2025 INSC 292
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(HON’BLE
SANJAY KAROL, J. AND HON’BLE MANMOHAN, JJ.)
UNION OF INDIA
Petitioner
VERSUS
MAN SINGH VERMA
Respondent
Criminal
Appeal No. 77 OF 2025-Decided on 28-02-2025
Criminal
Criminal Procedure
Code, 1973, Section 439 – Bail – Compensation for Wrongful confinement – Whether the contours
of Section 439 CrPC permit the grant of compensation by the High
Court to the appellant - Case registered against the respondent under Sections
8(C), 21 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 for
recovery of 1280 grams of brown powder (allegedly heroin) from the possession
of respondent – Two Laboratory reports stating that the sample tested negative
for heroin and other narcotic substances – Undisputed that the application for bail
filed before the High Court had become infructuous since the District Court had
already released the respondent - The straightforward course of action that
ought to have been adopted, therefore, was that the bail application would have
been dismissed as such - No occasion arose for the Court to pass an order
delving into the aspects of impermissibility of re-testing and/or wrongful
confinement - Not only was the same outside the bounds but it is erroneous on a
further count that since the application was infructuous, the exercise of
jurisdiction was entirely unjustified and contrary to law - Submission of the
Union of India that grant of compensation to the tune of Rs.5,00,000/- was
without the authority of law accepted - The order of the High Court to this
extent liable to be set aside - The observations made hereinabove should not be
taken to preclude any remedy that may be available to the respondent as per law
observations are limited only to the correctness of the grant of compensation
in the adjudication of a bail application.
(Para
7 and 10)
JUDGMENT
Sanjay Karol J. :-
The present appeal arises from the impugned order dated 22nd May, 2024 passed
by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench in Crl. Misc. Bail
Application No.2812 of 2023, wherein the High Court directed the Director
of Narcotics Control Bureau[For short
‘NCB’] , New Delhi, to pay a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakhs) as
compensation to the respondent for the alleged wrongful confinement. Aggrieved
by the said direction, the Union of India through NCB has preferred the present
appeal.
2.
The brief facts leading to the present appeal are as under :-
2.1.
In a joint operation, the NCB seized 1280 grams of brown powder (allegedly
heroin) from the possession of Man Singh Verma (respondent herein) and one Aman
Singh. Accordingly, Criminal Case No.02/2023 was registered against the
respondent under Sections 8(C), 21 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985[Abbreviated
as ‘NDPS’] on 6th January, 2023, consequently, he was remanded to
judicial custody.
2.2.
NCB prepared an arrest memo on the same date and drew four samples – SO1, SD1,
SO2 and SD2 from the recovered substance. Two of these samples (SO1 and SD1)
were sent to the Central Revenues Control Laboratory (CRPL), New Delhi, for
chemical examination.
2.3.
While awaiting results from the laboratory, the respondent filed B.A.No.251/2023
before Special Judge, NDPS, Barabanki District, seeking bail. This application
was rejected vide order dated 24th January, 2023. Consequently, the respondent
approached the High Court by filing Crl. Misc. Bail Application No.2812 of
2023.
2.4.
On 30th January, 2023, CRPL issued its report stating that the sample tested
negative for heroin and other narcotic substances. Following this, the
Investigating Officer (I.O.) moved an application before the Special Court
seeking permission to send a second set of samples (SO2 and SD2) to the Central
Forensic Science Laboratory (CFSL), Chandigarh, for further examination. The
same was allowed by the concerned Court.
2.5.
On 5th April, 2023, the report received from CFSL, Chandigarh, found that the
second set of samples also tested negative for any narcotic substance. As a
result, on 6th April, 2023, NCB filed a closure report before the Special
Judge, NDPS, pursuant to which, the respondent was released from District Jail,
Barabanki on 10th April, 2023 under an order of the Additional District and
Sessions Judge.
2.6.
Despite filing of the closure report and the respondent’s release, the High
Court proceeded to adjudicate the pending bail application and vide the
impugned order observed that the respondent was a young person who had been
wrongfully confined for four months despite the initial laboratory finding and,
therefore, directed the Director, NCB to pay Rs.5,00,000/-
as compensation to the respondent within a period of two months and to file a
compliance affidavit.
2.7.
Aggrieved by this order, the appellant filed a Modification Application before
the High Court seeking waiver of the compensation, which was rejected vide
order dated 16th July, 2024 on the ground that the application is barred
under Section 362 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973[For short ‘CrPC’].
2.8.
An Application for Grant of Exemption (for paying compensation) was also
preferred by one Mr. Surendra Kumar, Junior Intelligence Officer, NCB, which
was rejected by the High Court vide order dated 9th September, 2024, observing
that the order granting compensation has not been challenged before a higher
Court.
3.
