2025 INSC 105
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(HON’BLE
DIPANKAR DATTA, J. AND PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA, JJ.)
BADRINARAYANA
JAGANATHAN
Petitioner
VERSUS
STATE OF KARNATAKA
Respondent
Criminal
Appeal No. 4884 OF 2024 [arising out of S.L.P. (CRIMINAL) No. 10082 of 2019]
With Criminal Appeal No. 4883 OF 2024 [arising out of S.L.P. (CRIMINAL) No.
10115 of 2019]-Decided on 24-01-2025
Criminal,
Quashing
Criminal Procedure
Code, 1973, Section 173(2) and 482 – Quashing of chargesheet – Prayer for - Offences punishable
under sections 323, 504, 506, 509, 511 IPC - Complaint
merely states that the complainant was forcibly ejected from the Company's
office by security personnel, who allegedly attempted to assault, physically
harass, and threaten her with dire consequences - Therefore, the complaint does
not directly attribute any voluntary act of causing hurt to the complainant by
any of the two accused - Ingredients of offence under Section 323 of
the IPC have not been made out, prima facie, either in the complaint or the
chargesheet – The chargesheet states that the appellants used "filthy
language" while scolding the complainant; however, no such allegation is
made against the appellants in the complaint - Furthermore, it is nowhere
alleged that this act of using filthy language and insulting the complainant by
the appellants, has provoked the complainant to commit breach of public peace
or to commit any other offence - Therefore, from the materials on record, the
ingredients of the offence under Section 504 of the IPC are not
satisfied - The term "filthy language," when examined in isolation,
and without any contextual framework or accompanying words, indicating an
intent to insult the complainant's modesty, does not fall within the purview
of Section 509 of the IPC - Had there been references to specific
words used, contextual details, or any gestures—whether preceding, succeeding,
or accompanying these words—that could demonstrate a criminal intent to insult
the modesty, and it might have assisted the prosecution in establishing the
case against the appellants - Complaint does not indicate that the appellants
used language towards the complainant that would warrant an offence
under Section 509 of the IPC - However, the chargesheet alleges that
the appellants scolded the complainant using "filthy language" -
Notably, this allegation is also absent in the FIR - Prima facie ingredients of
an offence under Section 509 of the IPC have not been disclosed - Complaint
does not specifically attribute any threats or intimidation to the second
accused - Therefore, ingredients of Section 506 of the IPC, prima
facie, are not made out against him - The argument that the first accused acted
at the behest of the second accused held untenable, as Section 34 of
the IPC, which imposes vicarious liability in criminal matters, has not been
applied in this case – Held that none of the ingredients of Sections
323, 504, 506, and 509 of the IPC are present, even if they
are taken at face value and accepted in their entirety - The complaint is
bereft of even the basic facts, which are absolutely necessary for making out
an offence - Since the ingredients of the offences under the aforementioned
sections have not been made out, the charge under Section 511 of the
IPC cannot stand - Impugned order passed by the High Court cannot be sustained
and, consequently, stands set aside - The chargesheet and the entire
proceedings in Case, against the appellants also stand quashed.
(Para
14 to 39 and 45)
JUDGMENT
Dipankar Datta, J.:-
THE
APPEAL
1.
By a common impugned judgment and order dated 31st July, 2019[impugned order], a learned Judge of the High Court of Karnataka[High Court] dismissed Criminal Petition No. 3961 of 2015
(Badrinarayana Jaganathan vs. State of Karnataka & Anr.) and Criminal
Petition No. 3962 of 2015 (Madhushree Datta vs. State of Karnataka & Anr.),
both filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973[Cr. PC] , seeking quashing of the
chargesheet filed under Section 173(2), Cr. PC and the entire proceedings
in Case Crime No. 53073 of 2014, on the file of the Additional Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate, Bangalore[ACMM] .
2.
The accused appellants[appellants] Madhushree
Datta[first accused]and Badrinarayana
Jaganathan[second accused] have
taken exception to the impugned order by presenting these appeals.
FACTS
3.
