2025 INSC 118
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(HON’BLE SURYA
KANT, J. AND HON’BLE UJJAL BHUYAN, JJ.)
AJAY MALIK
Petitioner
VERSUS
STATE OF UTTARAKHAND
Respondent
Criminal
Appeal No. 441 of 2025 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 8777
of 2022) WITH Criminal Appeal No. 442 of 2025 (Arising out of Special Leave
Petition (Crl.) No. 15131 of 2024)-Decided on 29-01-2025
Criminal,
Quashing
(A)
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 482 – Penal Code, 186, Sections
343 and 370 – Quashing of FIR - No prima facie case - Appellant employed the Complainant through
the Placement Agency established by ‘Sh’ for domestic work at his residence in
Dehradun, which she joined on 16.10.2016 - She continued to work there for over
five months without any untoward incident - As per the purported agreement
between the Placement Agency and appellant, the Complainant’s wages were
regularly paid to her through the Agency - It therefore appears that the only
agreement between appellant and co-accused ‘Sh’ was the employment of the
Complainant as domestic help at the former’s residence - A thorough review of
the material on record does not indicate any orchestrated arrangement by
appellant with the co- accused to exploit or confine the Complainant - Case
appears to involve minimal interaction or communication between appellant and
the co-accused - Any correspondence between them seems limited strictly to
hiring of the Complainant as a domestic worker at appellant’s residence -
Against this backdrop, the charge under Section 120B of the IPC qua
Ajay Malik is highly speculative and warrants rejection at the very threshold
- In light of the conclusions reached
regarding each of the offences alleged against appellant, it becomes clear that
the Investigating Agency has failed to establish any prima facie case - Since
the FIR has been investigated and a Chargesheet has been filed, the FIR alone
cannot serve as the basis for dismissing appellant’s claims - Even assuming the FIR is accurate, it does
not substantiate the charges, which appear to have been mechanically
transcribed into the Chargesheet, despite the Investigating Agency having had
sufficient opportunity to gather material evidence - No element of illegal
confinement, trafficking, or criminal conspiracy has been established against
appellant - Additionally, the Complainant has, under oath, stated that she was
not illegally confined - If this remains her position in Court, the purpose of
proceeding to trial becomes questionable, amounting to an exercise in futility
and a sheer wastage of judicial resources - It appears that the Complainant’s
primary grievance lies in the unfair treatment she received from ‘Su’, ‘MR’ and
‘Sh’ - Allegations against these three co-accused are significantly more
serious and grave, considering that charges have been filed against them
under Sections 370, 373 and 376 of the IPC - In light of the absence of any prima facie
evidence of wrongdoing by appellant; the vague and omnibus claims made in the
FIR and subsequently the Chargesheet; and the Complainant's consistent stance
to compound and settle the dispute, unable to concur with the High Court's
conclusion in the Impugned Judgement, which otherwise constitutes a fit case
for quashing – Impugned Judgement passed by High Court accordingly set aside
and the FIR, Chargesheet and all other proceedings therefore arising qua
appellant liable to be quashed.
(Para 22 to 29 and 55)
(B)
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 320 – Penal Code, 186, Sections
343 and 370 – Compounding of offence - Section 370 IPC,
being a serious offence, does not find a place on the Schedule attached
to Section 320 of the CrPC and is thus classified as a non-compoundable
offence – Held that although inclined to agree with the High Court’s rejection
of appellants’ Compounding Application
owing to the non-compoundable nature of alleged offences, this issue is
nonetheless rendered academic given conclusion in the previous issue, where the
High Court’s view regarding quashing application has been rejected - Therefore,
while we may not need to delve into this issue, it must be underscored that a
delicate balance ought to be struck in cases wherein the parties seek compounding
of the offences - Though well-intentioned, an excessively moralistic order may
unnecessarily prolong criminal proceedings, which have no logical conclusion
and only serve to further distress the parties - Accordingly, the correctness
of the High Court’s decision to disallow appellant’s Compounding Application
does not require consideration on merits.
(C)
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 227 – Penal Code, 1860, Section 343 and
370 –Discharge order – Challenge as to – Held that the discharge stage
acts as a critical filter to eliminate cases lacking legal merit, sparing the
accused from unnecessary proceedings, while ensuring that credible cases
proceed to trial - Thus, discharge under Section 227 of the CrPC is
justified when the material on record fails to disclose a prima facie case
against the accused to proceed for trial - The legislative spirit behind this
provision envisions the rights of the accused being balanced with public
interest, so as to ultimately prevent abuse of the legal process - Allegations
against respondent-‘AK’ is that he held the key to the residence where the
Complainant was allegedly wrongfully confined - Claims of wrongful confinement
against ‘AM’ was rejected based on the High Court's finding regarding the alternative
exit available to the Complainant - There is no direct allegation against ‘AK’
made by the Complainant herself - Neither the FIR nor the Complainant's
statements disclose any explicit, illegal act on ‘AK’s part - He was not named
in the original FIR, and was only added by way of a Supplementary Chargesheet
by the Investigating Officer, seemingly as an after-thought - This hasty
inclusion lacks any substantive justification - While he was delivered the keys
by ‘AM’ and held them as a favor to him, there is no evidence to suggest that
he ever visited the premises or was aware and acting in furtherance of any
wrongful confinement of the Complainant – Held that have no hesitation in
upholding the correctness of the reasoned order of the High Court, in allowing
the discharge of ‘AK’ from the criminal proceedings - Given the demonstrable
lack of any mens rea or intent on the part of ‘AK’, apart from the lack of any
direct involvement, his discharge is well-founded and warrants no interference
by this Court.
(Para 34 to 36)
(D) Protection
of rights of domestic workers – It is an incontrovertible fact that the demand for
domestic workers has been mounting in India, in consonance with rapid
urbanization and development - While any avenues for employment being opened to
marginalised women merit celebration, we are at pains to note that despite
their growing demand, this indispensable workforce has also been the most
vulnerable to exploitation and abuse - Non-regulation of this crucial labour
sector, which often leads to the aforementioned malignant results - Held that
domestic workers’ lacking legal protection in India - Ministry of Labour and
Employment in tandem with the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment, the
Ministry of Women and Child Development, and the Ministry of Law and Justice
directed to jointly constitute a Committee comprising subject experts to
consider the desirability of recommending a legal framework for the benefit,
protection and regulation of the rights of domestic workers - The composition of the Expert Committee is
left to the wisdom of the Government of India and its concerned Ministries - It
will be appreciated if the Committee submits a Report within a period of 6
months, whereupon the Government of India may consider the necessity of
introducing a legal framework which may effectively address the cause and
concern of domestic workers.
