2025 INSC 229
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(HON’BLE
DIPANKAR DATTA, J. AND HON’BLE SANDEEP MEHTA, JJ.)
STATE OF KARNATAKA
Petitioner
VERSUS
T.N. SUDHAKAR REDDY
Respondent
Criminal
Appeal No(S). 5001 OF 2024 (Arising out of SLP(Criminal) No(s). 13264 of 2024)-Decided
on 17-02-2025
Criminal, Corruption, Quashing
(A) Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973, Section 482 – Quashing of FIR – Challenge as to - Omission to conduct a
preliminary inquiry - Offences punishable under Section
13(1)(b) and Section 12 read with Section 13(2) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Whether a preliminary inquiry was
mandatory before directing registration of an FIR under the PC Act in
the facts of the case at hand or whether the source information Criminal
Appeal No. 5001 of 2024 report could be treated to be a substitute for the
preliminary inquiry? - Clearly discernible that the source information report
dated 10th November, 2023, was in the nature of a preliminary inquiry in itself
and nothing else - The comprehensive nature of the said report took it beyond a
simple complaint, as it provided a meticulous breakdown of the respondent’s
monetary acquisitions - Further, the report makes cross-referencing of official
income records with actual property acquisitions, bank deposits, and other
financial assets - In substance, the source information report prime facie
reflects a systematic pattern of financial irregularities, wherein the
discrepancy in acquisition of assets was found to be 90.72% more than the known
sources of income of the respondent – Held that the source information report
dated 10th November, 2023, served as a critical piece of information which not
only documented the financial discrepancies but also presented a clear, prima
facie picture of disproportionate assets accumulated by the respondent but also
demanded immediate and thorough investigative action - The scope of preliminary
inquiries is not to verify the absolute truthfulness of information, and it is
only to ascertain whether a cognizable offence is disclosed or not there
from - The source information report in the case at hand clearly satisfies this
criterion by comprehensively documenting the financial irregularities committed
by the respondent and disclosed a prima facie case of commission of a
cognizable offence involving acquisition of disproportionate assets, punishable
under the PC Act - High Court erred in concluding that the FIR was liable
to be quashed on account of omission to conduct a preliminary inquiry.
(Para 26 and 27)
(B)
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, Section 17 – Corruption - Person authorised
to investigate - Whether
the Order dated 4th November, 2023, passed by the Superintendent of Police
under Section 17 of the PC Act, is sustainable in the eyes of law? -
Section 17 of the PC Act relates specifically to the investigation
process, and not the initial act of registering the FIR, for which it relies on
the provisions of the CrPC - Hence, it places limitations on only the
investigation; it does not impede the fundamental duty of the law enforcement
agency to record and register an FIR for cognizable offences - On a harmonious
reading of the provisions of the PC Act and the CrPC, it is
manifest that the Superintendent of Police is competent to direct the
registration of an FIR if he has information about the commission of a
cognizable offence, punishable under the PC Act - The former is also
competent to simultaneously direct the Deputy Superintendent of Police to
register an FIR for the offences under the PC Act, with the understanding
that the subsequent investigation will be subject to the restrictions outlined
in Section 17 of the PC Act - A composite order to register the FIR and
conduct investigation aligns with the statutory framework of the CrPC and the
PC Act - High Court erred in coming to the conclusion that the order dated 4th
December, 2023, passed by the Superintendent of Police, was directly passed
under Section 17 of the PC Act, thereby violating the mandatory
provisions of the PC Act.
(Para
45, 46 and 51)
JUDGMENT
Mehta, J. :- Heard.
2.
The present appeal by special leave is preferred by the appellant-State,
challenging the judgment and final order dated 4th March, 2024 passed by the
High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru[Hereinafter
referred to as ‘High Court’.], whereby the High Court allowed the Criminal
Petition No. 13460 of 2023, filed by
respondent-accused[Hereinafter referred
to as ‘the respondent.’] under Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973[Hereinafter
referred to as ‘CrPC’.], and quashed the FIR being Crime No. 56 of 2023
registered by the Karnataka Lokayukta Police Station, Bangalore against the
respondent for the offences punishable under Section
13(1)(b) and Section 12 read with Section 13(2) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
[Hereinafter referred to as the ‘PC Act.’]
Brief
facts:
3.
The respondent is a public servant who joined the Karnataka Power Transmission
Corporation Limited[Hereinafter referred
to as the ‘KPTCL.’] on 3rd August,
2007 as an Assistant Executive Engineer (Electrical). In 2021, he was promoted
to the post of Deputy General Manager (Vigilance)/Executive Engineer
(Electrical) at BESCOM, Bengaluru, Vigilance Squad, Bangalore and was
discharging his duties in the said capacity.
4.
The Police Inspector, Karnataka Lokayukta, Bangalore, submitted a source
information report dated 10th November, 2023 to the Superintendent of Police,
Karnataka Lokayukta, Bangalore[Hereinafter
referred to as the ‘Superintendent of Police’.] alleging inter alia that
during his service tenure in various government department units, the
respondent had acquired assets amounting to Rs. 3,81,40,246/-, which were
disproportionate and almost 90.72% more than his known sources of income.
5.
Based on the said source information report, the Superintendent of Police
issued an order dated 4th December, 2023, directing the Deputy Superintendent
of Police, Karnataka Lokayukta, Bangalore[Hereinafter
referred to as ‘Deputy Superintendent of Police.’] to register a case
against the respondent for offences punishable under Section 13(1)(b),
and Section 12 read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act, and
further authorized the said officer to conduct the investigation of the case.
The order dated 4th December, 2023 around which the controversy revolves is
reproduced herein below for ready reference: -
“KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTHA
No
KLA/B'City(SP-2)/Source/02/2023
Office of the
Superintendent of Police,
Karnataka Lokayukta,
Bengaluru City-2,
Bengaluru,
Dated 04.12.2023
PROCEEDINGS OF THE
SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTHA BENGALURU CITY-2
Sub Possession of properties disproportionate
to known source of income by Sri. T N Sudhakar Reddy, DGM,(EE) Ele, BESCOM
Vigilance, Bangalore.
Ref Source Report
submitted by Sri Balaji Babu H N, Police Inspector-8, Karnataka Lokayukta,
Bengaluru City P S, Dated 10.11.2023
I have gone through
the source report submitted by Sri Balaji Babu H N, Police Inspector-8,
Karnataka Lokayukta, Bengaluru City P S, relating to his receipt of credible
information that Shri T N Sudhakar Reddy, DGM,(EE) Ele, BESCOM Vigilance,
Bangalore has acquired properties disproportionate to his known source of
income to the extent of Rs 3,81,40,246/- and thereby committed an offence
under section 13(l)(b) r/w 13(2) and 12 of Prevention of
Corruption Act 1988.
