2025 INSC 151
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(HON’BLE
VIKRAM NATH, J. AND HON’BLE SANDEEP MEHTA, JJ.)
MANISH YADAV
Petitioner
VERSUS
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
Respondent
Criminal
Appeal No(S). OF 2025 (ARISING OUT OF SLP(CRL.) NO(S). 15882 OF 2024)-Decided
on 22-01-2025
Criminal, Rape, Atrocities, Quashing
Penal Code, 1860,
Sections 376, 323, 504 and 506 - Scheduled Castes and the
Schedules Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, Sections 3(1)(r),
3(1)(s), 3(2)(5a) and 3(2)(v) – Quashing of Summoning order – Rape - Appellant and he complainant were major and thus, both were
competent enough to make rational decisions - As per the statement of the
complainant, their initial physical relations were consensual in nature, and
without there being any promise of marriage being offered by the appellant -
While it can be said that initially the relationship between the complainant
and appellant had developed on the basis of mutual attraction and affection,
the same cannot by any stretch of imagination fall within the ambit of a
relationship flowing from a promise to marry - Therefore, while the present
case may involve a breach of promise, it does not constitute a case of an inherently
false promise to marry - Based on the circumstances, it cannot be concluded
that the appellant obtained the complainant’s consent to engage in a physical
relationship under the pretext of a false promise of marriage - Held that the theory put forth by the
prosecution in the chargesheet that the appellant induced the complainant to
indulge in physical relations under a false promise of marriage is neither
corroborated nor established by the best evidence available on record, which is
in the form of the statement of the complainant recorded under Section
164 CrPC - Moreover, in her statement, the complainant has not uttered a
single word which shows that she was maligned or abused by the appellant for belonging
to a particular caste - Ingredients of the offences alleged under the SC/ST
Act, against the appellant are ex-facie not made out from the highest
allegations as set out in the charge sheet - Present case appears to be one
where a consensual physical relationship between two adults has turned sour due
to certain intervening events - Hence, allowing the prosecution of the
appellant for the offences mentioned above would tantamount to sheer abuse of
the process of law and nothing else - Summoning order passed by learned Special
Judge, SC/ST Act and all
the proceedings sought to be taken there under against the appellant for
the offences punishable under Sections
376, 323, 504 and 506, IPC and Sections
3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(2)(5a) and 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST
Act deserve to be quashed and the impugned order is set aside.
(Para
14, 18 to 23)
ORDER
Mehta, J. :- Heard.
2.
Leave granted.
3.
The appellant through this appeal by special leave seeks to assail the order
dated 30th August, 2024 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, [Hereinafter referred to as ‘High Court’.]
whereby, it partially allowed the Criminal Appeal No. 227/2024 preferred by the
appellant, who had sought to question the legality and validity of the
order dated 24th August, 2023 passed by learned Special Judge, SC/ST Act,
Gazipur[Hereinafter, referred to as
‘trial Court’.] in Special Sessions
Trial No. 760 of 2023, summoning the appellant and his father, Rajnath Yadav,
to face trial for the offences punishable under Sections
376, 323, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860[Hereinafter, referred to as, ‘IPC’.]
and Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(2)(5a) and 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and
the Schedules Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989[Hereinafter referred to as ‘SC/ST Act.’] .
4.
The High Court vide Impugned Order dated 30th August, 2024, had partly allowed
the criminal appeal, by quashing the summoning order issued by the trial Court
against the father of the appellant, namely, Rajnath Yadav and upholding the
summoning order issued against the appellant. Hence, the present appeal by
special leave.
5.
Notice of the present special leave petition was served on respondent No. 2
i.e., the complainant/victim[Hereinafter,
referred to as ‘Complainant’.], but no one has appeared on her behalf.
6.
