2025 INSC 51
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(HON’BLE
DIPANKAR DATTA, J. AND HON’BLE PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA, JJ.)
INSPECTOR, RAILWAY
PROTECTION FORCE,
Petitioner
VERSUS
MATHEW K CHERIAN
Respondent
Criminal
Appeal No. 4169 of 2024 [Arising out of SLP (CRIMINAL) No. 2408 of 2017 With Criminal
Appeal Nos. 139-140/2025 [Arising out of SLP (CRIMINAL) Nos. 9225-9226 of 2022]-Decided
on 09-01-2025
Criminal,
Quashing
(A) Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973, Section 482 - Railways Act, 1989, Section 143 – Quashing
of criminal proceedings – Challenge as to - Whether the act of creating fake/multiple user IDs
by an individual, who may or may not be an authorized railway agent, with the
intention to procure and supply online tickets through IRCTC portal would
constitute an offence under Section 143 of the Act? - Section 143, on
its plain language, prohibits any person, other than a railway servant or an
authorised agent, to conduct the business of procurement and supply of railway
tickets - The provision does not specify the modalities of the procurement and
supply - Hence, reading the section and give its contents the natural and
ordinary meaning, keeping in mind the objective and purpose of the legislation,
it admits of no doubt that this provision criminalises unauthorised procurement
and supply, irrespective of the mode of procurement and supply - Mere fact of
the system of e-reservation and e-tickets being introduced after the enactment
of the Act does not render the provision in Section 143 toothless to
combat the illegal sale of e-tickets - Section 143, importantly, makes no
distinction between physical and online sale of tickets - The mischief that the
provision seeks to remedy is that there should not be illegal and
unauthorised procurement and sale of tickets, whatever be the mode –
physical or online - The facts of the
case prima facie reveal the commission of an offence under Section
143 of the Act – ‘M’, without the authorisation of the railways, was
carrying on a business of procurement and supply of railway tickets - The
allegations against ‘M’ taken at face value fulfill the elements required
under Section 143(1)(a) of the Act; hence, the threshold for quashing
has not been met in this case - Appeal deserves to be allowed and consequently,
the criminal proceedings against ‘M’ need to be restored.
(Para 27,28, 37 and 38)
(B) Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973, Section 482 - Railways Act, 1989, Section 143 – Quashing
of criminal proceedings – Challenge as to – Expression ‘procure’ and ‘purchase’ - High Court
made the distinction between “procure” and “purchase” - It held that the
tickets were “purchased” by genuine passengers - The tickets were not sold by
‘M’, rather, the tickets were sold by IRCTC in the names of the passengers -
Hence, it cannot be said that ‘M’ was procuring the tickets – Held that this
reasoning is flawed and unsustainable - Travel agents, by and large, do not
purchase tickets in their own name and then sell it to the passengers - Tickets
are procured in the name of the passengers by these agents in lieu of a
commission on the price thereof - Taking active steps, however faithfully, in
order to acquire and provide tickets to third parties but without being a railway
servant or an authorised agent would attract the expression ‘procure and
supply’ as in Section 143 – ‘M’ not being an authorised agent has to face
the proceedings against him.
(Para 30 and 37)
(C) Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973, Section 482 - Railways Act, 1989, Section 143 – Quashing
of criminal proceedings –
Challenge as to - Whether the act of creating fake/multiple user IDs by an
individual, who may or may not be an authorized railway agent, with the
intention to procure and supply online tickets through IRCTC portal would
constitute an offence under Section 143 of the Act? –‘R’ was an
authorised agent of the railways carrying on the business of procurement and
supply of railway tickets - Section 143 only deals with the actions
of unauthorised persons and does not mandate a procedure to be followed by the
authorised agents for procuring or supplying tickets to its customers - The
nature of allegations against ‘R’ in the connected appeal, though serious, Section
143 would not be attracted insofar as he is concerned - That
apart, Section 143 does not criminalise creating multiple user IDs -
Penal provisions have to be read strictly and narrowly as a general rule
- Section 143, by being completely silent on creation of multiple user
IDs, penalises the actions of only the unauthorised agents and not unauthorised
actions of the authorised agents - Thus, even if the facts disclosed in the
first information report are taken at face value, commission of an offence
cannot be attributed to ‘R’ - Any breach has to be remedied by civil action and
not criminal action – ‘R’ being an authorised agent, cannot be proceeded
against under Section 143 of the Act for alleged breach of any of the
terms and conditions of the contract - If, at all, he would be liable to face
civil action - Criminal proceedings against ‘R’ are liable to be quashed.
