2025 INSC 12
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(HON’BLE C.T. RAVIKUMAR, J. AND
HON’BLE RAJESH BINDAL, JJ.)
DALIP RAM
Petitioner
VERSUS
STATE OF PUNJAB
Respondent
Special
Leave Petition (C) No. 8687 of 2012 With Special Leave Petition (C) No. 1668 of
2019 Special Leave Petition C) No. 34380 of 2012 Special Leave Petition (C) No.
34382 of 2012 Special Leave Petition (C) No. 34381 of 2012 Special Leave
Petition (C) No. 33833 of 2012 Special Leave Petition (C) No. 33831 of 2012 Special
Leave Petition (C) No. 33998 of 2012 Special Leave Petition (C) No. 33832 of
2012 Special Leave Petition (C) No. 33764 of 2012 Special Leave Petition (C)
No. 34678 of 2012 Special Leave Petition (C) No. 38532 of 2012 Special Leave
Petition (C) No. 205-208 of 2014 Special Leave Petition (C) No. 22206-22209 of
2013 Special Leave Petition (C) No. 19680 of 2013 Special Leave Petition (C)
No. 30491 of 2013 Special Leave Petition
(C) No. 488 of 2014 Special Leave Petition (C) No. 486 of 2014 Special Leave
Petition (C) No. 36797 of 2013 Special Leave Petition (C) No. 6181 of 2014 Special Leave Petition (C) No. 17304-17305 of
2014 Special Leave Petition SLP (C) No. 30271 of 2014 Special Leave Petition
(C)...CC No. 6152 of 2015 Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15510 of 2015 Special
Leave Petition (C) No. 17550-17552 of 2015 Special Leave Petition (C) No. 24350
of 2015 Special Leave Petition (C) No. 24357 of 2015 Diary No(s). 12497 of 2017 Special Leave
Petition (C) No. 13391 of 2018 Special Leave Petition (C) No. 26164 of 2018-Decided
on 02-01-2025
Civil
(A)
Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961, Section 2(g)(ii-a) (a
amended by Punjab Act No.8 of 1995 with effect from 09.07.1985), Section 7 –
Transfer of Property Act, 1882, Section 105 - Village Common Lands - Shamlat
deh –
Words ‘displaced person’ Expression ‘quasi-permanent basis’ - Amended Section 2(g)(ii-a) of the Act
would reveal that the inclusive definition of Shamlat deh in the Act is
actually amended by inserting a non- inclusive clause - In terms of the same,
Shamlat deh, if allotted, on quasi-permanent basis to a displaced person or has
been otherwise transferred to any person by sale or by way of any other manner,
whatsoever, after the commencement of that Act on or before 9th day of July,
1985, it would fall out of the inclusion of the definition of Shamlat deh
under Section 2 (g) of the Act - In other words, such
allottee/transferee by sale or by any other manner would get the protection
statutorily available as relates such land(s) – Contention of the petitioner is
that the subject land was allotted to his father by the Government as he was a
landless person belonging to Harijan - Held that a scanning of the contentions
of the petitioner would reveal that he got no case that the subject land was
transferred to his father by sale - Also took note of his contention that it
was an evacuee property - The petitioner got no case that it was allotted
to his father on a quasi-permanent basis for being a displaced person or that
it was transferred by sale to his father - The case of the petitioner is that
the subject land came to his father’s possession by allotment/transfer
otherwise than by way of lease - His eviction was ordered, finding that even
after the expiry of lease period, he is continuing to be there, without even
paying the rent and therefore has been in unauthorised possession of the
subject land - Do not find any reason to disagree with the findings of the High
Court in the impugned judgment dated 18.10.2011 that after the expiry of the
lease period, the petitioner herein who stepped into the shoes of his father as
lessee has been continuing there as an unauthorised occupant - Petitioner not
entitled to get the protection of the Amendment Act and that the period of
lease had expired long back in 1971 and further that at any point of time
before any forum, the petitioner had not challenged the recorded status of his
father as lessee and further that he had only stepped into the shoes of his
father, find no reason to interfere with the direction to evict the petitioner
from the subject land in the application filed under Section 7 as he
being an unauthorised occupant as held by the authorities, which was confirmed
under the impugned judgment dated 18.10.2011 – Petition liable to be dismissed.
(Par 9 and 14)
(B)
Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961, Section 2(g)(ii-a) (as
amended by Punjab Act No.8 of 1995 with effect from 09.07.1985) – Words and
phrases –Words ‘displaced person’ - Expression ‘quasi-permanent basis’ - Meaning of the
aforesaid words explained.
(Para 5 and 6)
(C)
Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961, Section 11 - Res judicata -
Decision of claims of right, title or interest in shamilat deh - Held that the sine
qua non for filing a petition under Section 11, claiming right, title or
interest is that the land in question, over which such right, title or interest
is claimed should be one vested or deemed to have been vested in the Panchayat
concerned - In such circumstances, when the categoric case of the petitioner is
that he approached the Collector through a petition under Section
11 itself would be sufficient to treat that the land in question was
vested or deemed to have been vested with the respondent Panchayat - That
apart, it is his own case that it was leased out to him on 22.05.1990 by
the Panchayat - When that be the case of the petitioner, the petitioner cannot
be heard to challenge the vesting or deemed vesting of the land(s) in question
with the respondent-Panchayat - Held
that the High Court was perfectly correct in holding that the unsuccessful
attempt on the part of the respondent-Panchayat in the proceeding
under Section 7 of the Act cannot be a reason for holding that they
would or should act as res judicata to challenge an adverse order against them
under Section 11 of the Act.
