2025 INSC 194
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(HO’BLE SANJAY
KAROL, J. AND HON’BLE SANDEEP MEHTA, JJ.)
B.V. RAM KUMAR
Petitioner
VERSUS
STATE OF TELANGANA
Respondent
Criminal
Appeal No(S). 654 of 2025 (Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No(s). 7887 of 2024)-Decided
on 10-02-2025
Criminal, Quashing
Criminal Procedure
Code, 1973, Section 482 – Quashing of charge sheet – Seniors admonition - Offences punishable under Sections 269, 270 and 504 IPC
- On a reading of the charge sheet the highest allegation levelled against the
appellant is that he had been scolding the complainant in the
Institute(workplace) and thereby causing mental harassment to her since
October, 2021 – Held that allegations are purely conjectural, by no
stretch of imagination they can be considered sufficient to constitute the
ingredients of the offences under Sections 269 and 270, IPC - Appellant
is alleged to have raised his voice to ask her whether she had made sure about
the conduct rules before having submitted a complaint against him to the higher
authorities - Fail to see how the Investigating Officer was able to reach a
conclusion that a simple verbal spat which took place between the
appellant and complainant in the chamber of the appellant would make the former
liable under Section 504, IPC - At best, what can be inferred from the
allegations is that the appellant spoke to the complainant in a loud voice and
a belligerent tenor - Mere abuse, discourtesy, rudeness or insolence does not
amount to an intentional insult within the meaning of Section 504, IPC - Appellant
while discharging his duties as Director had received numerous complaints from
the parents of students against the complainant about negligence in the
discharge of her duties - In this backdrop, there was nothing out of ordinary
for the person in charge of the Institution(workplace) to call such subordinate
to the chambers and reprimand them in order to restore discipline in the
Institute(workplace) - Senior’s admonition cannot be reasonably attributed to
mean an ‘intentional insult with the intent to provoke’ within the means
of Section 504, IPC, provided that the admonition relates to the matters
incidental to the workplace covering discipline and the discharge of duties
therein - Allowing criminal charges to be pressed against the individual being
the Director of the Institute(workplace) for trying to maintain discipline may
lead to disastrous consequences crippling the entire disciplinary atmosphere required
in the workplace - Do not find existence of the necessary ingredients
constituting the offences applied in the charge sheet so as to allow further
prosecution of the appellant – Held to be is a fit case to quash the criminal
proceedings initiated against the appellant – Ordered accordingly.
(Para
17, 18, 22, 27 to 30)
JUDGMENT
Mehta, J. :- Heard.
2.
Leave granted.
3.
The instant appeal by special leave preferred by the appellant takes exception
to the judgment dated 3rd May, 2024, passed by the High Court of Judicature for
the State of Telangana at Hyderabad[Hereinafter,
referred to as the “High Court”.] in Criminal Petition No. 11653 of 2022,
whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973[For short, ‘CrPC’.] preferred by
the appellant, seeking quashment of the chargesheet in Case Crime No. 1771 of
2022, submitted against the appellant for the offences punishable
under Sections 269, 270 and 504 of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860[For short ‘IPC’.] before
the Court of learned XI Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad[Hereinafter, referred to as “trial Court”.].
Brief
facts: -
4.
Respondent No. 2(complainant) was working as an Assistant Professor, Pediatrics
in National Institute for Empowerment of Persons with Intellectual
Disabilities, Secunderabad[For short
‘Institute(workplace)’.]. On 2nd February, 2022, the complainant was called
by the appellant, through his attender, to come to his chamber. During the
time, appellant was discharging his duties as Officiating Director of the
Institute(workplace). It is alleged that no sooner the complainant entered the
chamber of the appellant, he started addressing her in a high-pitched voice
reprimanding her for having filed complaints against him to the higher
authority. The complainant immediately protested and apprised the appellant
that as she had just recovered from
Covid-19 virus and was continuously facing various medical issues, he must
refrain from raising his voice at her. Immediately thereafter, her hands began
to tremble and she started sweating profusely. She left the chamber of the
appellant stating that she would submit a written reply in this regard.