(Para 35 to 37 and 40)
JUDGMENT
Dipankar Datta J.:-
INTRODUCTION
1.
Common question of law touching interpretation of Section 143 of the Railways
Act, 1989[the Act] is involved
in these appeals by special leave; hence, we propose to decide the same by this
common judgment.
2.
In the first of the two sets of appeals[the
lead appeal] , the judgment and order[in Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 1991/2016 dt. 22.09.2016] of
the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulum [Kerala
High] is assailed whereby criminal
Court proceedings under Section 143 of the Act launched against the first
respondent – Mathew K. Cheriian[Mathew]
– was quashed.
3.
In the connected appeals, the appellant - J. Ramesh[Ramesh] – has assailed the judgment and order [in CRL. O.P. No.18701/2020 18703/2020 and Crl. MP. Nos.7328/2020
and 7329/2020] of the High Court of Judicature at Madras [Madras High Court] refusing to
quash the criminal proceedings launched against Ramesh under Section 143 of the
Act.
FACTUAL
MATRIX
4.
The factual scenario of the two sets of appeals are not too complicated. The
facts which are germane are noted as a precursor to our discussion.
5.
The prosecution case in the lead appeal is that on 11.03.2016, on reliable
information being disclosed to the Inspector, Railway Protection Force [RPF], that unauthorised business
of procuring and supplying railway e-tickets was being carried out in the office
of Mathew, Crime Case No. 524/2016 under Section 143 of the Act was registered
and a search conducted thereat. During the search and seizure operation, one
employee named Joby Jose of Kosamattam Finance, a non-banking finance company
(of which Mathew happened to be the managing director) was arrested and 17
pieces of evidence were seized. In his confessional statement, Joby Jose stated
he was working under the supervision of Mathew. On the basis of this statement,
Mathew was made co-accused in Crime Case No. 524/2016. He was accused of
creating fraudulent user IDs with the Indian Railway Catering and Tourism
Corporation [IRCTC] web portal
to procure and peddle railway tickets for profit, without being an agent
authorised to procure and supply railway tickets and, therefore, operating an
unauthorised business for procurement and supply of railway tickets. Aggrieved,
Mathew moved the Kerala High Court under Section 482, Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973[Cr. PC] seeking
quashing of the proceedings. The Kerala High Court, vide the impugned order,
quashed the criminal proceedings emanating from Crime Case No. 524/2016.
Dissatisfied thereby, the Inspector, RPF is in appeal.
6.
The connected appeals arise out of Case Crime No. 3116/2019 and Case Crime No.
600/2020. The case of the prosecution is that Ramesh and his son are the owners
of “Big Top Travels” which is an authorised agent for railway e-tickets. On
05.12.2019, Case Crime No. 3116/2019 came to be registered against Ramesh under
Section 143 of the Act on the basis of a search and seizure operation conducted
by a special team of the RPF in the shop premises of Ramesh. The offence
alleged against him is that he has been supplying e-tickets to various
customers, and that these e-tickets had been booked through multiple user IDs.
Case Crime No. 600/2020 was registered against Ramesh, also under Section
143(1)(a) of the Act for his involvement in fraudulent activities such as
supply of Tatkal e- tickets by creating multiple personal-user IDs and issuing
unauthorised e- tickets procured through IRCTC website, contrary to IRCTC
Rules. Ramesh, feeling aggrieved by initiation of criminal action by the
respondent- authorities, approached the Madras High Court under Section
482, Cr. PC with a prayer to quash the criminal proceedings. The Madras High
Court, however, refused to quash the criminal proceedings. Dissatisfied
with the impugned order of the Madras High Court, Ramesh has questioned the
same in the connected appeals.
