2025 INSC 442
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(HON’BLE ABHAY
S. OKA, J. AND HON’BLE UJJAL BHUYAN, JJ.)
UCO BANK
Petitioner
VERSUS
VIJAY KUMAR HANDA
Respondent
Civil
Appeal No. 5922 OF 2024-Decided on 03-04-2025
Labour Law, Industrial Dispute
Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947, Section 2(p) and Section 18(1), 11A - Industrial Disputes
(Central) Rules, 1957, Rule 58 - UCO Bank (Employees’) Pension Regulations,
1995, Regulation 22 - Bipartite Settlement, 19.10.1966, Clause 6(b) ,
19(5)(c) – Industrial Dispute – Removal from service - Pensionary benefits – Claim for - Initial penalty
imposed on the respondent by the appellant was dismissal from service with
immediate effect after having been found guilty of gross misconduct as per
Clause 19.5(c) of the Bipartite Settlement - Appellate authority modified the
penalty order passed by the disciplinary authority by substituting the penalty
of dismissal from service by removal from service with terminal benefits -
Respondent raised an industrial dispute which culminated in an award dated
13.02.2004 - As per this award, Labour Court had invoked the provisions
of Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act and substituted the
penalty of removal from service with terminal benefits by the penalty of
stoppage of four increments for one year with further direction for reinstatement
in service with 75 percent back wages - This award of the Labour Court failed
to stand judicial scrutiny as learned Single Judge of the High Court set aside
the same which decision was affirmed by the Division Bench in letters patent
appeal - This sequence of events demonstrates that the modified penalty as
imposed by the appellate authority attained finality as this appellate order
was not questioned by the appellant -
Learned senior counsel for the appellant in the course of her
submissions placed reliance on Regulation 22 of the Regulations, 1995
which provided forfeiture of service on resignation or dismissal or removal or
termination of an employee from the service of the Bank and consequently shall
not qualify for pensionary benefits - Interplay of Clause 6(b) of the
Bipartite Settlement and Regulation 22 of the Regulations, 1995 was
examined by this Court in S.K. Kool and both the learned Single Judge
and the Division Bench had followed the aforesaid decision of this Court -
Learned Single Judge noted that respondent had submitted his option for pension
on 05.10.2010 - Learned Single Judge also held that objection of the appellant
to the claim of pension by the respondent was without any basis in as much as
the appellate authority had specifically held that respondent would be entitled
to receive terminal benefits for the period of service he had rendered - This
order of the appellate authority has attained finality - Therefore, it
was held that respondent was entitled to receive pension in view of the
order passed by the appellate authority - This view of the learned Single Judge
has been endorsed by the Division Bench in the impugned judgment - Do not find
any compelling reason to interfere with the concurrent findings of the learned
Single Judge and the Division Bench while exercising our jurisdiction
under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.
(Para
17 to 22)
JUDGMENT
Ujjal Bhuyan, J. :- Heard learned counsel
for the parties.
2.
This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment and order dated
11.01.2017 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh
(briefly ‘the High Court’ hereinafter) dismissing Letters Patent Appeal No.
1525 of 2016 preferred by the appellant. 2.1. Appellant herein is the United
Commercial Bank (briefly ‘the Bank’ hereinafter).
3.
By the judgment and order dated 11.01.2017, the letters patent appeal filed by
the appellant Bank against the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge
was dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court. Learned Single Judge
vide the judgment and order dated 14.03.2016 had allowed the writ petition
filed by the respondent being Civil Writ Petition No. 2490 of 2014 by directing
the appellant to process the case of the respondent for pension and to release
the pensionary dues to him expeditiously.
4.
Relevant facts may be briefly noted.
5.
At the relevant point of time, respondent was serving as a Clerk in the
appellant Bank. A charge memo dated 12.10.1998 issued by the disciplinary
authority was served upon him, charging him with having indulged in acts of
gross misconduct within the premises of the Gurmandi Branch, Jalandhar of the
appellant Bank. As per the allegations, on 21.09.1998, at around 05:15 PM,
respondent along with another employee of the same branch Shri R.N. Chopra had
assaulted Shri J.B. Bansal, an officer of the appellant Bank posted at the
Raipur-Rasulpur Branch, in the cabin of the senior manager of the Gurmandi
Branch. Officials of the branch had to intervene to separate Shri Bansal from
the respondent and Shri Chopra.
5.1.
Before the respondent could file his response to the charge memo, the
disciplinary authority decided to institute an enquiry. In this connection,
Shri H.S. Saini, an officer in Scale III, was appointed as the Enquiry Officer
and Shri R.K. Kakkar, an officer in Scale II, was appointed as the Presiding
Officer vide the notification dated 18.12.1998.
5.2.
