2025 INSC 80
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(HON’BLE J.B.
PARDIWALA, J. AND HON’BLE R. MAHADEVAN, JJ.)
U. SUDHEERA
Petitioner
VERSUS
C. YASHODA
Respondent
Civil
Appeal No. 567 OF 2025 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 27761 of 2024)-Decided on
17-01-2025
Civil, CPC
(A)
Civil Procedure Code, Section 100 – Civil Procedure – Ad interim order - Whether the High
Court can pass any ad interim order for a limited period, before framing
substantial question(s) of law, while dealing with a second appeal filed under
Order 41 r/w Section 100 CPC? – Held that the High court cannot grant
any interim protection to the appellant, unless the substantial question of law
is framed under Section 100 (4) or as per the Proviso - On the other hand, if
the High Court is prima facie of the view that the substantial question of law
involved would not require much time for disposal, the court is bound to frame
the substantial question of law at the stage of admission and then order short
notice - High Court cannot use its inherent power under Section 151 in
violation of the express mandates in other provisions of the Code.
(Para 10.2)
(B)
Civil Procedure Code, Section 100 – Civil Procedure – Ad interim order - High Court, without
formulating substantial questions of law, granted the interim relief by
directing the parties to maintain status quo, till the next date of hearing.
The said interim order was also subsequently extended. It is also pertinent to
point out that all the respondents in the second appeal have not been served
and notice was unserved qua Respondent Nos.4, 6 and 7 therein. Therefore, we
are of the opinion that the High Court could not have passed the interim order
without satisfying itself of the existence of a substantial question of law, as
mandated under Section 100 CPC - Interim order passed by the High
Court liable to be set aside.
(Para
11 and 13)
JUDGMENT
R. Mahadevan, J. :- Leave granted.
2.
The challenge made in this appeal is to the interim order dated 20.09.2024
passed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Amaravathi[Hereinafter referred to as “the High Court”] in the Second
Appeal bearing No.518/2023. For the sake of clarity and ease of reference, the
order impugned herein is reproduced below:
“Learned counsel for
the respondent No.9 is present.
Notice sent to
respondent No.8 was served.
Therefore, service of
respondent No.8 is ‘held sufficient’. Learned counsel for the appellant is
permitted to take out steps for filing substitute service against the
respondent Nos.4, 6 and 7.
It was represented by
the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, Sri S. Rajendra Prasad that the
appellant is in possession and enjoyment of the scheduled property as on today
and the respondents are making efforts for interfering with the possession
of the appellant.
Considering the
representation made by the learned Senior Counsel for Reason: the
appellant, both parties are directed to maintain status-quo till 25.09.2024.
List the matter on 25.09.2024.”
3.
The Respondent No.1 is the plaintiff in the suit in O.S.No.48 of 2011;
Appellant Nos.1 to 3 are the legal representatives of the deceased Defendant
No.5; Appellant Nos.4 to 6 are Defendant Nos.1, 3, and 6; and Respondent Nos.2
and 3 are Defendant Nos.2 and 4 in the said suit.
4.
The brief facts of the case, as presented by the appellants, are as follows:
The defendants are
members of the Gazetted Officers Cooperative House Building Society[For short, “the Society”] , which
was registered in 1966 with the purpose of purchasing and making constructions
on lands in Mangalam Village, Tirupati. The Society purchased lands in Survey
Nos.2, 10/1, 10/2 and 12 measuring an extent of 5.35 Ac, 0.61Ac, 4 Ac, 5.47 Ac
respectively. The suit scheduled property measuring an extent of 0.61 Ac was
also purchased by the Society through a sale deed dated 20.03.1986 from one M.Savithramma
W/o. Mudduluru Ramakrishnamraju. The original pattadar of the suit scheduled
property was one Kannavaram Lokanadham, who sold the same to M.Savithramma by
sale deed dated 14.05.1981. While so, the Government issued notification
under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, seeking to acquire
the lands of the Society. Aggrieved
by the same, the Society approached the High Court by filing a writ petition
bearing No.2357/1987, which was allowed and the acquisition notificatio n was set aside, by order dated
27.07.1987. Thereafter, the Tirupati Urban Development Authority issued
Order under Section 14 of the Andhra Pradesh Urban Areas
(Development) Act, 1975, on 19.06.1996 granting approval of layout in respect
of the lands in Sy.Nos.2, 10/1, 10/2 of Mangalam Village, Tirupati. Pursuant to
the same, plots were developed and were sold to the defendants. As things
stood, the Respondent No.1/plaintiff approached the Tahsildar for mutation of
the revenue records in respect of the land in Sy.No.10/1 (0.61 Ac) and the same
was done ex parte by Order dated 13.04.2010. On the basis of the same, the
Respondent No.1/plaintiff filed a suit in OS.No.48 of 2011 before the 1st
Additional Junior Civil Judge, Tirupati, for permanent injunction against the
defendants. The trial Court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff, by
judgment dated 05.02.2016. However, the First Appellate Court viz., V
Additional District Judge, Tirupati, by judgment dated 11.11.2022 passed in
A.S.No.17/2016, allowed the appeal suit and set aside the judgment and decree
passed by the trial Court, after having found that the plaintiff could not have
maintained a suit for bare injunction, without seeking declaration of title.