SUBMISSIONS
7.
For the sake of brevity, the submissions advanced by the parties in both sets
of the appeals are noted together. Arguments of the prosecution can be
summarised as follows:
I. Section 143 of the
Act does not permit authorised agents to carry out unauthorised actions under
the façade of authorisation. When an authorised agent carries out unauthorised
transactions using the personal IDs of other individuals, the cloak of
authorisation cannot be used as a ruse. Therefore, to be exempt from the
application of Section 143, both the status of the person and the nature
of the action must be considered.
II. Section
143 is part of the overall scheme to promote the efficacy of the railway
system and its operations. Therefore, the Court must interpret the provision in
line with the object of the statute.
III. Mathew, as the
Managing Director of a finance company, created hundreds of user IDs to sell
railway tickets at a premium which constitutes an offence under Section
143.
IV. Section
143 makes no distinction between physical tickets and e-tickets and only
contemplates penal action against unauthorised carrying on of the business of
procuring and supplying railway tickets.
V. Offence under Section 143 is a
social crime. The mischief is sought to be addressed by limiting the number of
tickets that an individual can purchase using his personal ID and, thereby,
touting of railway tickets is prevented.
VI. The Kerala High
Court has erred in quashing the criminal proceedings at this stage as a bare
perusal of the complaint reveals that all the ingredients under Section
143 are prima facie attracted.
VII. The Madras High
Court has correctly refrained from following the erroneous decision of the
Kerala High Court.
VIII. While upholding
the decision of the Madras High Court, the decision of the Kerala High Court
ought to be reversed and the prosecution allowed to lead its evidence before
the relevant trial courts for the proceedings to be taken to its logical
conclusion.
8.
The submissions on behalf of the accused – Mathew and Ramesh – in favour of
quashing of the proceedings, as advanced before us, are these:
I. The plain and
unambiguous words of Section 143 of the Act make it clear that the creation of
multiple user IDs is not an offence under Section 143, and Section
143 must be construed strictly as it is a penal provision.
II. The
materialisation of e-ticketing scheme could not have been conceptualised by the
legislature at the time of passing the Act, as the scheme as well as the
internet did not exist at that time.
III. Section
143(1)(a) was intended to penalise the sale of tickets by persons other
than railway servants and authorized agents.
IV. Ramesh is an authorised agent and, thus,
could not have been proceeded against under Section 143(1), on its own
terms; and, if at all, there has been a breach or violation of the terms and
conditions of the contract by Ramesh, the remedy of the railways/RPF is to
approach the civil court.
V. The decision of the
Madras High Court ought to be reversed and the decision of the Kerala High
Court upheld, thereby bringing down the curtain on both the criminal
proceedings.
IMPUGNED
ORDERS
9.
Now, let us have a look at the orders impugned before us. A thorough
examination thereof would enable us to arrive at an appropriate conclusion.
10.
In the lead appeal, the Kerala High Court has quashed the criminal proceedings
against the first respondent. The reasons assigned therefor are reproduced
below:
“5. The Act was
enacted much before the advent of e-ticket system. The object of Section
143 is to prevent procurement of ticket for travelling on railway or 1n a
reserved compartment or journey in a train by any person with the ticket not
being issued by railway servant or by an authorised agent. It appears that
Railway wants to ensure the authenticity of the tickets issued to the
travellers on a travel in a railway. It appears that many travellers were
travelling on railway in a ticket not being issued to them and issued in the
name of third parties. The Railways Act wants to ensure that the
ticket is issued by railway servant or agent authorised on this behalf as the
case may be to a genuine travellers (sic, “traveller”).
6. …The use of
internet medium registered in the name of a person, to issue tickets to a third
party is not one contemplated under Section 143 for the purpose of
considering it as an offence. … There is no sale of ticket by the petitioner as
even admitted in the counter, the sale is being conducted by IRCTC.