(Para
38 to 40 and 55)
JUDGEMENT
Surya Kant, J. :- Leave granted.
2.
The instant appeals arise out of the common First Information Report No.
60/2017 (Case Crime No. 94/2017) (FIR), which inter alia
contains allegations of wrongful confinement and trafficking of a female
domestic worker—the Complainant.
3.
To further clarify, SLP (Crl.) No. 8777/2022, has been preferred by the accused
Ajay Malik in the FIR, as against the judgment dated 01.09.2022 of the High
Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital (High Court), whereby Criminal Miscellaneous
Application No. 96 of 2018 (CMA), seeking the compounding and quashing of the
criminal proceedings initiated against him, was rejected (Ajay Malik’s case).
SLP (Crl.) No. 15131/2024, on the other hand, has been filed by the State of
Uttarakhand, challenging the judgment dated 12.01.2021, in Criminal Revision
No. 173 of 2019, whereby the co-accused Ashok Kumar’s Revision Application
seeking discharge was allowed by the High Court (Ashok Kumar’s case).
A.
FACTS
4.
Considering that these appeals arise from the same incident, their factual matrices
remain predominantly uniform, with differences largely being restricted to the
differing roles ascribed to Ajay Malik and Ashok Kumar. It is thus necessary to
briefly advert to the facts that lay the foundation for these appeals.
A.
1 Background to the materialization of the criminal incident
4.1
The Complainant, a resident of Birhipani Nawatoli Bokhi, Birhipani, District
Jashpur, Chhattisgarh, belongs to a financially disadvantaged family from a
Scheduled Tribe. In her search for employment to support her family, she was
brought to Delhi in 2009 by her neighbours, Subhash and Mohan Ram, under the
pretext of securing work.
4.2
Upon her arrival in Delhi, the Complainant was handed over to one Shambhu @
Sambhu Prasad, who reportedly operated an office at Britannia Chowk, Shakurpur,
Delhi. Shambhu claimed to run the Saint Maryam Placement Services (Regd.),
ostensibly showcased as a social welfare society for Scheduled Tribes
(Placement Agency). Shambhu forcibly deployed the Complainant as a domestic help/housekeeper
in various households, requiring her to perform tasks such as washing utensils
and cleaning. As a result, she was reportedly sent to multiple locations,
including Karnal, Delhi, Gurgaon, and Kanpur. The Complainant further alleged
in the FIR that Shambhu through the Placement Agency failed to compensate her
for the labour extracted, and instead misappropriated her earnings. In this
regard, the Complainant also alleged that she was routinely assaulted whenever
she requested remuneration or sought permission to return home. 4.3 Ajay Malik
recruited the Complainant on 16.10.2016, having purportedly entered into a
written agreement with the Placement Agency, for her to work as a domestic help
at his official residence. Subsequently, two individuals employed by Shambhu
dropped off the Complainant at Ajay Malik’s home in Dehradun, Uttarakhand. Ajay
Malik at the time was serving as a Scientist at the Defence Electronics
Application Laboratory, Defence Research and Development Organization under the
Ministry of Defence (DRDO), where he had been employed since 1988. As a Class-I
Officer, Ajay Malik had been allotted a Type-V Government accommodation, where
he resided with his wife and two children. The alleged incident is said to have
occurred on these premises.
4.4
Ajay Malik, on 22.03.2017, departed from his residence with his entire family,
for official duty concerning the SDR-AR Phase II L Band Trials at Hindustan
Aeronautics Ltd., Kanpur. During the absence of Ajay Malik and his family, the
Complainant was left behind on the premises, the main entry to which had been
locked. A spare key to the home had been entrusted to his friend and neighbour,
Ashok Kumar, who is alleged to have visited Ajay Malik’s residence regularly to
provide the Complainant with drinking water and to keep watch on her. The
Complainant has further stated in the FIR that Ajay Malik had also left a
mobile phone with the Complainant to remain in regular touch with her, using
which she was able to contact the Police Authorities on 29.03.2017, to register
a complaint of wrongful confinement. A. 2 Registration of the FIR
4.5
Acting on the Complainant’s information, the Police arrived at Ajay Malik’s
residence, and with the assistance of Ashok Kumar, entered the premises. The
Complainant was subsequently recovered, and the Police prepared a Recovery Memo
dated 29.03.2017. Following this, an FIR was lodged on 30.03.2017 against four
individuals—Ajay Malik, Mohan Ram, Subhash, and Shambhu—under Sections
343 and 370 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), at Police
Station Rampur, District Sadar, Dehradun. On the same day, the Complainant’s
statement was recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Dehradun.
4.6
The investigation commenced, during which the Investigating Officer recorded
witness statements, collected evidence, and subsequently filed the first
Chargesheet against Shambhu on 09.07.2017. A second Chargesheet was filed on
31.12.2017 against the remaining three co- accused, whereby Ajay Malik
specifically was accused of having committed offences under Sections
343 and 370 read with Section 120B of the IPC.
Finally, the third Chargesheet came to be filed on 22.12.2017 against Ashok
Kumar, who had not been named in the FIR or the initial complaint, charging him
under Sections 343 and 120B of the IPC.
A.
3 Commencement of criminal proceedings
4.7
It is at this juncture that the criminal proceedings against Ajay Malik and
Ashok Kumar commenced separately and may be traversed as such.
A.
3. 1 Ajay Malik’s case
4.8
Having been Chargesheeted in Case Crime No. 94/2017, Ajay Malik filed CMA No.
96/2018 under Section 482 of the CrPC before the High Court in
January, 2018, seeking the quashing and setting aside of the:
(i) criminal
proceedings initiated against him through the FIR;
(ii) the Chargesheet
dated 31.10.2017; and
(iii) the summoning
order, passed in Criminal Case No. 5282/2017, pending before the Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Dehradun. The High Court initially vide order dated 25.01.2018,
stayed the trial proceedings in the above-mentioned Criminal Application.
4.9
Subsequently, Ajay Malik on 01.08.2022 moved Compounding Application No.
