Indian Judgements

Indian Judgements

TPA: Timeless Equity – Upholding the Right to Redeem in Usufructuary Mortgages

This petition under Article 227 of the Constitution arose from a civil suit instituted in 2016 for the redemption of a usufructuary mortgage originally executed in March 1978 for a principal amount of INR 15,000, wherein the mortgagee was put in possession and rents were adjusted towards interest. The petitioners (mortgagees) challenged concurrent orders of the trial court and revisional court rejecting their application under Order VII Rule 11 C.P.C. for dismissal of the plaint on the ground of limitation, arguing that the 30-year limitation period had expired in 2012 (30 years from the 4-year term ending in 1982). Dismissing the writ petition, the Allahabad High Court held that in a usufructuary mortgage where rents adjust against interest, the right to seek redemption and recover possession does not accrue on the date of the mortgage or upon the expiry of a fixed term, but only when the mortgagor tenders the principal amount or makes a payment/deposit under Section 62 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Consequently, since the tender was made on December 30, 2015, the suit filed in 2016 was well within limitation.

  • Nature of the Transaction:
    • The mortgage deed dated March 28, 1978, executed by late Jagdish Prasad Johri in favour of the petitioners for INR 15,000, was categorized as a usufructuary mortgage under Section 58(d) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
    • The terms stipulated that possession was handed over to the mortgagees and the rent of the house was to be adjusted towards interest on the sum advanced.
  • Statutory Framework and Limitation:
    • Under Article 61(a) of the Limitation Act, 1963, the limitation period for a suit by a mortgagor to redeem or recover possession of immovable property is 30 years, starting from when the right to redeem or recover possession accrues.
    • Section 62 of the Transfer of Property Act establishes that a usufructuary mortgagor has the right to recover possession when the mortgage money is paid out of rents and profits, or when the term has expired and the mortgagor pays, tenders, or deposits the balance.
  • Rejection of Mortgagees’ Time-Bar Argument:
    • The petitioners argued that the limitation period began after the expiry of the 4-year term on March 28, 1982, expiring on March 28, 2012, thereby extinguishing the right to seek possession under Section 27 of the Limitation Act.
    • The High Court rejected this contention, affirming that in usufructuary mortgages where usufructs adjust against interest, limitation does not run from the date of execution or expiry of a term, but from the date when the mortgage money is tendered or paid.
  • Judicial Precedents and Principles Applied:
    • The Court relied upon the binding Supreme Court Constitution Bench ruling in Singh Ram v. Sheo Ram, which held that the special right of a usufructuary mortgagor under Section 62 of the T.P. Act commences when the mortgage money is paid or deposited, and until then, limitation under Article 61 does not start.
    • The Court reaffirmed the timeless equity maxim: “Once a mortgage, always a mortgage,” emphasizing that the statutory right of redemption cannot be fettered or extinguished by the mere efflux of time unless done via a proper decree or act of parties under the proviso to Section 60.
  • Final Decision:
    • The trial court and revisional court committed no error in dismissing the application under Order VII Rule 11 C.P.C., as the cause of action validly arose on December 30, 2015, when notice and pay orders for the principal sum were tendered to the mortgagees and refused.

The writ petition was dismissed, and interim orders were discharged.

J.O. (Web) 2026 ALL 27

Shri Ram Prakash and 3 others v. Smt. Asha Johri and 3 others (D.O.J. 01.07.2026)

J.O. (Web) 2026 ALL 27 click here to view full text of judgment

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Supreme Court Judgment Summary 15th Sep, 2026

Supreme Court Judgment Summary 15th Sep, 2026

A Definitive Review on Disability Pension Rights for Ex-Servicemen

This landmark batch of appeals brought by the Union of India challenged various orders passed by the Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT) and High Courts, which had granted the disability element of service pensions to ex-servicemen. These former personnel had been assessed by Release Medical Boards (RMB) as having disabilities that were “Neither Attributable Nor Aggravated” (NANA) by military service. The Supreme Court addressed the core tension between the protective, beneficial jurisprudence established in Dharamvir Singh v. Union of India (governed by the Entitlement Rules 1982) and the restrictive framework introduced by the subsequent Entitlement Rules 2008. Crucially, the Court undertook a deep constitutional and administrative review of the legitimacy of the 2008 rules, evaluating whether they possessed binding legal force and whether they could dilute established beneficial entitlements.

