2025 INSC 19
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(HON’BLE C.T. RAVIKUMAR, J. AND
HON’BLE SANJAY KAROL, JJ.)
NARESH ANEJA @ NARESH KUMAR ANEJA
Petitioner
VERSUS
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
Respondent
Criminal
Appeal No. 01 of 2025 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 1093 of
2021)-Decided on 02-01-2025
Criminal, Quashing
(A) Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973, Section 482 – Quashing of criminal proceedings – Offence u/s 354, 506 IPC – Held
to apply Section 354 IPC, the offence must be committed against a woman;
criminal force must be applied against her; and such application of force must
be with the intent to outrage her modesty - The record is silent with respect
to the use of any force, apart from bald assertions of mental and physical
discomfort caused to the complainant by the appellant - For mens rea to be
established, something better than vague statements must be produced before the
court - As evidenced by the documents, i.e. the FIR, the preliminary
investigation report as also the concluding portion of the chargesheet, no
direct allegation nor any evidence in support thereof can be found attributing
intent to the appellant - It cannot be said that a case u/s 354 IPC
is made out against the appellant - Sum total of the circumstances, submissions
and documents on record do not point to appellant having committed any offence
against the complainant - Impugned judgment of the High Court passed in
Application u/s 482 liable to be set
aside - Criminal proceedings arising out of FIR No. liable to be quashed qua
the present appellant.
(Para 12 to 17)
(B) Penal Code,
1860, Section 503, 506 – Criminal intimidation – Ingredients - For an offence u/s 503 to be established,
it must be shown that: - (1) Threatening a person with any injury; (i) to his
person, reputation or property; or (ii) to the person, or reputation of anyone
in whom that person is interested. (2) Such threat must be intentional; (i) to
cause alarm to that person; or (ii) to cause that person to do any act which he
is not legally bound to do as the means of avoiding the execution of such
threat; or (iii) to cause that person to omit to do any act which that person
is legally entitled to do as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat
- Punishment for this offence is prescribed u/s 506 IPC, which is two
years or with a fine or both.
(Para
13)
JUDGMENT
Sanjay Karol, J. :- Leave Granted.
2.
The instant appeal questions the correctness of judgment in order dated 8th
January, 2021, passed in Application u/s 482 No. 18712 of 2020 by the High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad, whereby the appellant request to quash the
chargesheet and proceedings arising out of Case Crime No. 1074 of 2019 u/s
354, 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860[Hereinafter referred to as ‘IPC’] was turned down.
FACTS
IN BRIEF
3.
The appellant and respondent no. 2 [Hereinafter
referred to as ‘the complainant’] are Directors in a joint concern by
the name of ‘M/s LAJ-IDS Exports Pvt. Ltd.’ with the shareholding divided
3:1. Record reveals certain allegations and counter allegations in regard
to mishandling of the company’s finances, however, the same are not within the
scope of the present adjudication.
3.1
In July 2019, the appellant vide a communication Annexed as P-2 sought to end
this partnership. However, this fact also stands disputed.
3.2 On 20th July, 2019, respondent no. 2 filed
a complaint before the Senior Superintendent of Police, Janpad – Gautambuddh
Nagar, making allegations against RK Aneja (brother of the appellant and A-1 in
the chargesheet) of inappropriate behaviour in the workplace as also alleged
threat of murder. The complaint reads as under:
“To, The Senior Superintendent of
Police, Janpad – Gautambuddh Nagar (U.P.) Sir, The humble request is that
Applicant Puja D/o Late A.K. Tankha is R/o H.N.2106 Tower Lotus bulword Sector
100 Noida P.S. 39, Gautambuddh Nagar and Applicant is working ass Director in
I.D.S. Export Pvt. Ltd. House No.208, Sector 63, Noida Company and R.K. Aneja
R/o 7 Hauz Khas New Delhi are working as Director in the aforesaid company and
Applicant has been working in the aforesaid company from February 2018. R.K.