Challenging the same, the Respondent No.1 / plaintiff filed a second appeal
bearing No. 518 of 2023 before the High Court. After adjourning the matter on
three occasions on the ground that the respondents therein were not served, the
High Court on the fourth occasion i.e., 20.09.2024, granted interim relief in
the form of status quo, without formulating any substantial question of law
arising in the second appeal. By order dated 26.09.2024, the said interim
relief was extended till 17.10.2024. Feeling aggrieved, the legal heirs of
Defendant No.5 and the Defendant Nos.1,3, and 6 are before us with the
present appeal.
5.
The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that without framing
substantial question of law, an interim order cannot be passed in a second
appeal filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908[For short, “CPC”] . In this
connection, reliance was placed on the judgment of this Court in Ram Phal v.
Banarasi[(2003) 11 SCC 762] ,
wherein, it was found that the High Court granted interim order and thereafter,
fixed the matter for framing of question of law on a subsequent date, and
ultimately, it was held that ‘since the High Court dealt with the matter
contrary to the mandate enshrined under Section 100 CPC, the impugned
order deserves to be set aside’. The said judgment has been consistently
followed by this Court in the subsequent decisions in Raghavendra Swamy
Mutt v. Uttaradi Mutt[(2016) 11 SCC
235] and Bhagyashree Anant Gaonkar v. Narendra @ Nagesh Bharma
Holkar [(2023) SCC Online 1236] .
5.1.
The learned counsel further submitted that when the fact remains that all the
respondents have not been served and the plaintiff has not even sought for
declaration of title, the High Court erred in granting the interim relief, on a
mere representation.
5.2.
Referring to the judgment of this Court in Anathula Sudhakar v. P Buchi
Reddy[(2008) 4 SCC 594] , it is
submitted that the suit instituted for bare injunction without seeking
declaration of title, is not maintainable.
5.3.
The learned counsel further submitted that the trial Court decreed the suit on
the presumption that the Respondent No.1/plaintiff is the owner of the property
on the basis of revenue records. However, it is settled law that revenue
records cannot be the basis for determination of ownership. In this regard,
reference was made to the judgment of this Court in Bhimabai Mahadeo
Kambekar v. Arthur Import & Export Co.
[(2019) 3 SCC 191], wherein, it was held that ‘mutation of a land in the
revenue records does not create or extinguish the title over such land nor has
it any presumptive value on the title. It only enables the person in whose
favour mutation is ordered, to pay the land revenue in question’.
5.4.
It is finally submitted that the First Appellate Court, on facts, decided the
appeal in favour of the appellants and as such, the High Court ought not to
have granted an interim order merely on the basis of representation of the
counsel.
5.5.
By submitting so, the learned counsel prayed to allow this appeal by setting
aside the interim order passed by the High Court.
6.
On the contrary, the learned counsel for the contesting respondent / plaintiff
submitted that the jurisdiction of the Court is inherent to issue any ad
interim / temporary order for limited period, in case of exigencies or the
circumstances not covered in the scheme of Code to protect the ends of
justice and to safeguard the subject matter of the proceedings. To
substantiate the same, reference was made to the judgment of this Court
in Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal[AIR 1962 SC 527] , which was
referred to in Vareed Jacob v. Sosamma Geeverghese and Ors. [(2004) 6 SCC 378]
6.1.