We have heard Mr. Satya Darshi Sanjay, learned Additional Solicitor General for
the appellant, and Mr. Pijush K. Roy, learned Senior
Counsel appointed as Amicus Curiae in the matter. The respondent, despite
service, has not entered an appearance. We have also perused the material
placed on record and the written submission filed by the Amicus Curiae. The
main contentions raised, as can be understood from the record, have been
recorded as under:
APPELLANTS:
(i) The High Court,
while exercising its power under Section 439 CrPC, went beyond its
jurisdiction by doing a detailed examination of evidence and awarding
compensation for alleged wrongful detention. Reliance was placed on Kalyan
Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan[(2004) 7
SCC 528] , wherein it was observed that at the stage of granting bail,
a detailed examination of evidence and elaborate documentation of the merits of
a case need not be undertaken.
(ii) The officers of
NCB acted in bonafide manner on credible intelligence and initial test
results. Section 69 of the NDPS Act offers protection to officers for
acts done in good faith, thus prohibiting prosecution as well as imposition of
fine without proof of malafides.
(iii) It was further
submitted that the respondent had been released from custody on 10th April,
2023, almost a year before the High Court passed the impugned order, rendering
the bail application infructuous. Consequently, the award of compensation was
unwarranted.
AMICUS CURIAE:
(i) It was submitted
that re-testing the second sample of the same alleged contraband, which had
already been tested negative in its previous sample sent for analysis, was
impermissible under the NDPS Act and the guidelines laid down
in Thana Singh v. Central Bureau of Narcotics[(2013) 2 SCC 590] . In the present case, the concerned authority
should have filed an application for closure before the Special Judge upon
receiving the first negative report from CRPL on 30th January, 2023. However,
instead of filing such an application, the authority proceeded with re-testing
of second sample, which was illegal and led to an unjustified extension of the
respondent’s custody.
(ii) It was urged that
the principle of awarding compensatory relief for the violation of fundamental
rights by public officials as recognized in Rudal Sah v. State of Bihar[(1983) 4 SCC 141] ; Nilabati Behera
v. State of Orissa[(1993) 2 SCC 746] ;
and D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal [(1997) 1 SCC 416] – all adjudicated under Article
32 of the Constitution of India, should be extended to bail proceedings
under Section 439 CrPC.
(iii) Protection
under Section 69 NDPS Act to the authorities is not absolute. The
re-testing of second sample was done due to malice, as no exceptional
circumstances as per Thana Singh (supra) were present to justify the
second examination by a laboratory.
4.
The sole issue, which arises for consideration of this Court, is whether the
contours of Section 439 CrPC permit the grant of compensation by the
High Court to the appellant.
5.
To answer this issue at hand, it is imperative for this Court to discuss the
scope of jurisdiction of the Court while exercising its power
under Section 439 CrPC. Section 439 of CrPC reads as:
“439. Special powers
of High Court or Court of Session regarding bail.—(1) A High Court or Court of
Session may direct,—
(a) that
any person accused of an offence and in custody be released on bail, and if the
offence is of the nature specified in sub-section (3) of section 437, may
impose any condition which it considers necessary for the purposes mentioned in
that sub-section;
(b) that
any condition imposed by a Magistrate when releasing any person on bail be set
aside or modified:
Provided that the High
Court or the Court of Session shall, before granting bail to a person who is
accused of an offence which is triable exclusively by the Court of Session or
which, though not so triable, is punishable with 184 imprisonment for life,
give notice of the application for bail to the Public Prosecutor unless it is,
for reasons to be recorded in writing, of opinion that it is not practicable to
give such notice.
Provided further that
the High Court or the Court of Session shall, before granting bail to a person
who is accused of an offence triable under sub-section (3) of section 376
or section 376AB or section 376DA or section 376DB of the Indian
Penal Code (45 of 1860), give notice of the application for bail to the Public
Prosecutor within a period of fifteen days from the date of receipt of the
notice of such application.
(1A) The presence of
the informant or any person authorised by him shall be obligatory at the time
of hearing of the application for bail to the person under sub- section (3) of
section 376 or section 376AB or section 376DA or section DB of the Indian
Penal Code (45 of 1860).] (2) A High Court or Court of Session may direct
that any person who has been released on bail under this Chapter be arrested
and commit him to custody.”
6.
It is a settled principle of law that the jurisdiction conferred upon a Court
under Section 439 CrPC is limited to grant or refusal of bail pending
trial. In the following decisions, this Court has time and again held that the
sphere of consideration, when exercising power under this Section pertains only
to securing or restricting liberty of the person in question.
6.1.
In RBI v. Cooperative Bank Deposit A/C HR. Sha[(2010) 15 SCC 85], this Court held that the High Court order,
directing the Cooperative Bank to distribute the money recovered from the
accused, to persons who had made deposits less than Rs.10,000/- as and when
such recoveries are made, passed in a Bail Application had far-reaching
consequences and was beyond the scope of Section 439 CrPC. The Court
held as under :
“6. We are of the
opinion that the far-reaching consequences of the directions of the High Court
are in a way beyond the scope of an application for bail filed by an accused
under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the High
Court, as much as anyone else, must stay confined to the issues relevant to the
matter before it. It was thus not open to the High Court to pass orders which
could affect the working of banks all over the country. It has been pointed out
by Mr Basava Prabhu S. Patil, the learned Senior
Counsel for the appellant that it is for this reason that Reserve Bank of India
had filed this appeal.”