Aneja has been harassing and troubling the Applicant since October November
2018 and from few months R.K. Aneja has been holding hands on small works and
when the Applicant works on computer while sitting then he touches the
Applicant which cannot be explained by Applicant. Applicant informed this to
Naresh then he said that he will make R.K. Aneja understand. Holding the hand
of Applicant and touching her body in above office by the R.K. Aneja has been
seen by Chaman Lal S/o Kishan Lal R/o E-1813 G.N.22, Sangam Vihar, New Delhi
and Savender Singh R/o I.P. Extension New Delhi. R.K. Aneja has tried to rape
Applicant and upon screaming he threatened to kill her, then the Applicant
pushed R.K. Aneja and escaped from there and left the company. Applicant went
to police station and police officer did not lodge his complaint then the
Applicant went and met Senior Superintendent of Police Gautambudh Nagar in
Public Audience and gave her complaint on which no steps have been taken.
Applicant is again giving this complaint to Senior Superintendent of Police.
Therefore, it is requested t you sir, that
direction be given to the Station House Officer Phase-3 to lodge the first
information report against the above persons and take legal actions.
Applicant Sd/-”
3.3 A preliminary enquiry report was submitted
to the competent authority on 6th August, 2019. However, on 14th August, 2019,
the complainant filed an application bearing no. 457/2019 u/s
156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973[CrPC’ for short, before the Chief Judicial Magistrate[Abbreviated as ‘CJM’], Gautambuddh
Nagar alleging non-lodging of complaint as also no investigation having taken
place on the representation given to the Senior Superintendent of Police,
Gautambuddh Nagar. Relevant extract thereof is as under:
“…Conclusion:-
During the investigation, we
spoke to both the parties and gone through all the facts and it was found that
R.K. Aneja has firm in the name of “Laj Exports Limited which works in the
field of Garments. The above firm was registered in the year 2005. Applicant
Pooja Tankha has firm in the name of “IDS Fashions Pvt. Ltd. In the above firm
Applicant and her mother are designated Director. In the year 2018 Applicant
met with Accused R.K. Aneja through common friend Ajay Dalvi. Applicant
informed that she has various buyer from foreign in case Accused make joint
company then business can be increased. After that a joint business company was
registered by the Applicant and Accused in the name of Laj IDS Exports Private
Limited” in the above firm R.K. Aneja and Naresh Aneja had 75% share and
Applicant had 25% share. The above firm used to do designing and export of
Bridal wear and Evening Wear. Applicant had various customer in foreign
therefore he was given operational management work whereas the account finance
and other policy decision were with R.K. Aneja and Naresh Aneja.
Because of various difference
between the Applicant and Accused during the business of company, the dispute
arose in the company. Accused states that Applicant used to book the orders
received from foreign in her own private company “IDS Fashions Private Limited
and ‘not in the name of Laj IDS Exports Private Limited, but the resources
were used of Laj IDS Exports Private Limited. On the other hand the Applicant
states that the foreign customers know her personal company IDS Fashions
Private Limited and not Laj IDS Exports Private Limited therefore all orders
are taken in the name of IDS Fashions Private Limited and those are fulfilled
by the company Laj IDS Exports Private Limited, the information was well within
the knowledge of the other Director of Laj Exports Private Limited. Accused has
made allegation on the applicant that she has booked the order from foreign
without any acceptance/approval and did not give any information to the Accused
and has got the work executed from “Laj Exports Private Limited because of
which huge financial loss has occurred. On the other hand Applicant states that
even after being Director she was not able to see the accounts of “Laj IDS
Exports Private Limited and she has made allegation on the other Directors that
they have done misappropriation of account and theft of tax.
Hence it is clear that there is
dispute going on between applicant and Accused with regard to management and
finances of “Laj IDS Exports Private Limited.