(Para
38 to 40)
JUDGMENT
C.T. Ravikumar, J. :- The contentions and the factual
matrix involved in the captioned Special Leave Petitions would reveal that the
bone of contentions in them, essentially is one and the same viz., whether the
subject lands were Shamlat deh, allotted (if at all allotment was there) on
quasi- permanent basis to displaced person(s) or whether they were Shamlat deh
otherwise transferred to any person by sale or by any other manner whatsoever
after commencement of Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act,
1961 (for short, ‘the Act’). An answer to that question in the affirmative
would fetch protection to such allotment or transfer by sale or by any
other manner, statutorily by virtue of the amendment of Section
2(g)(ii-a) of the Act. Hence, the fate of most of these Special Leave Petitions
is dependent mainly on that question. Needless to say, that some allied
questions may also crop up for consideration. Special Leave Petition No.8687 of
2012 is taken as the lead case and wherever any allied question also crops up
and if found relevant, we will refer to such question(s) appropriately and also
deal with them. Before dealing with the lead case and also the contentions, it
will not be inappropriate to state that a scanning of all the above Special
Leave Petitions would reveal that all the aforesaid cases have been pending for
a long time and in fact, some of them were pending for more than three decades.
Special
Leave Petition No.8687 of 2012
2.
One Dalip Ram, son of Shri Uttam Ram filed the captioned Special Leave Petition
seeking leave to challenge the judgment dated 18.10.2011 passed by the High
Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Civil Writ Petition No.5865 of
1992. As per the same, the High Court rejected his challenge against the order
dated 28.08.1991 passed by the Financial Commissioner in Appeal No.110 of
1998 carrying challenge against the order dated 19.01.1988 in case No.544/1987
of the second respondent in an application filed by the third respondent-Gram
Panchayat under Section 7 of the Act. The second respondent as per
order dated 19.01.1988 allowed the aforesaid application for eviction of the
petitioner herein from the subject land specifically described in the
application. In the application, the third respondent-Gram Panchayat stated
that the petitioner herein/the respondent therein, is in unauthorised
possession of the subject land belonging to the Gram Panchayat which was leased
out to his father, even after the expiry of the lease period. Further, it was
stated that even thereafter, he had neither handed over its possession to the
Gram Panchayat nor paid lease money therefor. As per the order dated
19.01.1988, the second respondent found that the Gram Panchayat is the owner of
the subject land thereby, rejecting the contra claim over ownership by the
petitioner and finding that the petitioner herein/respondent therein is in
unauthorised possession of the subject land, ordered for his eviction. In the
appeal filed by the petitioner herein, the Commissioner confirmed the order,
rejecting the contentions of the petitioner that the land in question
was Banjar Qadim and spending huge amounts he converted it to cultivable
land and that the Panchayat has got no connection with the said land. The
authorities concurrently found that in the Jamabandi for the year 1963-64, the
subject land was recorded as Shamlat Deh and the petitioner’s father was shown
as its Chakotadar (lessee). Upon his death, the petitioner stepped into his
shoes and continued its possession, even after the expiry of the lease period
unauthorisedly. The Commissioner has also concurred with the findings that the
petitioner had failed to hand over the possession of the land to the Gram
Panchayat and also pay Chakota (rent). The petitioner challenged the aforesaid
orders dated 19.01.1988 and 28.08.1991 unsuccessfully before the High Court in
Civil Writ Petition No.5865 of 1992 and the same was originally dismissed by
the High Court as per order dated 21.07.1993. Seeking leave to challenge the
said order in Writ Petition No.5865 of 1992, the petitioner filed Special Leave
Petition No.3261-3262 of 1999. Taking into account the submission of the
petitioner, that after the dismissal of the Writ Petition, an amendment was
brought into Section 2(g)(ii) as Section 2 (g)(ii-A) in the
Act as per Punjab Act No.8 of 1995 and was given effect from 09.07.1985,
it was prayed to set aside the order sought to be impugned and the Writ
Petition may be directed to be considered afresh having regard to the amendment
brought in to the said Section. Accepting the said prayer, this Court as per
order dated 01.12.2004, set aside the said order of the High Court and the
matter was remitted to the High Court for fresh disposal observing that whether
the amendment would cover the case of the petitioner or not is a matter to be
examined on the basis of the materials already placed on record and in the
light of the contentions raised. The order against which leave is sought for to
challenge the same in this proceeding, was passed by the High Court pursuant to
such consideration on remand. Though on merits, the said Writ Petition was
again dismissed by the High Court subsequent to the remand, as per order dated
18.10.2011, it is a fact that the question, whether the aforesaid amendment
brought to the Act covers the case of the petitioner was not pointedly
considered thereunder. The said situation cannot be appreciated. Though we are
not happy with the said situation taking into account the fact that the Writ
Petition is of the year 1992, we do not think it appropriate to remand the
matter again at this distance of time. In that view of the matter, we are
inclined to consider the question, whether the amendment in view of the
factual position obtained in this case would apply to the case of the
petitioner so as to statutorily protect the allotment/transfer in any other manner
of the subject land, if any, by virtue of the said amendment.
3.
As part of such consideration, we will first refer to the position
of Section 2 (g) of the Act after the aforesaid amendment and it
reads thus: -
“2 (g) " Shamlat Deh
includes :-
(1) Lands described in the
revenue records as shamlat deh excluding abadi deh; (2) Shamlat tikkas;
But does not include land which
(ii) has been allotted on
quasi-permanent basis to a displaced person;
(ii-a) was shamlat deh, but, has
been allotted on quasi-permanent basis to a displaced person, or, has been
otherwise transferred to any person by sale or by any other manner whatsoever
after the commencement of this Act, but on or before the 9th day of July, 1985.
(emphasis
added)
4.
A perusal of the amended Section 2(g)(ii-a) of the Act would reveal that
the inclusive definition of Shamlat deh in the Act is actually amended by
inserting a non- inclusive clause. In terms of the same, Shamlat deh, if
allotted, on quasi-permanent basis to a displaced person or has been otherwise
transferred to any person by sale or by way of any other manner,
whatsoever, after the commencement of that Act on or before 9th day of July,
1985, it would fall out of the inclusion of the definition of Shamlat deh
under Section 2 (g) of the Act. In other words, such
allottee/transferee by sale or by any other manner would get the protection
statutorily available as relates such land(s).
5.
