Indian Judgements

Indian Judgements

Majority decision of the trustees is valid and binding—unanimity or total consonance is not required.

The primary dispute concerned rival claims of internal authority within three registered societies (Hindustan Medical Institution, Eastern India Educational Institution, and Belle Vue Clinic) regarding who was legally authorized to cast electronic votes on behalf of the societies’ corporate shares at the Annual General Meetings of Birla Corporation Limited (BCL).

The Supreme Court set aside the judgments of the Division Bench and Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court. It ruled that under the specific by-laws of these societies, a majority decision of the trustees is valid and binding—unanimity or total consonance is not required. Furthermore, the Court struck down the High Court’s direction that the “vote cast first” in point of time should automatically prevail, clarifying that statutory corporate voting laws demand verification of lawful authority rather than chronological speed.

1. Background and Context

The controversy arose among three societies registered under the West Bengal Societies Registration Act, 1961, all of which hold substantial shares in Birla Corporation Limited (BCL). Following the demise of Priyamvada Devi Birla in 2004, an Administrators Pendente Lite Committee (APL Committee) was established by the Calcutta High Court to preserve her estate during pending testamentary proceedings.

Subsequently, deep internal governance fractures developed within the three societies. Competing factions emerged, with each claiming the sole right to issue authorization letters and cast remote e-votes at BCL’s annual general meetings. In the 2021 meeting, the corporate scrutinizer invalidated the societies’ electronic votes due to these conflicting claims. Ahead of the September 27, 2022 Annual General Meeting, the societies filed suits on the Original Side of the Calcutta High Court seeking interim injunctions to ensure their designated proxies could vote without BCL interfering.

2. Lower Courts’ Rulings

  • Single Judge of the High Court: On September 16, 2022, the Single Judge refused to grant ad interim reliefs, stating that BCL had no business resolving the internal power struggles of the shareholder societies and that a scrutinizer cannot be forced at an interim stage to choose between rival authorizations.
  • Division Bench of the High Court: On appeal, the Division Bench affirmed the refusal of interim relief but introduced a significant legal caveat. Relying broadly on Section 48 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882, the Bench concluded that trustees must act in total consonance; if even one trustee dissents, the decision fails. It then directed that whichever vote was cast first in point of time by a society (whether by the Board of Trustees or the Managing Committee) must be accepted by the scrutinizer, effectively ignoring any subsequent conflicting updates.

3. Key Legal Issues and Findings of the Supreme Court

Issue I: Requirement of Unanimity among Trustees

The Division Bench had ruled that the absence of absolute unanimity defeats any decision of a Board of Trustees. The Supreme Court textually analyzed Clause 24 of the societies’ constitutive by-laws, which explicitly allows delegation via written resolutions signed by a majority of the trustees.

The Court highlighted that Section 48 of the Indian Trusts Act explicitly accommodates exceptions “where the instrument of trust otherwise provides.” Because the societies’ own internal by-laws explicitly permitted majority-backed authorizations, the High Court erred by forcing a general rule of total consensus, which stripped the express text of Clause 24 of its functional utility. A majority-backed decision is legally effective despite a lack of total unanimity.

Issue II: Authority of the Board of Trustees vs. Managing Committee

The High Court’s directive had treated the Board of Trustees and the Managing Committee as normatively interchangeable entities for the purpose of voting.

The Supreme Court rejected this alignment by looking at the Memorandums of Association, which dictate a strict two-tier governance structure: all movable and immovable properties (including corporate shares) vest securely in the trustees. The Managing Committee is merely a subordinate, delegated administrative branch possessing only the specific operational powers delegated to it by the trustees. Therefore, the High Court was wrong to treat the two bodies as interchangeable categories standing on the same plane.

Issue III: The “Vote Cast First” Chronological Rule

The core operational issue was whether the High Court could create a rule prioritizing whichever vote hit the electronic system first.

The Supreme Court held that neither Section 108 of the Companies Act, 2013, nor Rule 20 of the Companies (Management and Administration) Rules, 2014, treats chronology as a stamp of validity. Corporate e-voting laws protect a vote against duplication only if it is fundamentally a lawful vote of that juristic member. For non-individual shareholders (like societies), scrutiny rules mandate that the corporate scrutinizer verify actual board resolutions and authorization letters. The High Court impermissibly substituted “chronology for authority,” creating a race to vote that is completely alien to statutory corporate frameworks. An unauthorized vote cannot be validated simply because it was submitted fast.

