Indian Judgements

Indian Judgements

Online Gambling: State competence to enact law

In State of Tamil Nadu & Others v. Junglee Games India Pvt. Ltd. & Others (and companion appeals including State of Karnataka v. All India Gaming Federation & Others) [Civil Appeal Nos. 6124-6131 of 2023, decided on May 29, 2026], the Supreme Court of India adjudicated a landmark constitutional batch determining the legislative competence of States to regulate or prohibit online gaming and fantasy sports involving monetary stakes. The appeals were preferred by the States of Tamil Nadu and Karnataka against separate judgments of the Madras and Karnataka High Courts, which had struck down amendments to their respective gaming and police laws (the 2021 TN Amendment Act, the 2021 Karnataka Amendment Act, and the TN Online Gambling Act 2022/23). The High Courts had concurrently held that the legislative field under Entry 34 of List II (“Betting and gambling”) is strictly confined to games of chance, meaning that games of substantial skill (such as Rummy and Poker) fall outside State competence and are protected as legitimate trade or business under Article 19(1)(g).

The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, reversing the High Court judgments and upholding the constitutional validity of the impugned state legislations. The Division Bench of Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan ruled that the High Courts adopted an impermissibly restrictive construction of Entry 34 of List II. Integrating a rigorous review of the Constituent Assembly Debates, the Court established that the Constitution-makers intentionally selected wide terms to enable States to curb the social, economic, and psychological harms of wagering, regardless of whether the underlying game is anchored in chance or skill. Furthermore, the Court expanded the contours of the state’s regulatory power, determining that the legislative authority to curb digital gambling addiction and related financial distress is concurrently rooted in Entry 1 (“Public order”), Entry 6 (“Public health”), and Entry 33 (“Sports, entertainments and amusements”) of List II.

1. Factual Matrix and Statutory Frameworks

A. The Tamil Nadu Legislative Matrix

  • The 2021 Amendment Act: The State of Tamil Nadu enacted the Tamil Nadu Gaming and Police Laws (Amendment) Act, 2021, to modify the parent 1930 Gaming Act. It sought to tackle the growing menace of virtual gambling houses and online betting. The amendment expanded the definition of “gaming” under Section 3(b) to explicitly encompass wagering or betting in cyberspace using electronic transfers. It introduced Section 3-A, criminalizing any online betting on Rummy, Poker, or other games with up to two years’ imprisonment. Crucially, it amended Section 11 to remove the long-standing statutory exemption for “games of mere skill,” subjecting them to penal provisions if played for stakes.
  • The Madras High Court Round I (Junglee Games): On August 3, 2021, the Madras High Court struck down Part II of the 2021 Act. It held that the terms “betting” and “gambling” under Entry 34 List II must be read conjunctively, confining State power solely to betting on games of chance. It ruled that the blanket ban failed the proportionality test by completely negating human skill.
  • The 2022/23 Online Gambling Act & Round II: In response, Tamil Nadu enacted the Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Online Gambling and Regulation of Online Gaming Act, 2022/2023. On November 9, 2023, the Madras High Court struck down the Act’s Schedule (which listed Rummy and Poker as prohibited games of chance) and read down Sections 2(i) and 2(1)(iv) to protect online skill games.

B. The Karnataka Legislative Matrix

  • The 2021 Karnataka Amendment Act: The State of Karnataka amended the Karnataka Police Act, 1963, via Act No. 28 of 2021. It expanded Section 2(7) (“gaming”) to include online formats where funds or virtual currencies are risked on an unknown outcome, explicitly inserting an explanation clause that applied to “a game of skill”. Section 2(11) (“instruments of gaming”) and Section 2(13) (“place”) were widened to cover cyberspace, mobile apps, and virtual platforms, effectively bringing online gaming companies under the definition of “common gaming houses”. Section 78(1)(a)(vi)-(vii) criminalized any act of risking money on the unknown result of an event, including games of skill. Section 176 was amended to strip the protection previously granted to wagering on games of skill.
  • The Karnataka High Court Ruling (AIGF): On February 14, 2022, the Karnataka High Court allowed the gaming companies’ writ petitions. It struck down Sections 2, 3, 6, 8, and 9 of the Amendment Act. The High Court ruled that anything depending predominantly on skill cannot be termed gambling, and that games of skill do not lose their constitutional protection under Article 19(1)(g) merely by transitioning to an online platform.