532/2022 before the High Court seeking compounding of the alleged offences
under Section 320 of the CrPC. The application was supported by an
affidavit affirmed by the Complainant herself, wherein she provided that the
parties had amicably settled the dispute. She further deposed that she had no
objection, should the offences against Ajay Malik be compounded and the
criminal proceedings against him be quashed.
4.10
That being so, the High Court vide the Impugned Judgment dated 01.09.2022,
firstly rejected Ajay Malik’s compounding application— observing that a prima
facie case under Section 370 of the IPC was made out against him,
which is a non-compoundable offence under the aegis of Section 320 of
the CrPC. Secondly, the High Court also deemed it fit to turn down Ajay Malik's
main application under Section 482 of the CrPC on merits, holding
that the Chargesheet and witness testimonies combined made out prima facie
allegations of wrongful confinement against him.
4.11
As a sequel thereto, Ajay Malik has approached this Court. While issuing notice
in Ajay Malik’s case on 26.09.2022, this Court passed an ex-parte interim order
staying his arrest in connection with the captioned FIR, which operates till
date.
A.
3. 2 Ashok Kumar’s case
4.12
Having elucidated the contextual backdrop amid which Ajay Malik’s appeal arose,
we now advert to the facts in Ashok Kumar’s case. We note, at the cost of
repetition, that the State of Uttarakhand has preferred this appeal against the
order of the High Court discharging him from the criminal proceedings in
Sessions Trial No. 124/2018.
4.13
In this scenario, the Police Authorities, having conducted further
investigation in connection with the captioned FIR and accompanying complaint,
filed Third Charge Sheet No. 93B/2017 against Ashok Kumar under Sections
343 and 120B of the IPC on 22.12.2017. The Magistrate, Dehradun,
took cognizance of the same on 31.01.2018. Aggrieved, Ashok Kumar preferred a
Discharge Application before the Court of First Additional Sessions Judge,
Dehradun, under Section 227 of the CrPC on 06.08.2018. However, the
said Court, vide order dated 02.03.2019, rejected his Discharge Application,
having found prima facie evidence that he had held the keys to the residence
wherein the Complainant was wrongfully confined.
4.14
Discontented with the order of the Sessions Court, Ashok Kumar moved the High
Court through Criminal Revision No. 173/2019, which has been allowed vide the
Impugned Judgment dated 12.01.2021, quashing the criminal proceedings emanating
from the FIR qua him. While doing so, the High Court stressed on the absence of
any specific allegations against him in the FIR and subsequent recorded
statements. More pertinently, the High Court has also found that Ajay Malik’s
residence had two entry/exit points, with only one being locked—thereby
establishing that the Complainant had the option of egress available to her at
all relevant times.
4.15
Consequently, the Second Additional District Judge, Dehradun, vide order dated
06.02.2021, dropped the criminal proceedings against Ashok Kumar in Sessions
Trial No. 124/2018. It is in this factual backdrop that the aggrieved State is
before us in appeal.
B.
CONTENTIONS
5.
Before we formulate the issues that arise for consideration in these appeals,
we may briefly note the contentions forwarded by the parties:
5.1
Mr R. Basant, Learned Senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of Ajay Malik, while
praying that the Impugned Judgment be set aside and the criminal proceedings
pending against him be quashed, submitted as follows:
a) The Complainant’s
statement under Section 164 of the CrPC indicates that she merely
requested Ajay Malik if she could leave his residence, and he responded by
requesting her to remain until alternative arrangements could be made. No
evidence of active wrongful restraint, as is contemplated under Section
343 of the IPC, is thus presented.
b) A no-objection
affidavit filed by the Complainant explicitly denies any confinement or
mistreatment by Ajay Malik, indicating a lack of grievance against him. This
affidavit should hold significant weight, allowing the Court to quash
proceedings, following the principles evolved in Gian Singh v. State of
Punjab [Gian Singh v. State of
Punjab, 2012 (10) SCC 303.] and Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab. [Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, 2014
INSC 217.]
c) The interim relief
granted by the High Court demonstrates judicial recognition of Ajay Malik’s
case. In fact, decisions such as State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1990 SCR
Supl. (3) 259.] and Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor, [Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor, 2013 (3)
SCC 330.] emphasise the quashing of frivolous or baseless
prosecution.
d) The Complainant’s
allegations are linked to prior disputes with the Placement Agency, and not
Ajay Malik, further diminishing the relevance of the charges registered against
him.
5.2
Mr Prashant Bhushan, Learned Counsel, appearing for Ashok Kumar, adopted the
relevant part of the contentions put forth on Ajay Malik’s behalf and fervently
advocated to the correctness of the Impugned Judgment in discharging Ashok
Kumar. Additionally, he canvassed the following submissions:
a) Ashok Kumar is not
only a DRDO Officer with decades of unblemished service; he also does not have
any criminal antecedents. The only role attributable to Ashok Kumar in this
entire factual scenario is the key he possessed to Ajay Malik’s residence, which had been provided to him so
that he could keep an eye on the premises in the absence of the latter.
b) Ashok Kumar is
being needlessly harassed for innocently and innocuously agreeing to keep the
aforementioned keys with him. He was completely unaware of any alleged wrongful
confinement being perpetrated by Ajay Malik. He, moreover, never went to Ajay
Malik’s residence before the police arrived.
c) Ashok Kumar is also
not named in the FIR or the Complainant’s statement under Section
164 of the CrPC. The Police have mechanically filed a Supplementary
Chargesheet, roping him in as an accused. In any case, the ingredients for the
offences alleged against him have not been fulfilled.