Applicant had made allegation in
her complaint that Accused Director R.K. Aneja used to harass her and used to
threat him to kill her. During the enquiry with Applicant it was informed that
Accused R.K. Aneja used to touch her inappropriately and also used to stand
behind with bad intention. Although these allegations were opposed by the
Accused. It is stated that in other firms there are 1600 girls are working but
no one has made allegation of harassment till date. During the investigation
other worker of Laj IDS Exports Private Limited Smt. Babli W/o Shri Ashok Singh
Kumar, Shri Chamanlal S/o Shri Kishan Lal …illegible Yadav S/o Shri Harishchandra
Yadav, Avdhesh Kumar, Pawan Kumar, Sarwal Khan etc. were enquired and statement
were taken who has stated in their statement that they had no information of
such incident done with the Applicant by the R.K. Aneja. During the
investigation Applicant has also not provided any evidence like CCTV footage
etc. apart from her verbal statement from which the same can be clarified. From
the complete information it is clear that there is a dispute between Applicant
and Accused regarding management and finance of Laj IDS Exports Private Limited
but the allegation of harassment and touching inappropriately by the Accused
cannot be certainly stated.
… … …
Sd/-
(Piyush Singh)
District Magistrate-Second
Janpad-Gautambudhnagar”
(emphasis supplied)
3.4 The CJM, on 20th August, 2019, in
pursuance of this application, directed registration of complaint and
investigation thereof. On 4th September, 2019, First Information Report[For short ‘FIR’] No. 1074 of 2019
came to be registered u/s 354 & 506 of IPC where under
the present appellant is A-2.
Certain portions are extracted
below: -
“…Copy complaint in Hindi in
typed form before Hon’ble Chief Judicial Magistrate Sir, Gautambuddh Nagar,
Complaint No. 457 of 2019 Pooja D/o Late A.K. Tankha, R/o H.N.2106 Tower Lotus
Vulworld Sector 100 Noida P.S. 39, Gautambuddh Nagar… Applicant Versus 1. R.K.
Aneja Director 2. Naresh Aneja Director presently working in Company and
address Laj IDS Export Pvt. Ltd House No.208, Sector 63, Noida, District
Gautambuddh Nagar,.. Respondent. Ps Phase 3, Complaint under Section
156(3) CrPC, sir the humble request is that Applicant Pooja D/o Late A.K.
Tankha R/o H.N. 2016 Tower Lotus Sector 100, Noida PS 39 Gautambuddhnagar is
working as Director in the company and R.K. Anuja and Naresh R/o 7 Hauz Khas
New Delhi are also the director in the above company. Applicant has been
working in the aforesaid company from February 2018. R.K. Aneja has been
harassing the troubling the Applicant since October November 2018 and from few
months R.K. Aneja has been holding hands on small works and when the Applicant
works on computer while sitting then he touches the Applicant which cannot be
explained by Applicant. Applicant informed this to Naresh then he said that he
will make R.K. Aneja understand. Holding the hand of Applicant and touching her
body in above office by the R.K. Aneja is seen by Chaman Lal S/o Kishan Lal R/o
E- 1813 G.N. 22 Sangam Vihar, New Delhi and Savender Singh R/o I.P. Extension
New Delhi. R.K. Aneja has tried has tried to rape Applicant and upon screaming
he threatened to kill her, then the Applicant pushed R.K. Aneja and escaped
from there and left the company. Applicant went to police station and police
officer did not lodge his complaint then the Applicant went and met Senior
Superintendent of Police Gautambudh Nagar in Public Audience and gave her
complaint on which no steps have been taken. Applicant is again giving this
complaint to Senior Superintendent of Police but till date no investigation has
taken place. Constrained with the above the applicant is filing the present
complaint here. Therefore, it is requested to you sir, that direction be given
to the Station House Officer Phase-3 to lodge the first information report
against the above persons and take legal actions. Date 14.08.20219 Applicant SD
English…illegible”
(emphasis
supplied)
3.5 It is also to be noted that, shortly after
the present complainant filed her complaint, the appellant and his brother
filed a complaint against the complainant alleging criminal breach of trust,
cheating, and siphoning of funds of the partnership concern.
3.6
The appellant as also A-1 filed a Writ Petition in the High Court[Criminal Writ Petition 22246 of 2019;
disposed of vide order dated 1 st October 2019 seeking protection from
arrest as also the quashing of the subject FIR. Such a prayer to quash was
refused but protection from arrest was granted till submission of the final
report.