Adding further, it is submitted that since the Code does not provide for any
provision for protection of the subject matter of proceedings, when an Appeal
under Order 41 Rule 5 CPC is preferred, and the substantive question
of law remains to be framed yet, the inherent power of the Court
under Section 151 CPC can be invoked in the interregnum to protect
the subject matter.
6.2.
It is also submitted that the impugned order is only in the nature of an
exparte ad interim arrangement for a limited period i.e., till the next date of
hearing. It is neither creating any right nor divesting the parties of their
right. That apart, it does not stay the operation of the decree, but is only in
aid of preserving the subject matter of the suit and maintaining the status quo
as it stood on the date of passing of the order. Therefore, the said ad interim
ex parte arrangement cannot be construed as interim order. In support of
his contention, reference was made to the judgment of Bombay High Court in
Vrajesh Anandrao Kerkar v. Durgesh Tulsidas Kerkar and Others[2024 SCC OnLine Bom 472].
6.3.
The learned counsel further pointed out that in Ram phal (supra), the execution
of the decree itself was stayed, whereas in the present case, the
decree has not been stayed and mere ad interim arrangement to maintain
status quo is under challenge. Similarly, the judgment of this Court in
Bhagyashree Anant Gaonkar (supra) is factually distinguishable as the High
Court had passed the final judgment without even framing any question of law.
Therefore, the decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioners
are not applicable to the facts of the present case.
6.4.
Ultimately, it is submitted by the learned counsel that as per the averments
made in the plaint, the plaintiff has right and share in the suit scheduled
property. Hence, the second appeal could be decided only upon perusal of the
entire papers properly and the impugned order has been passed only as an
interim measure to protect the interest of the parties.
6.5.
Thus, according to the learned counsel, there is no infirmity or illegality in
the order so passed by the High Court and the same need not be interfered with
by this court.
7.
We have considered the rival submissions and perused the documents produced
before us.
8.
Now, the short question arising for our consideration is, whether the High
Court can pass any ad interim order for a limited period, before framing
substantial question(s) of law, while dealing with a second appeal filed under
Order XLI r/w Section 100 CPC.
9.
The facts that remain undisputed are that the suit in OS.No.48 of 2011 filed by
the Respondent No.1/ plaintiff was one for permanent injunction and the same
was decreed in her favour by judgment dated 05.02.2016. However, the First
Appellate Court set aside the same and allowed the appeal suit filed by the
appellants / defendants by judgment dated 11.11.2022. Therefore, the Respondent
No.1 / plaintiff preferred SA.No.518 of 2023, in which, without formulating the
substantial questions of law, the High Court granted the interim relief in the
form of status quo to be maintained by the parties, and the same is called in
question before us. Considering the limited nature of the issue involved
herein, we need not go further into the factual aspects of the matter.
10.
Let us first examine the relevant legal provisions and case laws connected to
the issue involved in this appeal.
10.1.
The right of filing a second appeal is provided under section
100 CPC, which confers jurisdiction on the High Court only when it is
satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. For better
appreciation, the said provision reads as under:
“[Substituted by Act 104 of 1976, sec.37, for section 100 (w.e.f.
1-2-1977)] [100. Second appeal.—(1) Save as otherwise expressly
provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in
force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal
by any Court subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that
the case involves a substantial question of law.
(2) An appeal may lie
under this section from an appellate decree passed ex parte. (3) In an appeal
under this section, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the
substantial question of law involved in the appeal.
(4) Where the High
Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case,
it shall formulate that question.
(5) The appeal shall
be heard on the question so formulated and the respondent shall, at the hearing
of the appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such
question:
Provided
that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the
power of the Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other
substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the
case involves such question.]” 10.2. This Court has categorically held that the
High Court acquires jurisdiction to deal with the second appeal on merits only
when it frames a substantial question of law as required to be framed
under Section 100 CPC; and it cannot grant an interim order, without
framing substantial question of law. In this regard, a few decisions and the
relevant paragraphs are usefully quoted below:(i) Ram Phal (supra)
“2. ... Aggrieved, the
respondents herein filed second appeal before the High Court against the
judgment and decree of the first appellate court. When the second appeal came
up for admission on 20-12-1999 the High Court directed to list the appeal for
framing of question of law on 28-3-2000. However, the High Court granted
interim order by staying the execution of the decree. It is against the said
order granting interim relief the respondent in the second appeal has preferred
this appeal. This Court, on a number of occasions, has repeatedly held that the
High Court acquires jurisdiction to decide the second appeal or deal with the
second appeal on merits only when it frames a substantial question of law as
required to be framed under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. In the
present case, what we find is that the High Court granted interim order and
thereafter fixed the matter for framing of question of law on a subsequent
date.