5.
The complainant filed a complaint against the appellant on the same day,
pursuant to which an FIR[FIR No. 65 of
2022.] came to be registered on 5th February, 2022 at Police Station,
Bowenpalli, Hyderabad for the offences punishable under Sections
269, 270, 504 and 354, IPC. Investigation was commenced and
statements of various witnesses were recorded. The Investigating Officer
submitted a chargesheet dated 27th September, 2022, against the appellant in
the Court concerned for the offences punishable under Sections
269, 270 and 504, IPC. It was primarily alleged in the
chargesheet[Case Crime No. 1771 of 2022.]
that the appellant failed to provide and maintain adequate PPE kits and gloves
in the Institute(workplace), which posed a great risk of spreading infectious
diseases such as Covid-19. The trial Court took cognizance of the above
offences and summoned the appellant. Aggrieved by the chargesheet and the
cognizance taken by the trial Court, the appellant preferred a criminal
petition[Criminal Petition No. 11653 of
2022.] under Section 482, CrPC before the High Court, seeking
quashment of proceedings sought to be taken against him in Case Crime No. 1771
of 2022.
6.
The High Court, while dismissing the above criminal petition, held that there
was no merit in the quashing petition filed by the appellant. It further opined
that as the allegations against appellant were serious in nature, therefore,
the true facts of the case required to be elicited and proved during the trial
before the trial Court. Accordingly, the quashing petition came to be dismissed
vide order dated 3rd May, 2024, which is assailed in the present appeal by
special leave.
Submissions
on behalf of the appellant: -
7.
Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the proceedings of the
criminal case registered against him tantamount to sheer abuse of the process
of law, being initiated maliciously, with an ulterior motive and a mala fide
intent. To buttress his submissions, learned Counsel stated that similar
complaints were also made by the complainant to the concerned Ministry, which
had sought reply from the appellant. As on date, all these complaints have been
closed being satisfied with the reply of the appellant.
8.
Learned counsel further contended that even if the allegations in the FIR and
chargesheet are accepted to be true and taken on their face value, they lack
the basic ingredients to constitute the offences set out therein. These
allegations do not make out a prima facie case against the appellant. The
alleged act of speaking in a brusque manner by the appellant, even if accepted
on the face value, was without any mens rea as he was only making a query from
the complainant about her lackadaisical and lazy approach towards the discharge
of duties in the Institute(workplace). Numerous complaints were made on behalf of
the students and their parents against the complainant for not being available
during the duty hours. These complaints were pending with the appellant while
he was discharging his duties as Officiating Director of the
Institute(workplace) and the query which the appellant made from the
complainant in his chamber was in this regard only, and was without any mala
fide intent. He also urged that the chargesheet filed against the appellant
lacks the fundamental facts and material constituting the necessary ingredients
of the offences for which the appellant has been summoned.
On
these grounds, learned counsel for the appellant urged this Court to accept the
appeal, set aside the impugned judgment and quash the proceedings of the
criminal case pending against the appellant in the trial Court pursuant to the
impugned chargesheet.
Submissions
on behalf of the respondents: -
9.
Per contra, learned counsel for the complainant contended that the High Court
was justified in dismissing the quashing petition filed by the appellant as it
was sans merit. The contents of the FIR and the chargesheet make out a prima
facie case of a continuous harassment of the complainant by the appellant. He
was in the habit of maltreating the complainant before her clients and other office
staff. To buttress this contention, learned Counsel has placed reliance on the
deposition of witnesses examined by the police during investigation who have
supported the version of the complainant with respect to the verbal altercation
that had taken place on 2nd February, 2022, between the complainant and
appellant.
10.
Learned counsel further contended that the act/omissions on behalf of the
appellant as the Director, in not maintaining and providing adequate supplies
of PPE kits, masks and sanitizers, make out a prima facie case for the offences
under which he has been charge-sheeted by the police.
On
these grounds, learned counsel for the complainant implored this Court to
refrain from interfering with the impugned judgment and dismiss the appeal.
11.