We think it appropriate in the context of the contentions to look into the
meaning of the words ‘displaced person’ and ‘quasi’. In the Black’s Law
Dictionary, Tenth Edition, the meaning of the words ‘displaced person’ is given
thus:-
“Someone who remains within an
internationally recognised state border after being forced to flee a home or
place of habitual residence because of armed conflict, internal strife, the
government’s systematic violations of human rights, or a natural or man-made
disaster.”
6.
It is to be noted that the protective benefits in terms of the amendment will
be available if the allotment on quasi-permanent basis is to a displaced
person. It is also not inappropriate in this context to search for the meaning
of the word ‘quasi’ to understand the meaning of the expression
‘quasi-permanent basis’ used in the aforesaid amended provision. In the Black’s
Law Dictionary, Tenth Edition for the said word, the meaning is given
thus:
“quasi – [Latin “as if”] (15c)
Seemingly but not actually; in some sense or degree;
resembling; nearly.
“Quasi. A Latin word frequently
used in the civil law, and often prefixed to English words. It is not a
definite word. It marks the resemblance, and supposes a little difference,
between two objects, and in legal phraseology the term is used to indicate that
one subject resembles another, but that there are also intrinsic and material
differences between them. It negatives the idea of identity, but implies a
strong superficial analogy, and points out that the conceptions are
sufficiently similar for one to be classified as the equal of the other.”
7.
Evidently, the contention of the petitioner is that the subject land was
allotted to his father by the Government as he was a landless person belonging
to Harijan. Ground ‘H’ raised in the captioned Special Leave Petition would
further reveal that the contention of the petitioner is that it was so
transferred (conspicuously, ‘not allotted’ as claimed in Ground B) to his
father. Thus, it is evident that the petitioner is stating clearly whether it
was ‘allotted’ or ‘transferred’ to his father. At the same
time,
he was categoric in his statement that the land in question which became
evacuee property was given to his father and hence, he is entitled to the
benefit of the amendment brought with effect from 09.07.1985, as Section
2(g)(ii-a) of the Act.
8.
Bearing in mind, the aforesaid facts and factors, we will examine the claim and
contention of the petitioner in the light of the decision of the Constitution
Bench of this Court in Amar Singh & Ors. v. Custodian, Evacuee
Property & Ors. [1957 SCR 801; 1957
INSC 28], and the decision in Basant Ram v. Union of India [AIR 1962 SC 994] and the
decision of a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court
in Bakshish Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Ors. [2011 SCC OnLine P&H 11928], which was rendered relying
on those decisions of this Court referred supra.
9.
The contention of the petitioner and the meaning of the word ‘displaced person’
would reveal that he is not claiming rather, he could not claim that his father
was a displaced person and that it was allotted to his father in that status.
His case is that his father was a landless Harijan, it was allotted /
transferred by the Government to him in the year 1961. In this context, it is
to be noted that in the original judgment as also as per the impugned judgment
which were passed in Writ Petition No.5865 of 1992, by the High Court,
confirming the concurrent findings of the authorities that in the year 1961,
the subject land was given to his father only on lease at the rate of ₹ 2 per acre for a period of 10 years. It was further
found concurrently that even after the expiry of the lease period, the subject
land was not handed over and Chakota (rent) was not being paid. In the
Jamabandi for year 1963-64, it was found that the land was described as Shamlat
deh and the petitioner’s father was shown as lessee. The concurrent finding
that the owner of the subject land was thus consistently confirmed by the High
Court. A perusal of Annexure A-1, allotment letter dated 04.08.1961 (claimed to
be the true copy) produced by the petitioner in this proceeding would reveal
that it was given to the father of the petitioner on an annual Chakota (rent)
at the rate of ₹ 2 per acre for a period of ten
years. The definition of Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act,
1882, would, therefore, make it nothing but a ‘lease’. A scanning of the
contentions of the petitioner would reveal that he got no case that the subject
land was transferred to his father by sale. We also took note of his contention
that it was an evacuee property. The petitioner got no case that it was
allotted to his father on a quasi-permanent basis for being a displaced person
or that it was transferred by sale to his father. The case of the petitioner is
that the subject land came to his father’s possession by allotment/transfer
otherwise than by way of lease. As noticed hereinbefore, his eviction was
ordered, finding that even after the expiry of lease period, he is continuing
to be there, without even paying the rent and therefore has been in
unauthorised possession of the subject land.
10.
In view of the factual and legal position thus obtained, it is only apposite to
refer to Bakshish Singh’s case of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana,
referred supra, rendered relying on the two decisions of this Court referred
supra. It is to be noted that in Bakshish Singh’s case, Bakshish Singh and
others were given land situated in village Mithewal in Tehsil Samrala for a
period of ten years in the year 1963, under the provisions of East Punjab and
Utilisation of Land Act, 1949. The land in question involved in this case is
also in the Tehsil Samrala. In the light of the contentions advanced to
challenge the order of their eviction, ordered under Section 7 of the
Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulations) Act, 1961, Bakhshish Singh and
others relied on the proviso to Section 2(g) (ii-a) which has
been inserted vide Punjab Act No.8 of 1995, whereby transfers of land prior to
09.07.1985 are protected. The High Court found that in terms of the said
amended provision, what was protected is allotment of land which was Shamlat
deh on quasi-permanent basis to a displaced person or has been otherwise
transferred to any other person by sale or any other manner whatsoever, after
the commencement of that Act, but on or before 09.07.1985. It was therefore
found that the petitioners therein were lessees for a fixed term and that the
subject lands were not allotted to them either permanently or on quasi-
permanent basis. After observing that the expression ‘quasi-permanent’ basis
came to be used following press communique dated February 7, 1948 announced by
the Government of East Punjab and that the Supreme Court had considered the
meaning with reference to the said communication in Amar Singh’s case (supra)
and brought out the distinction between the words ‘lease’ and ‘allotment’,
extracted paragraph 10 of the said decision reads thus:-
“10. Next, it may be noticed that
neither the East Punjab Ordinance 4 of 1947 nor the East Punjab Act 14 of 1947
which replaced it refer to or define either the word ‘lease’ or ‘allotment’.