The proceedings before the ACMM have, as its genesis, an incident of 25th
October, 2013. The second respondent as complainant[complainant] lodged a complaint dated 26th October, 2013
with the Sub-Inspector of Police, H.A.L. Police Station, Marathahalli,
Bangalore, against M/s Juniper Networks India Private Limited[Company] and the appellants. The
complainant asserted that she was employed as a Technical System Analyst at
the Company, where she was subjected to ongoing harassment by the
management. She claimed that she was coerced into resigning under duress, with
the threat of immediate termination if she did not comply. Specifically, the
complainant alleged that on October 25, 2013, between 2:00 p.m. and 3:00 p.m.,
the first accused, who held the position of Human Resources Manager at the
Company, demanded that the complainant resign under threat of immediate
dismissal. Furthermore, the first accused, allegedly instructed the complainant
not to return to work and confiscated her personal belongings, including her
laptop, bag, wallet, money, credit cards et cetera. The complainant further asserted
that the laptop contained proprietary intellectual property, specifically codes
and other work, that she had personally created. In addition, the complainant
alleged that the management ordered her removal from the premises, with
security personnel escorting her out and reportedly engaging in behaviour
amounting to physical harassment, assault and threatening with dire
consequences.
4.
Following the above complaint, a Non-Cognizable Report[NCR] was registered on 26th October, 2013. The NCR states that the
employees of the Company, namely the appellants, subjected the complainant to
both mental and physical harassment by confiscating her laptop, which contained
her data. The complainant subsequently filed a formal complaint seeking an
inquiry and investigation into the matter, following her forcible termination
from employment on October 25, 2013.
5.
More than 2 (two) months later, a First Information Report[FIR] was lodged by the complainant accusing the Company and
the appellants of having committed offences punishable under sections
323, 504, 506, 509, 511 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860[IPC]. The FIR states that the Company,
along with the first accused, subjected the complainant to both physical and
mental torture. They allegedly confiscated the laptop issued to the complainant
and forcibly evicted her from the Company.
6.
Following the registration of the FIR, an investigation was conducted into the
alleged offences under Sections 323, 504, 506, 509,
and 511 of the IPC. A chargesheet was filed on 23rd April 2014,
arraigning the appellants as accused. The chargesheet alleges that the
appellants physically assaulted the complainant and confiscated the laptop
provided by the Company, preventing her from retrieving the data stored on it.
Additionally, the appellants were accused of scolding the complainant in
“filthy language” and forcibly terminating her employment. Furthermore, with
the assistance of security personnel, the appellants are said to have had the
complainant removed from the premises of the Company.
7.
Aggrieved thereby, the appellants unsuccessfully approached the High Court as
noted above.
IMPUGNED
ORDER
8.
A perusal of the impugned order reveals that the High Court primarily
considered the allegations set forth in the complainant's complaint
and concluded that, prima facie, they meet the necessary elements to
constitute the offences attributed to the appellants. The High Court rejected
the appellants’ objection regarding the procedure followed by the police in
registering FIR No. 823/2013, and observed that the materials on record suggest
that the offences alleged against the appellants involve both cognizable and
non-cognizable offences. The High Court further held that a mere lapse in the
process of investigation, by itself, would not constitute a valid ground for
quashing the proceedings. Moreover, the records indicate that the investigating
officer had obtained the requisite authorization under Section
155(2) of the Cr. PC prior to registration of the FIR. Additionally, the
High Court noted that the alleged offences were committed by employees of the
Company, that is, the appellants, and not by the Company itself, without the
Company's consent. Consequently, non-inclusion of the Company as an accused in
the chargesheet did not entitle the appellants to seek quashing of the
chargesheet.
CONTENTIONS
9.
Mr. Luthra, learned senior counsel for the appellants argued that the High
Court erred in failing to exercise its inherent power under Section
482 of the Cr. PC, and to quash the chargesheet filed against the
appellants. He contended that the following points warrant consideration by
this Court:
A. Firstly, the FIR
and the chargesheet filed by the first respondent fail to disclose a prima
facie case against the appellants. The chargesheet, according to the
appellants, does not disclose any of the essential elements of the offences
under Sections 323, 504, 506, 509, and 511 of the
IPC even if accepted as true.
B. Secondly, the
offences alleged in the complaint are of a general nature and do not specify
the appellants' involvement in the commission of the alleged offences.
Categorical assertion is that the second accused was not present in the office
on the date of the alleged incident and, therefore, no specific role has been
attributed to him in relation to the alleged offences.