This was not the way
to deal with the matter as contemplated under Section 100 CPC. The High
Court is required to frame the question of law first and thereafter deal with
the matter. Since the High Court dealt with the matter contrary to the mandate
enshrined under Section 100 CPC, the impugned order deserves to
be set aside.”
(ii) Raghavendra Swamy Mutt (supra)
“23. The submission of
the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant is that Order 41 Rule 5 confers
jurisdiction on the High Court while dealing with an appeal under Section
100 CPC to pass an ex parte order and such an order can be passed
deferring formulation of question of law in grave situations. Be it stated, for
passing an ex parte order the Court has to keep in mind the postulates provided
under sub-rule (3) of Rule 5 of Order 41. It has to be made clear that the
Court for the purpose of passing an ex parte order is obligated to keep in view
the language employed under Section 100 CPC. It is because
formulation of substantial question of law enables the High Court to entertain
an appeal and thereafter proceed to pass an order and at that juncture,
needless to say, the Court has the jurisdiction to pass an interim order
subject to the language employed in Order 41 Rule 5(3).
24. It is clear as day
that the High Court cannot admit a second appeal without examining whether it
raises any substantial question of law for admission and thereafter, it is
obliged to formulate the substantial question of law. Solely because the Court
has the jurisdiction to pass an ex parte order, it does not empower it not to
formulate the substantial question of law for the purpose of admission, defer
the date of admission and pass an order of stay or grant an interim relief.
That is not the scheme of CPC after its amendment in 1976 and that is
not the tenor of precedents of this Court and it has been clearly so stated in
Ram Phal v. Banarasi, [(2003) 11 SCC 762] . Therefore, the High Court has
rectified its mistake by vacating the order passed in IA No. 1 of 2015 and it
is the correct approach adopted by the High Court. Thus, the impugned order is
absolutely impregnable.”
(iii) Santosh Hazari
v. Purushottam Tiwari[(2001) 3 SCC 179]
“9. The High Court
cannot proceed to hear a second appeal without formulating the substantial
question of law involved in the appeal and if it does so it acts illegally and
in abnegation or abdication of the duty cast on Court. The existence of
substantial question of law is the sine qua non for the exercise of the
jurisdiction under the amended Section 100 of the Code. (See: Kshitish
Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar Purkait [(1997) 5 SCC 438], Panchugopal
Barua v. Umesh Chandra Goswami [(1997) 4 SCC 713] and Kondiba Dagadu Kadam
v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar [(1999) 3 SCC 722].)”
(iv) Roop Singh v. Ram Singh[(2000) 3 SCC 708]
"7. It is to be
reiterated that under Section 100 CPC jurisdiction of the High Court
to entertain a second appeal is confined only to such appeals which involve a
substantial question of law and it does not confer any jurisdiction on the High
Court to interfere with pure questions of fact while exercising its
jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC.
(v) State Bank of India v. S.N. Goyal[(2008) 8 SCC 92]
“15. It is a matter of
concern that the scope of second appeals and as also the procedural aspects of second
appeals are often ignored by the High Courts. Some of the oft-repeated errors
are:
(a) Admitting a second
appeal when it does not give rise to a substantial question of law.
(b) Admitting second
appeals without formulating substantial question of law.
(c) Admitting second
appeals by formulating a standard or mechanical question such as “whether on
the facts and circumstances the judgment of the first appellate court calls for
interference” as the substantial question of law.
(d) Failing to
consider and formulate relevant and appropriate substantial question(s) of law
involved in the second appeal.
(e) Rejecting second
appeals on the ground that the case does not involve any substantial question
of law, when the case in fact involves substantial questions of law.
(f) Reformulating the
substantial question of law after the conclusion of the hearing, while
preparing the judgment, thereby denying an opportunity to the parties to make
submissions on the reformulated substantial question of law.
(g) Deciding second
appeals by re-appreciating evidence and interfering with findings of fact,
ignoring the questions of law.
