2025 INSC 132
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(HON’BLE B.R.
GAVAI, J. AND HON’BLE AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH, JJ.)
KARUPPUDAYAR
Appellant
VERSUS
STATE REP. BY THE
DEPUTYSUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, LALGUDITRICHY & ORS.
Respondent
Criminal
Appeal Nos. 496-497 of 2025[Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal)
No.8778-8779 of 2024]-Decided on 31-01-2025
Criminal, Quashing, Atrocities
Criminal Procedure
Code, 1973, Section 482 – Penal Code, 1860, Sections 294(b) and 353 - Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, Sections
3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) – Quashing of FIR -
Petition for -
What is alleged is that when the complainant was in his office the accused came
there; enquired with the complainant; not being satisfied, started abusing him
in the name of his caste; and insulted him - Thereafter, three colleagues of
the complainant came there, pacified the accused and took him away - It is thus
clear that even as per the FIR, the incident has taken place within the four
corners of the chambers of the complainant - The other colleagues of the
complainant arrived at the scene after the occurrence of the incident – Held that
since the incident has not taken place at a place which can be termed to be a
place within public view, the offence would not come under the provisions of
either Section 3(1)(r) or Section 3(1)(s) of the SC-ST Act - Allegations made
in the FIR, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety, do not prima facie constitute an offence either under Section 3(1)(r)
or under Section 3(1)(s) of the SC-ST Act - High Court did not even deal with
the said contention, leave aside considering the same - Judgment and final
order passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court liable to be quashed
and set aside - Charge-sheet and all proceedings pursuant thereto shall stand
quashed and set aside.
(Para
13 to 15, 18, 19 and 21)
JUDGMENT
B.R. Gavai, J.:-Leave granted.
2.
The present appeals challenge the judgment and final order dated 28th February
2024 in Criminal Original Petition (MD) No. 6676 of 2022 and Criminal
Miscellaneous Petition (MD) No.4621 of 2022 passed by the learned Single Judge
of the High Court of Madras at Madurai.
3.
By way of the impugned order, the High Court dismissedthe petitions filed by
the Appellant under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(hereinafter, “CrPC”) wherein the Appellant has prayed to call for records
relating to proceedings in Spl.S.C.No.7 of 2022 pending before the I_Additional
District and Sessions Judge (PCR), Tiruchirappalli and to quash the same.
4.
The facts, in brief, giving rise to the present appeals are as under:
4.1 The prosecution
story is that on 2nd September 2021 the Appellant approached the Respondent No.
3 (Mr. Ravikumar, Revenue Inspector) in order to inquire regarding the status
of a petition filed in the name of Appellant’s father concerning inclusion of
Appellant’s father’s name in the patta[‘Patta’
is a government issued document which contains various details such as
landowner’s name, land survey number, type of land, location of land, etc. that
validates the ownership of land.] for the land situated in Natham UDR, Sembarai
village.
4.2 A quarrel
developed between Appellant and Respondent No. 3 whereby the Appellant abused
Respondent No.3 by using his caste name in the Revenue Divisional Office,
Lalgudi, Tiruchirappalli.
4.3 Consequently,
Respondent No. 3 filed a complaint before the Respondent No. 2 (Sub-Inspector
of Police, Lalgudi Police Station, Trichy) and case being Crime No. 676 of 2021
was registered against the Appellant for the offences punishable under Sections
294(b) and 353 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter, “IPC”) read with
Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter, “SC-ST Act”).
4.4 After completion
of investigation, the charge sheet was filed by the Respondent No.1
(Investigating Officer/Deputy Superintendent of Police) in the court of
Judicial Magistrate, Lalgudi, Tiruchirappalli and the case was committed to the
Sessions Court.
4.5 As a result of the
same, a case being Spl. S.C. No. 7 of 2022 was initiated against the Appellant
before the I_Additional District and Sessions Judge (PCR), Tiruchirappalli
(hereinafter, “trial court”).
4.6 Aggrieved by the
initiation of criminal proceedings so also the trial, the Appellant filed
petitions under Section 482 of CrPC before the High Court to call for the
records relating to Spl. S.C. No. 7 of 2022 and to quash the same.