These two words were for the first time defined only by the amending East
Punjab Ordinance 16 of 1948 and it was made clear therein that an allotment was
different from a lease. From the historical background, it would appear likely
that the word ‘allotment’ was used for the grant of property to displaced
land-holders while ‘lease’ was intended to denote a temporary grant to other
displaced persons. But even so the temporary character of the right involved in
the word ‘allotment’ was specified by defining ‘allotment’ as meaning the grant
by the Custodian of a temporary right of use and occupation of evacuee property
to any person otherwise than by way of lease. This temporary character of the
right was reiterated also in the East Punjab Ordinance 9 of 1949 and in the
Central Ordinance 27 of 1949. It is only in Central Act 31 of 1950 that
by Section 2(a) thereof the word ‘temporary’ in the definition of the
word ‘allotment’ was dropped and ‘allotment’ in defined as meaning the grant by
a person duly authorized of a right of use or occupation of an immovable evacuee
property to any other person but does not include a grant by way of a lease.
Thus, the legislation of 1950 for the first time contemplated that allotment
may be otherwise than temporary. This Act as well as the previous
Central Ordinance completely omitted the definition of the word ‘lease’. These
changes were apparently necessitated by the fact that, in between, Punjab
Government notification dated 8th July, 1949, came into operation providing for
what has become subsequently known as quasi- permanent allotment…”
11.
In the light of the above extract from the decision therein it was held in
Bakhshish Singh’s case (supra) that lease is a temporary grant whereas
allotment though is a temporary right of use and occupation of evacuee
property to any person otherwise than by way of lease. The High Court has also
taken note of the decision rendered by this Court in Basant Ram’s case (supra),
that allotment of quasi-permanent basis was explained therein to mean that it
was to remain in force so long as the land was to remain vested in the
Custodian of Evacuee Property. Ultimately it was held that the leasehold rights
conferred upon the petitioners therein was neither transfer of rights in the
land nor allotment on quasi permanent basis and, therefore, they could not
claim protection under the amended provision of the Act. We find no reason to
disagree with the said conclusion arrived at by the High Court relying on the
aforesaid decisions of this Court. In the factual situation obtained in this
case which is akin to the one obtained in Bakshish Singh’s case (supra) despite
the oscillating stand of the petitioner as to whether it was ‘allotment’ or
‘transfer’.
12.
It is to be noted that in Bakshish Singh’s case (supra), the High Court went on
to consider whether the case of the petitioners therein would fall under the
protection given to transfer by sale or any other manner. Thereupon it was held
therein thus: -
“Still further, the protection is
to a transfer by sale or by any other manner. The lease for a fixed
term cannot be said to be a sale nor transfer of interest or rights in the
property in any manner. The expression “in any other manner” has to be read
ejusdem generis with the expression sale where the transfer is of the rights in
the immovable property. Both the judgments referred to by learned counsel for
the petitioner deals with the allotment of land by Gram Panchayat. But in
present case, the lease hold rights for a fixed term were conferred by a
Custodian, which is and cannot be an allotment on quasi permanent basis or
transfer of rights in the immovable property.
The petitioner as a lessee and
after the expiry of the lease period, cannot claim protection of the possession
in view of the judgment of the Full Bench in case of CWP No. 14902 of 1992
titled as Roshan @ Roshan Lal v. The Secretary, Govt. of Haryana 1998
(3) PLR 651. It has been held that after the expiry of lease period, the leasee
is an unauthorized occupant.”
13.
We are in perfect agreement with the conclusions and the findings of the High
Court in Bakshish Singh’s case (supra), rendered in situations identical to the
situations obtained in the case at hand.
14.
The upshot of the discussion is that we do not find any reason to disagree with
the findings of the High Court in the impugned judgment dated 18.10.2011 that
after the expiry of the lease period, the petitioner herein who stepped into
the shoes of his father as lessee has been continuing there as an unauthorised
occupant. In the said circumstances, having found that the petitioner is
not entitled to get the protection of the Amendment Act and that the period of
lease had expired long back in 1971 and further that at any point of time
before any forum, the petitioner had not challenged the recorded status of his
father as lessee and further that he had only stepped into the shoes of his
father, we find no reason to interfere with the direction to evict the
petitioner from the subject land in the application filed under Section
7 as he being an unauthorised occupant as held by the authorities, which
was confirmed under the impugned judgment dated 18.10.2011.
15.
Accordingly, SLP(c) No.8687 of 2012 stands dismissed.
16.
Now, in view of the meanings given to the words ‘allotment’; ‘lease’;
‘displaced person’; ‘quasi- permanent’ and ‘transfer’ used in the
amended Section 2(g)(ii-a) of the Act as noticed above and taking into
account the fact that in the remaining Special Leave Petitions there is no
contention that the concerned subject lands belong to the category of
‘displaced person’ or that the nature of receipt of subject lands partake the
character of ‘transfer’ of such lands by sale or transfer of the rights in an
immovable property on quasi-permanent basis, we are of the considered view
that in none of the other special leave petitions, the petitioner(s) concerned
can claim the protective benefit based on the amendment brought
into Section 2(g)(ii-a) of the Act, except by way of establishing that it
was transfer of land which was Shamlat deh, other than by sale and on
quasi-permanent basis, after the commencement of the Act, but on or before the
9th day of July, 1985. In that regard, we have already endorsed the view taken
on transfer by any other manner than by sale, of the High Court of Punjab &
Haryana, in Bakhshish Singh’s case (supra). We will consider whether any other
Special Leave Petitions’ case covers instances of lease, but continuance is
after the expiry of the lease, for long, unauthorisedly, as in the case of
Dalip Ram’s case.
17.
In SLP (C) No.34380/2012, the petitioners’ father, Mohinder Singh, approached
the third respondent by filing a petition under Section 11 of the Act
for declaration of title over the subject land. On perusing the revenue records
and jamabandis of different years, the authorities clearly found that he was a
lessee. Further, it was found that it was so given to him for 10 years and
no ownership right was given to him. For that and such other reason mentioned
therein it was dismissed as per order dated 02.02.2011. After his death, the
petitioners challenged the order dated 02.02.2011 before the second-respondent.