5.3
Per contra, Ms Anubha Dhulia, Learned Standing Counsel for the State of
Uttarakhand, sought to not only defend the correctness of the High Court in
disallowing Ajay Malik’s quashing application but also vehemently opposed the
discharge of Ashok Kumar. She, accordingly, advanced the following contentions:
i. Ajay Malik’s case
a) The Complainant’s
FIR details allegations of being locked in a house for a week, with the key
handed over to Ajay Malik’s associate. Moreover, her statements under Sections
161 and 164 of the CrPC corroborate these claims, describing the
Complainant's inability to leave the premises and her limited access to
communication. Additionally, the Recovery Memo records the discovery of the
Complainant confined in a locked flat by Police Authorities and a video
documenting her release. Taken together, these facts clearly make out the
charge of wrongful confinement against Ajay Malik.
b) The victim belongs
to a Below Poverty Line-Scheduled Tribe family, which highlights the power
imbalance between the Complainant and Ajay Malik. This disparity raises serious
concerns about systemic exploitation, with legislative intent ensuring these
offences remain non-compoundable under Section 370 of the IPC.
c) The no-objection
affidavit relied upon by Ajay Malik and allegedly affirmed by the Complainant
is a mere reproduction of the former’s Special Leave Petition before this
Court. It thereby lacks credibility, given the Complainant’s vulnerable status;
and potential coercion or manipulation cannot be ruled out at this stage.
d) Lastly, upholding
these charges aligns with social and moral principles, ensuring accountability
for exploitation and addressing broader societal inequalities. Domestic
workers, who often start working when they are underage, are particularly
vulnerable to exploitation by the elite classes—and most such cases are never
reported.
ii. Ashok Kumar’s case
a) The Complainant’s
FIR mentioned Ashok Kumar by name— credited as Ajay Malik’s friend—who was
responsible for looking after the Complainant and the premises in Ajay Malik’s
absence. Similarly, her statement under Section 164 of the CrPC also
details the allegations against Ashok Kumar. The High Court was thus incorrect
in holding that no case was made out against him since he was not named in
these two documents.
b) The Recovery Memo
further sheds light as to how when the Complainant was statedly freed from Ajay
Malik’s residence by Police Authorities, Ashok Kumar was called to the said
premises, having been in possession of the keys thereof. This fact speaks to
the reality that the Complainant was wrongfully confined in the house, with the
sole key resting with Ashok Kumar, who while being aware of the Complainant's
confinement, nonetheless elected to let her remain in that position.
C.
ISSUES
6.
We have duly considered the rival submissions of the parties, as elucidated
hereinabove, and carefully perused the material on record. We find that the
following issues need to be analysed:
i. Whether the High
Court acted well within the contours of its powers under Section
482 of the CrPC in rejecting Ajay Malik’s quashing petition?
ii. Whether the High
Court fell in error in rejecting the Compounding Application moved by Ajay
Malik and supported by the Complainant?
iii. Whether the High
Court was legally correct in accepting Ashok Kumar’s Criminal Revision, thereby
discharging him from the captioned criminal proceedings?
iv. Whether the
existing legal framework in India sufficiently protects the rights of domestic
workers?
D.
ANALYSIS
7.
It may be noted at the outset that while evaluating the issues formulated
above, we have taken into consideration the credentials of both, Ajay Malik and
Ashok Kumar; the contents of the FIR; the Complainant’s statements; and her
affidavits filed before the High Court and this Court.
D.
1 Issue No. 1: The correctness of rejecting Ajay Malik’s quashing application
8.
It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary
powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the
abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent
powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision.
However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court
must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are
embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing
the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where
intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice.
9.
It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has
laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before
quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold; thereby pre-empting the Prosecution
from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter
alia, contemplate the following situations: (i) the criminal complaint has been
filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process;
(iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature;
(v) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties
are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably. [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335.]
10.
Turning to the facts of the present case, it is thus necessary to examine each
of the offences alleged against Ajay Malik to determine whether a prima facie
case has been established and if there is any justification for quashing the
criminal proceedings against him. D. 1. 1 The offences alleged against Ajay
Malik
11.
The analysis in this regard will address each of the offences enumerated
against Ajay Malik, namely:
(i) wrongful
confinement under Section 343 of the IPC;
(ii) human trafficking
under Section 370 of the IPC; and
(iii) criminal
conspiracy under Section 120B of the IPC.
D.1.1.1
Wrongful confinement under Section 343 of the IPC
12.
The IPC defines ‘wrongful confinement’ as ‘wrongfully restraining any
person in such a manner so as to prevent that person from proceeding beyond
certain circumscribing limits’. Put more simply, this offence requires the
satisfaction of two prongs:
(i) the voluntary restraint of any person; and
(ii) the act being
done in a manner such that it prevents the said person from proceeding beyond
circumscribing limits.
13.
The State of Uttarakhand in this regard has vehemently contended that there are
several factors militating against Ajay Malik, including the FIR detailing that
he allegedly wrongfully confined the Complainant at his residence, and the
Recovery Memo which enumerates that the Complainant was locked inside Ajay
Malik’s residence, with the main gate being doubly locked. The specific
allegation thus seems to be that Ajay Malik restricted the Complainant’s
movements from the circumscribed limit of his residence.
14.
While this assertion appears plausible, what raises concern for this Court is
the claim that an alternative exit was available to the Complainant, allowing
her to freely enter and exit the premises. This fact is fortified by the High
Court's findings in the Impugned Judgment in Ashok Kumar's case, which held
that:
“7. The learned
Magistrate did not consider the aspect of the matter that where the complainant
was resided in the house of Ajay Malik which has two entries, one entry the
lock was put and another entry was free. Upon consideration of the case record
and the document submitted therewith there is no sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused. The revisionist was liable to be discharged
under Section 227 of Cr.P.C., which is quoted hereunder:-
“227. Discharge- If,
upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted
therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution
on this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his
reasons for so doing.”
[Emphasis Supplied]
15.
This factual finding aligns with Ajay Malik's consistent assertion that,
although the main entry to his residence was locked, an alternative exit
remained accessible for the Complainant to use, which has also been illustrated
in the site plan of the subject premises. Furthermore, even as far as the
Recovery Memo is concerned, it seems that the Police did not inspect or
document the existence of this alternate exit, leaving its availability
unverified.
16.
Be that as it may, certain additional factual circumstances lend further
support to this conclusion. First, the mobile phone allegedly left by Ajay
Malik with the Complainant, and subsequently recovered by the police, raises
questions about the plausibility of wrongful confinement. It remains
unexplained why Ajay Malik would provide the Complainant with a means of
communication, allowing her to contact others at will, had he intended to
confine her or restrict her within circumscribed limits. Second, the
Complainant had been issued a temporary pass issued by the DRDO Colony, where
Ajay Malik’s residence is located. The existence of this pass bolsters Ajay
Malik's claim that the Complainant frequently left the residence and the colony
for errands. Third, the Complainant’s own no-objection affidavits, explicitly
state that she was never wrongfully confined and that an alternative exit was
always accessible to her.