The use of computer or
use of printer for printing ticket purchased by a traveller cannot be deemed as
sale effected by the owner of the computer or printer. Procuring tickets has
to be understood as providing or giving tickets to the travellers.
Admittedly tickets are
procured by the genuine travellers. When legislature considered an actionable
wrong in a particular manner in a brick and mortar business, it cannot be
applied to an online business unless all elements constituting the offence- are
present in the online business. The offence is not attracted even if one has to
assume that action of the accused would amount to revision clearly mandates
that tickets have to be procured by the offender.”
11.
The view taken by the Kerala High Court appears to be that Section
143 is somewhat outdated in the age of purchasing tickets using the
internet. It has, in essence, read down Section 143 to state that one
can conduct a business of procuring and supplying tickets without the
authorisation of the railways as long as it is done through the internet. The
order also observes that as the tickets were procured in the name of genuine
passengers, it cannot be said that Mathew had contravened Section 143.
12.
In the connected appeals, the Madras High Court refused to quash the criminal
appeal and ratiocinated its view in the following words:
“9. …This Court is of
the considered view that the decision held by the High Court of Kerala holding
that the said provision was enacted much prior to the creation of e-tickets and
the petitioner therein was not carrying a business of procuring and supplying
of tickets for travel on the Railway reserved tickets through internet and
therefore online was not prohibited, whereas in the case on hand, the offence
committed by the petitioner is completely different from the aforesaid case.
The petitioner himself created more than 200 user IDs, procured tickets and
supplied to the passengers. Further, in the said business of procuring and
purchasing tickets on Railways were for the benefit of Rs.150/- for sleeper and
Rs.250/- for A/C per head in addition to ticket fare as service charge from his
customers, prohibited by the provisions under Section 143 of the Act.
In fact, recommendation of the e-tickets scheme no way alters the position of
purchase of tickets, as agent or the customer can book e-tickets by creating ID
in their name. But the authorized agent cannot create other user IDs for the
purpose of procuring tickets for illegal gain. Therefore, judgement cited
by the learned counsel for the petitioner is not applicable to the case on
hand. That apart, the crime is under investigation and only after
investigation, the respondent can unearth the truth.”
13.
The Madras High Court acknowledged that Ramesh was an authorised agent
under Section 143; however, it refused to quash the criminal proceedings
on the ground that such authorisation did not empower the appellant to create
multiple user IDs for the purpose of procuring tickets for illegal gain. On the
ground that Ramesh was only authorised to sell tickets through his own account
and was not specifically authorised to create multiple user IDs, the Madras
High Court dismissed Ramesh’s petition seeking quashing of the criminal
proceedings.
ANALYSIS
14.
The appeals before us, although have different factual matrices, involve a
common question of law. Having bestowed serious consideration and thought, we
find ourselves in a curious position where our interference seems to be
warranted in both sets of appeals.
15.
In order to settle the controversy in the present lis, the ambit and scope
of Section 143 of the Act has to be noticed and comprehended. The
question before us is whether the act of creating fake/multiple user IDs by an
individual, who may or may not be an authorized railway agent, with the
intention to procure and supply online tickets through IRCTC portal would
constitute an offence under Section 143 of the Act? In addition to
the scope of Section 143, we need to analyse whether the two criminal
proceedings in question did merit quashing by the respective High Court.
16.
At this stage, it would be beneficial to read Section 143 of the Act.
It reads:
143. Penalty for unauthorised carrying on of
business of procuring and supplying of railway ticket-
(1)
if any person, not being a railway servant or an agent authorised in this
behalf,-
(a) carries on the
business of procuring and supplying tickets for travel on a railway or from
reserved accommodation for journey in a train; or
(b) purchases or sells
or attempts to purchase or sell tickets with a view to carrying on any such
business either by himself or by any other person, he shall be punishable with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years or with fine which may
extend to ten thousand rupees, or with both, and shall also forfeit the tickets
which he do so procures, supplies, purchases, sells or attempts to purchase or
sell:
Provided that in the
absence of special and adequate reasons to the contrary to be mentioned in
judgment of the court, such punishment shall not be less than imprisonment for
a term-of one month or a fine of five thousand rupees.
