2025 INSC 182
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(HON’BLE K.V.
VISWANATHAN, J. AND HON’BLE S.V. N. BHATTI, JJ.)
NAUSHEY ALI & ORS.
Petitioner
VERSUS
STATE OF U.P.&
ANR.
Respondent
Criminal
Appeal No. 660 OF 2025 (@ SLP Criminal No. 3432 of 2023)-Decided on 11-02-2025
Criminal
Criminal Procedure
Code, 1973, Section 320, 482 – Quashing of FIR – Compounding of non-compoundable
offence -
Offence punishable u/s 307 IPC – Petition for quashing of criminal proceedings
inter alia for offence punishable u/s 307 IPC was filed on the basis of
compromise but it was dismissed by High Court by observing that since the
matter relates to offence under Section 307 IPC in which there are
injuries and even fracture of head of distal phalanx of left ring finger
received by ‘M’ and looking to the settled law with regard to compounding of
offence, the matter cannot be compounded” – Held that compounding and quashing
are conceptually different - High Court has mixed up the concepts of
compounding and powers of quashment - Role attributed to the seven members,
including the five appellants is not specific - General allegation was that
they abused in filthy language and assaulted ‘M’ with lathi and iron bars - The
specific individual role was only attributed to ‘A’, who is since deceased - Police
who investigated disbelieved the entire story - No recoveries have been made of
any pellets - What engaged the attention of the High Court was only the
fracture of the head of the distal phalanx of left finger of respondent No.2 - From
the injury report, it is clear that while the first four injuries were
contusions and abrasions, injury Nos. 5, 6 and 7 pertained to incised lacerated
wound and swelling on the middle finger of the left hand - X-ray report shows
that in the left hand there was a fracture of the head of distal phalanx of
left ring finger - Assuming that this was the result of injury with lathis
or iron bar considering the injury and the nature of the weapon used, certainly
no offence under Section 307 IPC is made out - Offence alleged, on
facts, does not fall in that category of cases where the court should deny
relief in the event of a settlement - At the highest, the offence alleged could
be one under Section 326 of IPC - It could not be said, on facts,
considering all the circumstances that this is a crime which has such an
harmful effect on the public and that it has the effect of seriously
threatening the well-being of the society - Considering the special features of
the case and taking the settlement on record and applying the law, held that
this is a fit case where proceedings in complaint case should be quashed - Order
of the High Court in application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. liable to
be set aside and complaint shall stand quashed.
(Para
7 to 9, 13 to 24)
JUDGMENT
K.V. Viswanathan, J.
:- Leave
granted.
2.
The present appeal calls in question the correctness of the order dated
19.01.2023 in Application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. No. 1315 of 2023
on the file of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. By the said order,
the High Court, by holding that a case involving allegation of Commission
of offence under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short
‘IPC’) cannot be compounded, dismissed the application under Section
482 Cr.P.C., seeking quashment of proceedings. Five of the eight
appellants before the High Court – Naushey Ali, Khushboo Ali, Khursheed, Raza
Ali and Nanhe – are before this Court in Appeal. The other three have passed
away.
3.
The facts of the case lie in a very narrow compass.
i) The appellants and
respondent No.2 Mahmood S/o late Abdul Lateef are residents of the same village
- Barwara Khas, District Moradabad, U.P.
ii) With respect to an
occurrence on 11.08.1991, it was the appellants’ party which first lodged Case
Crime No. 248/91 on the said day itself against the respondent No.2, his father
and others for offences punishable under Sections
147, 148, 149, 307, 325, 506, 323 and 504 of
IPC.
iii) On 27.08.1991,
Case Crime No. 248-A/91 was registered by Abdul Lateef, on behalf of respondent
No.2, in FIR No. 141 of 1991. The sections, violations of which were alleged
were, 147, 148, 149, 307, 325, 506, 323 and 504 IPC. This FIR was
registered against all eight persons, including the appellants.