3.7
Chargesheet No. 8264 of 2020 was filed on 10th January, 2020, under the
sections above named stating that the statement of the complainant, statements
of the appellant and witnesses and the statement of appellant u/s
164 CrPC, the offences were found to be made out. Relevant extract thereof
is as follows: -
“sir the above case was
registered on the complaint of the above Complainant Pooja Tankha after
investigation by SI Pramod Kumar Tyagi PS Phase 3. The above investigation was
transferred from PS 3 to PS Site 5. I SI have gone through the above case and
received C.D. and investigated. In the above case there is an anticipatory
order from the Hon’ble High Court of Allahabad for the arrest of above accused
Rajinder Kumar Aneja S/o Santlal Aneja R/o H-7, Hauz Khas, PS Hauz Khas New
Delhi because of which the Accused cannot be arrested. Upon investigation
statement of complainant and witness were taken and inspected the incident spot
and statement under Section 164 Cr.PC was taken from Accused Rajender
Kumar Aneja S/o Santlal Aneja R/o H-7, Hauz Khas PS Hauz Khas New Delhi 2.
Naresh Kumar Aneja S/o Sant Lal Aneja R/o H-7, Hauz Khas PS Hauz Khas New
Delhi, which is found under Section 354/506 IPC. Therefore, the
Charge Sheet is present through Challan before Hon’ble Court. Kindly give
appropriate punishment.” Cognizance thereon was taken on 24th June, 2020.
PROCEEDINGS
BEFORE THE HIGH COURT
4.
The appellant filed a petition u/s 482 CrPC seeking a quashing of the
chargesheet dated 10th January, 2020; cognizance order dated 24th June, 2020 as
also stay on further proceedings against the appellant arising out of Case
Crime No. 1074 of 2019 i.e. Trial Case No. 8264 of 2020 pending before the
Civil Judge, Junior Division, FTC-2, Gautambuddh Nagar.
5.
By the impugned order, the Learned Single Judge refused the prayer, observing
that only malicious or malafide institution of proceedings warrants
interference by way of the inherent powers of the High Court. It was further
observed that there were disputed questions of facts and that the High Court
could not enter into, nor could it undertake a “microscopic examination of
facts and evidence to thwart the prosecution case”. Before it, a prayer for
accepting the plea of bail was made seeking directions to the concerned court
in that regard.
6.
The Trial Court was directed to consider the prayer for bail on its own merits,
and the appellant was directed to appear before the concerned Court within 45
days, and for such a time period, he was protected from any coercive steps.
SUBMISSIONS
7.
We have heard Mr. R Basanth and Ms. Shobha Gupta, Learned Senior Counsel for
the appellant and complainant, respectively.
7.1
The case of the appellant, as can be understood from the record as also the
submissions made, is as follows:
(a) Prior to the
application u/s 156(3) CrPC, an earlier complaint dated 14th August,
2019, was registered making the same allegations, which fact has been hidden
from the Learned Magistrate. The preliminary investigating report submitted in
respect thereto records that no offence under Sections
354 & 506 IPC are made out and in fact, the dispute arises
from company affairs and management. In other words, the appellant has been
falsely implicated in this case.
(b) Contents of the FIR or the
chargesheet do not disclose commission of any offence by the appellant nor has
the complainant alleged any act on his part in the application u/s
156(3) CrPC. There is only one-line in the chargesheet stating that the
allegations against the appellant were proved.
(c) The FIR is motivated since
the complainant possessed intentions to commit fraud. Upon her intentions and
actions being unearthed, several cases have been filed against them.
7.2
The Complainant’s case is as under:
(a) There is an attempt to paint
the dispute as one originating from the company’s affairs, however, the
appellant and his brother took undue advantage of the complainant and
blackmailed her.
(b) The FIR and
statements u/s 161 and 164 CrPC are clear that A-1 made
inappropriate advances towards her and when she wished to file a complaint, the
appellant degraded her by way of abusive language and physical and mental
harassment.
(c) The appellant has concealed
relevant facts before this court, such as his criminal history, including
complaints allegedly filed by persons other than the complainant herein.