(2) Whoever abets any
offence punishable under this section shall, whether or not such offence is
committed, be punishable with the same punishment as is provided for the
offence.
(emphasis
supplied)
17.
The purport and objective of Section 143 of the Act is to restrict
entities which are not under the disciplinary control of or are not authorised
by the railways to conduct the business of procurement and supply of railway
tickets. Railway servants and authorised agents stand apart since, on its own
terms, Section 143 has no application to them.
18.
The whole scheme of e-ticketing was introduced for the convenience and betterment
of the passenger’s experience of travelling on a train, due to which the
procurement and supply of these e-tickets, rightfully so, is highly regulated.
In the additional affidavit of the appellant in the lead appeal, Rules and
Regulations for Reserved Bail e-Ticketing Service Providers (PSPs/RSPs) have
been annexed which reflect the idea of protecting the consumer and
strictly prohibit using personal/fraudulent IDs to book tickets for commercial
purposes. These rules, further, bar sharing of the credentials by these
authorised agents. Also, the perils of hoarding of resources by a select few
are widely known and has to be kept in mind while adjudicating the present lis.
19.
IRCTC has limited the number of tickets which can be reserved on one personal user
ID at 12 per month (24 per month with a user ID which is Aadhaar verified).
Mathew, it is alleged, had created hundreds of fake user IDs to sell tickets
without any authorisation from the railways. Although the internet and
e-tickets were unknown in India when the Act was brought into force, this
conduct of Mathew (who is neither a railway servant nor an authorised agent)
nevertheless attracts criminality under Section 143(1)(a) of the Act.
20.
The Kerala High Court allowed the quashing petition filed by Mathew on the
ground that the Act was enacted before the advent of internet and e- tickets
and the lawmakers could not have envisioned sale of tickets, online. We find
this line of reasoning of the High Court to be plainly erroneous.
21.
Statutory interpretation has to follow certain principles which have been
formulated through legal precedents. No court can refuse to enforce a provision
on the sole basis of the provision predating any subsequent development
regarding the ticketing process. If it can be demonstrated that a statutory
provision is broad enough to envelop the subsequent developments, even if the
developments were not envisioned by the legislature, the provision would stay
operational. This principle was expounded by this Court in Senior Electric
Inspector v. Laxminarayan Chopra[AIR 1962
SC 159] in the following words:
“…This Court in
construing the words ‘sale of goods’ in Entry 48, List II of the Seventh
Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935, accepted the aforesaid principle
in State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley & Co., (Madras)
Ltd. [(1959) SCR 379] and restated it at p. 416 thus:
‘The principle of
these decisions is that when, after the enactment of a legislation, new facts
and situations arise which could not have been in its contemplation, the
statutory provisions could properly be applied to them if the words thereof are
in a broad sense capable of containing them.’
The legal position may
be summarized thus: The maxim contemporanea expositio as laid down
by Coke was applied to construing ancient statutes, but not to
interpreting Acts which are comparatively modern. There is a good reason for
this change in the mode of interpretation. The fundamental rule of construction
is the same whether the Court is asked to construe a provision of an ancient
statute or that of a modern one, namely, what is the expressed intention of the
Legislature. It is perhaps difficult to attribute to a legislative body
functioning in a static society that its intention was couched in terms of
considerable breadth so as to take within its sweep the future developments
comprehended by the phraseology used. It is more reasonable to confine its
intention only to the circumstances obtaining at the time the law was made. But
in a modern progressive society it would be unreasonable to confine the
intention of a Legislature to the meaning attributable to the word used at the
time the law was made, for a modern Legislature making laws to govern a society
which is fast moving must be presumed to be aware of an enlarged meaning the
same concept might attract with the march of time and with the revolutionary
changes brought about in social, economic, political and scientific and other
fields of human activity. Indeed, unless a contrary intention appears, an interpretation
should be given to the words used to take in new facts and situations, if the
words are capable of comprehending them. We cannot, therefore, agree with the
learned Judges of the High Court that the maxim contemporanea expositio could
be invoked in construing the word ‘telegraph line’ in the Act.”