These lapses or
technical errors lead to injustice and also give rise to avoidable further
appeals to this Court and remands by this Court, thereby prolonging the period
of litigation. Care should be taken to ensure that the cases not involving
substantial questions of law are not entertained, and at the same time ensure
that cases involving substantial questions of law are not rejected as not
involving substantial questions of law.”
(vi) Municipal
Committee, Hoshiarpur v. Punjab SEB[(2010)
13 SCC 216]
“16… The court cannot
entertain a second appeal unless a substantial question of law is involved, as
the second appeal does not lie on the ground of erroneous findings of fact
based on an appreciation of the relevant evidence. The existence of a
substantial question of law is a condition precedent for entertaining the
second appeal; on failure to do so, the judgment cannot be maintained. The
existence of a substantial question of law is a sine qua non for the exercise
of jurisdiction under the provisions of Section 100 CPC. It is the
obligation on the court to further clear the intent of the legislature and not
to frustrate it by ignoring the same.”
(vii) Umerkhan v.
Bismillabi[(2011) 9 SCC 684]
“11. In our view, the
very jurisdiction of the High Court in hearing a second appeal is founded on
the formulation of a substantial question of law. The judgment of the High
Court is rendered patently illegal, if a second appeal is heard and judgment
and decree appealed against is reversed without formulating a substantial
question of law. The second appellate jurisdiction of the High Court under
Section 100 is not akin to the appellate jurisdiction under Section 96 of the
Code; it is restricted to such substantial question or questions of law that
may arise from the judgment and decree appealed against. As a matter of law, a
second appeal is entertainable by the High Court only upon its satisfaction
that a substantial question of law is involved in the matter and its
formulation thereof. Section 100 of the Code provides that the second appeal
shall be heard on the question so formulated. It is, however, open to the High
Court to reframe substantial question of law or frame substantial question of
law afresh or hold that no substantial question of law is involved at the time
of hearing the second appeal but reversal of the judgment and decree passed in
appeal by a court subordinate to it in exercise of jurisdiction under Section
100 of the Code is impermissible without formulating substantial question of
law and a decision on such question.”
(viii) In Bhagyashree
Anant Gaonkar (supra), this Court has observed that the exclusive jurisdiction
of the High Court to deal with a regular second appeal is stipulated
in section 100 CPC, which grants power to the High Court to consider
a regular second appeal only on a substantial question of law; and after
referring to the aforesaid earlier judgments, has ultimately, set aside the
impugned judgment passed in the Regular Second Appeal and remanded the matter
to the High Court for a fresh consideration after ascertaining whether
substantial questions were framed at the time of admitting the matter and if
not, to frame the substantial questions of law on hearing the learned counsel
for the respective parties and thereafter to dispose of the second appeal in
accordance with law.
(ix) Following the
aforesaid judgments, this Court in Hemavathi & others v.
V.Hombegowda and another[2023 INSC
848 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1206], has observed that if no substantial
question of law arose in the case, then, the appeal could not have been
entertained and ought to have been dismissed at the stage of admission. The
relevant passage reads as under:
“The jurisdiction of
the High Court to entertain a Second Appeal is well- known. It is a unique
jurisdiction of the High Court where the High Court can entertain a Regular
Second Appeal purely on a “substantial” question of law not even a question of
law or a question of fact. It is a settled law that the first appellate court
is the final Court insofar as the question of facts are concerned and it is
only when substantial questions of law would arise in a case that the High
Court can entertain a Regular Second Appeal and if at the stage of admission
such substantial questions of law are discerned by the High Court the same
would have to be framed and the appeal(s) would have to be admitted. It is only
thereafter that the parties have to be heard on the substantial questions of
law that are framed by the High Court at the stage of admission.
However, the
CPC gives power to the High Court to frame additional substantial
questions of law or to mould the substantial questions of law
already framed on hearing the parties at the time of final hearing of a
Second Appeal. In the event the respondents before the High Court are on record
even at the stage of admission of a Regular Second Appeal and the same is to be
disposed of finally even at this stage substantial questions of law must be
framed and answered before the Regular Second Appeal is admitted and disposed.”
10.3.