(d) With reference to Rupan
Deol Bajaj v. K.P.S Gill[(1995) 6 SCC
194] , Rajesh Bajaj v. State of NCT of Delhi[(1999) 3 SCC 259] and Medchl Chemicals and Pharma (P) Ltd.
v. Biological E Ltd . & Ors,
[(2002) 1 SCC 234]it is submitted that prima facie offence is made out
against the appellant, and therefore, the same should not be quashed.
CONSIDERATION BY THIS COURT
8.
In the above conspectus, the sole question to be considered by this court is
whether the charges levied against the appellant are ex-facie made out from the
record, thereby justifying the High Court’s refusal to quash proceedings by
invoking its inherent powers u/s 482 CrPC.
9.
For the purposes of immediate recall, it may be stated here that the
chargesheet finds the offences u/s 354 & 506 IPC to be
established, warranting trial against the appellant as well as A-1.
10.
It is well settled that when considering an application u/s 482 CrPC,
the court cannot conduct a mini-trial but instead is to be satisfied that prima
facie the offences as alleged are made out. To put it differently, it is to be
seen, without undertaking a minute examination of the record, that there is
some substance in the allegations made which could meet the threshold of
statutory language.
11.
Let us now consider the sections under which the offences have been alleged.
“354. Assault or criminal force
to woman with intent to outrage her modesty.—Whoever assaults or uses criminal
force to any woman, intending to outrage or knowing it to be likely that he
will thereby outrage her modesty, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which shall not be less than one year but which may
extend to five years, and shall also be liable to fine.
503. Criminal
intimidation.—Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person,
reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that
person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause
that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do
any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding
the execution of such threats, commits criminal intimidation.
Explanation.—A threat to injure
the reputation of any deceased person in whom the person threatened is
interested, is within this section.
506. Punishment for criminal
intimidation.—Whoever commits the offence of criminal intimidation shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
two years, or with fine, or with both;
if threat be to cause death or
grievous hurt, etc.—and if the threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, or to
cause the destruction of any property by fire, or to cause an offence
punishable with death or imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment for a term
which may extend to seven years, or to impute unchastity to a woman, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
seven years, or with fine, or with both.”
12.
A bear perusal of Section 354, IPC reveals that for it to apply, the
offence must be committed against a woman; criminal force must be applied
against her; and such application of force must be with the intent to outrage
her modesty. [See: Raju Pandurang Mahale v. State of Maharashtra[(2004) 4 SCC 371] ]
12.1
Criminal force is defined in Section 350 IPC[350. Criminal force.—Whoever intentionally uses force to any person,
without that person's consent, in order to the committing of any offence, or
intending by the use of such force to cause, or knowing it to be likely that by
the use of such force he will cause injury, fear or annoyance to the person to
whom the force is used, is said to use criminal force to that other.],
however, what exactly does modesty means, which is an essential aspect for this
Section to apply, has not been defined so as to constitute an offence u/s
354 IPC. Any discussion on this Section is incomplete without
reference to Rupan Deol Bajaj (supra) wherein the Learned Judges
observed:
“14. Since the word ‘modesty’ has
not been defined in the Penal Code, 1860 we may profitably look into its
dictionary meaning. According to Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (3rd Edn.)
modesty is the quality of being modest and in relation to woman means “womanly
propriety of behaviour; scrupulous chastity of thought, speech and conduct”.
The word ‘modest’ in relation to woman is defined in the above dictionary as
“decorous in manner and conduct; not forward or lewd; shamefast”. Webster's
Third New International Dictionary of the English Language defines modesty as
“freedom from coarseness, indelicacy or indecency; a regard for propriety in
dress, speech or conduct”. In the Oxford English Dictionary (1933 Edn.) the
meaning of the word ‘modesty’ is given as “womanly propriety of behaviour;
scrupulous chastity of thought, speech and conduct (in man or woman); reserve
or sense of shame proceeding from instinctive aversion to impure or coarse
suggestions”.