The second- respondent found from the records that the Gram Panchayat is shown
as the owner of the subject land and the petitioners’ father is shown as lessee
and consequently, the appeal was dismissed as per order dated 28.12.2011. As
per the impugned judgment, the High Court rejected the claim for protection qua
the subject land in terms of the amended Section 2(g)(ii-a) of the Act for
various reasons including the failure of the petitioners to establish the claim
that the land in dispute was allotted or transferred in any other manner to
their father than on quasi-permanent basis. The Court also upheld the finding
that the land vested with the Gram Panchayat. Needless to say, that the
petitioners who disputed the ownership of the Gram Panchayat cannot, now, claim
adverse possession over a period of more than 12 years. In view of the factum
of rejection of their application under Section 11 of the Act now,
there can be no impediment for evicting the petitioners from the subject land
in accordance with law, especially, as in the case of SLP(C) No.8687 of
2012, the lease period had expired long ago, if such steps were not already
taken. Consequently, SLP(C) No.34380 of 2012 is dismissed.
18.
In SLP(C) No.34382 of 2012, the factual situation is identical to SLP(C)
No.34380 of 2012. In fact, the third respondent found that the petition
under Section 11 of the Act was filed to avoid eviction based on
petition filed by the Gram Panchayat under Section 7 of the Act. The
finding was that the petitioner is in illegal possession of the subject land.
It was found that the petitioner could not produce any document to establish
the claim of allotment or transfer on quasi-permanent basis and consequently,
the finding of being in unauthorised possession was upheld. The petitioner
cannot maintain a claim for protection under the amended Section 2(g)(ii-
a) in the absence of evidence to
establish transfer on quasi-permanent basis by any other manner. Continuation
of possession of subject land in any other pretext cannot be permitted anymore.
19.
Consequently, SLP(C) No.34382 of 2012 is dismissed.
Special
Leave Petition (C) Nos.33764 of 2012, 33831 of 2012, 33832 of 2012, 33998 of
2012, 34678 of 2012 and 33833 of 2012
20.
The captioned Special Leave Petitions are filed challenging the common judgment
dated 06.07.2012 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana respectively in
Civil Writ Petition Nos.11643/2012, 11639/2010, 11638/2010, 11851/2010,
11637/2010, 4477/2006, 12652/2010, 12653/2010 and 12654/2010. As noticed by the
High Court, those Writ Petitions carried similar questions of law and fact for
adjudication and naturally, similar questions in the Special Leave Petitions,
as well. The impugned judgment itself would reveal that the question whether
the lands in dispute are excluded from Shamlat deh as defined
under Section 2(g)(i) of the Act was considered thereunder. At the
same breath, we will have to say that non-consideration of the question of entitlement
to protection under the amended Section 2(g)(ii-a) of the Act, obviously
was on account of failure to raise necessary pleadings therefor, though the
same was very much available to be raised by virtue of the fact that the
amendment in question was effected in the year 1995 w.e.f. 09.07.1985.
Normally, in such a situation, the petitioner could not be permitted to raise
such a question. However, we are inclined to consider the said question in view
of the fact that in the lead case also no such contention was originally
taken by the petitioner therein and still, earlier this question was considered
in this judgment in view of the circumstances mentioned therefor. It is in the
said circumstances, that despite the failure of the appellant to take up such a
contention, we have considered that aspect earlier in respect of all the above
Special Leave Petitions as well. On such consideration, we have already arrived
at the conclusion that as relates the subject lands involved in all the said
Special Leave Petitions as also there is nothing on record to hold that such
lands were allotted on quasi-permanent basis to displaced persons. Moreover,
there is nothing to hold that in all these cases that transfer of rights in the
immovable properties had occurred to bring such lands in such a position to
make them fall within the meaning of ‘allotment’ or ‘transfer’ for the purposes
of Section 2 (g) (ii-a) of the Act and as such to exclude it from the
definition of Shamlat deh and to consider the eligibility for protection or to
negate it.
21.
In view of the aforementioned position thus obtained, the question is, whether
based on the rest of the contentions raised in the said long-drawn-out
litigations, an interference with the impugned judgment is invited on other
grounds as noted earlier.
22.
The core contention raised to assail the common judgment dated 06.07.2012 is
that though the Divisional Deputy Director, Rural Development, functioning as
the Collector was to frame the issues for adjudicating the application filed
before him under Section 11 of the Act, the Collector had not framed
issues. According to the petitioner, it is not a mere irregularity whereas it
is an illegality which makes the order a nullity. Furthermore, it is contended
that it had caused prejudice to them. It is also contended that even otherwise
the order is a nullity as no finding was recorded as to whether the subject
land is Shamlat deh or not.
23.
A perusal of the impugned judgment would reveal that the High Court had in fact
dealt with all such contentions. After taking note of the fact that they are
all long-drawn-out litigations, the High Court held that non- framing of issues
by itself would not vitiate a proceeding, if the parties were alive to the
issues involved based on the pleadings and led evidence on such issues. The
said view of the High Court cannot be said to be an incorrect exposition of law
in the light of plethora of decisions on the subject. In the decision
in K.S. Venkatesh v. N.G. Lakshminarayana & Ors. [2007 SCC OnLine Kar 160] the High Court of Karnataka held
that where parties were aware of the case and led all evidence not only to
support their contentions but also in refutation of those of the other side, it
could not be held that non-framing of issue(s) had caused prejudice to any
party or vitiated the proceedings. The High Court of Gauhati in the
decision in Sudhangshu Bikash Dutta vs Ranesh Kumar Chakraborty and Ors[AIR 1997 GAU 15], held the same view. A
survey on the authorities on the said subject would reveal that many other High
Courts have also shared the same view. We do not find any reason to disagree
with the said exposition of law as, mentioned above, as in our view also,
non-framing of issues by itself will not make a decision a nullity, if the
parties to the lis understood and adduced evidence on the issues actually
involved in the matter. When the petitioners themselves filed Section
11 petitions and attempted to establish the fact that the subject land(s)
involved is not Shamlat deh and the Gram Panchayat concerned also produced
evidence to evince that the position is vice-versa, how can it be held that
they were at a loss to understand the issue and not adduced their best evidence
in that regard. In fact, the High Court has rightly found that the said
contention was raised by the petitioner without bona fides and in fact,
the orders concerned would disclose findings of the authorities that lands
involved in those cases belong to the category of Shamlat deh based on the
evidence adduced by the Gram Panchayats concerned. When that be the
circumstance, the petitioner could have produced evidence either in the appeal
or before the High Court to show that what was the evidence which they would
have produced to establish their claim in a petition under Section
11 petition. It is in this regard that they are all long-drawn-out
litigations and assume relevance especially because the indisputable fact is
that it is notice(s) from the part of the authorities in respect of such
properties that persuaded them to engage themselves into such litigations.