The learned standing counsel appearing for the State of Telangana also adopted
the submissions of the complainant’s counsel and prayed for dismissal of the
appeal. Analysis and Conclusion:
12.
We have given our thoughtful consideration to the arguments advanced at bar and
have gone through the impugned judgment and the material placed on record.
13.
The case of the complainant is primarily based on the allegation that the
appellant used to unjustifiedly scold and reprimand her in front of the other
employees of the Institute(workplace). She lodged an FIR for the offences
punishable under Sections 269, 270, 504 and 354, IPC
against the appellant, which led to the submission of the chargesheet
dated 27th September, 2022, for the offences under Sections 269, 270 and 504,
IPC. However, section 354 of IPC, which was incorporated in the FIR,
was deleted from the chargesheet on the ground that it became clear during the
investigation that there was no attempt to outrage the modesty of the
complainant.
14.
The position of law is well settled by catena of judgments of this Court that
in order to entertain a challenge to the FIR, chargesheet or an order taking
cognizance, all that has to be seen is, whether from a bare reading of the
chargesheet, the ingredients of the sections charged therein are being prima
facie made out or not. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment of
this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335.] wherein it was held that:-
“102. In the backdrop
of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under
Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series
of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power
under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section
482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the
following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could
be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise
to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any
precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines
or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases
wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value
and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or
make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations
in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the
FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police
officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a
Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the
uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence
collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence
and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the
allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute
only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police
officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section
155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the
allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just
conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an
express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the
concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the
institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific
provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for
the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal
proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is
maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”
(emphasis supplied)
Thus, it is trite that
the constitutional courts are wholly competent to exercise their extraordinary
power to quash the criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of the process of the
Court or otherwise to secure the ends of the justice if the allegations in the
FIR or complaint neither disclose the commission of any offence nor make out a
prima facie case against the accused.
15.
In order to ascertain, whether appellant in the present case has committed any
offence punishable under Sections 269, 370 and 504, IPC, it
is necessary to reproduce the allegations levelled in the chargesheet filed
against the appellant, which read thus:-
“On examination they
all stated that the accused Mr. B.V. Ram Kumar is of the said firm and he will
strict with his official works and there was some among them regarding Project
Work since last few days. On 02.02.2022 at about some argument ensued among the
LW-1 and accused. The accused warned why she is not present in the allotment
room; in turn she replied to give the instructions in written. In this regard
there were loud shouting among Director Mr. B.V. Ram Kumar and LW-1 Mrs. Mary
Anurupa and the Smt. Jyothi LW-7 who is the nurse had checked the BP of Mrs.
Mary Anurupa and Mr. B.V. Ram Kumar.
Further it came to
know that due to inadequate supply of PPE Kits and gloves to working staff, the
staff may be effected covid and due to the act of the accused there likely to
spread infection diseases dangerous to life and also provoke breach of peace in
the institution.
… The facts and
evidence collected during the course of investigation it is elicited that the
accused is the director of NIMH. The accused Harassing the LW-1 mentally in her
working place, since from October, 2021 on one or other pretext. On 02.02.2022
at 23.00 hours when she was seeing (sic) her clients at CDEIC unit in NIEPID
the accused sends his attender and called the LW-1 to his chamber and asked her
whether she knows about conduct rules when she gave complaint against him to
higher authority and talking with her in loud voice and shouted on her as she
submitted (sic) grievance related on him to her higher authorities on his
behaviour. The LW-1 suffered with covid and facing a lot of Medical Issues and
she should not shout as her hands shivering and sweating and also breathing
difficulty. The accused used to call her to his chamber and scolding
by interfering in internal complaints. She was sincerely affected with
covid due to inadequate supply of PPE Kits and gloves to working staff in early
intervention and she was in ICU and rejoined her duties. She had to face his
shouting and even during her medical leave he send memo to reply for no mistake
from her side. Due to the act off the accused there likely to spread infection
diseases dangerous to life and also provoke breach of peace in the institution.
Thus, the acts of the
accused BV Ram (sic) Kumar has committed an offence which liable to be punished
U/sec. 269, 270 and 504 IPC.”