2026 INSC 993 : Union of India & Ors. v. Col. NC Isaac (Retd.) and Connected Appeals (D.O.J. 15.09.2026)

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Setting Aside Ineligible Selection to Protect Merit

The Supreme Court of India dismissed the civil appeal filed by Sunita Lahu Panchpande, upholding the Bombay High Court’s judgment that had set aside her appointment as an Anganwadi Supervisor in Nashik District. The appellant, who originally served as an Anganwadi Sevika in Jalgaon District, applied for and was appointed to the post in Nashik despite an express restriction in the advertisement and the governing Government Resolution (G.R.) dated November 17, 2001, mandating that applicants must possess ten years of work experience specifically within Nashik District. Although the Divisional Commissioner had erroneously issued a clarification stating that experience from other districts was acceptable, the Supreme Court ruled that a subordinate administrative official cannot issue clarifications contrary to statutory G.R.s and recruitment advertisements. Citing the doctrine that appointments made in disregard of advertised qualifications amount to a fraud on the public, the Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s order directing the appointment of the eligible wait-listed candidate (the sixth respondent) in her place, while acknowledging the compassionate observation permitting the appellant’s accommodation in her home district.

  • Core Issues Addressed: The Supreme Court evaluated whether a candidate lacking the mandatory territorial work experience stipulated in a recruitment advertisement and government resolution can retain public employment based on an erroneous administrative clarification.
  • Mandatory Territorial Eligibility: A conjoint reading of the 2001 Government Resolution and the specific conditions of the advertisement clearly established that applicants must have accumulated their ten years of qualifying experience as an Anganwadi Sevika within the same district (Nashik).
  • Incompetence of Administrative Clarifications: The Divisional Commissioner lacked the legal authority to issue a clarification that ran completely contrary to the explicit text of the 2001 G.R.; any genuine doubt ought to have been referred back to the State Government.
  • Fraud on Public Aspirants: Reaffirming the principle laid down in Tripura Sundari Devi, the Court emphasized that appointing ineligible candidates in violation of advertised terms without an express relaxation clause constitutes a fraud on public candidates who possessed better qualifications but refrained from applying.
  • Final Outcome: The appeal was dismissed, the High Court’s judgment was upheld, the sixth respondent was awarded the rightful appointment with benefits to be disbursed within two months, and the appellant was granted time until September 30, 2026, to transition out of the post.

2026 INSC 1002

Sunita Lahu Panchpande v. The District Collector & Ors. (D.O.J. 16.09.2026)

2026 INSC 1002 click here to view full text of judgment

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Acquittal Under NDPS Act Due to Flawed Sampling and Unproven Contraband

The Supreme Court of India allowed the criminal appeals filed by the appellants Abdul Rajik and Govind, setting aside the concurrent judgments of the Trial Court and the High Court of Madhya Pradesh which had convicted them under Section 8 read with Section 20 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act, 1985. The appellants had been sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and 8 years respectively, following allegations that they were caught carrying charas. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution fundamentally failed to establish an unbroken chain of custody for the seized samples, pointing out severe lapses, including the total non-compliance with Section 52-A of the NDPS Act (drawing samples without a Magistrate), missing entries in the malkhana register regarding the exit of samples, a silent carrier constable, and an unexplained five-day delay before the samples reached the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL). Consequently, the FSL report became untrustworthy, and with no other reliable scientific proof that the recovered material was actually charas, the Court granted the appellants the benefit of the doubt and acquitted them.