From the material
placed before me and with application of my mind I am satisfied that a
prima-facie case is made out against Sri T N Sudhakar Reddy, D6M (EE), Ele,
BESCOM Vigilance, Bangalore Warranting a statutory investigation for an offence
under section 13(l)(b) r/w 13(2) & 12 of Prevention of
Corruption Act 1988.
ORDER NO.
KLA/INV/BCD/SP-2/02/2023, DATED. 04.12.2023.
Therefore by virtue of
the powers vested in me under provisions of Section 17 of the
Prevention of Corruption Act 1988, I, Dr. K Vamsikrishna, IPS, Superintendent
of Police, Karnataka Lokayukta, Bengaluru City-2, Bengaluru order that Sri.
Tippeswamy H J, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Karnataka Lokayukta, Bengaluru
City Police Station, Bengaluru to register a case under Section
13(1)(b) r/w 13(2) & 12 of Prevention of Corruption Act 1988
against Sri. T N Sudhakar Reddy, DGM(EE), Ele, BESCOM Vigilance, Bangalore and
to investigate the said case. I know Sri. Tippeswamy H J, Deputy Superintendent
of Police and he is having the knowledge of investigation of the cases
registered under P.C. Act and also he is having previous experience
of investigation of disproportionate of asset cases.
Further, I authorize
Sri. Tippeswamy H J, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Karnataka Lokayukta,
Bengaluru City Police Station, Bengaluru under the provisions of
the section 18 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 to
inspect the bankers books in so far as it relates to the accounts of the persons
suspected to be holding money on behalf of the said Sri. T N Sudhakar Reddy,
DGM,(EE) Ele, BESCOM Vigilance, Bangalore and to take or cause to be taken
certified copies of the relevant entries there from and the bankers concerned
shall be bound to assist the police officer Sri. Tippeswamy H J, Deputy
Superintendent of Police, Karnataka Lokayukta, Bengaluru City Police Station,
Bengaluru in the exercise of the powers under the said section of law.
(Dr. K Vamsirishna.,
IPS) Superintendent of Police Karnataka Lokayukta, Bengaluru City-2, Bengaluru.
To :
Sri. Tippeswamy H J,
Dy.S.P-4, Karnataka Lokayukta Bengaluru City-2, Bengaluru.”
6.
On the same day, i.e., 4th December 2023, an FIR[FIR in Crime No. 56 of 2003.] came to be registered against the
respondent at the Karnataka Lokayukta Police Station, Bangalore City, for the
offences punishable under Section 13(1)(b) and Section
12 read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act.
7.
Aggrieved, the respondent filed a Criminal Petition[Criminal Petition No. 13460 of 2023.] under Section 482 of the CrPC before
the High Court, seeking quashing of the aforesaid FIR. The High Court, vide
order dated 4th March, 2024, allowed the criminal petition and quashed the
FIR along with all the consequential criminal proceedings arising there from.
The said order of the High Court is the subject matter of challenge in this
appeal by special leave.
Submissions
on behalf of Appellant:
8.
Learned counsel for the appellant-State vehemently and fervently argued that
the High Court grossly erred in allowing the quashing petition preferred by the
respondent. In this regard, he has advanced the following submissions: -
(i) That it is not
mandatory to hold a preliminary inquiry when the secret information itself
discloses the commission of offences under the PC Act. The scope of the
preliminary inquiry is not to ascertain the veracity of the information, but
only to check whether the information reveals the commission of a cognizable
offence or not.
Therefore, the
necessity to conduct a preliminary inquiry is dependent upon the factual matrix
of each case. Learned counsel in this regard has put reliance upon the
decisions of this Court in the cases of CBI and Another v. Thommandru
Hannah Vijaylakshmi and Another[(2021) 18
SCC 135.] and National Confederation of Officers Association of
Central and Public Sector Enterprises & Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. [(2022) 4 SCC 764.].
(ii) That the
Superintendent of Police, upon receiving the source information report from the
Police Inspector, Karnataka Lokayukta, Bangalore, thoroughly examined the same
and came to a conclusion that the information provided in the said report
disclosed a prima facie case against the respondent for the offences punishable
under Section 13(1)(b) and Section 12 read
with Section 13(2) of the PC Act. Thereupon, he directed the Deputy
Superintendent of Police to register a case for these offences against the
respondent and to conduct investigation. Since there is no legislative prescription
as to the format of the preliminary inquiry, the source information report
submitted by the Police Inspector, Karnataka Lokayukta, Bangalore, which was
critically evaluated by the Superintendent of Police, itself served the purpose
of a preliminary inquiry. The source information report not only delineates the
assets amassed by the respondent but also lays out the expenditure made by him,
which is disproportionate to his known sources of income. He thus urged that
the source information report must itself be considered as a preliminary
inquiry report. Hence, it would be incorrect to conclude that no preliminary
inquiry was undertaken before the registration of the FIR. Learned counsel in
this regard has placed reliance upon the decision of this Court in the case
of State of Telangana v. Managipet Alias Mangipet Sarveshwar Reddy. [(2019) 19 SCC 87.]
(iii) That once the
Superintendent of Police, upon receiving the source information report, was
satisfied that the said report disclosed the commission of offences under
the PC Act, he was competent under Section 17 of the PC Act to
direct the Deputy Superintendent of Police to register an FIR in respect of the
offences disclosed in the source information report. Further, it was submitted
that the Superintendent of Police was well within his jurisdiction while
directing the Deputy Superintendent of Police to conduct the investigation of
the case. Learned counsel in this regard has placed reliance upon the
decision of this Court in the case of Thommandru Hannah
Vijayalakshmi (supra).
(iv) That the order
dated 4th December, 2023 issued by the Superintendent of Police to the Deputy
Superintendent of Police was passed after due application of mind to the facts
of the case and upon being satisfied that tangible material exists which merits
registration of the FIR. It is a reasoned order which sets out the name of the
accused, the foundational facts pertaining to acquisition of properties
disproportionate to his gross income, the information about all the expenditures
incurred by him, the nature of the offence, the relevant provisions of
the PC Act, and most importantly, the power of the Superintendent of
Police to direct the Deputy Superintendent of Police to register an FIR and
investigate the case. Thus, the High Court was not justified in concluding that
the Superintendent of Police did not apply his mind while issuing the order of
registration of FIR and the consequent authorization for investigation into the
offences thereunder. Reliance placed by the High Court on the judgment in the
case of State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors[1992 Supp (1) SCC 335.] is
misplaced because the present case does not fall within any of the categories
enumerated therein, justifying the decision to allow the quashing petition
filed by the respondent.