4. Conclusion and Directions

The Supreme Court set aside the judgments of both the Division Bench and the Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court. The Court legally established that:

  1. Written actions backed by a majority of the trustees constitute valid authorization under Clause 24 of these by-laws.
  2. Voting validity must firmly rest on lawful authority traceable to governing documents and company law, rather than chronological priority.

The Court expressly noted that it did not pass judgment on the ultimate factual validity of the underlying resolutions, appointments, or removals within the societies. The suits and interlocutory applications were restored to the file of the Calcutta High Court for fresh consideration on their merits by the Single Judge.

2026 INSC 554

Hindustan Medical Institution  V. Birla Corporation Limited & Ors. (D.O.J. 26.05.2026)

2026 INSC 554 click here to view full text of judgment

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Liberty Overlooked: Supreme Court Quashes Preventive Detention Order and Imposes Costs

In this criminal appeal, the Supreme Court of India set aside a judgment of the Allahabad High Court and quashed an order of preventive detention issued under the National Security Act, 1980 (NSA) against the appellant. The bench held that a confessional statement made to a police officer—particularly one alleged to have been extracted under torture and threats of death—cannot form the sole or primary basis for forming subjective satisfaction to sustain preventive detention, as it violates Article 20(3) of the Constitution and Section 23 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA). The Court further ruled that the detaining authority relied heavily on undisclosed and unsupplied material (such as missing CCTV footage and erased phone data), and that the detention order was an improper attempt to subvert judicial orders granting bail in regular criminal cases, effectively making the process a punishment. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, ordered the immediate release of the appellant, and imposed costs of Rs. 10 lakhs on the State.

  • Inadmissibility of Police Confessions for Detention: The Supreme Court held that an extra-judicial or police confessional statement, which is inherently suspect and barred as substantive evidence under Section 23 of the BSA and Article 20(3) of the Constitution, cannot serve as the sole foundation for subjective satisfaction in preventive detention. The court overruled contrary views in earlier precedents like Suman v. State of Tamil Nadu to this extent.
  • Missing and Undisclosed Material: The detaining authority’s reliance on crucial material such as CCTV footage, video recordings, and mobile communications allegedly linking the appellant as a “mastermind” was vitiated because these documents were neither supplied to the detenu nor produced before the court.
  • Misuse to Subvert Bail Orders: The Court observed that preventive detention was invoked merely to frustrate the judicial process and keep the appellant in custody despite his acquisition of bail in all regular criminal cases. The state cannot blur the line between punitive and preventive jurisdictions by using ongoing criminal investigation materials to justify detention.
  • Strict Scrutiny on Personal Liberty: Reaffirming principles from Ameena Begum and Vijay Narain Singh, the Court emphasized that preventive detention is an extraordinary measure that departs from ordinary constitutional guarantees of liberty under Article 21 and must be invoked with the utmost circumspection.
  • Relief and Costs: The detention and confirmation orders were quashed, and the appellant was directed to be released forthwith. Additionally, considering the loss of liberty and misuse of the process, the Supreme Court imposed costs of Rs. 10 lakhs on the State to be paid to the appellant within one month.

2026 INSC 1067

Mulla Afroz v. Union of India and Ors. (D.O.J. 29.09.2026)

2026 INSC 1067 click here to view full text of judgment

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Oral Agreements and Barred Suits: Supreme Court Sets Aside Specific Performance Decree

In this civil appeal, the Supreme Court of India addressed the legality of concurrent decrees granting specific performance based solely on an oral agreement. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside both the Trial Court and High Court judgments. The bench held that the subsequent suit for specific performance was fundamentally not maintainable under the rigours of Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), because the plaintiff had previously filed and withdrawn a suit for permanent injunction without seeking leave of the court to reserve the claim for specific performance. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the plaintiff failed to meet the heavy burden of proof required to establish a concluded oral contract, noting critical inconsistencies in pleadings, lack of proper corporate authorization, and unencashed advance instruments.