6.2.
This Court in Sangitaben Shaileshbhai Datanta v. State of Gujarat[(2019) 14 SCC 522], while examining a
case wherein the High Court had ordered the accused as well as the relatives of
the victim to undergo scientific tests, viz., lie detector, brain mapping and
narco-analysis, held that, by ordering such tests the High Court has converted
the adjudication of a bail matter to that of a mini-trial and was in
contravention of the first principles of criminal law jurisprudence and the
statutory requirements. The Court held as under:
“6. Having heard the
counsel for the parties, it is surprising to note the present approach adopted
by the High Court while considering the bail application. The High Court
ordering the abovementioned tests is not only in contravention to the first
principles of criminal law jurisprudence but also violates statutory
requirements. While adjudicating a bail application, Section 439 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is the guiding principle wherein the court
takes into consideration, inter alia, the gravity of the crime, the character
of the evidence, position and status of the accused with reference to the
victim and witnesses, the likelihood of the accused fleeing from justice and
repeating the offence, the possibility of his tampering with the witnesses and
obstructing the course of justice and such other grounds. Each criminal case
presents its own peculiar factual matrix, and therefore, certain grounds
peculiar to a particular case may have to be taken into account by the court.
However, the court has to only opine as to whether there is prima facie case
against the accused. The court must not undertake meticulous examination of the
evidence collected by the police, or rather order specific tests as done in the
present case.
7. In the instant
case, by ordering the abovementioned tests and venturing into the reports of
the same with meticulous details, the High Court has converted the adjudication
of a bail matter to that of a mini trial indeed. This assumption of function of
a trial court by the High Court is deprecated.”
6.3. In State
v. M. Murugesan[(2020) 15 SCC 251], this Court again
reiterated that the Court’s jurisdiction is limited to grant or refusal to grant bail, pending trial.
In this case, the High Court, while taking a decision on bail application, had
retained the file and directed the State to form a committee and seek its
recommendations on the reformation and rehabilitation of convict/accused
persons. The Court held that while ordering such directions the High Court has
committed grave illegality and held that the jurisdiction under Section
439 CrPC ends when the bail application is finally decided. The Court held
as under :-
“11. We find that the
learned Single Judge [M. Murugesan v. State, 2019 SCC OnLine Mad 12414]
has collated data from the State and made it part of the order after the
decision [M. Murugesan v. State, Criminal Original Petition No. 1618 of 2019,
order dated 18-2-2019 (Mad)] of the bail application, as if the Court had the
inherent jurisdiction to pass any order under the guise of improving the
criminal justice system in the State. The jurisdiction of the court under
Section 439 of the Code is limited to grant or not to grant bail pending trial.
Even though the object of the Hon'ble Judge was laudable but the jurisdiction
exercised was clearly erroneous. The effort made by the Hon'ble Judge may be
academically proper to be presented at an appropriate forum but such directions
could not be issued under the colour of office of the court.”
7.
Time and again, the act of Courts overstepping the bounds of jurisdiction,
has clearly been frowned upon. The instant case is another such example. It is
undisputed that the application for bail filed before the High Court had become
infructuous since the District Court had already released the respondent
herein. The straightforward course of action that ought to have been adopted,
therefore, was that the bail application would have been dismissed as such. No
occasion arose for the Court to pass an order delving into the aspects of
impermissibility of re- testing and/or wrongful confinement. Not only was the
same outside the bounds, as discussed above, but it is erroneous on a further
count that since the application was infructuous, the exercise of jurisdiction
was entirely unjustified and contrary to law.
8.
Regarding the submission pertaining to Section 69 of the NDPS Act, it
is submitted that the actions of the authorities are protected from
prosecution, in the absence of malafide intention. We refrain from making any
comment on this issue for reasons that shall come to light later in this
judgment.
9.
The learned Amicus Curiae in his submissions has
referred to judgments of this Court in Rudal Sah (supra), D.K.
Basu (supra) and Nilabati Behera (supra). As has already
been noticed, these judgments were rendered by this Court
under Article 32 jurisdiction, which is a remedy available to any
person whose fundamental rights have been violated. So, whereas the Court has
indeed held permissibility of grant of compensation, it has so done in the context
of violation of fundamental rights. The undue restriction of liberty, i.e.,
without the backing of procedures established by law is unquestionably an
affront to a person’s rights but the avenues to seek recourse of law in
connection therewith are limited to remedies as per law. However, none was
availed in the present facts.
10.
As such, we accept the submission of the Union of India that grant of
compensation to the tune of Rs.5,00,000/- was without
the authority of law. The order of the High Court, therefore, to this extent
has to be set aside. Ordered accordingly. Appeal is
allowed partly. The observations made hereinabove should not be taken to
preclude any remedy that may be available to the respondent as per law. Hence,
our observations are limited only to the correctness of the grant of
compensation in the adjudication of a bail application.
11.
We place on record our appreciation for the able assistance rendered by Mr.
Pijush K. Roy, learned Senior Counsel, Amicus Curiae.
Pending
applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.
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