On these grounds,
learned counsel appearing for the appellant-State implored this Court to accept
the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment and restore the FIR, registered
against the respondent.
Submission
on behalf of the Respondent:
9.
Per contra, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent vehemently and
fervently opposed the submissions advanced on behalf of the appellant-State.
He advanced the
following pertinent submissions, imploring this Court to dismiss the present
appeal:-
(i) That the High
Court was fully justified in quashing the FIR in Crime No. 56 of 2023
considering that the order dated 4th December, 2023, issued by the
Superintendent of Police, was passed without conducting any preliminary
inquiry. It is a well-established principle of law that before an FIR is
registered against a public servant for the offences punishable under
the PC Act, a preliminary inquiry must be undertaken by the competent
authority, considering the gravity of accusations involved in such cases which
have a direct bearing on the accused/public servant’s reputation and the
reputation of the entire department. Thus, a preliminary inquiry before registration
of an FIR is mandatory so as to avoid abuse of the process of law considering
that the primary objective of conducting the preliminary inquiry is to
ensure that the criminal investigation is not initiated on a frivolous and
untenable complaint. Learned senior counsel in this regard placed reliance
upon the decisions of this Court in P Sirajuddin v. State of Madras[(1970) 1 SCC 595.]; Lalitha Kumari
v. Government of Uttar Pradesh and Ors.
[(2014) 2 SCC 1.]; and Charansingh v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. [(2021) 5 SCC 469.]
(ii) That any order
issued under Section 17 of the PC Act, directing investigation in the
FIR, must be passed with judicious discretion, based upon due application of
mind and supported by substantive reasons. The second proviso to Section
17 of the PC Act, which is an additional safeguard for public servants,
stipulates that any offence that is punishable under Section
13(1)(b) of the PC Act shall not be investigated without the order of a
police officer who is below the rank of a Superintendent of Police. Thus, the
Superintendent of Police was under an obligation to record reasons before
directing the Deputy Superintendent of Police to register the FIR and conduct
investigation thereupon. However, in the present case, the Superintendent of
Police passed the order for registration of FIR casually and mechanically,
without assigning any reasons. That a bare perusal of the order dated 4th
December, 2023 reflects that the Superintendent of Police mentioned having
assessed the materials i.e., the source information report dated 10th November,
2023, and applied his mind thereto. However, the order fails to provide any
clear reflection of a comprehensive and substantive examination of the said
source information report, which makes it evident that the approach of the
Superintendent of Police was totally mechanical and laconic, vitiating the
criminal proceedings from the very inception i.e., the registration of the FIR.
(iii) That the
permission accorded by the Superintendent of Police to register the FIR was
based entirely upon the source information report and no verification
whatsoever was sought in order to adjudge the veracity of the allegations made
therein. Upon receiving the source information report, an independent
preliminary inquiry should have been conducted, before directing registration
of the FIR. However, the Superintendent of Police, influenced by the source
information report, straight away directed the Deputy Superintendent of Police
to register an FIR and simultaneously authorised him to commence the
investigation of the case. Learned senior counsel for the respondent further
contended that the entire procedure followed by the Superintendent of Police is
flawed and in teeth of the law laid down by this Court in Lalita
Kumari (supra), wherein it was held that preliminary inquiry by the police
is sine qua non in offences related to corruption even if the police are in
possession of information that discloses the commission of an offence. Hence,
the very initiation of the criminal process is vitiated as it was biased and
flawed from the beginning and thus, the High Court has rightly allowed the
quashing petition preferred by the respondent.
On these grounds, the
learned senior counsel for the respondent urged that the present appeal against
the judgment of the High Court is liable to be dismissed, and the High Court’s
decision to quash the FIR and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom,
should be upheld.
Discussion: -
10.
We have given our consideration to the submissions advanced at the bar and have
gone through the impugned judgment. With the assistance of learned counsels for
the parties, we have perused the material placed on record.
11.
There is no dispute that the respondent is a public servant who started serving
in KPTCL in 2007. He was duly promoted to the post of Deputy General Manager
(Vigilance)/Executive Engineer (Electrical), at BESCOM, Bengaluru, and has been
discharging his duties in the said capacity.
12.
The primary allegation set out against the respondent is that during his tenure
of service in various departmental units, the respondent had acquired assets to
the tune of Rs. 3,81,40,246/-, which were disproportionate and almost 90.72%
more than his known sources of income. A detailed source information report to
this effect was submitted to the Superintendent of Police who took cognizance
of this report and issued a composite Order (supra) dated 4th December, 2023,
directing the Deputy Superintendent of Police to register an FIR against the
respondent for the offences punishable under Section
13(1)(b) and Section 12 read with Section 13(2) of the
PC Act and to investigate the same.
13.
The core questions which arise for our consideration in the present case are as
follows: -
A. Whether a preliminary
inquiry was mandatory before directing registration of an FIR under the PC
Act in the facts of the case at hand or whether the source
information Criminal Appeal No. 5001 of 2024 report could be treated to be
a substitute for the preliminary inquiry?
B. Whether the Order
dated 4th November, 2023, passed by the Superintendent of Police
under Section 17 of the PC Act, is sustainable in the eyes of law?
Issue A: Whether a
preliminary inquiry was mandatory before directing registration of an FIR under
the PC Act in the facts of the case at hand or whether the source
information report could be treated to be a substitute for the preliminary
inquiry?
14.
It is the case of the appellant-State that preliminary inquiry is not mandatory
before registration of an FIR. Without prejudice to the above, it is contended
that the source information report submitted by the Police Inspector, Karnataka
Lokayukta Police Station to the Superintendent of Police, detailing acquisition
of assets by the respondent disproportionate to his known sources of income,
itself serves as a preliminary inquiry report as it was elaborate enough to
disclose a prima facie case for the offences punishable under Section
13(1)(b) and Section 12 read with Section 13(2) of the
PC Act.
15.
On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent would urge that the
Superintendent of Police acted in gross violation of law while issuing an
order to the Deputy Superintendent of Police to register an FIR as preliminary
inquiry in ‘corruption cases’ is a condition precedent for registration of the
FIR. Further, preliminary inquiry can only be conducted by a police officer,
who is competent to investigate the offence, and thus, a source information
report, however detailed, cannot be taken to be a substitute for a preliminary
inquiry.