The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that the appellant befriended the
complainant over a social media website, namely Instagram, which quickly
bloomed into a romantic relationship. The appellant allegedly promised the
complainant that he would marry her and they would live together as husband and
wife. Under the pretence of the said promise of marriage, the appellant
established physical relations with the complainant frequently at different
places viz. Gazipur, Banaras, etc. On account of the repeated physical
relations, the complainant conceived in December, 2022 and the appellant forced
her to undergo an abortion by taking medication. Subsequently, the appellant
began assaulting her and used derogatory caste-based slurs, imputing that he
would not marry her since he was a Yadav, but she belonged to a lower caste.
Following a complaint from the complainant with these allegations, an FIR[Crime No. 387 of 2023.] dated 5th
August, 2023, came to be registered against the appellant under Sections
376, 313, 323, 504, 506, IPC and Sections
3(1)(d), 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act at the P.S. Kotwali, District
Gazipur. After investigation, a charge sheet for the aforementioned offences was
filed against the appellant, while leaving out the offence under Section
313 IPC.
7.
The trial Court, vide order dated 24th August, 2023, summoned the appellant and
his father for the aforesaid offences, which stands partially affirmed by the
High Court(supra).
8.
We have heard and considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel for
the appellant and the learned counsel representing the State of Uttar Pradesh
and have gone through the material placed on record.
9.
At the outset, we may note that the complainant is a major girl and was working
at a Diagnostic Centre in Varanasi when she came in contact with the appellant
on the social media website, namely, Instagram.
10.
It will be germane to reproduce the statement of the complainant recorded
during the course of investigation under Section 164 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973[For short,
‘CrPC’.] which provides the substratum of allegations set out against the
appellant in the case at hand, and the same reads as follows: -
“Date: 09.08.2023
Victim’s Name: X.X.X.
X.X.X.
stated under oath that
she met Manish Yadav, son of Rajnath Singh, on Instagram in January 2022. Their
friendship started with a message from Manish, which eventually led to mutual
liking and in-person meetings. In May 2022, Manish called her to meet at his friend's
place, where he behaved inappropriately with her. Despite her reservations
about engaging in a physical relationship, she trusted him and had feelings for
him. Manish later forced himself on her multiple times. In September 2022, X.
X. X... moved to Varanasi for work, while Manish relocated to Prayagraj. He
would visit her in Varanasi and engage in physical relations without her
consent. By December 2022, she discovered she was pregnant. Manish made her
take medication to terminate the pregnancy. When visiting, he would suggest
eloping to get married, but she insisted on waiting until he secured a job.
During this period, X. X. X. cousin, Vatika, came to live with her. Manish
occasionally became abusive, verbally and physically, during his visits. In February
2023, X. X. X. witnessed Manish and Vatika in an inappropriate situation.
Although Manish apologized after a confrontation, he continued his relationship
with Vatika. To retaliate, Χ.Χ.Χ.. mentioned a friend named Ajay
to make Manish jealous. Manish then questioned her character and refused to
marry her, saying he wouldn't marry someone with whom he had been intimate.
X. X. X. visited
Manish's home and informed his father, who initially appeared understanding.
However, when she tried to follow up, his father dismissed her rudely. Manish
continued to exploit her under the pretence of marriage, eventually abandoning
her. When she confronted him about his past relationships with other girls,
Manish demanded Rs. 50 lakh as a condition for marriage.
X.X.X. concluded that
she had nothing further to add.”
(emphasis
supplied)
11.
As per the case set out by the prosecution, the appellant allegedly forced
himself upon the complainant on multiple occasions, however on going through
the aforesaid statement rendered by the complainant on oath, we find that she
had herself admitted that despite her reservations about engaging in a
physical relationship with the appellant, she trusted him and had feelings
for him.
12.
Furthermore, as per the prosecution case, in September, 2022, the complainant
moved to Varanasi for work, whereas the appellant relocated to Prayagraj.