Obviously, in the cases on hand, the High Court found, based on the pleadings
and the evidence adduced on the issues involved, that the authorities have
arrived at the findings that the nature of the subject lands involved is
Shamlat deh.
24.
It is a fact that the authorities have arrived at the conclusion that the
subject lands vested with the Gram Panchayat based on the finding that the
nature of the subject lands, going by the records, revealed their nature as
Shamlat deh. The fact is that in all these cases based on such contentions
and also the fact that the petitioners are in unauthorised occupation of such
lands, the Panchayat had earlier filed petitions under Section 7 of
the Act for evicting the petitioners. It is to be noted that in some of the
cases, it is to avoid the impact in case of disposal of such applications in
favour of the Panchayats concerned that the petitioners have filed applications
under Section 11 of the Act. In view of the fact that the different clauses
under Section 2(g) of the Act have individual characteristics and
independent of each other, each one would cover the nature of Shamlat deh, the
High Court repelled the contentions, especially referring to the decision in
C.W.P. No.2264 of 1986, titled as “Gram Panchayat Village Mulepur Tehsil
Sirhand Distt. Patiala v. Sucha Singh (Deceased) through LRS and Others”.
Thus, a careful consideration of the orders impugned before the High Court as
also the judgment of the High Court would reveal that they are all at ad idem
on the question of the nature of the subject lands viz., as Shamlat deh. It is
the consideration of all such aspects and analysing the factual positions
revealed from the evidence on record that the High Court confirmed the orders
of the authorities. In view of the aforesaid facts and the failure on the part
of the petitioners to show the prejudice on account of the non-framing of
the issues in the circumstances obtained in such cases and above all, in the
absence of any perversity in the impugned judgment, we are not inclined to
interfere with the impugned judgment, which would give a quietus to the
long-drawn-out litigations of more than one or two decades. At any rate, the
petitioners have failed to make out any case warranting interference by this
Court. In that view of the matter, the impugned judgment dated 06.07.2012 is
upheld and the Special Leave Petition (C) Nos.33764 of 2012, 33831 of 2012,
33832 of 2012, 33998 of 2012, 34678 of 2012 and 33833 of 2012 are dismissed.
Special Leave Petition (C) No.
1668 of 2019 Special Leave Petition (C) No. 34381 of 2012 Special Leave
Petition (C) No. 38532 of 2012 Special Leave Petition (C) No. 22206-22209 of
2013 Special Leave Petition (C) No. 19680 of 2013 Special Leave Petition (C)
No. 30491 of 2013 Special Leave Petition (C) No. 488 of 2014 Special Leave
Petition (C) No. 486 of 2014 Special Leave Petition (C) No. 36797 of 2013
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 6181 of 2014 Special Leave Petition (C) No.
17304-17305 of 2014 Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15510 of 2015 Special Leave
Petition (C) No. 17550-17552 of 2015 Special Leave Petition (C) No. 24350 of
2015 Special Leave Petition (C) No. 30271 of 2014
25.
In all the captioned Special Leave Petitions, except Special Leave Petition
Nos.15510 of 2015 and 17550- 17552 of 2015, the petitioners who approached the
Collector with petitions under Section 11 of the Act, essentially for
getting declaration of ownership over the subject lands suffered adverse
orders, inasmuch as the said petitions were dismissed. Thereupon, they
unsuccessfully took up the matters in appeals. Later, challenging the adverse
orders of the authorities, they approached the High Court by filing Writ
Petitions and the adverse orders thereon are being sought to be challenged
through the captioned Special Leave Petitions. In the case of SLP Nos.15510 of
2015, the concerned Gram Panchayat filed a petition under Section
11 of the Act and upon its dismissal it took up the matter in appeal
unsuccessfully. Those orders were challenged in Writ Petition No. CWP
No.2141/1986 and after considering the rival contentions and perusing the
documents, the High Court allowed Section 11 petition filed by the
Gram Panchayat. In SLP Nos.17550-17552 of 2015, the petitioners herein moved
application under Section 11 of the Act and the orders were
challenged unsuccessfully in appeals. It is thereafter that Writ Petitions were
filed challenging both the adverse orders passed by the authorities. The
High Court allowed the Writ Petitions and Section 11 petitions filed
by the parties concerned were dismissed. Since the prayer of the petitioner is
for granting the benefits flowing from the amended Section 2(g)(ii-a) of
the Act has already been repelled by us, we will proceed to consider the
surviving questions, that too, intrinsically connected to the questions
involved in Dalip Ram’s case (supra). In the said Special Leave Petitions, the
question whether the subject lands are Shamlat deh was also raised. However,
ultimately it is found that the subject lands are Shamlat deh and these vested
with the Gram Panchayats concerned, in other words, in such matters it was
found that the Gram Panchayat concerned is the owner of the property involved
in those matters. In most of the matters in this category, apprehending adverse
order and consequential steps for eviction and to avoid such unpleasant
situation, the petitioners approached the Collector by filing of petition
under Section 11 of the Act. The failure to establish their title
over the property and consequential finding of ownership with the Panchayat
concerned, steps were taken for their eviction. Besides their failure to
establish the case that the land involved is not Shamlat deh, they failed to
prove that it was allotted to them or transferred to them by sale or in
any other manner with rights over the said property. In short, it is either
suffering the concurrent finding resulting in dismissal of application
under Section 11 of the Act and are faced with Section
7 proceedings for eviction that they moved this Court. In Special Leave
Petition No.15510 of 2015, the petitioner has themselves stated that SLP (C)
No.8687 of 2012 viz., Dalip Ram’s case (supra) is pending before this Court. We
have already considered the said Special Leave Petition and after rejecting the
contentions dismissed the said Special Leave Petition. When that be the
circumstances and in the absence of any other sustainable reason for upholding
their right over the subject lands and consequent to the finding that the
subject lands belong to the Gram Panchayat concerned, the Special Leave
Petitions are also liable to the dismissed. Accordingly, they are dismissed.