C. Thirdly, the issues
pertaining to resignation and termination are civil in nature. Criminal
proceedings have been initiated by the complainant solely to exert pressure on
the Company and the appellants, with the intent of coercing them to settle the
matter, and thereby enabling complainant to gain an undue monetary advantage.
D. Fourthly, the
allegations levelled in the FIR are so absurd and inherently improbable that no
reasonable person could, based on these allegations, conclude that there are
sufficient grounds to proceed against the appellants.
E. Fifthly, the
allegations made in the FIR and reiterated in the chargesheet are inconsistent.
F. Sixthly, initially,
a NCR was registered against the appellants, and despite the investigation, no
new material has been placed on record to substantiate the commission of a
punishable offence under Sections 323, 504, 506, 509, and 511 of
the IPC.
G. Seventhly, in
criminal proceedings, the appellants cannot be held liable for the actions of a
third party. The complainant has alleged that it was the security guard who
harassed and assaulted her, threatening her with dire consequences.
H. Eighthly, no
medical examination was conducted by the first respondent on the complainant to
ascertain any injury resulting from an alleged assault by the appellants,
thereby leading to a serious miscarriage of justice.
I. Finally, it was
contended that no FIR based on the complaint dated 26th December, 2013 ought to
have been registered on the face of the NCR.
10.
Per contra, learned counsel for both sets of respondents supported the High
Court's order dismissing the appellants' petitions under Section 482 of
the Cr. PC. They vehemently refuted the submissions made by the learned counsel
for the appellants and presented the following arguments:
A. Firstly, the
allegations made in the complaint, prima facie, disclose the essential
ingredients of criminal offences. A plain reading of the complaint, the FIR,
and the chargesheet clearly establishes a case against the appellants
under Sections 323, 504, 506, and 511 of the IPC.
B. Secondly, the
Company and its employees, namely the appellants, subjected the complainant to
harassment and humiliation. They issued life threats, engaged in criminal
intimidation, committed physical assault, inflicted mental torture, insulted her,
and unlawfully seized her intellectual property, including code, data, and
other related materials. Furthermore, during the act of forcibly taking her
laptop, she was inappropriately touched and handled, thereby subjecting her to
physical harassment.
C. Thirdly, the
complainant was coerced into tendering her resignation, and when she protested,
force was used to compel her to return the laptop. Additionally, she was
physically assaulted and threatened with severe consequences.
CONSIDERATION
11.
We have heard learned senior counsel/counsel for all the parties at length and
examined the materials on record.
12.
The points for determination that emerge for decision are:
(i) Whether, based on
the materials on record, prima facie, ingredients of the offences
under Sections 323, 504, 506, 509, and 511 of the
IPC are made out, even if the allegations are taken at face value and accepted
in their entirety?
(ii) Whether the
chargesheet and the related criminal proceedings against the appellants, are
liable to be quashed?
13.
At the outset, we record that none of the two complaints lodged by the
complainant - the first on 26th October, 2013 and the next on 23rd December,
2013 - does with any degree of clarity and certainty suggest the presence of
the second accused at the time of the alleged occurrence
in the office premises of the Company. In
fact, when this was pointed out to learned counsel for the complainant, he had
no answer. Even though it is admitted that the second accused was not present, we
are minded to proceed on the premise as if the second accused too was present.
What would be the effect of arraigning him as an accused though not present
shall, however, be dealt with at a later stage of this judgment.
14.
While considering the first point, we need to examine in brief the relevant
provisions of the IPC.
SECTION
323, IPC
15.
To determine what are the ingredients of the offence under Section
323 of the IPC, it is important to read Sections
319, 321 and 323 together.
16.
What emerges on a conjoint reading of the aforementioned provisions is that,
for a conviction under Section 323 of the IPC, there must be a
voluntary act of causing hurt, i.e., bodily pain, disease, or infirmity, to
another person. Therefore, it is essential that actual hurt is caused.
17.
Turning to the facts of the case, the complaint merely states that the
complainant was forcibly ejected from the Company's office by security
personnel, who allegedly attempted to assault, physically harass, and threaten
her with dire consequences. Therefore, the complaint does not directly
attribute any voluntary act of causing hurt to the complainant by any of the
two accused.
18.