  • Maintainability and Order II Rule 2 CPC: The Court emphasized that when a plaintiff files a suit for a lesser relief (such as a permanent injunction) while a broader cause of action for specific performance has already accrued, omitting to claim specific performance or failing to obtain leave of the court at the time of institution bars a subsequent suit under Order II Rule 2. A subsequent withdrawal of the first suit with a general liberty to file afresh does not cure the initial defect of failing to seek leave under Order II Rule 2.
  • Strict Proof for Oral Contracts: Reaffirming precedents like Brij Mohan and Nanjappa, the Court reiterated that while a suit for specific performance can legally be based on an oral agreement, a heavy burden lies on the plaintiff to provide strict proof of a concluded contract where vital and fundamental terms were settled. Mere inferences or evasive/dishonest testimonies from defence witnesses cannot be used to fill gaps in the plaintiff’s case.
  • Discrepancies and Evidence: The record revealed shifting stances across plaints regarding the number of meetings, dates of refusal, and identities of participants. Crucially, a large advance cheque of Rs. 5 crores was never presented to the bank for encashment, indicating that the parties never finalized or acted upon a concluded contract.
  • Inadmissibility of Hearsay and Status: The testimony of high-ranking political figures or independent witnesses cannot substitute for lack of formal pleadings or direct legal authorization. The involvement of a family member (son-in-law) lacking official capacity or authorization from the company board cannot bind a corporate entity under Section 46 of the Companies Act, 1956.
  • Final Outcome: The Supreme Court concluded that the concurrent findings of the lower courts were perverse. The appeal was allowed, and the suit for specific performance was dismissed with parties bearing their own costs.

2026 INSC 1066

Bombay Garage Ahmedabad Limited & Ors. v. JP Iscon Private Ltd. & Anr. (D.O.J. 29.09.2026)

2026 INSC 1066 click here to view full text of judgment

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Unraveling the PHED Scam: SC Grants Regular Bail to Accused Public Servant and Private Intermediary

In these criminal appeals arising from the dismissal of regular bail applications by the Rajasthan High Court, a bench comprising Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Sheel Nagu considered the cases of two appellants—Shubhanshu Dixit, a former public servant who served as Secretary of the Rajasthan Water Supply and Sewerage Management Board (RWSSMB), and Sanjay Badaya, a private individual alleged to be an intermediary for the former Public Health Engineering Department (PHED) Minister—who were implicated in a massive financial scam involving forged IRCON certificates and tender irregularities. Noting that both appellants had already undergone substantial pre-trial detention ( Dixit arrested on February 17, 2026, and Badaya on May 11, 2026), that co-accused individuals including the principal political executive had already been granted bail or protection, and that continued incarceration would serve no fruitful purpose, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s orders and granted regular bail to both appellants subject to specific terms and conditions.

  • Background and FIR: The prosecution’s case stems from a preliminary enquiry initiated on 18th January 2024, culminating in an FIR registered on 30th October 2024 at the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) Police Station in Jaipur for offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and various sections of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, concerning financial irregularities within the Public Health Engineering Department (PHED), Rajasthan.
  • Role of Shubhanshu Dixit: Appellant Shubhanshu Dixit served as the Secretary of RWSSMB and de facto Secretary of the PHED Finance Committee; he was accused of suppressing whistleblower complaints regarding forged IRCON certificates and participating in meetings that awarded tenders to ineligible firms. He was arrested on 17th February 2026, and his regular bail application was dismissed by the High Court on 1st June 2026.
  • Role of Sanjay Badaya: Appellant Sanjay Badaya, a private individual, was alleged to be a central broker for the then PHED Minister, exercising undue influence over departmental files, transfers, and postings, and routing bribe monies through family bank accounts to a firm owned by the former Minister’s son. He was arrested on 11th May 2026, and his bail application was rejected by the High Court on 13th August 2026.
  • Grounds for Bail: While acknowledging the gravity of deep-rooted economic offences, the Supreme Court emphasized that pre-trial detention cannot be used as a punitive measure, especially when incarceration serves no further purpose.
  • Parity with Co-Accused: The Court was persuaded by the fact that other co-accused persons, such as Mr. Arun Srivastava, had been granted bail by the High Court, and the principal political executive (the former PHED Minister) had already been granted bail in the corresponding PMLA case by the Supreme Court.
  • Directions and Conditions: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s orders and directed that both Sanjay Badaya and Shubhanshu Dixit be released on regular bail upon furnishing satisfactory bail bonds to the Trial Court. The appellants were directed to join the investigation if called upon by the investigating officer, diligently participate in the trial proceedings without default, and avoid any breach of bail conditions.