The Enquiry Officer conducted the enquiry and on conclusion of the same
submitted his enquiry report to the disciplinary authority along with his
covering letter dated 09.10.1999. In the enquiry proceedings, stand of the
respondent was that no such incident of assault had taken place; instead, it
was a conspiracy hatched at the instance of the rival union to falsely
implicate the respondent and Shri Chopra. Enquiry Officer concluded that the
charges against the respondent stood proved.
5.3.
On going through the enquiry report, disciplinary authority passed an order
dated 18.10.1999 holding that the charge against the respondent of indulging in
riotous, disorderly and indecent behaviour within the premises of the Bank was
proved. Therefore, as the disciplinary authority, he proposed to impose the
penalty of dismissal from service. A copy of the enquiry report was
forwarded to the respondent with the intimation that a personal hearing would
be held on 29.10.1999 on the question of penalty.
5.4.
It appears that respondent had appeared before the disciplinary authority for
personal hearing and also filed a written submission. He reiterated that he was
innocent and was falsely implicated. He submitted he had two small school going
children besides his unemployed wife. Therefore, he pleaded that the penalty as
proposed should not be imposed.
5.5.
Disciplinary authority vide his order dated 14.12.1999 agreed with the findings
of the Enquiry Officer and held that the charge levelled against the respondent
for having indulged in riotous, disorderly and indecent behaviour within the
premises of the appellant Bank was proved. Respondent thus committed an act of
gross misconduct within the meaning of Clause 19.5(c) of the Bipartite
Settlement dated 19.10.1966, as amended. He, therefore, imposed the penalty of
dismissal from service on the respondent with immediate effect.
6.
Respondent preferred an appeal against the aforesaid order of dismissal from
service before the appellate authority. By order dated 16.02.2000, the
appellate authority while concurring with the finding of the disciplinary
authority qua the misconduct, however modified the penalty to one of removal
from service. It was ordered that respondent be removed from the services of
the Bank with immediate effect; however, he would be entitled to receive the
terminal benefits for the period of service he had rendered. It was clarified
that removal from service would not be a disqualification for the future
employment of the respondent.
7.
On an industrial dispute being raised at the instance of the respondent, the central
government referred the same to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-
cum-Labour Court, Jalandhar (for short ‘Labour Court’ hereinafter). The
question referred was whether the action of the Bank in dismissing the
respondent from service was legal and just. The supplementary question was as
to what relief the concerned workman (respondent) would be entitled to and from
which stage. Labour Court after hearing the matter passed an award dated
13.02.2004 opining that the penalty imposed was disproportionate to the gravity
of the alleged misconduct by taking into consideration the involvement of the
respondent in the alleged incident. Invoking the provisions of Section
11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (briefly, ‘the Industrial
Disputes Act’ hereinafter), the Labour Court substituted the penalty of
dismissal/removal from service with the penalty of stoppage of four increments
for one year. Respondent was directed to be reinstated in service with 75
percent back wages and other benefits. The reference was answered accordingly.
The aforesaid award was notified by the central government on 07.03.2004.
8.
Appellant assailed the aforesaid award dated 13.02.2004 before the High Court
by filing CWP No. 11806 of 2004. A learned Single Judge of the High Court vide
the judgment and order dated 25.03.2009 was of the view that the award passed
by the Labour Court was totally unjustified and could not be sustained. Power
under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act ought not to have
been invoked by the Labour Court. Punishment of removal from service with
terminal benefits as imposed on the respondent by the appellate authority could
not be said to be disproportionate. Therefore, the award dated 13.02.2004 was
set aside.
9.
Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated
25.03.2009, respondent preferred a letters patent appeal being LPA No. 928 of
2009 before the Division Bench of the High Court. Vide the judgment and order
dated 24.02.2010, the Division Bench agreed with the view taken by the learned
Single Judge that power under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes
Act ought not to have been invoked by the Labour Court. Consequently, the
appeal was dismissed.
10.
Respondent filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India before the High Court seeking a direction to the appellant to release his
retiral benefits. The same was registered as Civil Writ Petition No. 2490 of
2014. A learned Single Judge of the High Court vide the judgment and order
dated 14.03.2016 referred to the order of the appellate authority wherein the
latter had held that the respondent would be entitled to receive the terminal
benefits for the period of service he had rendered and thereafter allowed
the said writ petition by directing the appellant Bank to process the case of
the respondent for pension in pursuance of the option exercised by him and to
release the pensionary benefits due to him expeditiously.
11.
Appellant preferred LPA No. 1525 of 2016 before the Division Bench challenging
the aforesaid decision of the learned Single Judge dated 14.03.2016. A Division
Bench of the High Court vide the judgment and order dated 11.01.2017 placed
reliance on a decision of this Court in Bank of Baroda Vs. S.K. Kool[(2014) 2 SCC 715] and
another decision of the High Court in Hardial Singh Vs. Bank of
Baroda[2012 SCC Online P&H
8059] and thereafter affirmed the view taken by the learned
Single Judge. Consequently, the letters patent appeal of the appellant was
dismissed.