2. Core Legal Issues Formulated

The Apex Court formulated several pivotal constitutional and administrative issues, including:

  1. Whether the conjunction “and” in “betting and gambling” (Entry 34, List II) must be read conjunctively, restricting State competence to betting on games of chance.
  2. Whether the state legislations ran counter to the settled Supreme Court jurisprudence in the RMDC-I, RMDC-II, and R. Lakshmanan decisions.
  3. Whether the online mode transforms games of skill into games of chance, and whether a blanket ban violates the principle of proportionality under Article 14 and Article 19(1)(g).
  4. Whether the State Legislature derives auxiliary competence from other entries such as “public order” (Entry 1), “public health” (Entry 6), and “amusements” (Entry 33).

3. Submissions of the Parties

A. Arguments Canvassed by the States (Tamil Nadu & Karnataka)

  • The Digitization Menace: The States contended that rapid digitization has democratized access to virtual gambling spaces, morphing every mobile phone into a potential virtual gambling house. This architectural transformation has triggered severe “gaming disorders” (recognized by the WHO), widespread consumer debt, family distress, and a tragic spike in suicides.
  • Broad Reading of Entries: The states argued that Entries in the Seventh Schedule must receive the widest possible interpretation. Entry 34 uses “betting and gambling” disjunctively in practice. “Betting” covers any staking of money on an uncertain outcome, regardless of the underlying presence of skill. Even if a game involves skill for the player, a third-party bettor is merely guessing an outcome, which falls under Entry 34.
  • Alternative State Entry Anchors: Alternatively, the laws are valid under Entry 1 (“Public order”) to prevent digitally mediated social unrest; Entry 6 (“Public health”) to curb psychological harms and addictive predatory designs; and Entry 33 (“Sports, entertainments and amusements”) as modern virtual entertainment.

B. Arguments Canvassed by the Online Gaming Companies

  • Protection under Article 19(1)(g): The respondents (represented by senior counsels including Dr. A.M. Singhvi, Mr. Arvind Datar, Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, and Mr. Sajan Poovayya) argued that games of predominant skill (such as Rummy, Poker, and Fantasy Sports) are recognized commercial activities. They are protected under Article 19(1)(g) and cannot be declared res extra commercium or equated with gambling.
  • The Stare Decisis Barrier: Stare decisis binds the States to the RMDC and R. Lakshmanan trilogy, which settled that “betting and gambling” in Entry 34 excludes competitions where success depends on a substantial degree of skill. Staking money or charging a standard platform fee does not change a skill game into gambling.
  • Union Domain and Proportionality: The subject matter occupies cyberspace, meaning it falls exclusively within the Parliament’s domain under List I Entry 31 (“communications”), Entry 42 (“inter-State commerce”), and Entry 97 (residuary powers), governed by the Central IT Rules. A total ban fails the least-intrusive-measure test of proportionality when calibrated central regulations exist.

4. Constitutional Analysis & Core Reasoning of the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court systematically dismantled the reasoning of the High Courts, analyzing the constitutional texts across several foundational layers:

A. Unearthing the True Intent of the Constituent Assembly

To resolve the semantic debate over the conjunction “and” in Entry 34 (“Betting and gambling”), the Supreme Court pierced the text by examining the Constituent Assembly Debates from September 2, 1949.

  • The historical record revealed that when the assembly debated moving Entry 44 (now Entry 33 List II) to include “entertainments and amusements,” Member H.V. Kamath objected, citing a rumor that the Bombay Government was attempting to ban the “harmless game” of Rummy.
  • In response, Member T.T. Krishnamachari clarified that the state’s intervention against Rummy was driven by the massive monetary stakes involved. He explicitly noted that when a game of skill is played for exceptionally high stakes, it takes the form of gambling, and it was precisely for that reason that powers were provided under Entry 45 (now Entry 34) to allow States to regulate or prohibit it.
  • Based on this, the Supreme Court ruled that the founding fathers explicitly intended for States to have the power to regulate or prohibit even recognized games of skill when played with stakes. Reading “and” conjunctively to strip State power over skill-based wagering would directly defeat the clear intention of the Constitution-makers.

[ CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY DEBATES ]                          (Sept. 2, 1949)                                 │       ┌─────────────────────────┴─────────────────────────┐       ▼                                                   ▼ [ KAMATH’S OBJECTION ]                            [ KRISHNAMACHARI’S CLARIFICATION ] • Expressed alarm that the State                  • Explained that the intervention was   sought to ban a “harmless game”                  triggered by high monetary stakes.   like Rummy.                         • Confirmed that Entry 45 (now Entry 34)                                                     purposely empowers States to regulate/prohibit                                                     skill games when played for stakes.