Furthermore, the chargesheet reiterates the similar version set forth in the
complaint, stating that the complainant was forcibly thrown out of the
office by the security personnel. While the actions of the security personnel
could potentially constitute an offence of causing hurt, they are neither named
in the complaint nor figure as accused in the chargesheet. Having said that,
the appellants cannot be said to have foreseen or anticipated the actions of
the security personnel in such a manner that would render them co-perpetrators
of the offence. Hence, there is no basis for the prosecution to set forth the
concept of liability of the employer or for the overt acts of its employees in
this matter.
19.
In the light of the abovementioned discussion, we are of the considered opinion
that the ingredients of offence under Section 323 of the IPC have not
been made out, prima facie, either in the complaint or the chargesheet.
SECTIONS
504 AND 509, IPC
20.
The next question for determination is, whether the mere assertion of
"filthy language" allegedly used by the appellants in scolding the
complainant, is sufficient to establish commission of offences
under Sections 504 and 509 of the IPC.
21.
In the above context, it would be apt to consider the provisions contained
in Section 504 of the IPC.
22.
A perusal of Section 504 of the IPC reveals that a mere act of
insulting someone does not fulfil its requirements; the insult must be of such
a nature that it provokes the person insulted to breach the public peace or
engage in criminal conduct. Therefore, to establish the ingredients
of Section 504 of the IPC, it must be demonstrated, based on the
available material, that there was intentional insult with the intent or
knowledge that such insult would provoke either disturbance of the public peace
or the commission of any other offence.
23.
We may, at this juncture, profitably refer to the decision of this Court
in Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. [AIR 2014 SC 2013], wherein Section 504 of the IPC came
up for interpretation and it was held as under:
“13. Section
504 IPC comprises of the following ingredients, viz., (a) intentional
insult, (b) the insult must be such as to give provocation to the person
insulted, and (c) the accused must intend or know that such provocation would
cause another to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The
intentional insult must be of such a degree that should provoke a person to
break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The person who
intentionally insults intending or knowing it to be likely that it will give
provocation to any other person and such provocation will cause to break the
public peace or to commit any other offence, in such a situation, the
ingredients of Section 504 are satisfied. One of the essential
elements constituting the offence is that there should have been an act or
conduct amounting to intentional insult and the mere fact that the accused
abused the complainant, as such, is not sufficient by itself to warrant a
conviction under Section 504 IPC.
14. We may also
indicate that it is not the law that the actual words or language should figure
in the complaint. One has to read the complaint as a whole and, by doing so, if
the Magistrate comes to a conclusion, prima facie, that there has been an
intentional insult so as to provoke any person to break the public peace or to
commit any other offence, that is sufficient to bring the complaint within the
ambit of Section 504 IPC. It is not the law that a complainant should
verbatim reproduce each word or words capable of provoking the other person to
commit any other offence. The background facts, circumstances, the occasion,
the manner in which they are used, the person or persons to whom they are
addressed, the time, the conduct of the person who has indulged in such actions
are all relevant factors to be borne in mind while examining a complaint
lodged for initiating proceedings under Section 504 IPC.”
(emphasis
supplied)
24.
In the instant case, the chargesheet states that the appellants used "filthy
language" while scolding the complainant; however, no such allegation is
made against the appellants in the complaint. Furthermore, it is nowhere
alleged that this act of using filthy language and insulting the complainant by
the appellants, has provoked the complainant to commit breach of public peace
or to commit any other offence. Therefore, from the materials on record, the
ingredients of the offence under Section 504 of the IPC, as explained
in the abovesaid decision, are not satisfied.
25.
For ascertaining whether, prima facie, the provision of Section
509 of the IPC was attracted, it is essential to first understand the
meaning of the term "modesty", to determine whether modesty has been
insulted. While modesty is not explicitly defined in the IPC, this Court
has addressed the essence of a woman's modesty in the decision
in Ramkripal v. State of Madhya Pradesh[(2007)
11 SCC 265]. Excerpts from the decision read as under:
“12. What constitutes
an outrage to female modesty is nowhere defined in IPC. The essence of a
woman's modesty is her sex. The culpable intention of the accused is the crux
of the matter. The reaction of the woman is very relevant, but its absence is
not always decisive. Modesty in this Section is an attribute associated with female
human beings as a class. It is a virtue which attaches to a female owing
to her sex...”
(emphasis
supplied)
26.