4.7 The learned Single
Judge of the High Court, vide the impugned judgment and final order, held that
no prejudice would be caused to Appellant if he is subjected to trial and
dismissed his petitions.
4.8 Aggrieved thereby,
the present appeals arise by way of special leave.
5.
We have heard Smt. Vanshaja Shukla, the leaned counsel appearing on behalf of
the Appellant and Shri Sabarish Subramanian, the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the Respondents.
6.
Smt. Vanshaja Shukla submitted that the learned Single Judge of the High Court
has grossly erred in rejecting the petition of the Appellant. She submits that
even taking the allegations in the FIR at its face value, the ingredients to
constitute an offence under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC-ST Act are
not made out. She, therefore, submits that the learned Single Judge of the High
Court ought to have exercised his jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC
and quashed the proceedings.
7.
As against this, Shri Sabarish Subramanian, learned counsel for the Respondents
submits that upon detailed investigation a charge-sheet was filed by the then
Investigating Officer (Respondent No.1 herein). Learned Single Judge of the
High Court, on a perusal of the charge-sheet, found that no case for quashing
of the proceedings was made out. He, therefore, submits that no interference is
warranted in the facts and circumstances of the present case.
8.
For appreciating the rival submissions, it will be apposite to refer to the
provisions of Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC-ST Act, which read thus:
“3. Punishments for
offences of atrocities.—(1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or
a Scheduled Tribe,--
(a) ………………………………………………
(b) ………………………………………………
xxx xxx xxx
(r) intentionally
insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste
or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view;
(s) abuses any member
of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe by caste name in any place within
public view;”
9.
A perusal of Section 3(1)(r) of the SC-ST Act would reveal that for
constituting an offence thereunder, it has to be established that the accused
intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a
Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view.
Similarly, for constituting an offence under Section 3(1)(s) of the SC-ST Act,
it will be necessary that the accused abuses any member of a Scheduled Caste or
a Scheduled Tribe by caste name in any place within public view.
10.
The term “any place within public view” initially came up for consideration
before this Court in the case of Swaran Singh and others v. State through
Standing Counsel and another[2(2008) 8
SCC 4353]. This Court in the case of Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand
and another[(2020) 10 SCC 710]
referred to Swaran Singh (supra) and reiterated the legal position as under:
“14. Another key
ingredient of the provision is insult or intimidation in “any place within
public view”. What is to be regarded as “place in public view” had come up for
consideration before this Court in the judgment reported as Swaran Singh v.
State [Swaran Singh v. State, (2008) 8 SCC 435 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 527] . The
Court had drawn distinction between the expression “public place” and “in any
place within public view”. It was held that if an offence is committed outside
the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by
someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, then the lawn would
certainly be a place within the public view. On the contrary, if the remark is
made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely
relatives or friends) then it would not be an offence since it is not in the
public view (sic) [Ed. : This sentence appears to be contrary to what is stated
below in the extract from Swaran Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 435, at p. 736d-e, and in
the application of this principle in para 15, below:“Also, even if the remark
is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely
relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the
public view.”] . The Court held as under : (SCC pp. 443-44, para 28)
“28. It has been
alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by
Appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a “chamar”) when he stood near the car which
was parked at the gate of the premises. In our opinion, this was certainly a
place within public view, since the gate of a house is certainly a place within
public view. It could have been a different matter had the alleged offence been
committed inside a building, and also was not in the public view. However, if
the offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house,
and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary
wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if
the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there
(not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is
in the public view. We must, therefore, not confuse the expression “place
within public view” with the expression “public place”. A place can be a
private place but yet within the public view. On the other hand, a public place
would ordinarily mean a place which is owned or leased by the Government or the
municipality (or other local body) or gaon sabha or an instrumentality of the
State, and not by private persons or private bodies.”(emphasis in original)”
11.
It could thus be seen that, to be a place ‘within public view’, the place
should be open where the members of the public can witness or hear the
utterance made by the accused to the victim. If the alleged offence takes place
within the four corners of the wall where members of the public are not
present, then it cannot be said that it has taken place at a place within
public view.