12.
Hence the present appeal.
13.
This Court by order dated 03.07.2017 had issued notice and stayed the operation
and implementation of the impugned judgment and order dated 11.01.2017.
When the matter was heard on 23.04.2024, leave was granted.
14.
Learned senior counsel for the appellant submits that respondent was not
punished under Clause 6(b) of the Bipartite Settlement. Therefore, the High
Court was not justified in applying the case of S.K.
Kool (supra). That apart, the decision in S.K. Kool (supra)
was rendered in a different factual context. The employee in the said case had
opted for pension before the penalty of removal from service was imposed on
him. In the present case, respondent never opted for pension. Therefore,
S.K. Kool (supra) is clearly distinguishable in so far facts and
circumstances of the present case is concerned.
14.1.
Learned senior counsel further submits that respondent was not entitled to
pension in as much as he did not fulfil the requirements of pension in terms of
the ninth Bipartite Settlement dated 27.04.2010. The said settlement did not
include employees who had suffered the penalty of removal from service as being
eligible for pension.
14.2.
In any view of the matter, learned senior counsel submits that a delinquent
employee who has been imposed the major penalty of removal from service is
not entitled to pension or other retiral benefits. The charge against the
respondent is very serious and that was proved in the duly constituted
enquiry. Regulation 22 of the UCO Bank (Employees’) Pension
Regulations, 1995 (for short 'Regulations, 1995' hereinafter) also does not permit
grant of pension to such delinquent employees.
14.3.
In such circumstances, learned senior counsel submits that the High Court fell
in error in directing the appellant to grant pension to the respondent.
Therefore, the impugned order should be set aside.
15.
Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent submits that both the learned
Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court had correctly appreciated
the facts and the law and thereafter upheld the claim of the respondent.
15.1.
Learned counsel for the respondent heavily relied upon the decision of this
Court in S.K. Kool (supra) and submits that respondent having
completed the minimum pensionable years of service, he is entitled to the
pensionary benefits.
15.2.
It is further submitted that the appellate authority while maintaining the
finding of the disciplinary authority in so far the finding of misconduct of
the respondent is concerned, however held that the respondent would be entitled
to receive the terminal benefits for the period of service he had rendered.
Appellant did not challenge this decision. On the contrary, appellant had
challenged the subsequent Labour Court award substituting the same with a
lesser penalty and directing re-instatement in service. This challenge was
sustained by the Single Judge as well as by the Division Bench of the High
Court, thus restoring the appellate order. Therefore, the appellate order had
attained finality. On the strength of the appellate order, respondent is
entitled to pension and this is what the High Court in the subsequent round has
held. Learned counsel, therefore, submits that there is no merit in the appeal
and, as such, the appeal should be dismissed.
16.
Submissions made by learned counsel for the parties have received the due
consideration of the Court.
17.
A Bipartite Settlement was arrived at between the Indian Banks’ Association and
the Banks’ Workmen Union on 19.10.1966. This settlement was arrived at
under Section 2(p) and Section 18(1) of the Industrial
Disputes Act read with Rule 58 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules,
1957. This settlement therefore has a statutory backing and is binding on the
parties. Respondent was charged with committing an act of gross misconduct as
defined in Clause 19.5(c) of the aforesaid Bipartite Settlement which was
proved by the Enquiry Officer and accepted by the disciplinary authority. On
10.04.2002, a further settlement was arrived at between the Indian Banks’
Association, representing the management on the one hand, and the workmen
represented by the All India Bank Employees’ Association, National
Confederation of Bank employees and Indian National Bank Employees’ Federation
on the other hand. Pursuant thereto, Clause 6(b) was inserted in the said
Bipartite Settlement providing for one of the penalties which may be imposed on
a delinquent employee found guilty of gross misconduct. Clause 6(b) reads as
follows:
6. An employee found guilty of gross misconduct may:
(a) * * * * *
(b) be removed from
service with superannuation benefits i.e. pension and/or provident fund
and gratuity as would be due otherwise under the rules or regulations
prevailing at the relevant time and without disqualification from future
employment; or 17.1. Thus, as per the aforesaid clause, an employee who is
found guilty of gross misconduct may be removed from service but would be
provided with superannuation benefits which would otherwise be due to him.
Further, the penalty of removal from service would be without disqualification
from future employment.
18.
In the instant case, the initial penalty imposed on the respondent by the
appellant was dismissal from service with immediate effect after having been
found guilty of gross misconduct as per Clause 19.5(c) of the Bipartite
Settlement. Appellate authority vide the order dated 16.02.2000 modified the
penalty order dated 14.12.1999 passed by the disciplinary authority by
substituting the penalty of dismissal from service by removal from service with
terminal benefits. The substituted penalty in terms of the appellate order
dated 16.02.2000 reads as under:
Shri V.K. Handa (PFM
No. 22488) is hereby removed from the bank’s service with immediate effect.