15. … From the above dictionary
meaning of ‘modesty’ and the interpretation given to that word by this Court in
Major Singh case [AIR 1967 SC 63 : 1967 Cri LJ 1 : 1966 Supp SCR 286] it
appears to us that the ultimate test for ascertaining whether modesty has been
outraged is the action of the offender such as could be perceived as one which
is capable of shocking the sense of decency of a woman …”
12.2
While we hold the above observations as also the discussion made in Major Singh
(supra) in the highest esteem and regard, it must not escape us that the
observations were made in the societal context and milieu of that time and its
import today should be interpreted in our present context. Reference in this
regard may be made to observations by Bhat, J in Attorney General v.
Satish[(2022) 5 SCC 545] ,
“66. … These require an element
of application of physical force, to women. The expression “modesty” was
another limitation as older decisions show that such a state was associated
with decorousness [Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill, (1995) 6 SCC 194
: 1995 SCC (Cri) 1059] of women. This added a dimension of patriarchy and
class. [ Section 354 (or any other provision of IPC) does not
offer a statutory definition of the term “modesty”, and over time, was
interpreted broadly, contemporaneously with the developing and acknowledged
role of women in society, to overcome its inherently colonial and patriarchal
origins. … One cannot be unmindful of the circumstances in which these
provisions were enacted by a colonial power, at a time, when women's agency
itself was unacknowledged, or had limited recognition. Further, women in India
were traditionally—during the time of enactment of IPC, in the mid-
Nineteenth Century—subordinated to the care of their fathers, or their
husbands, or other male relatives. They had no share in immovable property;
notions of gender equality were unheard of, or not permitted. Women had no
right to vote. Quite naturally, the dignity of women— or indeed their autonomy,
was not provided for.
67. The advent of the
Constitution of India revolutionised—at least in law, all that. Regardless of
gender, race, caste, religion or region, or all of the acknowledged sectarian
and discrimination enabling barriers, everyone enjoyed equality of law, and
equal protection of law (Article
14). Further, the provision
in Article 15(1) proscribed discrimination by the State (in all its
forms) on various grounds, including gender. Article 15(3) enabled
the State to enact special provisions for women and children.”
12.3
Turning to the facts of the instant case, keeping in view the contents of the
FIR, the statement in the final report of the investigating officer, and the
statement u/s 164 CrPC of the complainant, we are of the view that
even prima facie the ingredients as referred to supra, are not met. The record
is silent with respect to the use of any force, apart from bald assertions of
mental and physical discomfort caused to the complainant by the
appellant.
12.4
It is well settled that for mens rea to be established, something better than
vague statements must be produced before the court. As evidenced by the
annexures referred to above, i.e. the FIR, the preliminary investigation
report as also the concluding portion of the chargesheet, no direct allegation
nor any evidence in support thereof can be found attributing intent to the
appellant. It cannot be said, then, that a case u/s 354 IPC is made
out against the appellant.
13.
Let us now examine the next charge for which the appellant stands accused. For
an offence u/s 503 to be established, it must be shown that:- (1)
Threatening a person with any injury; (i) to his person, reputation or property;
or (ii) to the person, or reputation of anyone in whom that person is
interested. (2) Such threat must be intentional; (i) to cause alarm to that
person; or (ii) to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally
bound to do as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat; or (iii) to
cause that person to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled
to do as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat. Punishment for
this offence is prescribed u/s 506 IPC, which is two years or with a
fine or both, as applicable to this case.
13.1 Manik Taneja v. State
of Karnataka [(2015) 7 SCC
423] as affirmed by a bench of three judges in Parminder
Kaur v. State of Punjab[(2020) 8 SCC
811] , records the principle of application of Section 506, IPC
in the following terms: –
“11.…A reading of the definition
of “criminal intimidation” would indicate that there must be an act of
threatening to another person, of causing an injury to the person, reputation,
or property of the person threatened, or to the person in whom the threatened
person is interested and the threat must be with the intent to cause alarm to
the person threatened or it must be to do any act which he is not legally bound
to do or omit to do an act which he is legally entitled to do.