16. In
addressing this issue, we must first consider the legal framework established
by this Court in a catena of decisions, particularly in P.
Sirajuddin (supra), Lalita Kumari (supra), Thommandru
Hannah Vijayalakshmi (supra), and Managipet (supra). This
Court in P. Sirajuddin (supra) has held that before any public
servant is charged with any acts of dishonesty, a preliminary inquiry ‘must’ be
conducted in order to obviate incalculable harm to the reputation of that
person. The relevant para from P. Sirajuddin is extracted herein below:-
“17. Before a public
servant, whatever be his status, is publicly charged with acts of dishonesty
which amount to serious misdemeanour or misconduct of the type alleged in this
case and a first information is lodged against him, there ‘must’ be some
suitable preliminary inquiry into the allegations by a responsible officer. The
lodging of such a report against a person, specially one who like the appellant
occupied the top position in a department, even if baseless, would do
incalculable harm not only to the officer in particular but to the
department he belonged to, in general...”
(emphasis
supplied)
17.
However, the authoritative pronouncement of law in respect of registration of
the FIR emerges from the decision of the Constitution Bench in Lalita
Kumari (supra) wherein, the issue before the Court was whether a police
officer is obligated to register an FIR upon receiving information regarding
the commission of a cognizable offence under Section 154 of the CrPC
(corresponding Section 173 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023[For short ‘BNSS’.]) or whether it is
essential to conduct a preliminary inquiry to verify the information before
registration of the FIR. This Court held that under Section 154 of
the CrPC, a police officer is required to register an FIR when the information
received by him discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, without
undertaking a preliminary inquiry. However, the Court was also cognizant of the
possible misuse of the criminal law resulting in the registration of frivolous
FIRs. To address this concern, it outlined specific ‘exceptions’ to the general
rule, which mandates the immediate registration of FIR upon receiving
information about a cognizable offence. The Constitution Bench
in Lalita Kumari (supra) held: -
“119. Therefore, in
view of various counterclaims regarding registration or non- registration, what
is necessary is only that the information given to the police must disclose the
commission of a cognizable offence. In such a situation, registration of an FIR
is mandatory. However, if no cognizable offence is made out in the information
given, then the FIR need not be registered immediately and perhaps the police
can conduct a sort of preliminary verification or inquiry for the limited
purpose of ascertaining as to whether a cognizable offence has been committed.
But, if the information given clearly mentions the commission of a cognizable
offence, there is no other option but to register an FIR forthwith. Other
considerations are not relevant at the stage of registration of FIR, such as,
whether the information is falsely given, whether the information is genuine,
whether the information is credible, etc. These are the issues that have to be
verified during the investigation of the FIR. At the stage of registration of
FIR, what is to be seen is merely whether the information given ex facie
discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. If, after investigation, the
information given is found to be false, there is always an option to prosecute
the complainant for filing a false FIR.”
(emphasis
supplied)
18.
The following guidelines were laid down by the Constitution Bench
governing the issues:-
“120. In view of the
aforesaid discussion, we hold:
120.1. The
registration of FIR is mandatory under Section 154 of the Code, if the
information discloses commission of a cognizable offence and no preliminary
inquiry is permissible in such a situation.
120.2. If the
information received does not disclose a cognizable offence but indicates
the necessity for an inquiry, a preliminary inquiry may be conducted only
to ascertain whether cognizable offence is disclosed or not.
120.3. If the inquiry
discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, the FIR must be registered.
In cases where preliminary inquiry ends in closing the complaint, a copy of the
entry of such closure must be supplied to the first informant forthwith and not
later than one week. It must disclose reasons in brief for closing the
complaint and not proceeding further.
120.4. The police
officer cannot avoid his duty of registering offence if cognizable offence is
disclosed. Action must be taken against erring officers who do not register the
FIR if information received by him discloses a cognizable offence.
120.5. The scope of
preliminary inquiry is not to verify the veracity or otherwise of the
information received but only to ascertain whether the information reveals any
cognizable offence.
120.6. As to what type
and in which cases preliminary inquiry is to be conducted will depend on the
facts and circumstances of each case. The category of cases in which
preliminary inquiry may be made are as under:
(a) Matrimonial
disputes/family disputes
(b) Commercial
offences
(c) Medical negligence
cases
(d) Corruption cases
(e) Cases where there
is abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution, for example, over
3 months' delay in reporting the matter without satisfactorily explaining
the reasons for delay.
The aforesaid are only
illustrations and not exhaustive of all conditions which may warrant
preliminary inquiry.”
(emphasis
supplied)
19.
It was held that a preliminary inquiry is not mandatory if the information
received by the police officer/Investigating Agency discloses the commission of
a cognizable offence. However, if the preliminary inquiry is conducted, its
scope is limited to determine whether the information prima facie reveals
commission of a cognizable offence and does not extend to verifying its
truthfulness. The necessity of a preliminary inquiry depends on the specific
facts and circumstances of each case. For instance, corruption cases fall into
a category where a preliminary inquiry ‘may be made’.
20.
The use of the term ‘may be made’ as noted in Lalita Kumari (supra)
underscores that conducting such an inquiry is discretionary in nature and not
a mandatory obligation.
21.
Following the rationale of Lalita Kumari (supra), this Court
in Managipet (supra) held that while the decision in Lalita
Kumari (supra) noted that a preliminary inquiry was desirable in cases of
alleged corruption, this does not vest a right in the accused to demand a
preliminary inquiry. Whether the preliminary inquiry is required to be
conducted or not will depend on the peculiar facts and circumstances of
each case, and it cannot be said to be a mandatory requirement, in the absence
of which, an FIR cannot be registered against the accused in corruption-related
matters.
22.
The relevant paragraphs from Managipet (supra) are extracted herein
below: -
“33. In the present
case, the FIR itself shows that the information collected is in respect of
disproportionate assets of the accused officer. The purpose of a preliminary
inquiry is to screen wholly frivolous and motivated complaints, in furtherance
of acting fairly and objectively. Herein, relevant information was available
with the informant in respect of prima facie allegations disclosing a
cognizable offence. Therefore, once the officer recording the FIR is satisfied
with such disclosure, he can proceed against the accused even without
conducting any inquiry or by any other manner on the basis of the credible
information received by him. It cannot be said that the FIR is liable to be
quashed for the reason that the preliminary inquiry was not conducted. The same
can only be done if upon a reading of the entirety of an FIR, no offence is
disclosed. Reference in this regard, is made to a judgment of this Court
in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal,
1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] wherein, this Court held inter alia
that where the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint, even if they are
taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie
constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused and also where a
criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fides and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking
vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and
personal grudge.