As per Section 100, a High Court can proceed to hear a Second Appeal only if
the case involves a substantial question of law, implying that when the appeal
is taken up for admission, it must satisfy itself that a substantial question
of law is involved. Thereafter, the High Court must frame such question and
direct the parties to submit their arguments on such question. The scheme of
the Code also enables the High Court to hear the parties on any other
substantial question of law, not framed by it at the first hearing, but during
the course of hearing for the reasons to be recorded. Again, if the court is
not satisfied at the first hearing that the case does not involve a substantial
question of law, it cannot proceed further. Once such additional question of
law is framed during the course of hearing, the parties must be given
opportunity to submit their arguments on the other substantial question of
law(s). We take cognizance of the fact, that in some High Courts, there is a
practice to order Notice of Motion, whereby even before an appeal is admitted,
an opportunity is granted to the respondents therein to contest the case. In
such a case, it is implied that the High Court is not satisfied prima facie
with the case. Such dissatisfaction could be either for a reason that the case
does not involve a substantial question of law or for a reason that in the
facts of the case, the question of law, though substantial, would not
warrant interference. In such cases, though the High Court in exercise
of its power under Section 151 of CPC is generally empowered to grant
interim orders to preserve the subject matter of the dispute and to avoid
multiplicity of proceedings, we are of the opinion, the court cannot grant any
interim protection to the appellant, unless the substantial question of law is
framed under Section 100 (4) or as per the Proviso. On the other hand, if the
High Court is prima facie of the view that the substantial question of law
involved would not require much time for disposal, the court is bound to frame
the substantial question of law at the stage of admission and then order short
notice. The High Court cannot use its inherent power under Section 151 in
violation of the express mandates in other provisions of the Code. We find
support to this view from the following passage in Manohar Lal Chopra v.
Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal[1961
SCC OnLine SC 17 : 1962 Supp (1) SCR 450 : AIR 1962 SC 527]:
“42. The Code of
Civil Procedure is undoubtedly not exhaustive : it does not lay down rules
for guidance in respect of all situations nor does it seek to provide rules for
decision of all conceivable cases which may arise. The civil courts are
authorised to pass such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or
to prevent abuse of the process of court, but where an express provision is
made to meet a particular situation the Code must be observed, and departure
therefrom is not permissible. As observed in LR 62 IA 80 (Maqbul Ahmed v. Onkar
Pratab) “It is impossible to hold that in a matter which is governed by an Act,
which in some limited respects gives the court a statutory discretion, there
can be implied in court, outside the limits of the Act a general discretion to
dispense with the provisions of the Act”. Inherent jurisdiction of the court to
make orders ex debito justitiae is undoubtedly affirmed by Section 151 of the
Code, but that jurisdiction cannot be exercised so as to nullify the provisions
of the Code. Where the Code deals expressly with a particular matter, the
provision should normally be regarded as exhaustive.”
10.4.
Thus, the law is clear that a second appeal will be maintainable before the
High Court, only if it is satisfied that the case involves a substantial
question of law. If no substantial question of law arises, the second appeal
could not have been entertained and the same ought to have been dismissed, as
the jurisdiction of the High Court itself is not yet invoked.
11.
Concededly, in the present case, the High Court, without formulating
substantial questions of law, granted the interim relief by directing the
parties to maintain status quo, till the next date of hearing. The said interim
order was also subsequently extended. It is also pertinent to point out that
all the respondents in the second appeal have not been served and notice was
unserved qua Respondent Nos.4, 6 and 7 therein. Therefore, we are of the
opinion that the High Court could not have passed the interim order without
satisfying itself of the existence of a substantial question of law, as
mandated under Section 100 CPC.
12.
Though the learned counsel for the Respondent No.1/plaintiff made an attempt to
contend that the High Court has jurisdiction to pass any interim order and the
order impugned herein is only an ad interim arrangement to protect the interest
of the subject matter of the proceedings, the same cannot be countenanced by us
in the facts of this case. Indisputably, the High Court has jurisdiction to
pass an interim order ex parte, however, it does not empower to grant ad
interim relief, without examining the parties and formulating the
substantial question of law involved in the second appeal as it is contrary
to section 100 CPC. The judgements relied upon by the learned counsel
for the contesting respondent are of no avail as they are factually
distinguishable and do not support the case of the respondent.
13.
In the light of the aforesaid settled legal position, we have no hesitation to
set aside the interim order passed by the High Court. Accordingly, the impugned
order dated 20.09.2024 made in SA.No.518 of 2023 is set aside and this appeal
stands allowed. There is no order as to costs.
14.
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
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