17.
On an objective consideration of this uncontroverted material on record, there
can be no other conclusion except to hold that the allegations, even if
accepted to be true, do not disclose the commission of an offence by Ajay Malik
under Section 343 of the IPC. D.1.1.2 Trafficking and exploitation
under Section 370 of the IPC
18.
We now turn to the allegations against Ajay Malik under Section
370 of the IPC, pertaining to the trafficking and exploitation of the
Complainant. In this regard, taking into consideration the extenuating
circumstances surrounding this case, this allegation seems to lack any
substantial merit. We say so for the following reasons:
i. The FIR includes
allegations of assault and exploitation against Ajay Malik and the other
co-accused. However, a closer examination reveals that the bulk of the FIR
primarily focuses on two neighbours, Subhash and Mohan Ram, who allegedly
brought the Complainant to Delhi, and Shambhu, who is accused of persistently
harassing the Complainant and exploiting her vulnerable situation.
ii. In the
Complainant's statement recorded under Section 164 of the CrPC, the
allegations against Ajay Malik seemingly diminish. She instead provides a
detailed account of how her neighbours brought her to Delhi and handed her over
to Shambhu, who subsequently sent her to work in various cities, withheld her
rightful earnings, and consistently denied her requests to return home. In
contrast, the only mention of Ajay Malik in her statement pertains to his
alleged refusal to send her home until alternative arrangements were made and
his having allegedly locked her in a room. The Complainant also notes that Ajay
Malik had left a mobile phone with her before leaving for Delhi and maintained
regular contact with her during that time.
iii. The no-objection
affidavit submitted by the Complainant before the High Court as part of Ajay
Malik’s Compounding Application, elucidates that the Complainant has no
grievances against Ajay Malik and unequivocally asserts that she was neither
trafficked nor wrongfully confined by him. She further expresses her
willingness to have all pending criminal proceedings against Ajay Malik
quashed. At the High Court's request, the Complainant appeared virtually and
reiterated her categorical stance, confirming that she holds no complaints
against Ajay Malik. The relevant paragraph from the Impugned Judgment in this
case reads as follows:
“10. After having
interacted with the complainant/respondent No. 2 herein through video
conferencing, she had submitted that the present applicant is not responsible
for the act, which was complained of by her and which finds reference in her
statement too, which was recorded under Section 164 of Cr.PC.”
[Emphasis
Supplied]
19.
Furthermore, during the pendency of these proceedings, the Complainant filed an
additional affidavit before this Court as well, which carries significant
weight and warrants our undivided attention. In this affidavit, she reiterates
that she was never wrongfully confined or trafficked by Ajay Malik and affirms
that she was always treated with dignity and respect. She further states that
she is now happily married with a daughter and has no desire to prolong the
embarrassment caused to Ajay Malik and his family due to the allegations. It is
thus abundantly clear that the Complainant has sought to recant the entirety of
her allegations against Ajay Malik.
20.
In this vein, having duly and holistically considered all of these aspects in
toto, we are of the opinion that no prima facie offence under Section
370 of the IPC qua Ajay Malik has been made out as well. Not only is there
no evidence of neglect or exploitation of the Complainant by Ajay Malik on
record, but her own sworn statements in denying any abuse must also be given
due credence.
21.
We deem it important to note that while there may have been instances
suggesting some degree of labour-based exploitation of the Complainant by Ajay
Malik and his family, this is not evident from the face of the record, and we
are not inclined to initiate an inquiry into this aspect. In any event, such
allegations do not constitute an offense under Section 370 of the
IPC, and we cannot conclusively find Ajay Malik guilty of trafficking and
exploitation as defined therein. However, that being said, this case has
prompted us to frame Issue No. IV, whereby we have elaborately addressed the
pressing need to establish guidelines to safeguard the rights of domestic
workers employed in households across the country.
D.1.1.3
Criminal conspiracy under Section 120B of the IPC
22.
Finally, we turn to the allegations against Ajay Malik under Section
120B of the IPC, which deals with punishment for criminal conspiracy. It
is trite law that the principal ingredient of this offence is the agreement to
commit an offence. [State of Kerala v. P.
Sugathan and Anr., (2000) 8 SCC 203.] The charge of conspiracy must be
explicitly evidenced, and should be easily discernable in the acts of the
conspiring parties. This Court has also previously held, in no uncertain terms,
that conspiracy cannot be made out without some kind of physical manifestation
of the alleged agreement being established.
[Ram Narayan Popli v. CBI, (2003) 3 SCC 641.]
23.
As previously noted, Ajay Malik employed the Complainant through the Placement
Agency established by Shambhu for domestic work at his residence in Dehradun,
which she joined on 16.10.2016. She continued to work there for over five
months without any untoward incident. As per the purported agreement between
the Placement Agency and Ajay Malik, the Complainant’s wages were regularly paid
to her through the Agency. It therefore appears that the only agreement between
Ajay Malik and co-accused Shambhu was the employment of the Complainant as
domestic help at the former’s residence.
24.
Furthermore, a thorough review of the material on record does not indicate any
orchestrated arrangement by Ajay Malik with the co- accused to exploit or
confine the Complainant. On the contrary, the case appears to involve minimal
interaction or communication between Ajay Malik and the co-accused. Any correspondence
between them seems limited strictly to hiring of the Complainant as a domestic
worker at Ajay Malik’s residence. Against this backdrop, the charge
under Section 120B of the IPC qua Ajay Malik is highly speculative
and warrants rejection at the very threshold.
D.
1. 2 Whether quashing would be justified?
25.
In light of the conclusions reached regarding each of the offences alleged
against Ajay Malik, it becomes clear that the Investigating Agency has failed
to establish any prima facie case. Since the FIR has been investigated and a
Chargesheet has been filed, the FIR alone cannot serve as the basis for
dismissing Ajay Malik’s claims.
26.
Even assuming the FIR is accurate, it does not substantiate the charges, which
appear to have been mechanically transcribed into the Chargesheet, despite the
Investigating Agency having had sufficient opportunity to gather material
evidence. Notably, no element of illegal confinement, trafficking, or criminal
conspiracy has been established against Ajay Malik. Additionally, the
Complainant has, under oath, stated that she was not illegally confined. If
this remains her position in Court, the purpose of proceeding to trial becomes
questionable, amounting to an exercise in futility and a sheer wastage of
judicial resources.