34. Therefore, we hold
that the preliminary inquiry warranted in Lalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari v.
State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] is not required to be
mandatorily conducted in all corruption cases.
It has been reiterated
by this Court in multiple instances that the type of preliminary inquiry to be
conducted will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. There are no
fixed parameters on which such inquiry can be said to be conducted. Therefore,
any formal and informal collection of information disclosing a cognizable
offence to the satisfaction of the person recording the FIR is sufficient.”
(emphasis
supplied)
23.
A three-judge bench of this Court in Thommandru Hannah
Vijayalakshmi (supra) extensively discussed the judicial precedents and
legal principles governing the requirement of conducting a preliminary inquiry
before registration of an FIR. The Court affirmed the view taken by the
two-judge Bench in Managipet (supra), holding that a preliminary
inquiry may not be necessary if the officer recording the FIR possesses
relevant information which discloses the commission of a cognizable
offence. The relevant extracts from Thommandru Hannah
Vijayalakshmi (supra) are reproduced herein below: -
“32. [..]... we hold
that since the institution of a Preliminary inquiry in cases of corruption is
not made mandatory before the registration of an FIR under the CrPC, PC Act or
even the CBI Manual, for this Court to issue a direction to that affect will be
tantamount to stepping into the legislative domain.
39. The precedents of
this Court and the provisions of the CBI Manual make it abundantly clear that a
preliminary inquiry is not mandatory in all cases which involve allegations of
corruption. The decision of the Constitution Bench in Lalita Kumari
[Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] holds
that if the information received discloses the commission of a cognizable
offence at the outset, no preliminary inquiry would be required. It also
clarified that the scope of a preliminary inquiry is not to check the veracity
of the information received, but only to scrutinise whether it discloses the
commission of a cognizable offence. Similarly, Para 9.1 of the CBI Manual notes
that a preliminary inquiry is required only if the information (whether
verified or unverified) does not disclose the commission of a cognizable
offence. Even when a preliminary inquiry is initiated, it has to stop as soon
as the officer ascertains that enough material has been collected which
discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. A similar conclusion has been
reached by a two-Judge Bench in Managipet [State of Telangana v. Managipet,
(2019) 19 SCC 87 : (2020) 3 SCC (Cri) 702] as well. Hence, the proposition that
a preliminary inquiry is mandatory is plainly contrary to law, for it is not
only contrary to the decision of the Constitution Bench in Lalita Kumari
[Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] but
would also tear apart the framework created by the CBI Manual.”
(emphasis
supplied)
24.
Applying these principles to the case at hand, it is perspicuous that
conducting a preliminary inquiry is not sine qua non for registering a case
against a public servant who is accused of corruption. While preliminary
inquiry is desirable in certain categories of cases including those under
the PC Act, it is neither a vested right of the accused, nor a mandatory
pre-requisite for registration of a criminal case. The purpose of a preliminary
inquiry is not to verify the veracity of the information received, but merely
to ascertain whether the said information reveals the commission of a
cognizable offence. The scope of such inquiry is naturally narrow and limited
to prevent unnecessary harassment while simultaneously ensuring that genuine
allegations of a cognizable offence are not stifled arbitrarily. Thus, the
determination, whether a preliminary inquiry is necessary or not will vary
according to the facts and circumstances of each case.
25.
In the present case, the Police Inspector of the Karnataka Lokayukta submitted
a comprehensive source information report dated 10th November, 2023 to the
Superintendent of Police, which included meticulous documentation and
evaluation of the assets acquired by the respondent, which were grossly
disproportionate to his known sources of income. The respondent, during his
tenure of service in various departmental units, had acquired assets worth
Rs.3,81,40,246/-, which were disproportionate and almost 90.72% more than his
known sources of income. Thereupon, the Superintendent of Police took
cognizance of the source information report and concluded that the allegations
made against the respondent did constitute prima facie offences punishable
under Section 13(1)(b) and Section 12 read
with Section 13(2) of the PC Act.
26.
It is clearly discernible that the source information report dated 10th
November, 2023, was in the nature of a preliminary inquiry in itself and
nothing else. The comprehensive nature of the said report took it beyond a
simple complaint, as it provided a meticulous breakdown of the respondent’s
monetary acquisitions. Further, the report makes cross-referencing of official
income records with actual property acquisitions, bank deposits, and other
financial assets. In substance, the source information report prime facie
reflects a systematic pattern of financial irregularities, wherein the
discrepancy in acquisition of assets was found to be 90.72% more than the known
sources of income of the respondent.
27.
Thus, in our view the source information report dated 10th November, 2023,
served as a critical piece of information which not only documented the
financial discrepancies but also presented a clear, prima facie picture of
disproportionate assets accumulated by the respondent but also demanded
immediate and thorough investigative action. As we have noted above, the scope
of preliminary inquiries is not to verify the absolute truthfulness of
information, and it is only to ascertain whether a cognizable offence is
disclosed or not there from. The source information report in the case at
hand clearly satisfies this criterion by comprehensively documenting the
financial irregularities committed by the respondent and disclosed a prima
facie case of commission of a cognizable offence involving acquisition of
disproportionate assets, punishable under the PC Act. Thus, we are of the
opinion that the High Court erred in concluding that the FIR was liable to be
quashed on account of omission to conduct a preliminary inquiry.
Issue
B: Whether the order dated 4th November 2023, passed by the Superintendent of
Police under Section 17 of the PC Act, is sustainable in the eyes of
the law?
28.
It is the case of the appellant-State that since the preliminary inquiry is not
mandatory, the Superintendent of Police, who took cognizance of the source
information report, has rightly exercised his powers to issue an order
directing the Deputy Superintendent of Police to register an FIR against the
respondent and to commence the investigation.
29.
Learned senior counsel for the respondent urged that the Superintendent of
Police, grossly erred in issuing the order dated 14th December 2023
under Section 17 of the PC Act merely on the basis of the source
information report dated 10th November 2023. Vide this order, he directed the
Deputy Superintendent of Police to register a case against the respondent for
offences punishable under Section 13(1)(b) and Section
12 read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act and to investigate the
case. It was contended that the Superintendent of Police failed to apply his
mind while appointing the investigating officer under Section 17 of
the PC Act, as in the absence of a formally registered FIR, the permission of
the Superintendent of Police could not have been sought as required under
second proviso to Section 17 of the PC Act.
30.
For the purpose of deciding this issue, it is essential to make a reference
to Section 17 of the PC Act.