B. Clarifying the Trilogy of Precedents (RMDC and K.R. Lakshmanan)

The Court held that both High Courts fundamentally misapplied the rulings in RMDC-I, RMDC-II, and K.R. Lakshmanan.

  • The RMDC cases dealt with the interpretation of prize competitions and judicial definitions of gambling for tax purposes, but they did not define or limit the baseline boundary of the state’s legislative competence under Entry 34.
  • Similarly, R. Lakshmanan declared horse-racing to be a game of predominant skill, but it did not lay down a constitutional embargo preventing a State Legislature from regulating the act of betting on that skill. The Supreme Court ruled that the High Courts’ conclusions—asserting that Entry 34 completely excludes any authority over skill-based betting—were per incuriam.

C. Plurality of Competence and the “Public Order” Matrix

The Court affirmed that Entry 34 is not the lone source of authority for the states. Legislative entries must receive a broad and liberal interpretation, and an overlap does not destroy competence if the statute’s true character falls within State List limits. The Court found that the states possess valid concurrent competence through several other constitutional anchors:

  1. Public Order (Entry 1, List II): Expanding the contours of “public order,” the Court ruled that in the internet age, the concept transcends basic physical street violence. Predatory online gaming designs that trigger widespread financial ruin, domestic despair, and subsequent suicides severely disrupt the “even tempo of the life of the community,” satisfying the potentiality test for public order intervention.
  2. Public Health (Entry 6, List II): Articles 39(f) and 47 cast a constitutional duty on the State to protect youth from exploitation and improve public health. The Court drew an analogy to the State’s power to ban intoxicating liquors, ruling that the power to protect citizens from the psychological and physiological harms of digital “gaming disorders” falls squarely under public health.
  3. Sports and Amusements (Entry 33, List II): Because online gaming apps are structured as modern digital entertainment, they fall within the regulatory field of amusements.

D. Proportionality and Non-Arbitrariness Upholdings

The Court rejected the online gaming companies’ arguments that the state interventions were manifestly arbitrary or disproportionate under Articles 14 and 19.

  • No Manifest Arbitrariness: The state laws do not suffer from a lack of a determining principle. The states executed their legislative choices based on empirical reports (such as the Justice Chandru Committee report in Tamil Nadu) documenting real-world harms.
  • The Proportionality Balance: While games of skill enjoy a baseline commercial character, no fundamental right is absolute. Where a digital commercial format generates widespread economic dependency, predatory fraud, and systemic public harm, a complete ban on the staking element satisfies the proportionality test. The state’s compelling public interest in protecting its citizens outweighs the business interests of online intermediaries.

5. Conclusion and Final Decretal Order

  • Appeals Allowed: The Supreme Court allowed all the captioned appeals filed by the States of Tamil Nadu and Karnataka.
  • High Court Rulings Set Aside: The impugned judgments of the High Court of Madras (dated August 3, 2021, and November 9, 2023) and the High Court of Karnataka (dated February 14, 2022) are officially set aside and overturned.
  • Statutes Validated: Part II of the Tamil Nadu Gaming and Police Laws (Amendment) Act, 2021, the Schedule and core provisions of the Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Online Gambling and Regulation of Online Gaming Act, 2022/2023, and the Karnataka Act No. 28 of 2021 are declared intra vires the Constitution and fully enforceable.
  • Mandamus Discharged: The writs of mandamus restraining the state authorities from interfering with online gaming businesses are discharged. The States retain full sovereign competence to regulate, penalize, or prohibit online wagering and betting operations within their borders.
  • Costs: Ordered with no order as to costs.

2026 INSC 594

State of Tamil Nadu And Others  V. Junglee Games India Pvt. Ltd. And Others (D.O.J. 27.05.2026)

2026 INSC 594 click here to view full text of judgment

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Admissibility of Deceased Witness Testimony Against Absconding Accused

Supreme Court allowed the appeals filed by the State of West Bengal, ruling that the deposition of a deceased witness recorded in an earlier trial is admissible in a subsequent trial against an absconding accused, provided the requirements of Section 299 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) are met. The Court clarified that the provision serves to preserve evidence when an accused deliberately absconds, preventing them from benefiting from the unavailability of material witnesses due to the passage of time. The Court set aside the High Court’s order, which had denied the admission of the victim’s testimony, confirming that the statutory preconditions—the accused absconding and no immediate prospect of arrest—were satisfied at the time the witness deposed.

