there is a strong probability of that event happening on or about that time, it may lend support to that inference, and, in absence of cogent evidence to the contrary, may serve the purpose of creating a reasonable doubt in the prosecution story.

21. Now, we shall come to the testimony of PW1 and PW4 to find out whether they have been prompt in reporting the matter, or had reported the matter with delay, after they had contacted the police. Importantly, this is a case where the FIR was lodged after discovery of the body, and not as a missing report. The FIR was lodged by PW1 at 9.45AM on 25.05.2004, *inter alia*, stating that at about 8.00 PM of 24.05.2004, the accused-appellants took his son i.e., the deceased on a motorcycle. The deceased did not return in the night. A search for him was made in the morning whereupon the deceased's body was found in a field near the bus stand. The FIR also

expresses suspicion regarding the involvement of the accused-appellants in the murder. Interestingly, the FIR recites that when PW1 was on his way to lodge the report, he met the police on the way and dictated the narration to the police, which was later lodged as a report. Two aspects are conspicuous in the FIR. One is the statement describing the condition of the body; and the other is the lack of information of the motorcycle being found at another spot.

22. As far as description of the body is concerned, the FIR describes the body as showing signs of being dragged. Ordinarily, drag marks on the ground may indicate that the body has been dragged. But none of the site plans prepared during investigation and exhibited during trial show presence of drag marks on the ground. Further, no drag marks are noticed in the site plan of the spot from where the body was lifted. The absence of drag marks in the site plan, yet a mention in the FIR regarding presence of signs that the body was dragged, when, ordinarily, an expert only could tell about it upon examining the body, gives an

impression that its disclosure in the FIR is a result of consultation with the police.

23. When we consider the testimony of PW4, another feature comes to light, which is, that the search for the deceased had been ongoing since night and that his body was found very early in the morning.

24. Insofar as discovery of the Yamaha motorcycle is concerned, there is no evidence on record as to from whom and when information was received about the said motorcycle lying in the field. Although from the testimony of the investigating officer and other witnesses it is clear that the damaged motorcycle was recovered from the field on the same day the FIR was lodged, it is not clear as to who informed about the presence of the damaged motorcycle in the field, and at what time.

25. In that backdrop, the submission on behalf of the appellants is that the damaged motorcycle and the body of the deceased were first noticed in the field, from there the body was transported to the place from where it was recovered to contrive a story of murder.

This was done because if the body had been lying near the motorcycle the logical inference would have been that the deceased died in an accident. Therefore, only after completing that exercise, in consultation with the police, the story of last scene was contrived.

26. We have given thoughtful consideration to the above submissions. What strikes us is that, admittedly, at the spot where the motorcycle was found there was human blood. The nature of injuries was such that the person would have died instantaneously on the spot. Further, admittedly, the motorcycle was found lying damaged in the field. The fatal injuries were only on the head, and possible in a motorcycle accident, as discussed above. In such circumstances, there was no occasion for the accused to transport the body to another place and leave chappals of the deceased behind. If the accused wanted to create a scene of an accident, they would not have removed the body from there. And if they wanted to remove the body after killing the deceased, they would not have damaged the motorcycle and leave it in the field. Now, when we

consider that the prosecution has failed to disclose as to from whom they got the information of the motorcycle, and at what time of the day the motorcycle was found, a serious doubt arises about the prosecution case. In that backdrop, when we consider the medical evidence giving rise to the possibility of death occurring in the wee hours of the morning, the evidence of 'last seen' circumstance, in our view, fails to inspire confidence. We thus hold that the last seen circumstance is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Ownership of Yamaha motorcycle

27. The prosecution sought to prove that Ranjeet Singh was the owner of the Yamaha motorcycle found in the field near which human blood and chappals of the deceased were found. In fact, according to the prosecution, two pairs of chappals were found at the spot. One was identified by PW1 as that of the deceased and the other could not be identified. Interestingly, a forensic team went to the spot along with finger print expert, but there is no forensic report

in respect of presence of finger prints of any of the accused on that motorcycle.

28. Ownership of the motorcycle was sought to be proved by examining PW10 who produced a Bill (Ex. P12) showing sale of Yamaha motorcycle with specified Chassis/ Engine number to Ranjeet Singh, son of Kapur Singh for Rs.33,220/-. During cross-examination, PW10 stated that he does not know Ranjeet Singh personally; he did not sell the motorcycle to Ranjeet Singh; and that what he had stated was from the entry in the Bill book. He also could not prove the signature of Ranjeet Singh on the Bill Book to show acceptance of delivery of the vehicle by him. Admittedly, the vehicle is not registered in the name of any of the accused persons. No witness has come forward to state that that motorcycle had been in the possession or ownership of any of the accused. Only PW1 and PW4 stated in their deposition in Court that the accused had come on a red colour motorcycle to take the deceased with them. But the colour and make of the motorcycle was absent in their previous

statement and they were confronted with that omission during their deposition in Court. In such circumstances, bearing in mind that accused Ranjeet Singh had denied ownership of the motorcycle in his statement under Section 313 of CrPC, we are of the view that ownership of the Yamaha motorcycle could not be proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Disclosure Statement

29. The prosecution sets up a case that basis disclosure statement(s) of the accused the crime scene was reconstructed and a Honda motorcycle was recovered which was used to carry/ drag the dead body from the place of murder to the place where it was found.
30. In so far as discovery of the crime scene is concerned, the same was already a discovered fact, and therefore, the disclosure has no evidentiary value. Admittedly, they could neither recover the murder weapon nor blood-stained clothes etc. to link the accused to the crime. Further, the Honda motorcycle did not show any signs of carrying or dragging a dead body. No blood stains were found on it. In such circumstances,

the alleged disclosure statement(s) have no evidentiary value.

Motive

31. The prosecution relies on testimony of PW1 and PW4 to prove motive for the crime. According to those witnesses, the accused felt that the deceased had been leaking information to the police about their illicit narcotic trade etc. No doubt, the prosecution has produced certain documents to show that the accused were tried and convicted, but there is nothing on record to show that the deceased had been an informant or witness in any case against them. Neither PW1 nor PW4 disclose about any previous incident where the accused may have threatened the deceased about passing information to the police against them. No previous incident of altercation or fight involving accused and the deceased has been brought to our notice from the evidence. Besides, if the deceased and accused were inimical towards each other, the deceased would not have gone with them in the night. And if PW1 and PW4 were aware of the enmity, they would have reported

immediately when the deceased did not return in the night. In such circumstances, we are of the view that the prosecution has also failed in proving the motive for the crime.

Conclusion

32. In light of the discussion above, we find, firstly, the prosecution has failed to prove the incriminating circumstances beyond reasonable doubt, and, secondly, those circumstances cumulatively do not indicate that in all human probability it is the accused who had committed the crime and no one else. Besides, the circumstances proven on record do strongly indicate that the deceased died in a motorcycle accident.

33. In our view, the High Court had failed to consider and evaluate the evidence in the context of the submissions made before it and committed a serious mistake of not testing the prosecution case against the weight of attending facts and circumstances proven on record.

34. We have therefore no hesitation in allowing the appeals.

The appeals are allowed. The judgment and order of the

High Court as well as the Trial Court are set aside. The appellants are acquitted of all the charge(s) for which they were tried. They are reported to be on bail. They need not surrender. Their bail bonds are discharged.

35. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

.....J.
(MANOJ MISRA)

.....J.
(VIJAY BISHNOI)

New Delhi;
July 14th, 2026