“Section 17: Persons authorised to investigate.—
Notwithstanding
anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), no
police officer below the rank,—
(a) in the case of the
Delhi Special Police Establishment, of an Inspector of Police;
(b) in the
metropolitan areas of Bombay, Calcutta, Madras and Ahmedabad and in any other
metropolitan area notified as such under sub-section (1) of section
8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), of an Assistant
Commissioner of Police;
(c) elsewhere, of a
Deputy Superintendent of Police or a police officer of equivalent rank, shall
investigate any offence punishable under this Act without the order of a
Metropolitan Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class, as the case may be,
or make any arrest there for without a warrant:
Provided that if a
police officer not below the rank of an Inspector of Police is authorised by
the State Government in this behalf by general or special order, he may also
investigate any such offence without the order of a Metropolitan Magistrate or
a Magistrate of the first class, as the case may be, or make arrest there for
without a warrant:
Provided further that
an offence referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section
13 shall not be investigated without the order of a police officer not
below the rank of a Superintendent of Police.”
(emphasis
supplied)
31. Section
17 of the PC Act prescribes that no police officer below the rank of an
Inspector in the case of the Delhi Special Police Establishment, an Assistant
Commissioner of Police in the metropolitan areas of Bombay, Calcutta, Madras
and Ahmedabad and any other metropolitan area notified as such, and in any
other case, the Deputy Superintendent of Police or a police officer of
equivalent rank shall investigate an offence punishable under the Act without
prior order of the Metropolitan Magistrate or a Magistrate of the 1st Class, as
the case may be, or make any arrest without a warrant. According to the first
proviso to Section 17, if a police officer not below the rank of an
Inspector of Police as is authorised in this behalf by a general or special
order issued by the Government, he can also investigate such offences without
the order of the Metropolitan Magistrate or a Magistrate of the 1st Class, as
the case may be, or make arrest there under without a warrant. Further,
the second proviso provides that where an offence referred to in clause (e) of
sub-section (1) of Section 13 is sought to be investigated, such an
investigation shall not be conducted without obtaining the order of a police
officer not below the rank of a Superintendent of Police.
32. In
the impugned judgment, the High Court has placed reliance on the decision of a
Coordinate Bench in the case Balakrishna H.N. v. State of Karnataka and
Ors. [Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 15886
of 2022 (GM-RES).] and concluded that the failure to conduct a
preliminary inquiry before registering the FIR, and the issuance of the order
by the Superintendent of Police under second proviso to Section 17 of
the PC Act, tantamounted to a clear violation of the legal mandate. The
High Court in the case Balakrishna (supra) held that:-
“11. The Apex Court
considers entire spectrum of law and at sub-para 15.1 of paragraph 23 holds
that an inquiry at pre-FIR stage is held to be permissible; not only
permissible but desirable, more particularly in cases where the allegations are
of misconduct of corrupt practice acquiring assets/properties disproportionate
to his known sources of income. This cannot be demanded as a matter or right is
what is held, apart from holding that there cannot be a hearing given to the
accused prior to drawing up of a source report or registration of a crime. The
Apex Court nevertheless holds that the preliminary inquiry is not only
desirable but necessary in such cases. At paragraph 33 the Apex Court holds
that the superior officer thus has to verify whether the developed source
information prima facie would result in the registration of a case; if yes,
they then will have to direct verification of such information. Though the
entire verification was governed by the CBI manual which the Apex Court had
already held that it should be strictly and scrupulously followed, the Apex
Court holds that preliminary inquiry would not be a matter of right or
necessary in every case.
12. If the reasons
rendered by Apex Court are noticed, two factors would emerge – one, that the
prosecution is required to draw up source report after conducting some sort of
a preliminary inquiry to know the assets of the Government servant and two, after
the source information report is placed before the Superior Officer –
Superintendent of Police, he has to verify as to whether a crime should be
registered or otherwise. If these principles that would emerge from the
judgment of the Apex Court are considered qua the facts obtaining in the case
at hand, the registration of the crime would fall foul of the
principles laid down by the Apex Court and that of this Court in the
afore-quoted judgment.”
(emphasis
supplied)
33.
Therefore, according to the High Court, the Superintendent of Police is not
competent to pass an order under Section 17 of the PC Act until a
formally registered FIR came into existence. In other words, registration of
the FIR is sine qua non for issuance of an order to investigate the case. The
High Court framed a four-step procedure: first, the police must verify the
facts upon receiving the source information report; second, a preliminary
inquiry is to be conducted by the police; third, the FIR is registered; fourth,
the FIR, along with the source information report and the preliminary
inquiry report, is to be forwarded to the Superintendent of Police. Thus, it
was concluded that it is only at the 4th stage that the Superintendent of
Police becomes competent to issue an order directing investigation
under Section 17 of the PC Act.
34.
From the discussion and conclusions drawn by us on the first issue, it is clear
that conducting a preliminary inquiry is not an absolute mandate of law in
cases concerning offences under the PC Act. Hence, the four-step procedure
formulated by the High Court to quash the FIR against the respondent is not
compliant with any prescription in law and is also contrary to the
law laid down by this Court. What invites our consideration,
therefore, is whether the Superintendent of Police is competent to pass a
composite order for registration of an FIR as well as directing investigation
under Section 17 of the PC Act, authorising the Deputy Superintendent
of Police to conduct investigation.
35.
It is an established principle that the special law overrides the general law.
However, when a general law and a special law address the same subject matter,
the rule of harmonious construction is to be applied.
36. In State
of M.P. and Ors. v. Ram Singh[(2000) 5
SCC 88.], this Court discussed the legislative intent of the PC
Act and held:-
“10. The
Act was intended to make effective provisions for the prevention of
bribery and corruption rampant amongst the public servants. It is a social
legislation intended to curb illegal activities of the public servants and is
designed to be liberally construed so as to advance its object.”
37.
Chapter 3 of the PC Act deals with provisions concerning offences,
and the following chapter, i.e., Chapter 4 of the Act articulates procedural
aspects with regard to the investigation of the offences set out in Chapter 3.
With respect to other procedural aspects inter alia registration of the FIR,
the PC Act relies on the CrPC. Since the PC Act only outlines the
procedure for investigation of offences, therefore, as a necessary corollary,
Sections 154 (corresponding Section 173 of the BNSS) will be applicable for the
registration of FIR in relation to offences punishable under the PC Act.
38.