iv) The gravamen of
the allegation was that the appellants’ party wanted to pass the irrigation
water through the field of the complainant by forcibly digging the land. When
it was resisted by the complainant party, the appellants’ party abused them in
filthy language and assaulted Mahmood S/o Abdul Lateef with lathi and iron
bars. When Mahmood ran to save his life, Abdul Waris (since deceased) opened
fire from his rifle.
v) According to the
complainant, on hearing the sound, Munnan S/o Mangu and Vilayat S/o Inayat came
and saved them. Thereafter, they reached the Police Station to lodge a report,
when they found that the appellants’ party was already present at the Police
Station. A complaint was lodged by Mahmood but the thumb impression on his
behalf was put by his father Abdul Lateef.
vi) On 07.09.1991,
after investigation, the police filed a final report No. 50/91 stating that the
complaint was a false complaint. It was recorded that during the course of
investigation, from the statements of witnesses, it was found that the case has
been falsely registered by the complainant as a counter blast to FIR No. 248/91
lodged by the appellants’ party.
vii) However, on
05.09.1992, the police report was rejected by the VIth Additional Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Moradabad, who summoned the appellants and the three
others - Abdul Waris, Rasheed and Maseeta (all since deceased), for trial, for
offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 324, 325 and 323 of
IPC and issued warrants.
viii) Aggrieved, the
appellants challenged the order dated 05.09.1992 of the trial Court before the
High Court in Criminal Revision No. 1318 of 1992, wherein an interim order was
passed staying the order of 05.09.1992.
ix) The criminal
revision was ultimately dismissed on 03.04.2015 after it remained pending for
nearly twenty-three years. It is the case of the appellants’ party that the
dismissal of the criminal revision was not known to them till October,
2022, when they received summons from the trial Court.
x) It appears that, in
the meantime, due to the intervention of the elderly persons in the village, on
19.12.2022, a compromise was entered into between the injured Mahmood and the
appellants.
xi) Based on the
compromise and affidavit of the injured Mahmood, the appellant and three others
filed application under Section 482 CrPC numbered as Criminal Misc.
Application No. 1315 of 2023 before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
praying for quashment of the entire proceedings in view of the compromise
entered into between the parties on 19.12.2022.
xii) It has also come
on record that Case No. 248 of 1991 lodged on 11.08.1991 by the appellants’
party was settled during the lifetime of Abdul Waris. There is no dispute that
the said case is not pending.
xiii) However, vide
the impugned order, on the ground that the matter related to an offence
under Section 307 IPC in which there are injuries and a fracture of
the head of distal phalanx of left ring finger received by R-2 Mahmood, the
High Court held that the matter cannot be compounded. The relevant part of the
judgment of the High Court is set out herein below:-
“Although it is a
common ground between both the learned counsels that parties have entered into
compromise and have settled their dispute outside the Court. The said
compromise has been filed by separate affidavits and has also been filed by the
injured. Copy of which is Annexure-8 to the affidavit but since the matter
relates to offence under Section 307 IPC in which there are injuries
and even fracture of head of distal phalanx of left ring finger received by
Mehboob Ali and looking to the settled law with regard to compounding of offence,
the matter cannot be compounded”
(Emphasis
supplied)
xiv) Aggrieved, five
of the eight petitioners before the High Court are in appeal before us. Three
others have passed away.
4.
We have heard Mr. Anupam Mishra, learned counsel for the appellants, Ms. Garima
Prashad, learned Senior Advocate and AAG for the respondent No.1-State of U.P.
and Mr. Harikumar V., learned counsel for respondent No.2- Mahmood.
We
have also perused the records of the case as well as the written submissions
filed by the appellants.
5.
The only question that arises for consideration is: Is the present case a fit
case where proceeding could be quashed, particularly when Section
307 IPC has inter alia been invoked in the summons?
6.