27.
Based on the foregoing facts, it appears that the Complainant’s primary
grievance lies in the unfair treatment she received from Subhash, Mohan Ram,
and Shambhu. At this juncture, it is important to note that the allegations
against these three co-accused are significantly more serious and grave,
considering that charges have been filed against them under Sections
370, 373 and 376 of the IPC. The Placement Agency run by
Shambhu could be described as a deceptive front, supposedly aimed at the welfare
of tribal girls, but in reality, it perpetuates their abuse and exploitation.
This dubious operation seems to be the root cause of the Complainant’s
suffering, with Ajay Malik having been included in the FIR without substantial
justification.
28.
In this backdrop, it appears to us that the Complainant's actions were driven
by a fear that should she leave Ajay Malik's employment, as she had done in
previous jobs in different cities, she would once again fall under the control
of the Placement Agency, which would subject her to further exploitation and
abuse. This fear likely led her to lodge the complaint as a means of escaping
her situation. This sequence of events aligns with the Complainant's subsequent
and consistent stance thereafter, in which she asserts that Ajay Malik and his
family did not wrongfully confine or exploit her. Furthermore, she has
expressed a desire for the proceedings against Ajay Malik, who is a retired
senior citizen now, to be quashed.
29.
In light of the absence of any prima facie evidence of wrongdoing by Ajay
Malik; the vague and omnibus claims made in the FIR and subsequently the
Chargesheet; and the Complainant's consistent stance to compound and settle the
dispute, we are unable to concur with the High Court's conclusion in the
Impugned Judgement, which otherwise constitutes a fit case for quashing.
D.2
Issue No. 2: The correctness of rejecting Ajay Malik’s Compounding Application
30.
We now turn to the second issue in Ajay Malik’s case concerning the rejection
of his compounding application. As stated previously, Ajay Malik had moved a
Compounding Application in his pending petition, based on the strength of the
Complainant’s no-objection affidavit.
31. Section
320 of the CrPC provides for the compounding of offences, and its appended
Schedule lists the various criminal offences that may be compounded or settled
by and between the parties under the Court's supervision. In the facts of the
instant case, the FIR against Ajay Malik was registered under Sections
343 and 370 of the IPC. Incontrovertibly, Section
370 IPC, being a serious offence, does not find a place on the Schedule
attached to Section 320 of the CrPC and is thus classified as a
non-compoundable offence.
32.
Although we are inclined to agree with the High Court’s rejection of Ajay
Malik’s Compounding Application owing to the non-compoundable nature of alleged
offences, this issue is nonetheless rendered academic given our conclusion in
the previous issue, where we have rejected the High Court’s view regarding Ajay
Malik’s quashing application.
Therefore,
while we may not need to delve into this issue, it must be underscored that a
delicate balance ought to be struck in cases wherein the parties seek
compounding of the offences. Though well- intentioned, an excessively
moralistic order may unnecessarily prolong criminal proceedings, which have no
logical conclusion and only serve to further distress the parties. Accordingly,
the correctness of the High Court’s decision to disallow Ajay Malik’s
Compounding Application does not require our consideration on merits.
D.
3 Issue No. 3: The State’s challenge to Ashok Kumar’s discharge
33.
Adverting to Ashok Kumar’s case, we shall now consider the merit of the State's
challenge to the Impugned Judgment therein. At the cost of repetition, the
proceedings herein concern Ashok Kumar, a neighbor and friend of Ajay Malik.
Although Ashok Kumar was not initially named in the FIR, he was later
Chargesheeted by the Investigating Officer and included as a co-accused. The State
is aggrieved by the High Court’s decision to allow Ashok Kumar’s Criminal
Revision Petition, thereby discharging him from the criminal proceedings
arising from the captioned FIR.
34.
It is trite law that the discharge stage acts as a critical filter to eliminate
cases lacking legal merit, sparing the accused from unnecessary proceedings,
while ensuring that credible cases proceed to trial. Thus, discharge
under Section 227 of the CrPC is justified when the material on
record fails to disclose a prima facie case against the accused to proceed for
trial. The legislative spirit behind this provision envisions the rights of the
accused being balanced with public interest, so as to ultimately prevent abuse
of the legal process.
35.
The sum of the allegations against Ashok Kumar is that he held the key to the
residence where the Complainant was allegedly wrongfully confined. While we
have already negated the claims of wrongful confinement against Ajay Malik
based on the High Court's finding regarding the alternative exit available to
the Complainant, certain additional mitigating circumstances may be observed in
the case of Ashok Kumar. Firstly, there is no direct allegation against him
made by the Complainant herself. Neither the FIR nor the Complainant's statements
disclose any explicit, illegal act on Ashok Kumar's part. Secondly, Ashok Kumar
was not named in the original FIR, and was only added by way of a Supplementary
Chargesheet by the Investigating Officer, seemingly as an after-thought. This
hasty inclusion lacks any substantive justification. Thirdly, while Ashok Kumar
was delivered the keys by Ajay Malik and held them as a favor to him, there is
no evidence to suggest that he ever visited the premises or was aware and
acting in furtherance of any wrongful confinement of the Complainant.
36.
For these reasons, we have no hesitation in upholding the correctness of the
reasoned order of the High Court, in allowing the discharge of Ashok Kumar from
the criminal proceedings. Given the demonstrable lack of any mens rea or intent
on the part of Ashok Kumar, apart from the lack of any direct involvement, his
discharge is well-founded and warrants no interference by this Court.
D.
4 Issue No. 4: Domestic workers’ lacking legal protection in India
37.
We lastly address the final issue framed by us in these appeals, which pertains
to the rights, protections, and privileges (or lack thereof) accorded to
domestic workers in the Indian milieu. While this broader issue may only be
tangential to the present appeals, we have taken it upon ourselves to deal with
the same in light of the gravity and nature of the systemic issues we have been
presented with. D. 4. 1 Background
38.
It is an incontrovertible fact that the demand for domestic workers has been
mounting in India, in consonance with rapid urbanization and development.