13. …It is the intention of the
accused that has to be considered in deciding as to whether what he has stated
comes within the meaning of “criminal intimidation”. The threat must be with
intention to cause alarm to the complainant to cause that person to do or omit
to do any work. Mere expression of any words without any intention to cause
alarm would not be sufficient to bring in the application of this section. But
material has to be placed on record to show that the intention is to cause
alarm to the complainant….”
13.2
A recent judgment of this court, Sharif Ahmed v. State of U.P[2024 SCC OnLine SC 726]
held
as under: -
“38. An offence of criminal
intimidation arises when the accused intendeds to cause alarm to the victim,
though it does not matter whether the victim is alarmed or not. The intention
of the accused to cause alarm must be established by bringing evidence on record.
The word ‘intimidate’ means to make timid or fearful, especially : to compel or
deter by or as if by threats. The threat communicated or uttered by the person
named in the chargesheet as an accused, should be uttered and communicated by
the said person to threaten the victim for the purpose of influencing her mind.
The word ‘threat’ refers to the intent to inflict punishment, loss or pain on
the other. Injury involves doing an illegal act.” This judgment also, with
reference to Manik Taneja (supra), underscored the importance of
material and evidence being placed on record to demonstrate intention. A mere
statement without intention would not attract the offence.
13.3
What flows from the judgments referred is that for an offence of criminal
intimidation to be prima facie established, the intention should
be clearly visible, and the same is to be established by evidence on
record.
Granted that at this stage,
evidence on record is not the standard to be applied since the trial is
underway, but at least the results of the investigation and the material
gathered thereunder, which is on record, should disclose somewhat of an
offence. The FIR, interim investigation report and the chargesheet, reproduced
above, do not disclose any offence having been committed by the appellant
herein.
14. During oral submissions, it
was urged that the statements u/s 161 and 164 CrPC, when
read collectively, do indeed disclose an offence having been committed by the
appellant. This was in response to the submission on behalf of the appellant
that, on the face of it no offence is made out against him. We find it
difficult to accept the submission on behalf of the complainant. The position
of law in regard to the admissibility of these statements is settled. We may
refer to State of Maharashtra v. Maroti[(2023) 4 SCC
298] (authored by one of us, Hon. C.T Ravikumar J.) wherein the Court
held-
“23. In the decision in Rajeev
Kourav v. Baisahab [Rajeev Kourav v. Baisahab, (2020) 3 SCC 317 : (2020) 2 SCC
(Cri) 51] , a two-Judge Bench of this Court dealt with question as to the
matters that could be considered by the High Court in quashment proceedings
under Section 482CrPC. It was held therein that statements of witnesses
recorded under Section 161CrPC being wholly inadmissible in evidence could not
be taken into consideration by the Court while adjudicating a petition filed
under Section 482CrPC. In that case, this Court took note of the fact that the
High Court was aware that one of the witnesses mentioned that the deceased
victim had informed him about the harassment by the accused, which she was not
able to bear and hence wanted to commit suicide. Finding that the conclusion of
the High Court to quash the criminal proceedings in that case was on the basis
of its assessment of the statements recorded under Section 161CrPC,
it was held that statements thereunder, being wholly inadmissible in evidence
could not have been taken into consideration by the Court while adjudicating a
petition filed under Section 482CrPC. It was also held that the High Court
committed an error in quashing the proceedings by assessing the statements
recorded under Section 161CrPC.
24. There can be no dispute with
respect to the position that statements recorded under Section 161CrPC are
inadmissible in evidence and its use is limited for the purposes as provided
under Sections 145 and 157 of the Evidence Act, 1872. As a
matter of fact, statement recorded under Section 164CrPC can also be used only
for such purposes.”
15.