(emphasis
supplied)
16.
On a threadbare reading of the chargesheet, we find that the highest allegation
levelled against the appellant is that he had been scolding the complainant in
the Institute(workplace) and thereby causing mental harassment to her since
October, 2021. On 2nd February, 2022, at 11 o’clock in the night, while the
complainant was attending to her clients, the appellant called her to his
chamber. When the complainant entered the chamber of the appellant, he raised
his voice and asked her whether she knew about the conduct rules before having
submitted her grievance related to him to the higher authorities. The
chargesheet also narrates that the complainant was affected by Covid-19 because
of the inadequate supply of PPE kits and gloves maintained by the appellant as
the Director of the Institute(workplace).
17.
From the bare perusal of the chargesheet and documents relied therein, apart
from the fact that the allegations are purely conjectural, by no stretch
of imagination they can be considered sufficient to constitute the ingredients
of the offences under Sections 269 and 270, IPC. The
Investigating Officer seems to have been unduly influenced by the sensitive
situation prevailing during Covid-19 and relied upon the bald allegations of
the complainant, who alleged that the appellant did not provide and maintain an
adequate supply of PPE kits and gloves for the working staff at the
Institute(workplace). The allegation with respect to failure to maintain
adequate supply of PPE kits and gloves stands refuted by the statements of
witnesses, namely Smt. K. Nagarani dated 8th February, 2022, working as Hindi
Translator and Sh. Bharat Naik dated 9th February, 2022, working as Data Entry
Operator at the Institute(workplace), who have categorically stated during the
investigation that there was no shortage of supply of PPE kits, masks or
sanitizers at the Institute(workplace).
18.
Admittedly, the appellant had called the complainant to his chambers. When she
entered, the appellant is alleged to have raised his voice to ask her whether
she had made sure about the conduct rules before having submitted a complaint
against him to the higher authorities. We thus, fail to see how the
Investigating Officer was able to reach a conclusion that a simple verbal
spat which took place between the appellant and complainant in the chamber
of the appellant would make the former liable under Section 504, IPC. At
best, what can be inferred from the allegations is that the appellant spoke to
the complainant in a loud voice and a belligerent tenor.
19.
For appreciating the necessary ingredients required to substantiate a charge
under Section 504, IPC, a reference in this regard may be made to the
judgment of this Court in Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra, [(2013) 14 SCC 44.] wherein the
Court discussed the essential ingredients of Section 504, IPC. The Court
held as follows: -
“13. Section
504 IPC comprises of the following ingredients viz. (a) intentional
insult, (b) the insult must be such as to give provocation to the person
insulted, and (c) the accused must intend or know that such provocation would
cause another to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The
intentional insult must be of such a degree that should provoke a person to
break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The person who
intentionally insults intending or knowing it to be likely that it will give
provocation to any other person and such provocation will cause to break the
public peace or to commit any other offence, in such a situation, the
ingredients of Section 504 are satisfied. One of the essential
elements constituting the offence is that there should have been an act or
conduct amounting to intentional insult and the mere fact that the accused
abused the complainant, as such, is not sufficient by itself to warrant a conviction
under Section 504 IPC.”
14. We may also
indicate that it is not the law that the actual words or language should figure
in the complaint. One has to read the complaint as a whole and, by doing so, if
the Magistrate comes to a conclusion, prima facie, that there has been an
intentional insult so as to provoke any person to break the public peace
or to commit any other offence, that is sufficient to bring the complaint
within the ambit of Section 504 IPC. It is not the law that a complainant
should verbatim reproduce each word or words capable of provoking the other
person to commit any other offence. The background facts, circumstances, the
occasion, the manner in which they are used, the person or persons to whom they
are addressed, the time, the conduct of the person who has indulged in such
actions are all relevant factors to be borne in mind while examining a
complaint lodged for initiating proceedings under Section 504 IPC.”
(emphasis supplied)
20.