According to reports by the International Labor Organization (ILO)—which is a
United Nations agency devoted to promoting internationally recognized labour
and human rights— domestic workers currently constitute a significant portion
of the unorganised workforce in India,
[ILO Report, “Indispensable yet unprotected: Working conditions of Indian
Domestic Workers at Home and Abroad”, 2015.] with millions of individuals,
primarily women, [ILO Report, “Employer
practices and perceptions on paid domestic work: Recruitment, employment
relationships, and social protection”, 2023.] engaged in this sector. Their
contributions are indispensable to urban households, performing tasks such as
cooking, cleaning, caregiving, and other essential services.
39.
While any avenues for employment being opened to marginalised women merit
celebration, we are at pains to note that despite their growing demand, this
indispensable workforce has also been the most vulnerable to exploitation and
abuse. Domestic workers often belong to marginalised communities, such as
Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Other Backward Classes, and Economically
Weaker Sections. They are compelled to undertake domestic work due to financial
hardship or displacement, further reinforcing their vulnerability. That is not
to say, however, that we are declaiming this source of gainful employment that
is readily available to women across all social sub- stratas. On the contrary,
we seek to affirm this important livelihood that is available to so many women,
which brings them one step closer to financial security and the accompanying
independence.
40.
Our concerns instead lie with the non-regulation of this crucial labour sector,
which often leads to the aforementioned malignant results. The same is
abundantly evident from the factual circumstances of the present appeals,
wherein the Complainant was tortured and exploited for several years at the
hands of individuals who forcibly transported her to differing cities, in the
promise of a better life which never materialised. The purported Placement
Agency which employed the Complainant continually leeched her salaries, leaving
her utterly destitute and helpless.
41.
The simple reason for this harassment and rampant abuse, which seems to be
prevalent throughout the country, is the legal vacuum which exists vis-à-vis
the rights and protection of domestic workers. Indeed, domestic workers in
India remain largely unprotected and without any comprehensive legal
recognition. As a result, they frequently endure low wages, unsafe
environments, and extended hours without effective recourse.
42.
Before we discuss the Indian legal experience with domestic workers, it is
perhaps fitting to advert to the prevailing international standards.
D.
4. 2 International norms and standards
43.
In the international spectrum, over the course of many decades, the ILO has
provided various guidelines and conventions for the betterment of labour laws
across the world. It is noteworthy that it has also extensively sought to
protect the rights of domestic workers, which it recognises as a uniquely
disadvantaged and marginalised class. It proactively advocates for the
inclusion of domestic workers in pre- existing labour treaties. For instance,
during discussions on the Protection of Workers’ Claims (Employer’s Insolvency)
Convention, 1992 (No. 173), the definition of ‘insolvency’ was revised to refer
to as ‘employer’s assets’ instead of the narrower term ‘enterprise’s assets,’
ensuring domestic workers were covered. Moreover, Article 2 of the
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948
(No. 87), applies to all ‘workers and employers’ without any exception.
44.
Reference may also be made to the principles of non-discrimination and equal
opportunity in the Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958
(No. 111), and the Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No. 100), which also
cover domestic workers. In fact, the ILO Committee of Experts has repeatedly
emphasised that laws or policies promoting equality in jobs must include
domestic workers and that excluding them would violate these Conventions. [ILO Guide, “Effective Protection for
Domestic Workers: A Guide to Designing Labour Laws”, 2012; ILO Manual,
“Achieving decent work for domestic works”, 2012.]
45.
However, the most significant international development in the realm of the
rights of domestic workers was in 2011, with the adoption of the Domestic
Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189). This Convention offers specific protection
to domestic workers while laying down the basic rights that such workers are
entitled to, and the measures that States must take to ensure decent work
conditions. These protections include regulating work settings and providing
domestic workers with social security benefits that are at par with other
workers. This Convention is supplemented by the ILO Recommendation No. 201,
which further addresses the need for facilities like proper accommodation,
food, and the medical health of domestic workers.
46.
Apart from the illustrative treaties reproduced hereinabove, the plight of
domestic workers is also addressed in several other Conventions. For instance,
the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of Their Families, 1990, in its General Comment No. 1,
provides for and acknowledges the particularly vulnerable position of migrant
domestic workers. Similarly, General Comment No. 26 to the landmark Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 1979 addresses
female migrant workers and extends to those undertaking domestic work as well.
47.
Thus, contemporary international standards not only acknowledge the
vulnerability of domestic workers but also strive to provide them extensive
protection and parity with other labourers. D. 4. 3 Domestic laws and
guidelines
48.
Coming to the legal standing of domestic workers within India, there seems to
be a degree of lacunae in legislative frameworks, safeguarding and protecting
their rights.
49.
At this juncture, we must fairly note that there have already been several
attempts to bring domestic workers under legal protection. However, for a
plethora of reasons that are beyond the scope of the present discussion, these
Bills have never materialized into tangible laws or policies. In this regard,
we may briefly note the following:
i. The Domestic
Workers (Conditions of Employment) Bill of 1959 was among the earliest
legislative attempts to regulate the working conditions of domestic workers. It
aimed to establish minimum standards for wages, work hours, and employment
terms for domestic workers. However, the Bill received little support and was
ultimately not enacted into law. ii. The House Workers (Conditions of Service)
Bill of 1989 sought to address similar issues, focusing on formalising
employment practices and providing essential safeguards for domestic workers. Despite
being introduced, this Bill neither formed the subject of significant
Parliamentary discussions nor advanced towards enactment.
iii. The Housemaids
and Domestic Workers (Conditions of Service and Welfare) Bill, 2004 was
introduced in the Rajya Sabha as a private member’s Bill. This Bill proposed
mandatory registration of domestic workers and required the government to
ensure sufficient employment opportunities, medical benefits, and other welfare
measures. It also included penalties for employers hiring unregistered workers.
However, the Bill was not passed by Parliament.
iv. The Domestic
Workers (Registration, Social Security and Welfare) Bill, 2008, introduced by
the National Commission for Women, aimed to establish a registration process
for domestic workers and to provide them with social security benefits. The
Bill did not progress beyond its drafting stage and was not enacted into law.
v. The Domestic
Workers (Decent Working Conditions) Bill of 2015 sought to include domestic
workers under existing labour laws, such as the Industrial Disputes
Act of 1947. The Bill proposed ensuring fair wages and regulated working
conditions for domestic workers. However, it remained pending and was not
enacted into law.
vi. The Domestic
Workers Welfare Bill 2016 proposed including migrant and minor domestic workers
within its ambit. The Bill prescribed working conditions, terms of employment,
and the collection of a cess from employers to maintain a social security fund.