At the outset, we want to set right the error that occurs in the short order of
the High Court. The High Court has not appreciated the difference between
compounding of an offence and quashment of proceedings. As explained
in Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab and Another, (2012) 10 SCC 303, quashing
of offence or criminal proceedings on the ground of settlement between an
offender and victim is not the same thing as compounding of offence. This
Court, highlighting the difference, had the following to say:-
“57. Quashing of
offence or criminal proceedings on the ground of settlement between an offender
and victim is not the same thing as compounding of offence. They are different
and not interchangeable. Strictly speaking, the power of compounding
of offences given to a court under Section 320 is materially
different from the quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court in
exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. In compounding of offences, power of a
criminal court is circumscribed by the provisions contained in Section
320 and the court is guided solely and squarely thereby while, on the
other hand, the formation of opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal
offence or criminal proceeding or criminal complaint is guided by the material
on record as to whether the ends of justice would justify such exercise of
power although the ultimate consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of
indictment.
58. Where the High
Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that the dispute
between the offender and the victim has been settled although the offences are
not compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of criminal
proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands
that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored; securing
the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are
acts which have harmful effect on the public and consist in wrongdoing that
seriously endangers and threatens the well-being of the society and it is not
safe to leave the crime-doer only because he and the victim have settled the
dispute amicably or that the victim has been paid compensation, yet certain
crimes have been made compoundable in law, with or without the permission of
the court. In respect of serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., or
other offences of mental depravity under IPC or offences of moral
turpitude under special statutes, like the Prevention of Corruption
Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in
that capacity, the settlement between the offender and the victim can have no
legal sanction at all. However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and
predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile,
commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences
arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family
dispute, where the wrong is basically to the victim and the offender and the
victim have settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact
that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within
the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal
complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there
is hardly any likelihood of the offender being convicted and by not quashing
the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall
be defeated. The above list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will
depend on its own facts and no hard-and-fast category can be prescribed.”
(Emphasis
supplied)
7.
As would be additionally clear from a close reading of the above two
paragraphs, even though compounding and quashing are conceptually different,
this Court was careful in pointing out that merely because there is a
settlement, for certain categories of offences proceedings will not be quashed.
This is on the premise that crimes that have harmful effects on
the
public and consist of wrongdoing that seriously endangers and threatens the
well-being of the society cannot be quashed, only because the accused and the
victim have amicably settled the matter.
8.
Coming to the facts, notwithstanding the fact that the High Court has mixed up
the concepts of compounding and powers of quashment, still the case needs to be
considered from the point of view of Section 482.
9.
Will the mere mention of Section 307 IPC in the criminal proceedings
force the court to adopt a hands-off approach, when parties come forward with a
settlement? In that event, what should be the duty of the court and what are
the tests to be applied to decide in which cases settlements would be accepted
and in which cases it would not be?
10. In State
of Madhya Pradesh vs. Laxmi Narayan and Others, (2019) 5 SCC 688, after
discussing the ratio in Narinder Singh and Others vs. State of Punjab and
Another, (2014) 6 SCC 466 and other judgments, this Court held:-
“15. Considering the
law on the point and the other decisions of this Court on the point, referred
to hereinabove, it is observed and held as under:
15.1. That the power
conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings for
the non-compoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised
having overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly those
arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial
relationship or family disputes and when the parties have resolved the entire
dispute amongst themselves;
15.2. Such power is
not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involved heinous and serious
offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such
offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society;
15.3. Similarly, such
power is not to be exercised for the offences under the special statutes like
the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public
servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the
basis of compromise between the victim and the offender;
15.4. Offences under
Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act, etc. would fall in the category of heinous
and serious offences and therefore are to be treated as crime against the
society and not against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal
proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC and/or
the Arms Act, etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot be
quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that
the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves.
However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a
mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under
this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether
incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the
prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to
framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would
be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such
injury is inflicted on the vital/delicate parts of the body, nature of weapons
used, etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court would be permissible
only after the evidence is collected after investigation and the charge-sheet
is filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not
permissible when the matter is still under investigation. Therefore, the
ultimate conclusion in paras 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in
Narinder Singh should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the
circumstances stated hereinabove;
15.5. While exercising
the power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings in
respect of non-compoundable offences, which are private in nature and do not
have a serious impact on society, on the ground that there is a
settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, the High Court is
required to consider the antecedents of the accused; the conduct of the
accused, namely, whether the accused was absconding and why he was absconding,
how he had managed with the complainant to enter into a compromise, etc.”