Despite that, the appellant continued to visit her in Varanasi and engaged in
physical relations with the complainant, allegedly without her consent. In
December, 2022, the complainant discovered that she had become pregnant and
thereupon, the appellant forced her to take medications in order to terminate
the pregnancy. However, the theory put forth by the complainant regarding the
appellant forcing her to terminate the pregnancy has not been established, and
thus, the offence under Section 313 IPC, stands dropped from the
chargesheet.
13.
The complainant further stated that later on, her cousin Vatika had also come
to reside with her. She alleged that in February, 2022, she saw the appellant
and Vatika engaged in an inappropriate position. In retaliation, she befriended
a person, namely, Ajay to make Manish jealous. Thereafter, Manish cast
aspersions on her character and refused to marry her stating that he was not
willing to marry someone with whom he had been intimate once.
14.
In our opinion, it is clearly discernible that both the appellant and the
complainant were major and thus, both were competent enough to make rational
decisions. As per the statement of the complainant(supra), their initial
physical relations were consensual in nature, and without there being any
promise of marriage being offered by the appellant. While it can be said that
initially the relationship between the complainant and appellant had developed
on the basis of mutual attraction and affection, the same cannot by any stretch
of imagination fall within the ambit of a relationship flowing from a promise
to marry.
15.
The criminal jurisprudence on the scope of 'consent' in cases where sexual
intercourse took place on the promise of marriage has been well established
through a catena of judgments by this Court. In Uday v. State of
Karnataka[(2003) 4 SCC 46.], this
Court acquitted the accused based on the reasoning that the prosecutrix, a
mature college student, consented to sexual intercourse with the accused of her
own free will. The Court found that she was fully aware of the consequences of
her actions and held that her consent was not based on any misconception of
fact. In Uday(supra), the Court noted that:
“21. It therefore
appears that the consensus of judicial opinion is in favour of the view that
the consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse with a person with
whom she is deeply in love on a promise that he would marry her on a later
date, cannot be said to be given under a misconception of fact. A false promise
is not a fact within the meaning of the Code. We are inclined to agree with
this view, but we must add that there is no straitjacket formula for determining
whether consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse is voluntary, or
whether it is given under a misconception of fact. In the ultimate
analysis, the tests laid down by the courts provide at best guidance
to the judicial mind while considering a question of consent, but the court
must, in each case, consider the evidence before it and the surrounding
circumstances, before reaching a conclusion, because each case has its own
peculiar facts which may have a bearing on the question whether the consent was
voluntary, or was given under a misconception of fact. It must also weigh the
evidence keeping in view the fact that the burden is on the prosecution to
prove each and every ingredient of the offence, absence of consent being one of
them.”
(emphasis
supplied)
16.
This Court, in the case of Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana[(2013) 7 SCC 675], while discussing the
nature of the ‘consent’ in cases where sexual intercourse occurs on the promise
of marriage, distinguished between a mere ‘breach of promise’ and ‘not
fulfilling a false promise’. The Court held as follows:
“21. Consent may be
express or implied, coerced or misguided, obtained willingly or through deceit.
Consent is an act of reason, accompanied by deliberation, the mind weighing, as
in a balance, the good and evil on each side. There is a clear distinction
between rape and consensual sex and in a case like this, the court must very
carefully examine whether the accused had actually wanted to marry the victim,
or had mala fide motives, and had made a false promise to this effect only to
satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the ambit of cheating or
deception. There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not
fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was
made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether
the consent involved was given after wholly understanding the nature and
consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix
agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the
accused, and not solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by the
accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which he could not
have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her,
despite having every intention to do so. Such cases must be treated
differently. An accused can be convicted for rape only if the court reaches a
conclusion that the intention of the accused was mala fide, and that he had
clandestine motives.
24. Hence, it is
evident that there must be adequate evidence to show that at the relevant time
i.e. at the initial stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever, of
keeping his promise to marry the victim. There may, of course, be
circumstances, when a person having the best of intentions is unable to marry
the victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The “failure to keep a
promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are
not very clear from the evidence available, does not always amount to
misconception of fact. In order to come within the meaning of the term
“misconception of fact”, the fact must have an immediate
relevance”. Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a
situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal
liability on the other, unless the court is assured of the fact that from the
very beginning, the accused had never really intended to marry her.”