  • Background: In a 2012 gang-rape case, the respondent and another accused were absconding while three others were tried and convicted. The victim, a key witness, testified in the first trial but passed away in 2015. After the respondent was arrested in 2016, the prosecution sought to admit the victim’s earlier deposition as evidence under Section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act read with Section 299 of the CrPC.
  • High Court Order: The High Court of Calcutta had rejected the application, observing that the prosecution had a duty to obtain a specific direction from the Trial Court to record evidence against the absconder during the first trial, and thus the earlier deposition could not be used against the respondent.
  • Interpretation of Section 299 CrPC: The Supreme Court held that Section 299 CrPC acts as an exception to the general rule requiring a witness to be examined in the presence of the accused. It does not mandate a formal, prior order from a Magistrate to record that the accused is absconding; rather, what is relevant is whether the conditions—that the accused is absconding and there is no immediate prospect of arrest—were established at the time the evidence was recorded.
  • Preventing Misuse of Process: The Court reasoned that taking a restrictive view of Section 299 would jeopardize the criminal justice system by incentivizing accused persons to wilfully abscond and await the death or unavailability of material witnesses.
  • Application to Facts: The Court noted that the respondent was a declared absconder when the victim’s testimony was recorded (2013), and he remained at large until his arrest in 2016. As the two essential conditions of Section 299(1) were met, the deceased victim’s evidence is admissible in the trial against the respondent.

Legislative Continuity: The Court noted that the legislature has maintained this principle in Section 335 of the recently enacted Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, reinforcing the intent to ensure evidence is preserved against those who evade trial.

2026 INSC 718

The State of West Bengal v. Kader Khan – (D.O.J. 17.07.2026)

2026 INSC 718 click here to view full text of judgment

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Insolvency and Bankruptcy: Finality of Resolution Plans and Extinguishment of Sub-judice Claims

Supreme Court allowed the appeals filed by the Successful Resolution Applicant (Appellant-SRA), ruling that upon the approval of a Resolution Plan under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC), all claims—including those pending adjudication (sub-judice)—that are not specifically provided for in the plan stand extinguished. The Court held that the “clean slate” doctrine is fundamental to the IBC, preventing unresolved or contingent claims from resurfacing and undermining the revival of the corporate debtor. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court orders and dismissed the civil suit and arbitration proceedings initiated by operational creditors, affirming that they are bound by the terms of the approved Resolution Plan.

  • Background: The Appellant-SRA challenged Bombay High Court orders that allowed a civil recovery suit and arbitration proceedings to continue against the corporate debtor (Bhushan Steel Limited) despite the approval of its Resolution Plan. The respondents, operational creditors, sought to pursue claims that were pending at the time of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP).
  • Treatment of Claims: During the CIRP, the Resolution Professional admitted the respondents’ disputed claims at a notional value of Rupee One (1) each. The approved Resolution Plan stipulated that because the liquidation value was NIL, no amounts were due to operational creditors; however, a settlement fund was provided for those with admitted claims.
  • The “Clean Slate” Doctrine: The Court emphasized that a successful resolution applicant must start on a “clean slate,” free from “hydra-headed” surprise claims. Once a Resolution Plan is approved under Section 31(1) of the IBC, it becomes binding on all stakeholders, and claims not incorporated therein are deemed extinguished, withdrawn, or abated.
  • Finality of the Plan: The Court noted that the Final List of Creditors attained finality, and the respondents could not seek to reopen or question the commercial wisdom of the Committee of Creditors after the plan’s approval. The Court found no merit in the allegations of fraud, noting that no proceedings had been initiated under Rule 11 of the NCLT Rules to challenge the plan’s integrity.
  • No Express Carve-out: Upon a harmonious reading of the Resolution Plan, the Court concluded there was no express “carve-out” protecting sub-judice claims from extinguishment. The plan explicitly mandated that all legal proceedings relating to the period prior to the effective date stand extinguished, except to the extent of the specific settlement amount provided.
  • Observation on MSMEs: In an “Afterword,” the Court observed that the current insolvency framework does not adequately account for the position of small operational creditors and MSMEs, who are often placed at the bottom of the repayment waterfall. The Court suggested that the Legislature and Law Commission examine this to ensure a more balanced repayment mechanism.
  • Outcome: The Court allowed the appeals, set aside the contrary High Court orders, and dismissed the pending civil suit and arbitration proceedings, enforcing the finality of the Resolution Plan.

2026 INSC 717

M/S Tata Steel Ltd. v. Varsha & Anr. (D.O.J. 17.07.2026)

2026 INSC 717 click here to view full text of judgment

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Excluding Nominated Members from Local Authority Elections

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court of Karnataka’s decision to exclude nominated members of Town Panchayats from participating in Legislative Council elections for Local Authorities’ Constituencies. The Court ruled that under the constitutional framework established by the 74th Amendment (Part IX-A), nominated members, who serve only in an advisory capacity, lack the democratic mandate of elected representatives. Consequently, their inclusion in the electoral roll was declared unconstitutional, and the Court affirmed the direction to conduct a recount of votes after segregating the invalid votes cast by these nominated members.