(emphasis
supplied)
22.
The aforenoted decision has been followed in a relatively recent decision of
this Court in Dharani Sugars and Chemicals Ltd. v.
Union of India[(2019) 5 SCC
480] . This Court, further, noticed an English decision in Comdel
Commodities Ltd. v. Siporex Trade S.A. (No. 2) [(1990) 2 All E R 552 (HL)] distilling the principle as follows:
‘… When a change in
social conditions produces a novel situation, which was not in contemplation at
the time when a statute was first enacted, there can be no a priori assumption
that the enactment does not apply to the new circumstances. If the language of
the enactment is wide enough to extend to those circumstances, there is no
reason why it should not apply.’
23.
Bearing in mind the above principles, we may now proceed to consider a couple
of decisions of this Court on the rule of literal interpretation.
24. In Jugalkishore
Saraf v. Raw Cotton Co. Ltd. [AIR 1955 SC
376] , Hon’ble S.R. Das J. (as His Lordship then was), speaking for
the Court, held as follows:
“6…The cardinal rule
of construction of statutes is to read the statutes literally, that is, by
giving to the words their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. If,
however, such a reading leads to absurdity and the words are susceptible of
another meaning, the Court may adopt the same. But if no such alternative
construction is possible, the Court must adopt the ordinary rule of literal
interpretation. In the present case, the literal construction leads to no
apparent absurdity and therefore, there can be no compelling reason for
departing from that golden rule of construction.”
25.
A reference can also be made to the decision of not too distant an origin. In Ansal
Properties & Industries Ltd. V. State of Haryana [2009 (3) SCC 553], the rule of literal construction has been
reiterated in the following words:
“39. If the
legislature had intended that the licensee is required to transfer the land and
also to construct the buildings on it or to make payment for such construction,
the legislature would have made specific provisions laying down such conditions
explicitly and in clear words in which event the provisions would have been
worded in altogether different words and terms. It is a well-settled
principle in law that the court cannot read anything into a statutory provision
which is plain and unambiguous. The language employed in a statute is
determinative factor of legislative intent. If the language of the enactment is
clear and unambiguous, it would not be proper for the courts to add any words
thereto and evolve some legislative intent, not found in the statute.”
(emphasis
supplied)
26.
From the above decisions, it is quite clear that if the language of the
particular statute under consideration is clear and unambiguous, it is not for
the courts to add to or delete any words from the statute in the guise of
ascertaining what could have been the legislative intent.
27. Section
143, on its plain language, prohibits any person, other than a railway servant
or an authorised agent, to conduct the business of procurement and supply of
railway tickets. The provision does not specify the modalities of the
procurement and supply. Hence, if we read the section and give its contents the
natural and ordinary meaning, keeping in mind the objective and purpose of the
legislation, as discussed above, it admits of no doubt that this provision
criminalises unauthorised procurement and supply, irrespective of the mode of
procurement and supply.
28.
We are further of the considered opinion that the mere fact of the system of
e-reservation and e-tickets being introduced after the enactment of the Act
does not render the provision in Section 143 toothless to combat the
illegal sale of e-tickets. Section 143, importantly, makes no distinction
between physical and online sale of tickets. The mischief that the provision
seeks to remedy is that there should not be illegal and
unauthorised procurement and sale of tickets, whatever be the mode – physical
or online. The Kerala High Court seems to have missed this aspect.
29.
There has been a major technological development in the last three decades by
reason whereof a significant number of services provided by the Governments are
available online. Electronic and internet services have not only become
indispensable but offer significant advantages to the public. Having regard to
the comprehensive phraseology employed in Section 143, the net of its
coverage is wide enough to encompass regulation of the conduct of ticketing
agents and to protect the public from unscrupulous elements trying to defraud
them by sale of valueless tickets.