The initiation of criminal proceedings requires information that details the
commission of an offence, whether cognizable or not. It is trite that if the
information reveals the commission of a cognizable offence, the police
officials are duty-bound to register an FIR, except in cases where individual reputation
and relations are at stake, wherein it is advisable to conduct a preliminary
inquiry. In this regard, reference may be made to Paras 120.3 and 120.4.
of Lalita Kumari (supra) [Refer
to Para 18 of this judgment.] .
39. In
the case of Kailash Vijayvargiya v. Rajlakshmi Chaudhuri[(2023) 14 SCC 1.], this Court held as
follows: -
“29. Drawing on
several earlier judgments and the language of Section 154 of the Code, it was
held that the Police is bound to proceed to conduct investigation, even without
receiving information about commission of a cognizable offence if the officer
in-charge otherwise suspects the commission of such an offence. The legislative
intent is to ensure that no information of commission of a cognizable offence
is ignored and not acted upon, which would otherwise result in unjustified
protection of the alleged offender/accused. Every cognizable offence must be
promptly investigated in accordance with the law. This being the legal
position, there is no reason that there should be any discretion or option left
with the Police to register or not to register an FIR when information is given
about commission of a cognizable offence. This interpretation in a way keeps a
check on the power of the Police, which is required to protect the liberty of
individuals and society rights inherent in a democracy. It is the first step
which provides access for justice to a victim and upholds the rule of law,
facilitates swift investigation and sometimes even prevents commission of crime
and checks manipulation in criminal cases.”
(emphasis
supplied)
40.
In the present case, the Superintendent of Police, after forming an opinion
that the source information 20 Refer to Para 18 of this judgment. report dated
10th November, 2023 prima facie disclosed the necessary ingredients of the
offences punishable under the PC Act, directed the Deputy Superintendent
of Police to register an FIR against the respondent and subsequently in the
same order, authorised him to investigate the case. We find nothing wrong in
this composite order which could justify the quashing thereof. However, the
High Court, taking exception to the aforesaid order, found that the
Superintendent of Police had acted de hors the legal mandate and went on to
quash the FIR on the rationale that the act of issuing the order
under Section 17 of the PC Act while simultaneously directing the
registration of the FIR violated the principles laid down in Bhajan
Lal (supra).
41.
We are of the opinion that the High Court gravely erred while imposing
unwarranted fetters on the investigation agency in corruption cases by carving
out a framework of administrative hurdles which may have the potential of
incapacitating law enforcement agencies. By mandating elaborate
pre-investigation procedures and creating unwarranted procedural check dams,
the High Court’s approach has the potential to render the effectiveness of law
enforcement nugatory. These additional procedural requirements which virtually
tantamount to framing a policy could not only disrupt the smooth functioning of
investigation agencies, but also risk shielding corrupt public
servants from proper scrutiny, which would be in contravention of the
objective of the PC Act.
42.
The legislative intent behind the PC Act is to provide a robust
mechanism for investigating corruption-related offences, and to avoid the
creation of meandering procedural hurdles that shield corrupt officials. While
interpreting such procedural laws, it must be borne in mind that the
interpretation should facilitate and not frustrate the investigation of
potential criminal activities, particularly in cases involving serious
allegations of corruption. The correct approach in such cases is to bolster the
system created to ensure accountability and prevent arbitrary investigations,
and not as a means to create insurmountable procedural barriers at the very
inception. The purpose of fair investigation is to ensure that the accused is
afforded all the rights guaranteed to him under the law. As a corollary, an
investigation which should be expected to be fair, must focus on collecting
evidence that leads to the right conclusion and nothing else. A fair
investigation cannot be interpreted to cater to the accused only, rather it must
be such that the entire investigation process has a backing of the law, and the
due procedure established therein. Thus, the ambit of fair investigation
tethers the procedural safeguards in order to remain immune from arbitrary
actions of individual investigators.
43.
The critical issue which requires clarity is what would be the appropriate
procedural mechanism when a detailed source information report reaches the
Superintendent of Police. The Superintendent of Police is entrusted with the
administrative authority to direct his subordinates to register an FIR upon
receiving a factual report which prima facie discloses the commission of
offences punishable under the PC Act. The Superintendent of Police is
conferred with the responsibility of evaluating source information report(s)
and to determine whether the same prima facie warrants further investigation.
This administrative command is not contingent upon a pre-existing, formally
registered FIR or an exhaustive preliminary inquiry report, as we have held while
answering Issue A.
44.
Under Section 36[36. Powers of
superior officers of police.—Police officers superior in rank to an officer in
charge of a police station may exercise the same powers, throughout the local
area to which they are appointed, as may be exercised by such officer within
the limits of his station.] of CrPC (corresponding Section
30 of the BNSS), police officers superior in rank to the officer in charge
of a police station are vested with the same powers that the officer in charge
may exercise within their station. Section 154 of CrPC (corresponding
Section 173 of the BNSS) empowers the officer in charge to reduce every piece
of information, disclosing a cognizable offence, into writing either personally
or under his direction. A conjoint reading of Section 36 with Section 154 would
make it clear that if the officer in charge of a police station can direct the
registration of an FIR under Section 154, as a natural corollary by virtue
of Section 36 CrPC, superior officers, which in the case at hand is
the Superintendent of Police, are equally competent to issue such directions
for registration of the FIR.
45.
As a consequence of the above discussion, we are convinced that the High Court
erred in holding that the Superintendent of Police must first direct the
registration of an FIR and only after it is registered, he would be competent
to issue an order for investigation under Section 17 of the PC Act.
This interpretation could be permissible only if the subordinates of the Superintendent
of Police had a discretion to either comply with or disregard the latter’s
directive to register the FIR. Under the scheme of the CrPC, the automatic
consequence of registration of an FIR is commencement of investigation. The
only deviation which Section 17 of the PC Act creates is that the
Superintendent of Police must authorize a competent subordinate officer to
commence investigation. Since the subordinate police officers are obligated to
comply with the orders of the Superintendent of Police, it cannot be argued
that he lacked the authority to issue directions under Section 17 of
the PC Act simultaneously with the direction to register the FIR. The
former interpretation is against the true intent of the PC Act and is
liable to be discarded.
Hence,
the composite order dated 4th December 2023 issued by the Superintendent of
Police under Section 17 of the PC Act, directing the registration of
the FIR and authorizing investigation by the Deputy Superintendent of Police is
valid and compliant with law.
46.
Furthermore, it is the case of the respondent that the Superintendent of Police
passed the order mechanically in typed proforma and did not provide clear,
comprehensive evidence of examining the source information report, which
suggests a perfunctory approach that improperly set the criminal law into
motion. The High Court in the impugned judgment also made a reference
to Bhajan Lal (supra) to conclude that the Superintendent of Police
did not properly apply his mind to the source information report and the statutory
requirements before directing the registration of FIR.