Thus, upon reading the complaint as a whole, if the Magistrate comes to a
conclusion, prima facie, that there has been an intentional insult made by the
accused to the complainant so as to provoke the latter to break the public
peace or to commit any other offence, then only the act complained of would
fall within the ambit of Section 504, IPC. The law does not mandate that
the complainant should verbatim reproduce each word or words capable of
provoking him/her to commit breach of peace or any other offence. The
background facts, circumstances, the occasion, the manner in which the
offending words are used, the person to whom they are addressed, the time, the
conduct of the person who has indulged in such actions are all relevant factors
to be borne in mind while examining a complaint lodged for initiating
proceedings under Section 504, IPC.
21.
Further, this Court in the case of Mohammad Wajid v. State of U.P., [2023 SCC Online SC 951.] while
discussing Section 504, IPC, propounded the test for considering the
circumstances wherein, an abusive language takes the form and shape of an
intentional insult and held thus:-
“28. Section
504 of the IPC contemplates intentionally insulting a person and thereby
provoking such person insulted to breach the peace or intentionally insulting a
person knowing it to be likely that the person insulted may be provoked so as
to cause a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence. Mere
abuse may not come within the purview of the section. But, the words of abuse
in a particular case might amount to an intentional insult provoking the person
insulted to commit a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence.
If abusive language is used intentionally and is of such a nature as would in
the ordinary course of events lead the person insulted to break the peace or to
commit an offence under the law, the case is not taken away from the purview of
the Section merely because the insulted person did not actually break the peace
or commit any offence having exercised self-control or having been subjected to
abject terror by the offender. In judging whether particular abusive language
is attracted by Section 504, IPC, the court has to find out what, in the
ordinary circumstances, would be the effect of the abusive language used and
not what the complainant actually did as a result of his peculiar idiosyncrasy
or cool temperament or sense of discipline. It is the ordinary general nature
of the abusive language that is the test for considering whether the abusive
language is an intentional insult likely to provoke the person insulted to
commit a breach of the peace and not the particular conduct or temperament of
the complainant.
29. Mere abuse,
discourtesy, rudeness or insolence, may not amount to an intentional insult
within the meaning of Section 504, IPC if it does not have the necessary
element of being likely to incite the person insulted to commit a breach of the
peace of an offence and the other element of the accused intending to provoke
the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace or knowing that the person
insulted is likely to commit a breach of the peace. Each case of abusive
language shall have to be decided in the light of the facts and circumstances of that case and there
cannot be a general proposition that no one commits an offence under Section
504, IPC if he merely uses abusive language against the complainant.”
(emphasis
supplied)
22.
Needless to say, that mere abuse, discourtesy, rudeness or insolence does not
amount to an intentional insult within the meaning of Section 504, IPC. Furthermore,
it would be immaterial that the person who has been insulted and provoked did
not actually break the peace or commit any offence.
23. Section
504, IPC consists of two parts. Firstly, the actus reus- being the intentional
insult which gives rise to the provocation. Secondly, the mens rea, i.e., the
intention or knowledge on the part of the accused that such intentional
provocation is likely to cause the person insulted to break public peace or
commit any other offence. The animus nocendi in Section 504, IPC is that
the accused should ‘intentionally insult’ the other person with the intention
or knowledge that the provocation caused by such insult is likely to result in
the commission of breach of public peace or any other offence by the person who
has been so insulted. The offence is said to be complete once the accused
person makes ‘intentional insult’ with the aforesaid mens rea. Hence, intention
or knowledge on the part of accused person that his actions of making
‘intentional insult’ have the potential to provoke the person insulted is
sine qua non for the commission of the offence under Section 504, IPC.
24.
The natural corollary of the above discussion is that if the accused does not
intend to give provocation, the offence is not made out. An insult without an
‘intention to insult’ is not punishable under Section 504, IPC. Further,
‘intentional insult’ must be of such a degree that it has the potential to
provoke a reasonable person to break the public peace or to commit any other
offence.
25.