(Emphasis
supplied)
11.
Before we apply this judgment to the facts, it will be worthwhile to recall the
observations of Sikri, J. in Narinder Singh (supra):-
“26. Having said so,
we would hasten to add that though it is a serious offence as the accused
person(s) attempted to take the life of another person/victim, at the same time
the court cannot be oblivious to hard realities that many times whenever there
is a quarrel between the parties leading to physical commotion and sustaining
of injury by either or both the parties, there is a tendency to give it a slant
of an offence under Section 307 IPC as well. …”
(Emphasis
supplied)
12.
Coming back to Laxmi Narayan (supra), this Court has held that mere
mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge-sheet should not
be the basis for adopting a hands-off approach. It has further held that it
would be open for the court to examine as to whether incorporation
of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or whether there is
evidence to back it. It has been held that the courts may go by the nature of
injuries sustained; as to whether the injuries are inflicted on the vital/
delicate parts of the body and the nature of weapon used. It has also been
clarified that such an exercise would be permissible after investigation and filing
of chargesheet/framing of charges or during the trial. [See 15.4
of Laxmi Narayan (supra)].
13.
Coming to the facts of the case, admittedly, there is a settlement between the
parties. The case filed by the appellants’ party which was prior in point of
time and that too on the same day of occurrence, has been settled.
14.
It should be recalled that, at the outset, after investigation, the police
actually closed the case in its final report of 07.09.1991. It was the trial
Court, which by its order of 05.09.1992, refused to accept the same and
summoned the appellants. The incident is of 11.08.1991, i.e. about 33˝ years
back. No doubt, there is a reference to the firing in the FIR but admittedly
there was no injury. The allegation is that firing was done by Abdul Waris. He
is since deceased. The facts, assuming to be true, also do not make out a case
of common object for the appellants under Section 149 IPC insofar as
the offence of Section 307 is concerned.
15.
The role attributed to the seven members, including the five appellants is not
specific. General allegation was that they abused in filthy language and
assaulted Mahmood with lathi and iron bars. The specific individual role was
only attributed to Adbul Waris, who is since deceased.
16.
In any event, the police who investigated disbelieved the entire story. No
recoveries have been made of any pellets. What engaged the attention of the
High Court was only the fracture of the head of the distal phalanx of left
finger of respondent No.2.
17.
We have seen the injuries sustained by Mahmood (R-2) from the medical evidence
collected. From the injury report, it is clear that while the first four
injuries were contusions and abrasions, injury Nos. 5, 6 and 7 pertained to
incised lacerated wound and swelling on the middle finger of the left hand. We
have also seen the x-ray report which shows that in the left hand there was a
fracture of the head of distal phalanx of left ring finger. Assuming that this
was the result of injury with lathis or iron bar, applying the test
in Laxmi Narayan (supra), considering the injury and the nature of
the weapon used, certainly no offence under Section 307 IPC is made
out.
18. Section
307 of IPC reads as under:-
“307. Attempt to
murder.— Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such
circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of
murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is
caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to
imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned.
Attempts by life convicts.— When any person offending under this section is
under sentence of imprisonment for life, he may, if hurt is caused, be punished
with death.”
19.
Keeping in mind the surrounding circumstances, the nature of the weapon and the
nature of the injury, on facts, we are inclined to conclude that the overt act
attributed to the appellants does not bring the case within the four corners of
the Section 307 of IPC, either on a stand-alone basis or as held
above with the aid of Section 149 of IPC.
20.