47. In
the case of Bhajan Lal (supra), this Court adjudicated an issue
wherein the Superintendent of Police had issued the order in a mechanical and
very casual manner. The Superintendent of Police, while authorising the Station
House Officer to investigate a case, had only made an endorsement to the effect
‘Please register the case and investigate’. The Court, Criminal Appeal No.
5001 of 2024
while
quashing the investigation as well as the entire proceedings, held that the
Station House Officer is not clothed with the valid legal authority to take up
the investigation and proceed with the same within the meaning of Section
5-A(1) of the PC Act. The relevant paragraphs from Bhajan
Lal (supra) are extracted below:-
“129. In the
present case, there is absolutely no reason, given by the SP in directing the
SHO to investigate and as such the order of the SP is directly in violation of
the dictum laid down by this Court in several decisions which we
have referred to above. Resultantly, we hold that appellant 3, SHO is not
clothed with the requisite legal authority within the meaning of the second
proviso of Section 5-A(1) of the Act to investigate the offence under
clause
(e) of Section
5(1) of the Act.
[..] [..]
131. From the above
discussion, we hold that (1) as the salutary legal requirement of disclosing
the reasons for according the permission is not complied with; (2) as the
prosecution is not satisfactorily explaining the circumstances which impelled
the SP to pass the order directing the SHO to investigate the case; (3) as the
said direction manifestly seems to have been granted mechanically and in a very
casual manner, regardless of the principles of law enunciated by this Court, probably
due to blissful ignorance of the legal mandate and (4) as, above all, the SHO
has got neither any order from the Magistrate to investigate the offences
under Sections 161 and 165 IPC nor any order from the SP
for investigation of the offence under Section 5(1)(e) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act in the manner known to law, we have no other
option, save to quash that order of direction, reading “investigate” which
direction suffers from legal infirmity and also the investigation, if any, so
far carried out. Nevertheless, our order of quashing the direction of the SP
and the investigation thereupon will not in any way deter appellant 1, the
State of Haryana to pursue the matter and direct an investigation afresh in
pursuance of the FIR, the quashing of which we have set aside, if the State so
desires, through a competent police officer, clothed with the legal authority
in strict compliance with Section 5- A(1) of the Act.
(emphasis
supplied)
48.
The apparent distinction in Bhajan Lal (supra) and the case at hand,
is that the Superintendent of Police in the instant case has demonstrably
applied his mind and passed a well-reasoned and a speaking order directing
registration of the FIR and authorised the Deputy Superintendent of Police to
begin with the investigation. The Superintendent of Police received the report
on 10th November, 2023, and issued the subject order on 4th December, 2023,
i.e. after a gap of 24 days. The said order not only provided details of the
respondent, but it also makes a reference to the quantification of the
disproportionate assets, nature of the offence along with the provisions
concerned. In addition, it also referred to the provisions that empowered the
Superintendent of Police to authorise his junior officer to investigate the
case. The Superintendent of Police assigned a palpable reason as to why
the particular Deputy Superintendent of Police was directed to investigate the
case. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment in Ram
Singh (supra), wherein this Court held as follows:-
“15. We are not
satisfied with the finding of the High Court that merely because the order of
the Superintendent of Police was in typed pro forma, that showed the non-
application of mind or could be held to have been passed in a mechanical and
casual manner. As noticed earlier the order clearly indicates the name of the
accused, the number of the FIR, the nature of the offence and power of the
Superintendent of Police permitting him to authorise a junior officer to
investigate. The time between the registration of the FIR and authorisation in
terms of the second proviso to Section 17 shows further the
application of mind and the circumstances which weighed with the Superintendent
of Police to direct authorisation to order the investigation.
(emphasis
supplied)
49.
Moreover, this Court in the case of Superintendent of Police, Karnataka
Lokayukta v. B. Srinivas[(2008) 8 SCC
580.], adjudicated on a similar factual scenario wherein the Superintendent
of Police issued a verbatim, similar order as in the present case. The Court
opined that the order passed by the Superintendent of Police is elaborate and
the reasons are clearly discernible therefrom.
50.
Therefore, in view of the discussion made hereinabove, we are of the opinion
that the order dated 4th December, 2023, issued by the Superintendent of Police
under Section 17 of the PC Act, is fully compliant with the law. The
High Court erred in imposing unwarranted administrative frameworks that could
potentially incapacitate the law enforcement agencies. Thus, the Superintendent
of Police’s authority to issue a composite order directing registration of the
FIR and authorizing the officer to conduct an investigation is valid in the
eyes of law. The said order was issued without undue haste and with due
application of mind. The reasons assigned in the order dated 4th December, 2023
for entrusting the investigation to the Deputy Superintendent of Police are
manifest and obvious.
Conclusion
51.
In view of the above discussion, we conclude that:-
a. The High Court
erred in coming to the conclusion that the order dated 4th December, 2023,
passed by the Superintendent of Police, was directly passed under Section
17 of the PC Act, thereby violating the mandatory provisions of
the PC Act.
b. The preliminary inquiry is not mandatory in
every case under the PC Act. If a superior officer is in seisin of a
source information report which is both detailed and well-reasoned and such
that any reasonable person would be of the view that it prima facie discloses
the commission of a cognizable offence, the preliminary inquiry may be avoided.
c. Section
17 of the PC Act relates specifically to the investigation process, and
not the initial act of registering the FIR, for which it relies on the provisions
of the CrPC. Hence, it places limitations on only the investigation; it
does not impede the fundamental duty of the law enforcement agency to record
and register an FIR for cognizable offences.
d. On a harmonious
reading of the provisions of the PC Act and the CrPC, it is
manifest that the Superintendent of Police is competent to direct the
registration of an FIR if he has information about the commission of a
cognizable offence, punishable under the PC Act. The former is also
competent to simultaneously direct the Deputy Superintendent of Police to
register an FIR for the offences under the PC Act, with the understanding
that the subsequent investigation will be subject to the restrictions outlined
in Section 17 of the PC Act. A composite order to register the FIR
and conduct investigation aligns with the statutory framework of the CrPC and
the PC Act.
52.
For the above reasons, we quash and set aside the judgment and order dated 4th
March, 2024 passed by the High Court of Karnataka in Criminal Writ Petition No.
13460 of 2023 and restore the FIR in Crime No. 56 of 2003, pending before the
23rd Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bangalore City.
53.
The appeal is allowed accordingly.
54.
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
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