Further, this Court while discussing the test for outraging the modesty of a
woman under Section 509 of the IPC in Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar
Pal Singh Gill[(1995) 6 SCC 194],
observed as under:
“15. In State
of Punjab vs. Major Singh (AIR 1967 SC 63) a question arose whether a
female child of seven and a half months could be said to be possessed of
‘modesty' which could be outraged. In answering the above question Mudholkar
J., who along with Bachawat J. spoke for the majority, held that when any act
done to or in the presence of a woman is clearly suggestive of sex according to
the common notions of mankind that must fall within the mischief
of Section 354 IPC. Needless to say, the `common notions of mankind'
referred to by the learned Judge have to be gauged by contemporary societal
standards. The other learned Judge (Bachawat J.) observed that the essence of a
woman's modesty is her sex and from her very birth she possesses the modesty
which is the attribute of her sex. From the above dictionary meaning of
‘modesty' and the interpretation given to that word by this Court in Major
Singh's case (supra) it appears to us that the ultimate test for ascertaining
whether modesty has been outraged is, is the action of the offender such as
could be perceived as one which is capable of shocking the sense of decency of
a woman...”
(emphasis
supplied)
27.
The conclusion that emerges from the above discussion is that it will be
essential for this Court to carefully assess the evidence presented, in order
to determine whether there is sufficient material to establish the intention
and knowledge on the part of the appellants, to insult the modesty of the
complainant or, to put it pithily, whether any act was intended to shock
the sense of decency of the complainant being a woman.
28.
The term "filthy language," when examined in isolation, and without
any contextual framework or accompanying words, indicating an intent to insult
the complainant's modesty, does not fall within the purview of Section
509 of the IPC. Had there been references to specific words used,
contextual details, or any gestures—whether preceding, succeeding, or accompanying
these words—that could demonstrate a criminal intent to insult the modesty, and
it might have assisted the prosecution in establishing the case against the
appellants.
29.
In considering the term "filthy language" objectively, in the overall
conspectus of the case, we are of the view that the appellants' actions do not
demonstrate the requisite intent or knowledge that would reasonably lead to the
conclusion that their conduct could provoke such a severe emotional response as
to constitute an insult to a woman's modesty.
30.
Be that as it may, it goes without saying that each case must be assessed
having regard to the specific facts and circumstances, not only of the case
itself, but also of the individuals involved in the alleged incident. It is undisputed
that the complainant and the appellants were positioned as an employee and
senior officials, respectively. Moreover, it is evident from the case presented
by both parties that a dispute existed between them with regard to the
employment in question.
31.
To reiterate, in the present case, the complaint does not indicate that the
appellants used language towards the complainant that would warrant an offence
under Section 509 of the IPC. However, the chargesheet alleges that
the appellants scolded the complainant using "filthy language."
Notably, this allegation is also absent in the FIR.
32.
In light of the employer-employee relationship between the appellants and the
complainant; the existing dispute between them relating to the employment; the
absence of any references to specific words used, contextual details, or
accompanying gestures—whether preceding or succeeding the alleged words—the
failure to mention the use of any "filthy language" in the complaint;
and the fact that this allegation is only found in the chargesheet: there are
serious concerns regarding the claim of insulting modesty of the complainant by
the appellants. Considering the materials available on record, we are of the
view that prima facie ingredients of an offence under Section 509 of
the IPC have not been disclosed.
SECTION
506, IPC
33.
This brings us to the offence under Section 506 of the IPC, which the
High Court has found to be prima facie disclosed against the
appellants. Section 506 of the IPC prescribes the punishment for the
offence of criminal intimidation, while Section 503 defines the
offence of criminal intimidation.
34.
This Court had the occasion to examine the ingredients of Sections 503 and 506 of
the IPC in Manik Taneja and Another v. State of Karnataka & Anr. [(2015) 7 SCC 423], where it was
observed as follows:
“11. xxxxxxxxxxxx A
reading of the definition of ‘criminal intimidation’ would indicate that there
must be an act of threatening to another person, of causing an injury to the
person, reputation, or property of the person threatened, or to the person in
whom the threatened person is interested and the threat must be with the intent
to cause alarm to the person threatened or it must be to do any act which he is
not legally bound to do or omit to do an act which he is legally entitled to
do.”
35.