It is trite that whether the person provoked further commits an illegal act or
not is immaterial to draw the conclusion of culpability under Section 504,
IPC. The ‘intentional insult’ and provocation must be so proximate and close
that the accused has either the intention or the knowledge that the intentional
insult made by him is likely to cause the provoked person to break public peace
or commit some other offence. However, what would be the nature of ‘intentional
insult’ causing provocation, to draw culpability under Section 504, IPC
would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The test to be
applied to determine if the intentional insult made by the accused is
sufficient to cause provocation is that of a reasonable person, i.e., if
the insult is sufficient to provoke any reasonable person to break peace or
commit any other offence, only then the accused will be liable for the offence
under Section 504, IPC.
26.
In the case at hand, all that the chargesheet discloses is that the appellant
and the complainant had a verbal altercation which became unbearable for the
complainant owing to her medical conditions. At the time of the incident, the
appellant was discharging his functions as the Director of the
Institute(workplace) and he was therefore, entrusted with the administration
and management of the entire Institute(workplace) and in addition, he was
required to discharge his own professional obligations as a medical
professional to both the Institute(workplace) and the society at large. It is,
therefore, a reasonable expectation on the part of a person, who caters to the
affairs at the helm, that his juniors should attend to the professional affairs
of the Institute(workplace) with utmost sincerity and dedication. We are
equally cognizant of the circumstances that existed during the times of
Covid-19 pandemic and the pressure on the medical professionals was multiplied
manifold, therefore, in our view it was reasonable for the appellant to
contemplate similar expectations from his juniors/associates.
27.
Furthermore, it is also pertinent to note the fact that complaints with respect
to indiscipline in the Institute(workplace) were already pending with the
office of the Director of the Institute(workplace). In addition, the appellant
while discharging his duties as Director had received numerous complaints from
the parents of students against the complainant about negligence in the
discharge of her duties. In this backdrop, there was nothing out of ordinary
for the person in charge of the Institution(workplace) to call such subordinate
to the chambers and reprimand them in order to restore discipline in the
Institute(workplace). The intention behind this was simply to control the
perceived indiscipline of the subordinates who were alleged to be shirking from
the performance of their duties and were displaying lethargic, lackadaisical
and laid-back approach towards the profession. If such a behaviour is not
checked by superior officers, who have been entrusted with the task of
administration, it could lead to become a premium for other employees to follow
suit.
28.
In the facts and circumstances of the present case, appellant’s act of
reprimanding the complainant cannot by any stretch of imagination be treated to
be an ‘intentional insult’ meted out to the complainant so as to provoke
her to commit breach of peace or any other offence. If the interpretation
advanced from the side of prosecution and the complainant is accepted, it may
lead to gross misuse of liberty in workplaces. Therefore, in our opinion, senior’s
admonition cannot be reasonably attributed to mean an ‘intentional insult with
the intent to provoke’ within the means of Section 504, IPC, provided that
the admonition relates to the matters incidental to the workplace covering
discipline and the discharge of duties therein.
29.
From a perusal of the impugned chargesheet and the statements recorded by the
Investigating Officer during the course of investigation, it is discernible
that the appellant has been roped in the present criminal proceedings on account
of his strict demeanour and the tendency to maintain discipline which is
reasonably expected of individuals who serve a noble vocation of a medical
profession while also serving as the head of the Institution during the
difficult time of Covid-19 pandemic. Therefore, we are of the firm view that
allowing criminal charges to be pressed against the individual being the
Director of the Institute(workplace) for trying to maintain discipline may lead
to disastrous consequences crippling the entire disciplinary
atmosphere required in the workplace. We do not find existence of the
necessary ingredients constituting the offences applied in the chargesheet so
as to allow further prosecution of the appellant and hence, it is a fit case to
quash the criminal proceedings initiated against the appellant.
30.
As a consequence of the discussion made hereinabove, the impugned judgment
dated 3rd May, 2024, passed by the High Court for the State of Telangana at
Hyderabad is quashed and set aside. Resultantly, the impugned chargesheet being
CC No. 1771 of 2022 for offences punishable under Sections
269, 270 and 504, IPC filed before the Court of learned XI
Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate at Hyderabad and all the proceedings
sought to be taken thereunder against the appellant are hereby quashed.
31.
The appeal is allowed accordingly.
32.
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
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