2026 INSC 1065

Sanjay Badaya v. State of Rajasthan (With Criminal Appeal No. of 2026 arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 13461 of 2026 – Shubhanshu Dixit v. State of Rajasthan)(D.O.J. 29.09.2026)

2026 INSC 1065 click here to view full text of judgment

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Safeguarding Women’s Dignity: Supreme Court Intervenes Suo Motu on Systemic Safety Lapses in Delhi-NCR

Taking suo motu cognizance of alarming media reports detailing brutal crimes against women and minors across Delhi-NCR—including the gang rape and murder of a teenager in Swaroop Nagar and the sexual assault of a minor inside a moving sleeper bus—the Supreme Court bench comprising Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice K. Vinod Chandran expressed deep anguish over systemic law enforcement failures. Highlighting that public safety is an intrinsic facet of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution, the Court emphasized that mere expressions of concern by public authorities are insufficient. It mandated a measurable response with fixed institutional accountability, directing comprehensive status reports on existing safety infrastructure, laying down immediate interim measures such as specialized vulnerability mapping and strict enforcement against tinted vehicle windows, and appointing Ms. Liz Mathew, Senior Counsel, as Amicus Curiae to assist the Court.

  • Suo Motu Cognizance & Triggering Incidents: The Supreme Court initiated the suo motu writ petition following horrific incidents in Delhi-NCR, notably the gang rape and murder of a teenage girl in Swaroop Nagar and the sexual assault of a minor in a moving sleeper bus that traversed over 47 kilometers from Greater Noida to Delhi unchecked, drawing painful parallels to the 2012 Nirbhaya case.
  • Violation of Article 21: The Court underscored that the right to live with dignity and free from violence is a core component of Article 21. It ruled that public spaces (such as roads, buses, parks, and subways) cannot be permitted to become high-risk zones due to poor illumination, inadequate surveillance, or administrative laxity.
  • Call for Accountability: Moving beyond symbolic solidarity and expressions of concern, the Court stressed the urgent need for measurable responses, clear institutional responsibility, and proactive crime prevention.
  • Information Sought from Authorities: The Supreme Court directed the Chief Secretary of Delhi and the Commissioner of Police to submit comprehensive status reports within four weeks on critical safety mechanisms, including:
    • The Nirbhaya Fund implementation and women safety umbrella programs.
    • Operational status of emergency response systems, specifically ERSS Number 112 and Women Helpline 181.
    • The Safe City Project (covering CCTV networks, command-and-control centers, smart lighting, and maintenance mechanisms).
    • Functionality and staffing of Women Help Desks across police stations.
    • Operational parameters of Fast Track Special Courts (FTSCs) and Exclusive POCSO Courts.
  • Immediate Interim Measures (Within 4 Weeks):
    • Specialized Police Task Force: Constitution of a dedicated task force by the Delhi Police Commissioner for vulnerability mapping of dark, isolated, and unsafe public stretches.
    • Citizen Feedback Mechanism: Establishment of an accessible, tech-enabled platform for citizens to report non-functional lights, blind spots, or inadequate CCTV coverage with geo-tagging capabilities and trackable action taken reports.
    • Intensified Enforcement: Deployment of mobile check-posts and strict enforcement of the total prohibition on black, tinted, or solar-control window films on vehicles in compliance with Avishek Goenka v. Union of India.
  • Judicial and Administrative Directions: The Delhi High Court Registrar General was ordered to place on record the status, pendency, and disposal rates of FTSCs and Exclusive POCSO Courts, with instructions to assign the subject cases to a designated court for expeditious trial within one year. Furthermore, the media was urged to proactively run pro-bono awareness columns and helpline details, and Ms. Liz Mathew, Senior Counsel, was appointed as Amicus Curiae.
  • Next Date of Hearing: The matter has been posted for further hearing on 5th October 2026.

2026 INSC 1063

In Re: Safety, Security and Protection of Women and Children in Public Spaces (Suo Motu Writ Petition (Criminal)) (D.O.J. 28.09.2026)

2026 INSC 1063 click here to view full text of judgment

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