Special
Leave Petition (C) No. 13391 of 2018 and SLP (C) 26164 of 2018
26.
The petitioners in SLP(C) No.13391 of 2018 seek to challenge the judgment dated
16.01.2018 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in
CWP No.15343 of 2004 in this Special Leave Petition. The challenge in the said
Writ Petition was against notices for auctioning the subject lands over which
the petitioners claim ownership and possession, unsuccessfully.
27.
The High Court as per the impugned judgment took note of the indisputable and
undisputed fact that the proceedings under Section 11(2) of the Act
initiated by the petitioners herein have been dismissed rejecting the claims
over the subject lands. There is no case for the petitioners that thereafter
they have successfully challenged the adverse orders passed against them in
such proceedings. When they allowed such orders to become final or when they attained
finality otherwise the notices issued and called in question unsuccessfully can
only be taken as necessary sequel to the manner in which the proceedings
initiated under Section 11(2) of the Act culminated.
28.
In such circumstances, the challenge against issuance of notices was rightly
negated by the High Court. It calls for no interference in view of our finding
with respect to the protection available to properties under the amended
provision of Section 2(g)(ii-a) of the Act.
29.
Consequently, the captioned SLP(s) are dismissed.
Special
Leave Petition (C) No. 205-208 of 2014
30.
The Interlocutory Application filed in the above Special Leave Petition has
been perused. The said IA No.212671 of 2023 is filed in the light of the order
passed by this Court in Review Petition (C) No.526 of 2023 in Civil Appeal
No.6990 of 2014, evidently the Review Petition was allowed. The Civil Appeal
No.6990 of 2014 was restored into its original number and the final order dated
7th April, 2022 was recalled. Thereafter, the matter was again heard and the
judgment is reserved. In such circumstances, the prayer in the IA is allowed as
it appears that the issue involved in the captioned SLP is similar to the one
in Civil Appeal No.6990 of 2014. Hence, this matter is de-tagged and is to be
listed after six weeks.
Special
Leave Petition (C)…CC No.6152 of 2015
31.
On going through the order sought to be challenged, we find that this is not
directly connected or allied to the main question which we have dealt with
in
Dalip
Ram’s case (supra). Hence, this matter is de- tagged and to be listed after six
weeks.
32.
The captioned petition is yet to be numbered as Special Leave Petition due to
pendency of IA Nos. 98235, 98232, 98239, 98238, 98241 and 98237, of 2018.
Since, no specific orders are passed in IA(s) and in place of deceased
person(s) legal representatives are not actually substituted (if those
applications are to be allowed), we have not gone through the same for purpose
of disposal. Hence, de-tagged to be dealt with appropriately in accordance with
rules.
Special
Leave Petition (C) No. 24357 of 2015
33.
The factual background of the cases that culminated in the common judgment
dated 16.02.2015 reveals the repeated litigious attempts on the part of the
petitioner and his predecessors and the Gram Panchayat qua the subject lands
over which the petitioners herein claimed title, ownership and possessions.
34.
The Civil Writ Petition No.5177 of 1995, the judgment of which is sought to be
challenged, was filed by the Gram Panchayat Village Mulepur. The
orders under challenge before the High Court in the Writ Petition were
orders in which the primary authority as also the appellate authority, allowed
the petition filed under Section 11 of the Act by the petitioner. As
per the impugned judgment, the High Court allowed the Writ Petition and
dismissed the petition filed under Section 11 of the Act by the
petitioner herein holding that the land in question is Shamlat deh and vests
with the Gram Panchayat free from encumbrances.
35.
In paragraph 11 of the order sought to be impugned, the question arose for
consideration was mentioned thus: -
“11. The question which arises
for consideration in the present case is whether entry of “Shamlat Deh” in the
column of ownership, possession of co-sharers in column No.5, nature of land as
Banjar Qadim in column No.8 and land not assessed to land revenue in column
No.10 according to jamabandi for the year 1950-51, would vest in Gram Panchayat
as Shamlat Deh or would be covered by the exclusion clause of Section
2(g) of the 1961 Act?”
36.
Despite our anxious scrutiny of the materials on record, we could not get at
hand any material much less any specific contention as to how the
petitioner/his predecessor, came into possession of the subject
land, otherwise than on lease from the Gram Panchayat. Page E of the
synopsis would reveal that the petitioner would admit the fact that on
22.05.1990, he took the subject land(s) involved in the case on hand on lease
from the Writ Petitioner, Gram Panchayat. The lease deed dated 22.05.1990 is
produced in this proceeding as Annexure P-1. Though, it is the case of the
petitioner that on 22.05.1990, the subject land(s) was leased out to him. A
perusal of the same would reveal that the name of the lessee is shown therein
as Shri Surender Singh son of Salamdin, village Mulepur. The petitioner is
Chiragdin, of course son of Surender Singh of village Mulepur. Whether
Chiragdin and Surender Singh is one and the same person or whether he is the sibling
of the lessee is not discernible from the materials on record. Be that as it
may, the case of the petitioner is that at the time when the land(s) was leased
out to him as per Annexure P-1, he was already in possession of the same. His
case was that being one of the co-sharers and proprietor of village Mulepur, he
was not bound to deliver back the possession of the land to the respondent-
Gram Panchayat after expiry of the lease period as the land(s) never vested in
the Gram Panchayat.
37.