12.
If we take the averments/allegations in the FIR at its face value, what is
alleged is as under:
That on 2nd September
2021, while the complainant was engaged in his office doing his duty, the
accused came to the office in the morning in order to enquire about the
petition given by him already to the Revenue Divisional Officer regarding
entering the name of his father in the ‘patta’. On such enquiry being made, the
complainant informed the accused that the said petition has been sent to the
Taluk office, Lalgudi and that appropriate action would be taken after receipt
of the reply from the Taluk Office, Lalgudi. It is alleged that at that stage,
the accused asked the complainant as to what caste he belongs to and stated
that the complainant belongs to ‘Parayan’ caste. Thereafter, the accused stated
that, “if you people are appointed in Government service you all will do like
this only…”. Thereafter, he scolded the complainant calling his caste name and
insulted him using vulgar words. The further allegation is that thereafter the
colleagues of the complainant came there, pacified the accused and took him
away.
13.
Taking the allegations in the FIR at their face value, it would reveal that
what is alleged is that when the complainant was in his office the accused came
there; enquired with the complainant; not being satisfied, started abusing him
in the name of his caste; and insulted him. Thereafter, three colleagues of the
complainant came there, pacified the accused and took him away.
14.
It is thus clear that even as per the FIR, the incident has taken place within
the four corners of the chambers of the complainant. The other colleagues of
the complainant arrived at the scene after the occurrence of the incident.
15.
We are, therefore, of the considered view that since the incident has not taken
place at a place which can be termed to be a place within public view, the
offence would not come under the provisions of either Section 3(1)(r) or
Section 3(1)(s) of the SC-ST Act.
16.
We may gainfully refer to the following observations of this Court in the case of
State of Haryana and others v. Bhajan Lal and others[1992 Supp (1) SCC 335]. The law as laid down therein by this Court
has been consistently followed.
“102. In the backdrop
of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter
XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of
decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226
or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted
and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of
illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of
the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it
may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently
channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an
exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be
exercised.
(1) Where the
allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they
are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie
constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the
allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any,
accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an
investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under
an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the
uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence
collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence
and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the
allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute
only a non_cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police
officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of
the Code.
(5) Where the
allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just
conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an
express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the
concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the
institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific
provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for
the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal
proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is
maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.
103. We also give a
note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding
should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the
rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an
enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations
made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers
do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its
whim or caprice.”
17.
No doubt, that the power under Section 482 of the CrPC is required to be
exercised sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare
cases. It is equally settled that the court will not be justified in embarking
upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the
allegations made in the FIR or the complaint. However, the court would be
justified in exercising its discretion if the case falls under any of the
clauses carved out by this Court in Paragraph 102 in the case of Bhajan Lal
(supra)
18.
We find, as already observed herein, that the allegations made in the FIR, even
if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not
prima facie constitute anoffence either under Section 3(1)(r) or under Section
3(1)(s) of the SC-ST Act. We are of the considered view that the case would
fall under the first category, listed by this Court in Paragraph 102 in the
case of Bhajan Lal (supra).
19.
On a perusal of the order of the High Court, we find that the High Court has
not at all considered this aspect of the matter though it was strenuously
argued on behalf of the petitioner before the High Court (Appellant herein)
that the allegations made in the FIR do not make out a case that the offence is
committed in public view. The High Court did not even deal with the said
contention, leave aside considering the same.
20.
In that view of the matter, we find that the present appeals deserve to be
allowed.
21.
In the result, we pass the following order:
(i) The appeals are
allowed.
(ii) The judgment and
final order dated 28th February2024 in Criminal Original Petition (MD) No. 6676
of 2022 and Criminal Miscellaneous Petition (MD) No.4621 of 2022 passed by the
learned Single Judge of the High Court of Madras at Madurai is quashed and set
aside.
(iii) The charge-sheet
in Special S.C. No. 7 of 2022 on the file of I Additional District and Sessions
Judge (PCR), Tiruchirappalli and all proceedings pursuant thereto shall stand
quashed and set aside.
22.
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
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