In Dr. Rakesh Kumar Gupta v. State of Uttar Pradesh &Ors [ Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 632, decided on June 9, 2026], the Supreme Court of India adjudicated a significant procedural and constitutional question regarding the scope of a third “referee” Judge’s jurisdiction under Section 392 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). The matter arose from a trial where three brothers (the Rastogi siblings) were convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court unanimously upheld the conviction of two brothers (Anil and Ajay) but split on the third brother (Atul), leading to a reference to a third Judge. The referee Judge not only acquitted Atul but went on to reverse the unanimous conviction of Anil and Ajay, acquitting all three siblings.
The Supreme Court expressed its respectful disagreement with its prior coordinate Bench precedent in Sajjan Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1999)—which had historically allowed a referee Judge to re-examine the entire case, including points of absolute unanimity. A Division Bench comprising Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Satish Chandra Sharma held that under the precise text of Section 392, the terms “an appeal” and “the appeal” have an anaphoric grammatical function that restricts the referee Judge’s jurisdiction strictly to the specific instance where the division of opinion actually occurred. Warning that a literal application of Sajjan Singh creates anomalous, discriminatory, and unconstitutional results under Article 14, the Court formally referred the question to a larger Bench to be constituted by the Chief Justice of India, deferring final judgment on the siblings’ acquittal until the larger Bench delivers its opinion.
1. Factual Matrix and Trajectory of Litigation
- The Trial and Conviction: The respondents—three brothers named Anil, Ajay, and Atul Rastogi—faced trial before the IInd Additional Sessions Judge, Lucknow, for offenses under Sections 148, 149, and 302/149 of the IPC arising out of a 1991 case crime. On January 31, 2001, the Sessions Judge convicted the siblings and sentenced them to life imprisonment.
- The Split Division Bench: The siblings preferred a single composite criminal appeal before the Allahabad High Court. The Division Bench fractured in its opinion on July 11, 2006:
- Justice Bhanwar Singh upheld the conviction and life sentences of Anil and Ajay, but allowed the appeal of Atul, acquitting him.
- Justice Devi Prasad Singh maintained the conviction and life sentences for all three brothers.
- The Referee Judge’s Reversal: Because the Judges were equally divided in opinion exclusively in relation to Atul, the appeal was referred to a third Judge under Section 392 of the CrPC. The referee Judge (Justice Vikram Nath, as he then was) agreed that Atul should be acquitted. However, he went a step further and re-evaluated the evidence against Anil and Ajay, completely reversing the concurrent, unanimous findings of the two reference Judges and acquitting them as well. The complainant and the State of Uttar Pradesh filed separate appeals before the Supreme Court challenging these total acquittals.
2. Core Legal Questions Formulated
The Supreme Court framed three pure questions of law arising out of Section 392 of the CrPC:
- Whether, in a division of opinion between two Judges of a Division Bench, the referee Judge is strictly obliged to align with one of the two opinions, or is empowered to chart a completely divergent course.
- Whether the third Judge must confine their opinion to the specific points of disagreement, or is competent to overturn conclusions unanimously reached by both the referring Judges.
- Whether a third Judge who disagrees with the unanimous findings of a Division Bench is required to refer the appeal to be re-heard by a larger Bench of Judges.
3. Legal Analysis &Ratio Decidendi of the Court
The Supreme Court engaged in a deep comparative textual analysis, contrasting the historical layout of Section 429 of the old 1898 Code with Section 392 of the 1973 Code:
A. Grammatical Significance: “An Appeal” vs. “The Appeal”
The Court observed that a notable shift in terminology occurred between the old and new procedural codes. While Section 429 of the 1898 Code directed that “the case” be laid before another Judge, Section 392 of the 1973 Code deliberately mandates that “the appeal” be laid before the referee Judge.
Applying the principles of statutory construction and English grammar, the Court highlighted the anaphoric use of definite articles:
- Section 392 opens with the indefinite article: “When an appeal under this Chapter is heard… and they are divided in opinion…”. This establishes the broad class of qualifying actions.
- It is immediately followed by the definite article: “…the appeal, with their opinions, shall be laid before another Judge…”.
- The Rule: The definite article (“the”) acts anaphorically to refer back to the individual instance introduced by the indefinite article (“an”). Therefore, “the appeal” that travels to the third Judge is strictly limited to the specific dispute where a division of opinion actually occurred.
B. The Discrimination and Fallacy of Composite Appeals
The Court pointed out that the Rastogi siblings had filed a “composite appeal” simply as a matter of administrative convenience. In the eyes of the law, a composite appeal filed by multiple convicts functions as separate individual appeals rolled up into one memorandum.
The Court reasoned that a literal application of the Sajjan Singh precedent creates absurd, anomalous, and discriminatory results that breach the right to equality under Article 14:
- The Separate Filing Scenario: If the three brothers had filed three separate appeals, and the appeals of Anil and Ajay were unanimously dismissed by the Division Bench, their legal fate would be sealed unless they approached the Supreme Court under Article 136. The split opinion on Atul’s separate appeal would only send Atul’s case to the referee Judge.
- The Composite Advantage Anomaly: Under Sajjan Singh, simply because they filed a composite appeal, Anil and Ajay get a secondary “free shot” at an acquittal before a single referee Judge, who effectively acts as an appellate authority over a concurrent two-Judge Bench. The Court held that a procedural happenstance cannot be allowed to grant an unconstitutional advantage to one set of litigants over another.
C. Risks of Reversing Unanimous Outcomes
The Court illustrated two highly problematic converse scenarios that Sajjan Singh failed to visualize:
- Unanimous Acquittal Risk: If a Division Bench unanimously agrees that two out of three convicts are innocent but splits on the third, sending the entire composite appeal to a referee Judge exposes the two successfully acquitted individuals to the risk of being convicted by a single third Judge.
- State Appeal Risk: In a state appeal against the acquittal of three persons, if the Division Bench unanimously upholds the acquittal of two but splits on the third, a single referee Judge could step in and mistakenly convict all three.
The Court concluded that such outcomes run counter to judicial discipline, propriety, and comity, which are integral components of a fair criminal justice delivery system[cite: 17].
4. Decretal Directions & Final Order
- Reference to a Larger Bench: Recording its respectful disagreement with Sajjan Singh v. State of M.P. (1999), the Division Bench formally referred the question of whether Sajjan Singh lays down the correct law to a larger Bench[cite: 17].
- Role of the Chief Justice: The Registry is directed to place the matter before the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India to determine the appropriate strength and constitution of the larger Bench[cite: 17].
- Deference of Final Judgment: The Court explicitly reserved its final answers to the core questions regarding the validity of Anil and Ajay Rastogi’s acquittals[cite: 17]. The present appeals are ordered to be laid before an appropriate Bench for final judgment only after the larger Bench delivers its binding opinion on the referred question[cite: 17].