It also mandated the registration of workers by employers and placement
agencies. This Bill was, however, not enacted. vii. The Domestic Workers
(Regulation of Work and Social Security) Bill, 2017 sought to regulate the work
of domestic workers, prescribe duties for employers and placement agencies,
establish Boards for their registration, address issues related to the
marginalisation caused by migration, and provide for the inclusion of domestic
workers in significant labour laws. However, the Bill was never enacted.
50.
It, thus, seems to us that no effective legislative or executive action in
furtherance of enacting a statute, which could prove to be a boon to millions
of vulnerable domestic workers across the country, has been undertaken as of
now. Over and above the absence of any legislation protecting their interests,
domestic labourers also find themselves excluded from existing labour laws as
well. These, inter alia, include statutes such as the Payment of Wages
Act 1936, Equal Remuneration Act 1976, Sexual Harassment of
Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act,
2013, Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, etc.
51.
Be that as it may, we must also acknowledge that recent years have witnessed
certain positive developments aimed at improving the legal and social status of
domestic workers in India. These developments, while still in their initial
stages of implementation, signal recognition of the need to address the
systemic neglect faced by this workforce. In this regard, reference may be made
to the Code on Wages, 2019, which introduces provisions to address the issue of
minimum wages for domestic workers. Moreover, statutes such as the Social
Security Code of 2020 replace earlier legislation, including the Unorganized
Workers’ Social Security Act of 2008, bringing domestic workers
within the ambit of ‘unorganised workers’. This inclusion makes them eligible
for various benefits such as social security, health insurance, provident fund,
and maternity benefits. Further, the introduction of the e-Shram portal in 2021
has facilitated the creation of a centralised database to identify and register
migrant/domestic/unorganised workers, enabling their access to welfare schemes.
52.
It is equally noteworthy that despite the absence of comprehensive protections
for domestic workers through a Central Law, several States have taken
initiatives to safeguard their rights and welfare. Tamil Nadu established the
Tamil Nadu Domestic Workers Welfare Board in 2007 under the Tamil Nadu
Manual Workers (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Work) Act, 1982. The
Board administers various social security benefits, including education
assistance, marriage assistance, delivery assistance, accidental death
compensation, and pensions. These benefits are provided through monetary
compensation at fixed rates. Maharashtra has enacted the Maharashtra
Domestic Workers Welfare Board Act, 2008, creating District Domestic Labour
Welfare Boards with tripartite representation from employers, employees, and
the government. This Act allows domestic workers to voluntarily
register to access social security benefits, including maternity and child
care, education assistance, and medical expense reimbursement. Similarly,
Kerala introduced the Kerala Domestic Workers (Regulation and Welfare) Bill,
2021 to protect, regulate, and improve the welfare of domestic workers. The
Bill aims to ensure minimum wages, fair treatment, and lawful payment for
workers, many of whom are employed through third-party agencies.
53.
Amidst this backdrop, which motions the lack of specific protections covering
domestic workers in India, it becomes this Court's solemn duty and
responsibility to intervene, exercise the doctrine of parens patriae and forge
the path leading to their proper welfare. In a catena of decisions, [Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar, (1983) 4 SCC
141; M.C. Mehta (2) v. Union of India, (1988) 1 SCC 471; Nilabati
Bahera v. State of Orissa, (1993) Cri. LJ 2899; Vishwa Jagriti
Mission v. Central Govt., (2001) 6 SCC 577; Aruna Ramachandra Shanbaug v.
Union of India, (2011) 4 SCC 454; Vineet Narain v. Union of India, (1998)
1 SCC 226; Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1997 SC 3011.] this
Court has repeatedly stepped in and laid down interim guidelines to protect
vulnerable groups who were utterly unprotected due to legal gaps. That being
said, we do not presently deem it appropriate to lay down an interim legal code
which would govern the working conditions of domestic workers. We say so, being
cognizant of the factum that ordinarily, the judiciary should not stray too far
out of bounds, and expressly interfere in the legislative domain. The
democratic setup of this country may be likened to a tripartite machine, fueled
by the doctrine of separation of powers, without which it’s functioning shall
surely come to a grinding halt.
54.
It is in this vein, that we once again repose our faith in the Legislature, and
the elected representatives of the Indian people, to take the imperative steps
towards ensuring an equitable and dignified life for domestic workers. In light
of the same, we seek to dispose of these appeals with certain pointed
directions to the Government of India.
E.
CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS
55.
In view of the foregoing analysis and conclusions arrived at hereinabove, we
deem it appropriate to invoke this Court’s extraordinary powers
under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and issue the
following directions:
i. Ajay Malik’s appeal
(SLP (Crl.) No. 8777/2022) is thus allowed and the Impugned Judgement dated
01.09.2022 passed by High Court in Criminal Misc. Application No. 96/2018 is
accordingly set aside. Additionally, the FIR No. 60/2017 (Case Crime No.
94/2017), Chargesheet and all other proceedings therefore arising qua him are
hereby quashed.
ii. There is no merit
in the appeal preferred by the State against Ashok Kumar (SLP (Crl.) No.
15131/2024), and it is thus dismissed. Therefore, the High Court’s order dated
12.01.2021 in Criminal Revision No. 173/2019 is upheld.
iii. The conclusions
drawn in favour of Ajay Malik and Ashok Kumar shall have no bearing on the
criminal proceedings pending against the other accused, including those who are
alleged to have exploited the Complainant on the pretext of securing her
employment. Those proceedings shall be decided as per their own merits.
iv. As regard to the
larger issue of the protection of rights of domestic workers, we direct the
Ministry of Labour and Employment in tandem with the Ministry of Social Justice
and Empowerment, the Ministry of Women and Child Development, and the Ministry
of Law and Justice, to jointly constitute a Committee comprising subject
experts to consider the desirability of recommending a legal framework for the
benefit, protection and regulation of the rights of domestic workers.
v. The composition of
the Expert Committee is left to the wisdom of the Government of India and its
concerned Ministries. It will be appreciated if the Committee submits a Report
within a period of 6 months, whereupon the Government of India may consider the
necessity of introducing a legal framework which may effectively address the
cause and concern of domestic workers.
56.
The present appeals are disposed of in the above terms. Consequently, pending
interlocutory applications, if any, are also disposed of.
57.
Ordered accordingly.
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