However, he will be entitled to receive the terminal benefits for the
period of service he has rendered. Removal from service will not be a
disqualification for his future employment.
19.
We have already seen that respondent had raised an industrial dispute which
culminated in an award dated 13.02.2004. As per this award, Labour Court had
invoked the provisions of Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act
and substituted the penalty of removal from service with terminal benefits by
the penalty of stoppage of four increments for one year with further direction for
reinstatement in service with 75 percent back wages. This award of the Labour
Court failed to stand judicial scrutiny as learned Single Judge of the High
Court set aside the same which decision was affirmed by the Division Bench in
letters patent appeal. This sequence of events demonstrates that the modified
penalty as imposed by the appellate authority attained finality as this
appellate order was not questioned by the appellant.
20.
Learned senior counsel for the appellant in the course of her submissions
placed reliance on Regulation 22 of the Regulations,
1995. Regulation 22(1) of the aforesaid regulations reads thus:
22.
Forfeiture of service.-(1) Resignation or dismissal or removal or termination
of an employee from the service of the Bank shall entail forfeiture of his
entire past service and consequently shall not qualify for pensionary benefits.
20.1.
According to her, in view of Regulation 22, the respondent would not be
entitled to pension.
21. Interplay
of Clause 6(b) of the Bipartite Settlement and Regulation 22 of the
Regulations, 1995 was examined by this Court in S.K. Kool (supra) and
after due consideration answered the same in the following manner:
13. …….From a plain
reading of the aforesaid Regulation, it is evident that removal of an employee
shall entail forfeiture of his entire past service and consequently such an
employee shall not qualify for pensionary benefits. If we accept this
submission, no employee removed from service in any event would be entitled for
pensionary benefits. But the fact of the matter is that the Bipartite
Settlement provides for removal from service with pensionary benefits "as
would be due otherwise under the rules or regulations prevailing at the
relevant time". The consequence of this construction would be that the
words quoted above shall become a dead letter. Such a construction has to
be avoided.
14. The Regulations do
not entitle every employee to pensionary benefits. Its application and
eligibility is provided under Chapter II of the Regulations whereas Chapter IV
deals with qualifying service. An employee who has rendered a minimum of ten
years of service and fulfils other conditions only can qualify for pension in
terms of Regulation 14 of the Regulations.
Therefore, the
expression "as would be due otherwise" would mean only such employees
who are eligible and have put in minimum number of years of service to qualify
for pension. However, such of the employees who are not eligible and have not
put in required number of years of qualifying service shall not be entitled to
the superannuation benefits though removed from service in terms of Clause 6(b)
of the Bipartite Settlement. Clause 6(b) came to be inserted as one of the
punishments on account of the Bipartite Settlement. It provides for payment of
superannuation benefits as would be due otherwise.
15. The Bipartite
Settlement tends to provide a punishment which gives superannuation benefits
otherwise due. The construction canvassed by the employer shall give nothing to
the employees in any event. Will it not be a fraud Bipartite Settlement?
Obviously it would be. From the conspectus of what we have observed we have no
doubt that such of the employees who are otherwise eligible for superannuation
benefit are removed from service in terms of Clause 6(b) of the Bipartite
Settlement shall be entitled to superannuation benefits. This is the only
construction which would harmonise the two provisions. It is well-settled rule
of construction that in case of apparent conflict between the two provisions, they
should be so interpreted that the effect is given to both. Hence, we are of the
opinion that such of the employees who are otherwise entitled to superannuation
benefits under the Regulations if visited with the penalty of removal from
service with superannuation benefits shall be entitled for those benefits and
such of the employees though visited with the same penalty but are not eligible
for superannuation benefits under the Regulations shall not be entitled to
that.
22.
Both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench had followed the aforesaid
decision of this Court. Learned Single Judge noted that respondent had
submitted his option for pension on 05.10.2010. Learned Single Judge also held
that objection of the appellant to the claim of pension by the respondent was
without any basis in as much as the appellate authority had specifically held
that respondent would be entitled to receive terminal benefits for the period
of service he had rendered. This order of the appellate authority has attained
finality. Therefore, it was held that respondent was entitled to receive
pension in view of the order passed by the appellate authority. This view of
the learned Single Judge has been endorsed by the Division Bench in the impugned
judgment. The decision in S.K. Kool (supra) is binding on us.
Therefore, we do not find any compelling reason to interfere with the
concurrent findings of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench while
exercising our jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of
India.
23.
Accordingly, the civil appeal is dismissed.
However,
there shall be no order as to cost.
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