In the present case, the complaint does not specifically attribute any threats
or intimidation to the second accused. Therefore, ingredients of Section
506 of the IPC, prima facie, are not made out against him. The argument
that the first accused acted at the behest of the second accused is untenable,
as Section 34 of the IPC, which imposes vicarious liability in criminal
matters, has not been applied in this case.
36.
However, the complainant has stated in her complaint that she was threatened by
the first accused, as detailed below:
“Then on 25-10-2013 at
about 2.00 P.M. and 3-00 P.M. one MADHUSHIREE DUTTA (HR) asked me to forcefully
resign or otherwise I will be sent out immediately. Further she abruptly asked
me not to come for my work henceforth”.
37.
Before an offence of criminal intimidation to be made out against the first
accused, it must be established that she had the intention to cause alarm to
the complainant. A review of the alleged threat reveals that the complainant is
primarily alleging illegal termination, which constitutes a civil dispute,
rather than criminal intimidation. It is also the appellants' case, which has
not been disputed by the complainant, that the complainant has filed a
reference before the labour court challenging her termination and seeking
reinstatement along with back wages. Given these circumstances and the
materials on record, the ingredients of Section 506 of the IPC, prima
facie, are not disclosed against the first accused too.
38.
After a thorough examination of the matter, including a review of the materials
on record: viz., the complaint, the FIR, and chargesheet, we are of the view
that none of the ingredients of Sections 323, 504, 506,
and 509 of the IPC are present, even if they are taken at face value
and accepted in their entirety. The complaint is bereft of even the basic
facts, which are absolutely necessary for making out an offence.
39.
Since the ingredients of the offences under the aforementioned sections have
not been made out, the charge under Section 511 of the IPC cannot
stand.
40.
To sum up, after the complainant filed the complaint, a NCR was registered. It
indicated that no cognizable offence was initially believed to have been
committed against the complainant. Subsequently, an FIR was lodged on 23rd
December, 2012, i.e., 58 (fifty-eight) days after the initial complaint was
filed, under Sections 323, 504, 506, 509,
and 511 of the IPC. It is pertinent to note that only Section
509 constitutes a cognizable offence, whereas Sections 323, 504,
and 506 are non- cognizable offences. Furthermore, the FIR does not
contain any allegations that would substantiate a charge
under Section 509 of the IPC. Additionally, the chargesheet is the
sole document that alleges the use of "filthy language" by the
appellants in scolding the complainant. The discrepancies and variations
outlined above, suggest a deliberate attempt to reclassify the nature of the
proceedings from non-cognizable to cognizable or to transform a civil dispute
into a criminal matter, potentially aimed at pressurizing the appellants into
settling the dispute with the complainant.
41.
Notwithstanding this, and as asserted by the appellants, there are certain
facts that strongly suggest that the criminal proceedings were initiated by the
complainant against the appellants with mala fide intentions, specifically to
wreak vengeance, cause harm, or coerce a settlement. The presence of the second
accused cannot by any stretch of imagination be visualised, if one were to
barely read the complaints- initial and subsequent – and treat the contents as
true; yet, the complainant alleged acts against him which, according to her,
amounted to criminal offence. We are reminded of the maxim res ipsa loquitur
and leave the discussion at that.
42.
The legal principles governing the exercise of jurisdiction under Section
482 of the Cr. PC for quashing complaints and criminal proceedings have
been formulated by this Court in a plethora of decisions. We see no reason to
burden this judgment of ours by referring to the same. However, we are fully
convinced that allowing the criminal proceedings to proceed against the
appellants would amount to an abuse of the legal process and result in a
travesty of justice.
43.
In view of the foregoing discussion, we are also of the view that the arguments
advanced by Mr. Luthra on the permissibility of the police to register the FIR
on 23rd December, 2013 need not be examined in this appeal.
CONCLUSION
44.
We, therefore, answer point (i), referred to in paragraph 12 (supra) in the
negative while point (ii) of the same paragraph is answered in the affirmative.
45.
Thus, the impugned order passed by the High Court, dated 31.07.2019, cannot be
sustained and, consequently, stands set aside. The chargesheet and the entire
proceedings in Case Crime No. 53073 of 2014, on the file of the ACCM,
Bangalore, against the appellants also stand quashed.
46.
The appeals are, accordingly, allowed.
47.
We, however, make it clear that the findings/observations recorded/made herein
shall have no bearing on the pending reference between the parties before the
Labour Court.
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