It is in the said circumstances that the question arose for consideration was
mentioned in paragraph 11 of the judgment sought to be impugned as extracted
hereinbefore. The petitioner who came into possession of the land(s) as
aforesaid claimed ownership over the land in dispute by filing petition
under Section 11 of the Act. In the contextual situation, it is
relevant to refer to Section 11 of the Act.
“11. Decision of claims of right,
title or interest in shamilat deh.- ( 1) Any person or [a Panchayat] claiming
right, title or interest in any land, vested or deemed to have been vested in a
Panchayat, may submit to the Collector, within such time, as may be prescribed,
a statement of his claim in writing and signed and verified in the prescribed
manner and the Collector shall have jurisdiction to decide such claim in such
manner as may be prescribed.
(2) Any person or a Panchayat
aggrieved by an order of the Collector made under sub-section (1) may, within
sixty days from the date of the order, prefer an appeal to the Commissioner in
such form and manner as may be prescribed and the Commissioner may after
hearing the appeal, confirm, vary or reverse the order appealed from and may
pass such order as he deems fit.”
38.
A perusal of the same would reveal that any person can maintain a petition
under Section 11, claiming right, title or interest in any land, vested or
deemed to have vested in a Panchayat. When that be so, the petitioner who
claims a right in terms of order under Section 11 cannot be heard to
contend that the land was never vested with the Panchayat, it could not have
been deemed to have vested in a Panchayat, as he himself/the predecessors
approached the authority under Section 11. In other words, the very filing
of Section 11 of the Act, pre-supposes that the land in question in
respect of which the applicant claims right, title or interest is a land vested
or deemed to have been vested in a Panchayat. In short, the sine qua non for
filing a petition under Section 11, claiming right, title or interest is
that the land in question, over which such right, title or interest is claimed
should be one vested or deemed to have been vested in the Panchayat concerned.
39.
In such circumstances, when the categoric case of the petitioner is that he
approached the Collector through a petition under Section 11 itself
would be sufficient to treat that the land in question was vested or deemed to
have been vested with the respondent Panchayat. That apart, it is his own case
that it was leased out to him on 22.05.1990 by the Panchayat. When that be
the case of the petitioner, the petitioner cannot be heard to challenge the
vesting or deemed vesting of the land(s) in question with the
respondent-Panchayat.
40.
In our considered view, the High Court was perfectly correct in holding that
the unsuccessful attempt on the part of the respondent-Panchayat in the
proceeding under Section 7 of the Act cannot be a reason for holding
that they would or should act as res judicata to challenge an adverse order
against them under Section 11 of the Act.
41.
The High Court observed and held that the entries of Shamlat deh prior to
consolidation, irrespective of any nomenclature would definitely vest the land
in Gram Panchayat in terms of Section 2 (g)(1) and Section
4 of the Act, and therefore, the words ‘Shamlat deh’ simpliciter followed
by any other entry would vest with the Gram Panchayat under the Act.
42.
As we observed and found earlier in the case in hand, virtually, there is no
necessity to go into such questions as the very precise case of the petitioner
is that he got the land(s) in question on lease from the respondent-Panchayat.
That apart, independent of that, the other case put-forth by the petitioner is
that the title of the subject lands were declared in his favour in a
proceeding under Section 11 of the Act. But then, there is nothing on
record to show that the petitioner had challenged the entries in the
jamabandies of the year concerned qua the land in question that it is Shamlat
deh and that in relation to the same he/the predecessor was a lessee. That
apart, the High Court after analysing the factual position and the relevant
provisions observed and held that a person could not be in cultivating
possession of the land which was recorded as Banjar Qadim in the year 1950-51.
In this contextual situation, it is relevant to refer to paragraph 29 of the
impugned judgment which read thus: -
“29. The expression banjar qadim
in the jamabandi for the year 1950-51 assumes significance in view of
definition of the phrases like Banjar Qadim, Banajr Jadid and Gair Mumkin. The
person could not be in cultivating possession of the land which was recorded as
banjar Qadim in the year 1950-51. If the land has not been harvested for four
successive crops and has not been sown, then such land is classified as Banjar
Jadid or new fallow. If it continues to be uncultivated and the said entries
are maintained for the next four harvests then such land comes under the
category of banjar qadim or old fallow. The aforesaid terminology shows that a
banjar qadim land is a land which remained uncultivated for 8 preceding
harvests. Banjar Qadim land shown in column No.8 of the Jamabandi for the
year 1950-51 negates the plea of self-cultivating possession of the respondents
as on 26.01.1950.”
43.
It is based on the afore-extracted paragraph, the High Court went on the
consider the other contentions with respect to the relevant provisions. The
High Court on such consideration of the entire issues arrived at the conclusion
that taking note of the nature of the land, as claimed by the petitioner, his
claim for cultivation over the land could not be presumed for a period of 12
years immediately preceding the commencement of the 1961 Act. Taking into
account all the aforesaid circumstances, we do not find any reason to find
fault with the said conclusion. Even otherwise, the petitioner who got in
possession of the subject land(s) based on a lease cannot be heard to contend
that he ceases to be a lessee. In terms of Section 105 of the
Transfer of Properties Act, 1882, the transaction in respect of the land in
question, evident from Annexure P-1 could only be styled as lease. While
considering the question of benefit flowing from the amendment, Section 2
(g) of the Act by inserting (ii-a) to it, we have already found that the
land in question should have been Shamlat deh and the person claiming the
benefit should establish that it was allotted to him on permanent basis or
transferred by way of sale or in any other manner or transferred in any other
manner on permanent basis with rights over the same.
44.
In Dalip Ram’s case (supra), which was dismissed as per orders in this
judgment, we have held that ‘lease’ and ‘allotment’ are different and a person
who got possession of subject land by way of lease cannot be heard to challenge
the title or ownership of the Panchayat concerned from whom it got the land on
lease.
45.
The discussion as above would reveal that there is no perversity in the
judgment sought to be impugned warranting an interference in exercise of the
power under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.
46.
In the said circumstances, the Special Leave Petition stands dismissed.
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