  • Background: The election to the Karnataka Legislative Council (Chikkamagaluru Local Authorities Constituency) was challenged because 12 nominated members from four Town Panchayats were included in the electoral roll and participated in the voting. The appellant, who won by a narrow margin of 6 votes, contended that the electoral roll’s finality should be respected.
  • Constitutional Interpretation: The Court held that while Article 171(3)(a) mentions “members” of local authorities, this must be interpreted through the lens of the 74th Constitutional Amendment. Article 243-R establishes that while nominated members may be appointed for their expertise, they are expressly barred from voting in municipal meetings, underscoring their advisory rather than representative role.
  • Democratic Representation: The Supreme Court emphasized that allowing nominated members to vote in Legislative Council elections would undermine the democratic nature of the electoral process, as they are not democratically elected. The Court affirmed that “members” in the context of electoral colleges refers to democratically elected representatives.
  • Finality of Electoral Rolls: While acknowledging the principle that electoral rolls typically attain finality, the Court distinguished this case by noting that the inclusion of the nominated members was void ab initio and unconstitutional. Therefore, the finality of the roll could not be used to validate an illegality that strikes at the core of the electoral college’s composition.
  • Secrecy of the Ballot: The Court rejected the argument that segregating these votes would violate the secrecy of the ballot. It maintained that the higher constitutional goal of preserving free and fair elections and ensuring the purity of the electoral process outweighs the requirement for absolute secrecy in this specific context.
  • Outcome: The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and affirmed the High Court’s orders. The Court directed the authorities to proceed with the consequential actions based on the recount results already obtained, ensuring that the election outcome reflects only the valid votes cast by elected representatives.

2026 INSC 716

Pranesh M.K. v. Shanthegowda & Ors. – (D.O.J. 16.07.2026)

2026 INSC 716 click here to view full text of judgment

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Railway: Establishing Liability in Untoward Railway Incidents

The Supreme Court set aside the concurrent dismissal of a compensation claim by the Railway Claims Tribunal and the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. The Court held that when a passenger dies in an “untoward incident” (falling from a running train), the absence of a recovered ticket does not automatically negate the status of a bona fide passenger. Emphasizing the “no-fault liability” principle under Section 124A of the Railways Act, 1989, the Court ruled that once the claimant establishes the foundational facts through an affidavit, the burden shifts to the Railways. Technical lapses and the inability to recover personal belongings should not defeat the humanitarian and welfare objectives of the legislation.

  • Background: The appellant filed a claim for compensation following the death of her husband, who fell from a running train while traveling from Raipur to Ahmedabad. The Railway Claims Tribunal and the High Court previously rejected the claim, citing a lack of proof regarding the deceased being a bona fide passenger (specifically due to the missing ticket).
  • Legal Principle (No-Fault Liability): The Court reiterated that Section 124A of the 1989 Act is a beneficial, “no-fault” provision. It is designed to provide expeditious relief to victims of untoward incidents without requiring proof of negligence by the Railway Administration.
  • Burden of Proof: Relying on Union of India v. Rina Devi and Doli Rani Saha v. Union of India, the Court clarified that:
    • The mere absence of a ticket does not disprove that a person was a bona fide
    • The initial burden is on the claimant, which is sufficiently discharged by filing an affidavit stating the facts.
    • Once this is done, the burden shifts to the Railways to disprove the claim based on attending circumstances.
  • Operational Concerns: The Court highlighted the critical issue of chronic overcrowding in Indian Railways. It noted that while the Railway Manuals contain detailed safety and ticketing protocols, the execution often fails. The Court suggested that Railways should increase manpower to better manage safety and ticketing, which could simultaneously reduce such tragedies and provide employment.
  • Constitutional Perspective: The Court observed that using terms like “second class passenger” is outdated and potentially offensive to the spirit of the Constitution of India; it suggested that class designations should refer to the “coach” rather than the “passenger.”

Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the lower court judgments. It ordered the Railways to pay compensation of ₹8,00,000 to the appellant within four weeks, failing which the amount would attract interest at 8% from the date of the original claim filing.

2026 INSC 715

Lata v. Union of India & Anr. – (D.O.J. 17.07.2026)

2026 INSC 715 click here to view full text of judgment

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