(emphasis
supplied)
17.
Moreover, in Deelip Singh v. State of Bihar, [(2005) 1 SCC 88.] the Court acquitted and set aside the
conviction of the accused while holding that while there was a breach of
promise to marry, it was not a case of false promise to marry. The relevant
extract is produced here in under:
“35. The remaining
question is whether on the basis of the evidence on record, it is reasonably
possible to hold that the accused with the fraudulent intention of inducing her
to sexual intercourse, made a false promise to marry. We have no doubt that the
accused did hold out the promise to marry her and that was the predominant
reason for the victim girl to agree to the sexual intimacy with him. PW 12 was
also too keen to marry him as she said so specifically. But we find no evidence
which gives rise to an inference beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had
no intention to marry her at all from the inception and that the promise he
made was false to his knowledge. No circumstances emerging from the prosecution
evidence establish this fact. On the other hand, the statement of PW 12 that
“later on”, the accused became ready to marry her but his father and others
took him away from the village would indicate that the accused might have been
prompted by a genuine intention to marry which did not materialise on account of
the pressure exerted by his family elders. It seems to be a case of breach of
promise to marry rather than a case of false promise to marry. On this aspect
also, the observations of this Court in Uday case[(2003) 4 SCC 46 :
2003 SCC (Cri) 775 : (2003) 2 Scale 329] at para 24 come to the aid of the
appellant.”
(emphasis
supplied)
18.
Applying the above principle to the case at hand, it is clearly discernible
that in the present case, the complainant had agreed to indulge in intimate
relations with the appellant on the accord of her own desires and not on the
basis of any false promise of marriage made by the appellant. Therefore, while
the present case may involve a breach of promise, it does not constitute a case
of an inherently false promise to marry. Based on the circumstances, it cannot
be concluded that the appellant obtained the complainant’s consent to engage in
a physical relationship under the pretext of a false promise of marriage.
19.
Admittedly, during his visit to Varanasi, the appellant himself had asked the
complainant to elope with him and get married, but it was the complainant who
insisted on waiting till he secured a job. Therefore, while the prosecution
story primarily rests on the fact that the appellant had lured the complainant
to develop physical relations with him on the promise to marry her in future,
this very statement of the complainant suggests the contrary. The complainant’s
act of declining the appellant’s proposal of marriage shows that it was not the
appellant who failed to stand firm upon his promise if any such promise was
made by the appellant at any point in time.
20.
Thus, the theory put forth by the prosecution in the chargesheet that the
appellant induced the complainant to indulge in physical relations under a false
promise of marriage is neither corroborated nor established by the best
evidence available on record, which is in the form of the statement of the
complainant recorded under Section 164 CrPC.
21.
Moreover, in her statement, the complainant has not uttered a single word which
shows that she was maligned or abused by the appellant for belonging to a
particular caste. Therefore, we are of the firm view that the ingredients of
the offences alleged under the SC/ST Act, against the appellant are ex-facie
not made out from the highest allegations as set out in the charge sheet.
22.
In view of the above discussion, we are of the opinion that the present case
appears to be one where a consensual physical relationship between two adults
has turned sour due to certain intervening events. Hence, allowing the
prosecution of the appellant for the offences mentioned above would tantamount
to sheer abuse of the process of law and nothing else.
23.
Resultantly, the summoning order dated 24th August, 2023 passed by learned
Special Judge, SC/ST Act Gazipur, and all the proceedings sought to be
taken there under against the appellant for the offences punishable
under Sections 376, 323, 504 and 506, IPC
and Sections
3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(2)(5a) and 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST
Act deserve to be, and are hereby quashed. Thus, the impugned order is set
aside.
24.
The appeal is allowed, accordingly.
25.
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
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