30.
The Kerala High Court made the distinction between “procure” and “purchase”. It
held that the tickets were “purchased” by genuine passengers. The tickets were
not sold by Mathew, rather, the tickets were sold by IRCTC in the names of the
passengers. Hence, it cannot be said that Mathew was procuring the tickets.
This reasoning, in our view, is flawed and unsustainable. Travel agents, by and
large, do not purchase tickets in their own name and then sell it to the
passengers. Tickets are procured in the name of the passengers by these agents
in lieu of a commission on the price thereof. Taking active steps, however
faithfully, in order to acquire and provide tickets to third parties but
without being a railway servant or an authorised agent would attract the
expression ‘procure and supply’ as in Section 143.
31.
We agree with the prosecution that Section 143, a penal provision, has
been enacted to tackle a social crime. The Indian Railways is a keystone of our
country’s infrastructure. It carries around 673 crore passengers annually
and has a tremendous impact on the economy of this country.
Any
effort to disrupt the integrity and stability of the ticketing system has to be
stopped on its tracks.
32.
The second issue before us is whether these criminal proceedings in the two
appeals should be quashed. This Court has dealt with the issue of quashing
numerous times. Reference in this connection may be made to the decisions
in R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab[1960
SCC OnLine SC 21.], State of W.B. v. Swapan Kumar Guha[(1982) 1 SCC 561.], State of
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal[1992 Supp (1) SCC
335.], Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate[(1998) 5 SCC 749] , and Amit
Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander[(2012) 9 SCC
460].
33.
The principles which can be extrapolated from these precedents are that
quashing of a criminal proceeding can take place, inter alia, if the first
information report does not reveal a crime or if the fact situation be such
that continuance of the criminal proceedings would result in abuse of the
process causing injustice to the accused. This power of quashing, however, is
not unfettered or unlimited and as the old adage goes - “judicial discretion
has to be exercised judiciously”.
34.
In the lead appeal, the facts of the case prima facie reveal the commission of
an offence under Section 143 of the Act. Mathew, without the
authorisation of the railways, was carrying on a business of procurement and
supply of railway tickets. The allegations against Mathew taken at face value
fulfil the elements required under Section 143(1)(a) of the Act;
hence, the threshold for quashing has not been met in this case.
35.
In the connected appeals, Ramesh was an authorised agent of the railways
carrying on the business of procurement and supply of railway
tickets. Section 143 only deals with the actions of unauthorised
persons and does not mandate a procedure to be followed by the authorised
agents for procuring or supplying tickets to its customers. The nature of
allegations against Ramesh in the connected appeal, though
serious, Section 143 would not be attracted insofar as he is concerned.
36.
That apart, Section 143 does not criminalise creating multiple user
IDs. Penal provisions have to be read strictly and narrowly as a general
rule. Section 143, by being completely silent on creation of multiple user
IDs, penalises the actions of only the unauthorised agents and not unauthorised
actions of the authorised agents. Thus, even if the facts disclosed in the
first information report are taken at face value, commission of an offence
cannot be attributed to Ramesh. Any breach has to be remedied by civil action
and not criminal action.
37.
To sum up, Mathew not being an authorised agent has to face the proceedings
against him while Ramesh, being an authorised agent, cannot be proceeded
against under Section 143 of the Act for alleged breach of any of the
terms and conditions of the contract. If, at all, he would be liable to face
civil action.
38.
In our view, for the foregoing reasons, the lead appeal deserves to be allowed
and consequently, the criminal proceedings against Mathew need to be restored.
It is ordered accordingly.
39. The proceedings against Mathew shall be
taken to its logical conclusion, in accordance with law. Observations made by
us hereinabove are for the purpose of a decision on the lead appeal and may not
be construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the prosecution’s
case.
40.
The connected appeals are allowed as well, but the criminal proceedings against
Ramesh are hereby quashed.
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