We are also inclined to conclude that considering the overall circumstances,
the nature of the weapon and the nature of the injury (fracture of the head of
distal phalanx of left ring finger), the offence alleged, on facts, does not
fall in that category of cases where the court should deny relief in the event
of a settlement. At the highest, the offence alleged could be one
under Section 326 of IPC. It could not be said, on facts, considering
all the circumstances that this is a crime which has such an harmful effect on
the public and that it has the effect of seriously threatening the well-being
of the society. We make it clear that we are saying so on the facts of the
present case. We are also firmly of the opinion that proceeding with the trial,
when parties have amicably resolved the dispute in the present case, would be
futile and the ends of justice require that the settlement be given effect to
by quashing the proceedings. It would be a grave abuse of process to let this
trial remain pending under the above circumstances, particularly when the
dispute is settled and resolved.
21.
It should also be borne in mind that this was a case which resulted in a
closure report from the side of the police. The State has also before us, after
placing the law, fairly left it to the court to take a decision.
22. In Ramgopal
v. State of M.P, (2022) 14 SCC 531, Surya Kant, J. speaking for this court, in
a case involving a charge under Section 326 IPC, while annulling the
proceedings, felicitously set out the statement of law and applied it to the
facts of the said case as under:
“19. We thus sum up
and hold that as opposed to Section 320 CrPC where the Court is
squarely guided by the compromise between the parties in respect of offences
“compoundable” within the statutory framework, the extraordinary power enjoined
upon a High Court under Section 482 CrPC or vested in this Court
under Article 142 of the Constitution, can be invoked beyond the
metes and bounds of Section 320 CrPC. Nonetheless, we reiterate that
such powers of wide amplitude ought to be exercised carefully in the context of
quashing criminal proceedings, bearing in mind:
19.1. Nature and
effect of the offence on the conscience of the society;
19.2. Seriousness of
the injury, if any;
19.3 Voluntary nature of compromise between
the accused and the victim; and 19.4 Conduct of the accused persons, prior to
and after the occurrence of the purported offence and/or other relevant
considerations.
20. Having appraised
the aforestated parameters and weighing upon the peculiar facts and
circumstances of the two appeals before us, we are inclined to invoke powers
under Article 142 and quash the criminal proceedings and consequently
set aside the conviction in both the appeals. We say so for the reasons that:
20.1. Firstly, the
occurrence(s) involved in these appeals can be categorised as purely personal
or having overtones of criminal proceedings of private nature.
20.2. Secondly, the
nature of injuries incurred, for which the appellants have been convicted, do
not appear to exhibit their mental depravity or commission of an offence of
such a serious nature that quashing of which would override public interest.
20.3. Thirdly, given
the nature of the offence and injuries, it is immaterial that the trial against
the appellants had been concluded or their appeal(s) against conviction stand
dismissed.
20.4. Fourthly, the
parties on their own volition, without any coercion or compulsion, willingly
and voluntarily have buried their differences and wish to accord a quietus to
their dispute(s).
20.5. Fifthly, the
occurrence(s) in both the cases took place way back in the years 2000 and
1995,
respectively. There is nothing on record to
evince that either before or after the purported compromise, any untoward
incident transpired between the parties.
20.6. Sixthly, since
the appellants and the complainant(s) are residents of the same village(s)
and/or work in close vicinity, the quashing of criminal proceedings will
advance peace, harmony, and fellowship amongst the parties who have decided to
forget and forgive any ill will and have no vengeance against each other.
20.7. Seventhly, the
cause of administration of criminal justice system would remain un-effected on
acceptance of the amicable settlement between the parties and/or resultant
acquittal of the appellants; more so looking at their present age.”
23.
Considering the special features of the case and taking the settlement on
record and applying the law, we find that this is a fit case where proceedings
in complaint case No. 8023 of 2015 arising out of Case Crime No. 248 of 1991
pending in the Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No.5,
Moradabad should be quashed.
24.
In view of the above, we allow the Appeal. The order of the High Court in
application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. No. 1315 of 2023 dated
19.01.2023 shall stand set aside and proceeding in Complaint Case No. 8023 of
2015 arising out of Case Crime No. 248 of 1991 pending in the Court of
Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No. 5, Moradabad shall stand
quashed.
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