  • Core Issues Addressed: The Supreme Court examined the validity of convictions under the NDPS Act concerning the integrity of link evidence, the absolute necessity of maintaining a secure chain of custody for seized contraband samples, and the legal consequences of failing to comply with Section 52-A of the NDPS Act.
  • Breach in Link Evidence and Custody: The prosecution failed to prove the safe transit of the samples from the malkhana to the FSL. Crucially, the forwarding letter from the Superintendent of Police was dated December 1, 2004, whereas the FSL recorded receipt on December 6, 2004, leaving an unexplained five-day gap with zero evidence as to whose custody the samples remained in during this period.
  • Non-Compliance with Section 52-A: The investigating officer completely omitted the mandatory statutory safeguard of drawing representative samples in the presence of an Executive or Judicial Magistrate, which severely dented the integrity of the seizure and sampling process.
  • Exclusion of the FSL Report: Due to the shattered chain of custody and procedural flaws, the FSL report (Exhibit P-46) lost its evidentiary value and had to be discarded. Furthermore, the informal spot-testing method (burning a small piece of the substance) was deemed unscientific and insufficient to prove the material was charas.
  • Final Outcome: The appeals were allowed, the judgments of conviction and sentences were set aside, and the appellants were acquitted of all charges with their bail bonds discharged.

2026 INSC 1001

Abdul Rajik v. State of M.P. (D.O.J. 16.09.2026)

2026 INSC 1001 click here to view full text of judgment

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The Finality of Tax Settlements: Barring Reassessment After ITSC Orders

The Supreme Court of India dismissed the civil appeal filed by the Revenue (Income Tax Department), upholding the judgment of the Delhi High Court which had quashed a reassessment notice and order issued against the respondent-assessee, M/s. Omaxe Limited. The core controversy revolved around whether the Assessing Officer (AO) retained the jurisdiction to reopen a concluded assessment under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, to disallow housing project deductions under Section 80IB(10) after the Income Tax Settlement Commission (ITSC) had already passed a final settlement order under Section 245D(4). The Supreme Court ruled that Chapter XIX-A of the Income Tax Act is a self-contained code. Once an application for settlement is admitted and a final order is issued, it attains absolute finality under Section 245-I, and the regular assessment machinery cannot be invoked to bypass this conclusiveness. The Court clarified that if the Revenue wishes to challenge a settlement order on grounds of fraud or misrepresentation, its sole exclusive remedy is to approach the ITSC directly under Section 245D(6)—not to initiate parallel reassessment proceedings.

  • Core Issue Addressed: The Supreme Court examined whether an Assessing Officer can independently issue a reassessment notice under Section 148 to disallow deductions (such as under Section 80IB(10)) that were part of the total income considerations during a concluded proceeding before the Settlement Commission.
  • Exclusive Jurisdiction of the ITSC: The Court reaffirmed that upon the admission of a settlement application, the ITSC assumes exclusive jurisdiction over the case for that assessment year, placing the regular assessment machinery under statutory abeyance pursuant to Section 245F(2).
  • Conclusiveness of Settlement Orders: Under Section 245-I, orders passed by the ITSC under Section 245D(4) are final and conclusive on the matters stated therein, barring the Revenue from splitting an assessment to re-litigate items through standard reassessment channels.
  • Exclusive Remedy for Fraud or Misrepresentation: If the Revenue discovers that a settlement order was obtained through misrepresentation or concealment, Section 245D(6) provides the exclusive statutory pathway to declare the settlement void by moving the ITSC directly, a route the Revenue unsuccessfully attempted and exhausted in this very case.
  • Final Outcome: The appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed, confirming that the regular tax authorities cannot initiate parallel reassessments once an ITSC settlement order has attained finality.

2026 INSC 1000

Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax & Another v. M/s. Omaxe Limited (D.O.J. 16.09.2026)

2026 INSC 1000 click here to view full text of judgment

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