Arguendo, accepting the submissions of the learned senior counsel appearing for
the complainant, if examine the statements, both u/s
161 and 164 (the latter of which was handed to us in sealed
cover) still, our conclusion that no prima facie offence is made out on the
part of the appellant, does not change. For reference, the statement of the
complainant u/s 161 is reproduced below: – “The statement
under section 161of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) was given by
Pooja Tankha complainant on September 4, 2019. She stated that she held the
position of Director in Laj IDS Export Company. My partners were R K Aneja and
Naresh Aneja, whose office was located in Sector 63, Noida, at 208. Whenever I
worked in the office, R K Aneja would come to my office and subject me to
physical harassment, touching her from various places without her consent. He
did not heed her refusal. I couldn’t explicitly state where all he touched me
against my will. Concerned about this, when I opposed R K Aneja and went to the
police Station to file a report. However, I was told that since I has only one
son and lives alone I should consider my situation and that Naresh Aneja was
mentally harassing me. Once, when I was working in that office, Chaman Lal and
the pantry boy, Ashish alias Pawan saved from the indecent actions of R.K
Aneja. This incident took place on September 4, 2019.
Sd/-
04.09.2019”
16.
This Court has on numerous occasions considered the power of the High Courts to
quash criminal proceedings u/s 482 CrPC. The scope thereof,
therefore, does not require us to devote substantive portions of this judgment
thereto. Only for the purposes of immediate reference, we take notice of a few
pronouncements in this regard, other than State of Haryana v. Bhajan
Lal, which is recognised as the locus classicus on the issue.
16.1
This Court’s judgment in Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd. culled
out the following principles:-
(i) A complaint can be quashed
where the allegations made in the complaint, even if they are taken at their
face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any
offence or make out the case alleged against the accused.
For this purpose, the complaint has
to be examined as a whole, but without examining the merits of the allegations.
Neither a detailed inquiry nor a meticulous analysis of the material nor an
assessment of the reliability or genuineness of the allegations in the
complaint, is warranted while examining prayer for quashing of a complaint.
(ii) A complaint may also be
quashed where it is a clear abuse of the process of the court, as when the
criminal proceeding is found to have been initiated with mala fides/malice for
wreaking vengeance or to cause harm, or where the allegations are absurd and
inherently improbable.
(iii) The power to quash shall
not, however, be used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The power
should be used sparingly and with abundant caution.
(iv) The complaint is not
required to verbatim reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence alleged. If
the necessary factual foundation is laid in the complaint, merely on the ground
that a few ingredients have not been stated in detail, the proceedings should
not be quashed. Quashing of the complaint is warranted only where the complaint
is so bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making
out the offence.
(v) A given set of facts may make
out: (a) purely a civil wrong; or (b) purely a criminal offence; or (c) a civil
wrong as also a criminal offence. A commercial transaction or a contractual
dispute, apart from furnishing a cause of action for seeking remedy in civil
law, may also involve a criminal offence. As the nature and scope of a civil
proceeding are different from a criminal proceeding, the mere fact that the
complaint relates to a commercial transaction or breach of contract, for which
a civil remedy is available or has been availed, is not by itself a ground to
quash the criminal proceedings. The test is whether the allegations in the
complaint disclose a criminal offence or not.
16.2
The scope of this power is best remembered in the words of Y.V Chandrachud J.
(as his Lordship then was) writing for the Court in State of Karnataka v.
L. Muniswamy wherein it was observed:-
“7… In the exercise of this
wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes
to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of
the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the
proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court's inherent powers,
both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public
purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to
degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the
veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on
which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the
High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of
justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be
administered according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling
necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realisation of
the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers
of the High Court to do justice, between the State and its subjects, it would
be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient
jurisdiction.”
16.3
Other judgments of this Court in State of A.P. v. Aravapally Venkanna; Neeharika
Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra; Sachin Garg v. State of U.P.; Vishal
Noble Singh v. State of U.P. may also be seen in this context.
17.
Having regard to the judgments above, we are of the view that the sum total of
the circumstances, submissions and documents on record, considered supra, do
not point to appellant (Naresh Aneja) having committed any offence against the
complainant. In that view of the matter, the impugned judgement of the
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad passed in Application u/s 482 No.
18712 of 2020 is set aside. Ex consequenti, criminal proceedings arising out of
FIR No. 1074 of 2019 are quashed qua the present appellant.
18.
The appeal is allowed. It is clarified that the observations here are
restricted only to the present Appellant, and no view whatsoever has been
expressed in respect of R.K Aneja, regarding whom the law will continue on its
course.
Pending
applications, if any, shall stand closed.
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